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Traffic growth, capacity constraints, climate change and the necessity to develop a more 
cost efficient system led to an ambitious initiative to reform the architecture of airspace 
management. This initiative, launched by the European Commission (EC), is called Single 
European Sky (SES). The four Key Performance Areas (KPAs) of SES are environment; 
cost efficiency; capacity; and safety. In the environment KPA Performance Indicators for 
Air Navigation Services Providers (ANSPs) are established to ensure that improvement in 
sustainability is achieved. In addition, aviation is included in the European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS): the EC sets limits on CO2 emissions and provides 
economic incentives to airlines to reduce emissions by establishing a market-based 
trading system. EU-ETS can be used to simultaneously promote economic efficiency and 
achieve environmental goals on a sustainable basis. 
The PhD research examines the existence of cancel-out effects between supply-led, i.e. 
SES, and demand-led management, i.e. EU ETS, policies by following a holistic approach. 
Environmental economics theory and industrial economics are applied to identify factors 
that have a significant influence on the two policies. Interestingly, and in spite of common 
objectives, the two schemes are governed by different bodies, which may fail to streamline 
their communication process. Hence, the PhD thesis also addresses the issue of 
governance and its possible failure regarding the full implementation and efficiency of the 
schemes.   
From a methodological perspective, Delphi is conducted in two rounds to encapsulate 
policy complexity at an in-depth level. The target population comprises stakeholders 
involved in SES and EU ETS. To select candidates purposive and snowball sampling was 
used. Thus, the sample consists of 39 senior managers/experts from Civil Aviation 
Authorities; ANSPs; aviation-related organisations and institutions; and airlines.  
viii 
Based on the results of the Delphi and building on its theoretical background, the PhD 
thesis then develops a conceptual model to address governance failure, thus effectively 
linking supply- to demand-oriented aviation policies in a holistic manner.  
 
Key words: Single European Sky, Emissions Trading Scheme, Air Navigation Service 
Provider, Performance Indicators in aviation, Aviation Policy and Governance   
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1 Introduction  
The air traffic control is the mainstay of civil aviation. Aviation is a cross-border activity, yet 
the air traffic management is organised in a fragmented way. This fragmentation impacts 
safety, limits capacity, increases costs and slows down the decision-making process. The 
airspace should therefore be organised according to the requirements of "Functional 
Airspace Blocks" regardless of national borders. 'Functional Airspace Block' means an 
airspace block based on operational requirements, reflecting the need for integrated 
management of the airspace regardless the existing boundaries of Flight Information 
Regions (FIR's) (EC 549/2004).  
The fragmentation of European Union airspace into 27 national systems of air traffic gave 
rise to a number of problems (EC, 2015). For this reason, the creation of a ‘Single 
European Sky’ (SES) was promoted. The aim of this reform is to meet the needs for 
improved capacity and safety. The main objectives are to restructure the European 
airspace traffic, to create additional capacity and to increase the overall efficiency of the 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. Its four pillars are: a) to achieve better performance 
and more efficient response to environmental challenges, b) to increase the levels of flight 
safety, c) to utilise new technology, and d) to increase airport capacity, efficiency and 
safety.  
Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) are directly related to the Single European Sky and 
environmental performance. The establishment of Functional Airspace Blocks was aimed 
at the efficient use of airspace, improving system efficiency of air traffic management, 
reducing costs, which would be achieved by saving fuel, reducing distances and improving 
service quality for passengers. The process of creating and operating FAB's is extremely 
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difficult and time-consuming, as it requires the consent of the countries concerned, as well 
as civil and military cooperation.  
An equally important issue is the air pollutant emissions. In 2009, the European Union 
decided to include aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). By 2012, the 
airline industry set out a CO₂ emission ceiling, initially set at 97% of 2005 emission levels 
by 2013 and then at 95%. All carriers flying to and from the European Economic Area 
(EEA) must pay an amount for each excess tonne of CO₂ emitted on a flight to and from 
(and within) the EEA. Airspace users are required to monitor the annual emissions for 
each flight. These data should then be aggregated to an annual emissions report to be 
audited by an independent accredited verifier. The operator should provide the 
corresponding number of allowances. If actual emissions are lower than the operator’s 
rights/allowances, they can sell their excess allowances on the market or "bank" them to 
cover future emissions. If they predict that their emissions will exceed their rights, they can 
take action to reduce their emissions and/or buy additional rights/allowances. Airlines can 
also buy emission credits from clean energy projects carried out in third countries under 
the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. The existence of a market in which these rights can 
be traded allows businesses to manage their emissions in a cost-effective way.  
1.1 Rationale of the research  
Air transportation traffic from 1945 to 1973, which is the first oil crisis, grew at double-digit 
rates according to IATA.org (2016a). Due to technological improvements and technical 
innovation, mainly the introduction of turbo-propeller aircraft in the early 1950s, 
transatlantic jets in 1958, wide-bodied aircraft and high by-pass engines from 1970 
onwards, the air traffic grew even further. A number of factors, including higher speeds, 
greater size, and better unit cost control offered more affordable air tickets, in combination 
with an increase in passengers’ purchase power, led to explosion in demand for air travel.  
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According to Oxford Economics (2011), air transport generates three distinct types of 
economic benefit. Aviation creates jobs and tax revenues, contributes to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Air transportation is vital for remote regions. The increased connectivity 
due to aviation represents an important infrastructure asset that enhances direct 
investments, economic agglomeration and other spill over impacts on the production 
capacity of an economy. For all those reasons, air transportation plays an extremely 
important social role. It connects people. It connects core regions with periphery regions. 
In 1948, there were 120 flights across the Atlantic per week, whereas nowadays there are 
more than 1,200 flights per day in the North Atlantic airspace alone (ATAG, 2014).  
Having said that, this traffic increase is not considered sustainable. The rapid air transport 
growth has created a series of environmental problems from noise pollution to climate 
change. The negative externalities caused by aviation are in parallel in proportion to the 
traffic growth. Aviation produces around 2% of the world’s man-made emissions of carbon 
dioxide (CO2), according to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). The IPCC (1999) forecasts that the aviation’s share of global man-made 
CO2 emissions will increase to around 3% in 2050. According to the Aviation Environment 
Federation (2016), aviation is one of the most energy- and carbon-intensive forms of 
transport, whether measured per passenger, per km or per hour of travelling.  
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Figure 1: Estimated regional share of CO2 from international aviation in 2020 without a 
regulatory intervention (Based on ICAO Doc 10018, 2013) 
Climate change is affecting aviation operations in many ways according to a European 
Aviation Environmental Report of 2016 (EASA, EEA and EUROCONTROL, 2016). Due to 
climate change, there will be more frequent heavy rain in Northern Europe, reducing the 
number of landings and take-offs at airports. The increase in the air temperatures affects 
the performance of the aircraft as well as the airports’ surface areas. Storms can become 
larger, more frequent and powerful leading to more flight delays or cancellations. Changes 
in snow cover can, on the one hand, reduce the snow-related delays, but on the other 
hand, there might be more severe snow-incurred incidents in areas previously 
unaccustomed to such weather phenomena. The long-term rise of the sea level will affect 
coastal airports. Finally, climate change leads to constant changes in the wind direction. 
This increases runways crosswinds reducing airport capacity and increasing delays in 
flight movements.  
The second pillar of the lack of sustainable development is that the growth in traffic is not 
paired with the necessary infrastructure development. The traffic is putting pressure to the 









airports and to the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). The number of flights has 
increased by 80% between 1990 and 2014, and is forecasted to grow by a further 45% 
between 2014 and 2035 (EASA, EEA and EUROCONTROL, 2016). The number of the 
airports though is not increasing at the same pace. In addition, the airspace size cannot be 
increased.  
Passenger arrivals constitute evidence of the increase in traffic over the last decades. The 
number of airports, the available aircraft and the number of airlines are not always 
considered representative indicators of the traffic growth. The number of USA airports in 
1980 was 15,161. There were 4,814 public use airports and 10,347 private use airports. In 
2014, there were 19,299 airports, out of which 5,145 were for public use and 13,863 were 
private use airports, according to the Bureau of Transport Statistics of the Department of 
Transportation (2016). The available airplanes for service (domestic and international) in 
1960 were 2,135 operated by 55 carriers and, in 2006, there were 6,758 available 
airplanes operated by 66 carriers. In 1960, there were 2,566 thousands of passenger 
arrivals and in 2006 the same figure reached 62,951 thousands of passenger arrivals in 
USA airports (DoT, 2016).  
The USA case proves that the rate of growth in passenger traffic is not the same with the 
rate of growth in the number of airports and airlines. The number of runways has 
increased and qualitative improvements have been made, but this does not eliminate the 
congestion in some airports. Nowadays, airplanes offer more Available Seats Miles (ASM), 
since there are more wide-bodied aircraft available or two-deck airplanes, such as Airbus 
A380 that offers around 550 seats. Due to competition, airlines experienced consolidation 
through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, expanding or developing an airport 
is considered a highly expensive investment, thus emphasis seems to be given to optimal 
utilisation of existing airports.  
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This is the problem that the aviation is facing nowadays: growth is not sustainable. The 
question that arises is whether there is any solution to this. The solution is two-fold, supply 
management policies and demand management policies. The supply chain management 
focuses on time-efficient movement of resources and on the integration of the various 
functions and pressures. Expansion in structural elements like buildings requires large 
capital investments that are difficult to reverse (Bozarth, 2016). Building new airports might 
be expensive but sometimes it is necessary. In the case of airspace though, expansion is 
not an option. The only solution in this case is to optimise the use of the airspace.  
From the demand management point of view, sustainable growth can be achieved by 
revenue management or by taxation. In terms of revenue management, congestion pricing 
or peak pricing can be a solution. Congestion pricing can be applied as charging more for 
longer and complex routes. In terms of peak pricing, this can be applied as charging more 
for routes operated during peak hours. Another alternative can be taxation on the fuel 
consumption or economic incentives for better environmental performance, such as 
Market Based Measures (MBM). All those demand management strategies aim to improve 
the environmental performance of aviation.  
Performance is a complex concept that describes the capability of generating results. 
Figure 2 depicts a causal model that links the outcome (often reduced to output and 
results), the processes and the foundations. This model is portrayed as a tree to illustrate 
how an organization goes through the process of performancing. The analogy to a tree 
helps to capture process complexity and characteristics of growth and change. 
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Figure 2: The performance tree (Source: Adapted from Lebas, l995 (Neely, 2004: 69) 
Performance can be expressed as a set of variables or indicators that are complementary, 
or occasionally contradictory. Performance measures can be classified as follows 
(Parmenter, 2015): 
1. Performance Indicators (PIs) express what needs to be achieved. 
2. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) express what needs to be achieved to 
drastically improve performance. 
3. Result Indicators (RIs) express what has already been achieved in general. 
4. Key Result Indicators (KRIs) express what has been achieved according to a 
certain perspective or critical success factor. 
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Another approach of describing performance indicators is given by Samsonowa (2012). In 
general, Performance Indicator (PI) can be described as an auxiliary metric that partially 
reflects the performance of an organizational unit. Regulation 390/2013 considers 
performance indicators as indicators used for the purpose of performance monitoring, 
benchmarking and reviewing of performance schemes for air navigation services and 
network functions. 
Both supply management policies and demand management policies intent to address 
sustainable development. They seek to achieve the same target through different means. 
An important element is the possible cancelling-out and/or overlapping effects, that one 
scheme can cause to the other. The aim should be to develop synergies between the two 
policies and have a systemic approach to environmental problems.  
Single European Sky (SES) focuses on the provision of Air Navigation Services (ANS) 
related to the supply management. ANS include the following services: air traffic 
management (ATM), communications, navigation and surveillance (CNS), meteorological 
services for air navigation (MET), search and rescue (SAR) and aeronautical information 
services/aeronautical information management (AIS/AIM), as stated in ICAO Document 
9161 (2013). Air Navigation Service Providers are offering ANS to airlines during all 
phases of operations, i.e. approach, aerodrome and en route. The European Commission 
implemented SES to regulate ANS and improve the efficiency of ANSPs towards a more 
sustainable growth. One of the Key Performance Areas (KPAs) SES is focusing on is the 
Environment. Through the creation of Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs), the SES aims to 
improve the airspace architecture and optimise its use by airspace users.  
On the other hand, the inclusion of aviation in the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) is related to the demand management. EU ETS is a Market Based 
Measure for handling emissions. The EU ETS is based on the 'cap and trade' principle. A 
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'cap', or limit, is set on the total amount of certain greenhouse gases that can be emitted 
by the airlines operating between aerodromes in the European Economic Area (EEA). The 
cap is reduced over time so that total emissions decrease. Within the cap, airspace users 
receive or buy emission allowances that they can trade with one another as needed. They 
can also buy or sell limited amounts of international credits from emission-saving projects 
around the world. The limit on the total number of allowances available ensures that they 
have a value. As a result, airspace users in the European airspace are regulated through a 
demand management policy. The regulator in EU ETS is the European Commission and 
the Competent Authorities.  
Both SES and EU ETS aim to tackle the negative externalities of aviation. The European 
Commission (EC) in collaboration with the Member States regulates both regulatory 
schemes. However, the problem that arises is that, although both schemes are centralised 
to the EC, they are handled by different departments/directorates. The Commission is 
divided into several departments and services. The departments are known as Directorate-
Generals (DGs). SES is regulated by Directorate-General Mobility and Transport (DG 
MOVE) and EU ETS is regulated by Directorate-General Climate Action (DG CLIMA).  
The research gap that can be detected in the schemes concerns the potential existence of 
any cancelling-out and/or overlapping effects in the supply management, that is the SES, 
and demand management, that is the EU ETS policies. Moreover, the rationale of the 
present thesis is to research whether there is any governance failure in the full 
implementation and efficiency of the schemes following a holistic view, by simultaneously 
examining demand and supply management.   
1.2 Research Aim and Research Questions   
This study aims to analyse the aviation governance in terms of the environmental 
regulation of aircraft operators and Air Transport Management (ATM) and determine the 
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effectiveness of the Single European Sky and European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
in the area of environment. Finally, this research seeks to uncover any implementation 
issues for the Single European Sky and EU Emissions Trading Scheme reforms and 
provide suitable recommendations for policy makers.  
In order to achieve this aim the study will seek to provide answers to the following 
research questions:  
1. Are aviation operations sustainable and what are the factors leading to sustainable 
growth? 
2. How does the market environment and structure, in which the Single European Sky 
(SES) and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) are 
implemented, affect the efficiency of the schemes? 
3. Can the inclusion of aviation in the European Union emissions Trading Scheme 
and/or Single European Sky lead to carbon-neutral growth? 
4. Can the effective implementation of SES render the EU ETS redundant and are the 
environmental targets overlapping? 
5. What do the research findings reveal about any issues the SES and the EU ETS 
reforms are facing and how can these findings be used to improve the aviation 
environmental performance and achieve a more sustainable growth?  
To address the above research questions, it was necessary to examine the literature 
review, to better understand the nature of the problem as well as the nature of the market. 
Emphasis has been given to the theoretical overview and critical analysis of carbon trading 
and airspace management and harmonisation (charges, operating benefits, conditions for 
success, practical obstacles and addressing their legislative-regulatory framework, 
economic and technical issues, etc.). In order to get a better insight into the management 
of the scheme, the researcher held a post at EUROCONTROL in Brussels for 18 months. 
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EUROCONTROL is the Network Manager of SES and is responsible for Monitoring and 
Reporting of EU ETS (aviation area). Additionally, experts from different countries were 
interviewed and asked about their opinion on the efficiency of the schemes. This process 
is described in detail in the Methodology Chapter.  
1.3 Research Context  
The first step for this study was to set the boundaries within which it would be carried out 
by identifying the stakeholders involved in the reform of the European sky and the 
regulation of the negative externalities. A stakeholder is defined as any entity with a 
declared or conceivable interest or stake in a policy matter. Moreover, stakeholders are 
those who are affected by the outcome or those who can affect the outcome of a proposed 
development intervention (World Bank, n.d.). The range of stakeholders relevant to 
consider for analysis varies according to the complexity of the area targeted. Stakeholders 
can be of any form, size and capacity. They can be individuals, organisations or 
unorganised groups. In most cases, stakeholders fall into one or more of the following 
categories: international actors (e.g. EUROCONTROL), national or political actors (e.g. 
legislators, governors), public sector agencies (e.g. EASA), interest groups (e.g. trade 
unions, airline associations), commercial/private for-profit and non-profit organizations 
(NGOs, foundations), civil society members, and users/consumers. 
Moreover, aviation plays a crucial social role for a country or region. Aviation offers 
connectivity to states with other states or periphery/semi-periphery regions to core regions. 
After/Following the airlines’ liberalisation, the air transportation became widely available 
due to lower ticket/fare prices. The passenger is one of the main stakeholders in aviation 
and constitutes a central point of consideration in the regulations. The aviation is quite a 
complex industry due to its multidimensional role. Aviation can act as a mechanism for a 
country’s defence, but at the same time, airplanes are used for bombing attacks by the 
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state itself. The military dimension of aviation is different from one country to the other and 
it depends by the geopolitical position of a state. 
The current environment is highly deregulated and this has led to a very competitive 
environment for the airlines. The role and value of airports is currently growing, as they 
contribute to agglomeration and economic development of the destination and the 
surrounding area. The Air Navigation Service Providers are the ones offering the 
navigation services and one of the main players that will be discussed in this PhD thesis.  
Furthermore, the regulators are one of the most important players in this ‘game’. The 
regulators of aviation are the European Parliament and the European Council, the 
European Commission and its supporting agencies. At national level, the regulators are 
the Civil Aviation Authorities, the Ministries of Transport and the National Supervisory 
Authorities. The employees in the aviation industry through the trade unions and the 
passengers through their respective passenger associations also exercise influence over 
the Parliament and the national authorities for passing regulations.  
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is a specialised agency of the 
United Nations (UN). It was created after the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(the Chicago Convention) of 1944 and it was ratified in 1947. ICAO together with its 
Member States and a number of global aviation organisations develop international 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).   
The European Parliament is the EU's law-making body. EU voters directly elect the 
parliament members every 5 years. The Parliament has three main roles: legislative, 
supervisory and budgetary. The Parliament passes EU laws, together with the European 
Council, based on European Commission proposals. The number of Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) for each country is approximately proportionate to its 
population, but no country can have fewer than 6 or more than 96 MEPs and the total 
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number cannot exceed 751 (750 plus the President). Moreover, MEPs are grouped based 
on political affiliation, rather than nationality.  
The European Commission (EC) was established in 1951. It is the executive body of the 
European Union (EU), the only one that can propose legislation, and it is also responsible 
for implementing decisions and upholding the EU treaties. The EC operates as a cabinet 
government with 28 members (also called Commissioners). The EC is divided into 33 
departments and services. The departments are known as Directorate-Generals (DGs). 
The DG that deals directly with Aviation is Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE). The other 
DGs are also related with the aviation sometimes, for instance, DG CLIMA is responsible 
for the Emissions Trading Scheme.   
The EC was set up from the beginning to act as an independent supranational authority 
separate from governments; hence, it should act independently and remain neutral to 
external influences. It should be noted though that the Commissioners are proposed by the 
Member States’ governments. The EC proposes the legislation, the Council and 
Parliament approve/pass the legislation and the EC is responsible to ensure, with the help 
of Member States and EC Agencies (like EASA), that it is implemented.  
The Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) is a generic term used in many countries, notably 
the UK, and refers to national regulatory bodies responsible for aviation. The CAA 
implements the ICAO SARPs in national legislation and are responsible for regulatory 
oversight. On the other hand, the National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs) were 
established by request of the EC. NSAs ensure the supervision of the regulatory 
framework. Their main responsibilities include certifying and overseeing Air Navigation 
Service Providers as well as preparing/drafting the national performance plans of the 
Member States concerned (Reg. No 550/2004). In some states, the NSA is incorporated 
within the CAA, whereas in some others it is a separate agency. The NSAs should be 
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independent from the ANSPs, in order to be allowed to have an effective oversight. Only in 
4 out of 28 cases, a functional separation has been achieved, meaning that both NSA and 
the ANSP are part of the same organisation, but are internally separated to ensure 
independence of the NSA (SkyBrary, 2014). In order for NSAs to convene and discuss 
issues pertinent to the SES, the NSA Coordination Platform (NCP) was established at 
European level in 2009.  
Airlines and airports rely on the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) for the 
management of air traffic. Hence, Air Navigation Services (ANS) provision is considered 
as a core element for air transportation. Air Navigation Services include five broad 
categories of services provided to air traffic during all phases of operation (area control, 
approach control and aerodrome control). These services are the following: Air Traffic 
Management (ATM), Communication services, Navigation services and Surveillance 
services (CNS), Meteorological services for air navigation (MET), Aeronautical Information 
Services (AIS) and Search and Rescue (SAR) (ICAO Doc 9161, 2013). 
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Figure 3: Air Navigation Services categories 
Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) provide information on the availability of air 
navigation services and their associated procedures necessary for the safety, regularity 
and efficiency of air navigation (i.e. AIP, AIC, NOTAM, etc.). Communications, Navigation 
and Surveillance (CNS) includes communication facilities, navigation services and 
surveillance systems. Communication facilities have two main categories: aeronautical 
fixed service and aeronautical mobile service.  
In Europe, there are 37 ANSPs. Most of them are government-owned. NATS is a Private 
Public Partnership (PPP). Nevertheless, according to Article 28 of the Chicago 
Convention, the State is ultimately responsible for the provision and operation of air 
navigation facilities and services 
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, commonly known as 
EUROCONTROL, is an international organisation working to achieve safe and seamless 
air traffic management across Europe. EUROCONTROL is the Network Manager for 
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Single European Sky and is responsible for the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
(MRV) of EU ETS.  
The Performance Review Commission (PRC) was established in 1998 by the 
Permanent Commission of EUROCONTROL. It advises EUROCONTROL’s Governing 
Bodies and supports the effective management of European ANS through target-setting 
and the establishment of a transparent and independent performance review system. This 
system addresses all aspects of ANS, including policy and planning, safety management 
at and around airports and in the airspace, as well as financial and economic aspects of 
services rendered. 
The PRC is responsible for enforcing implementation of the performance and target-setting 
system throughout/in all EUROCONTROL’s Member States. The PRC reports directly to 
the EUROCONTROL Permanent Commission through the Provisional Council on its 
activities. These activities include providing advice on ANS performance issues, including 
performance targets. The PRC deliverables include: 
 Annual performance review reports (PRR); 
 ATM Cost-effectiveness benchmarking reports (ACE); 
 Special reports on issues such as comparisons of ATM-related operational 
performance in the United States and Europe. 
The Performance Review Body (PRB) is composed of the 12 Members of the PRC, plus 
the PRB Chairman, appointed by the European Commission. The PRB reports directly to 
the European Commission. The purpose of the PRB is to assist the European Commission 
in the implementation of the performance scheme and to assist the National Supervisory 
Authorities (NSAs) on request. The PRB’s complete list of tasks is described in Article 3 of 
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Regulation No 691/2010 and Regulation No 390/2013. The PRB tasks include but are not 
limited to the following:  
 collection, examination, validation and dissemination of performance-related data;  
 definition of new or adaptation of key performance areas and the related key 
performance indicators;  
 setting up or revision of EU-wide performance targets;  
 consistency assessment of adopted performance plans, including performance 
targets, with the EU-wide targets;  
 assessment of the revised performance targets or the corrective measures taken by 
the EU Member States;  
 monitoring, benchmarking and reviewing of the performance of air navigation 
services, at national or FAB and European Union level;  
 monitoring, benchmarking and reviewing of the performance of the network 
functions;  
 assessment of the achievement of the performance targets;  
 assistance to NSAs with regards to national or functional airspace block 
performance issues.  
The Performance Review Unit (PRU) is the supporting Unit of the PRC and the PRB. In 
terms of administration, it is part of the EUROCONTROL Agency’s Single Pan European 
Sky Directorate. The PRU is responsible for monitoring and reviewing the performance of 
the European ANS System. Based on its analysis, the PRU supports the PRC and the 




1.4 Research undertaken in aviation and the environment and research 
gap  
The PhD thesis aims to highlight and fill the literature gap in the area of the implementation 
process and the problems associated with the policy design of the inclusion of aviation in 
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). ETS is well researched in the 
energy industry but not in aviation. The focus of this thesis is aviation and the published 
research around aviation limits on the effects of ETS for airlines. No in-depth research has 
been previously undertaken regarding the implementation issues and no related 
suggestions for policy makers have been made in the past.  
Moreover, in the area of Single European Sky, the published research is even more 
limited. Very few papers are published and those focus on general aspects of SES and not 
on the environmental aspect. Table 1 lists the published papers on the area of this 
research, i.e. aviation and EU ETS and SES and the environment. No published work is 
found on the relation of SES and EU ETS.  
Table 1: Research about Aviation and the environment  
Author(s) and paper Focus Methodology 
Aviation and EU ETS 
Xu, J., Qiu, R. & Lv, C., 2016. 
Carbon emission allowance 
allocation with cap and trade 
mechanism in air passenger 
transport. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 131, pp.308–320. 
Government allocation 
decisions and airlines aircraft 
selection decisions1 
Theoretical 
economic model  
 
                                            
1
 The statement that the developed model has the ability to describe the interactions of multiple stakeholders and 
balance their conflicts is not realistic since it addresses only the government authorities and the airlines with focus on 
aircraft selection.  
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Author(s) and paper Focus Methodology 
Zanin, M. et al., 2016. Towards a 
secure trading of aviation CO 2 
allowance. Journal of Air Transport 
Management, 56, pp.3–11. 
Secure Multi-party 
Computation framework for 
confidential information in 





Meleo, L., Nava, C.R., Pozzi, C., 
2016. Aviation and the costs of the 
European Emission Trading 
Scheme: The case of Italy, Energy 
Policy, 88, pp. 138-147.  
Calculation of the EU-ETS 
direct costs for Italian airlines 
and effects on airfares, 
revenues, and social costs 
Theoretical 
economic model  
 
Malavolti, E. and Podesta, M., 2015. 
Strategic Reactions of Airlines to 
the European Trading Scheme. 
Transportation Research Procedia, 
8, pp.103-113. 
Economic analysis difference 
between passengers carried 
without regulation and when 
the regulation is put in place. 
Emphasis given on the 
selection of aircraft  
Theoretical 
economic model  
 
Miyoshi, C., 2014. Assessing the 
equity impact of the European 
Union Emission Trading Scheme on 
an African airline. Transport Policy, 
33(C), pp.56–64. 
Equity issues by measuring 
the impact of the EU ETS on 
an African airline compared to 
airlines in an Annex I country. 
Case study and 
BADA and logit 
models  
Sheu, J.-B., 2014. Airline 
ambidextrous competition under an 
emissions trading scheme – A 
reference-dependent behavioral 
perspective. Transportation 
Research Part B: Methodological, 
60(C), pp.115–145. 
Airline fare adjustments due 





Barbot, C. et al., 2014. Trade-offs 
between environmental regulation 
and market competition: Airlines, 
emission trading systems and entry 
deterrence. Transport Policy, 33(C), 
pp.65–72. 
Effects on potential airline 
competition and entry 
deterrence 
Theoretical 
economic model  
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Author(s) and paper Focus Methodology 
Girardet, D. & Spinler, S., 2013. 
Does the aviation Emission Trading 
System influence the financial 
evaluation of new airplanes? An 
assessment of present values and 
purchase options. Transportation 
Research Part D: Transport and 
Environment, 20, pp.30–39. 
Impact of the CO2 costs for 
short- and long-haul aircraft 
based on present values and 
on purchase options 
Econometric model  
Kopsch, F., 2012. Aviation and the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme—
Lessons learned from previous 
emissions trading schemes. Energy 
Policy, 49(C), pp.770–773. 
Brief discussion on design 
issues (allocation, liability, 
inter-temporal trade, trade 
barriers, hot spots)  
Case studies  
Malina, R. et al., 2012. The impact 
of the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme on US aviation. 
Journal of Air Transport 
Management, 19(C), pp.36–41. 
Economic impacts on US 







Preston, H., Lee, D.S. & Hooper, 
P.D., 2012. The inclusion of the 
aviation sector within the European 
Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme: 
What are the prospects for a more 
sustainable aviation industry? 
Environmental Development, 2, 
pp.48–56. 
Whether the policy has the 
potential to significantly 
reduce aviation emissions 
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3
 The paper gives a rather confusing description of Single European Sky and references to three Key Performance 
Areas whereas the Regulation 691/2010 refers to four areas. The identification of the stakeholders’ interests is 
accurate.  
4
 This paper is the same as the Baumgartner, M. & Finger, M., 2014. European air transport liberalization: Possible 
ways out of the single European sky gridlock. Utilities policy, 30, pp.29–40. In terms of content. It simply has a 
different title and it is published twice.  
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1.5 PhD Thesis Layout  
The PhD thesis consists of nine chapters. In this chapter, the theoretical framework on 
which the study is based was introduced. Moreover, the motivation of the research as well 
as the aim and the research questions and objectives were stated and the stakeholders 
were introduced. The remaining chapters are organised as follows. The main focus of 
chapter two is sustainable aviation.  The growth of aviation is not considered sustainable, 
due to the negative externalities caused by aviation operations to the environment and the 
social welfare. The three affected areas are the climate, the levels of noise and local air 
quality.  
                                            
5
 The paper gives a rather confusing description of Single European Sky and references to three Key Performance 
Areas whereas the regulation refers to four areas. The identification of the stakeholders’ interests is accurate.  
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Chapters 3 and 4 contextualise the study in the relevant literature. The concepts of 
European Union Emissions Trading scheme and the Single European Sky are explained. 
These chapters can be seen as two extensive case studies of environmental and 
economic regulation of civil aviation. Chapter 5 further elaborates on the literature review 
and experts’ consultation. This chapter states the theoretical basis underpinning some 
parts of the research and discussion of the findings. The key areas examined in this 
chapter are the Transaction Costs and the multi-stakeholder governance and management 
theory.  
Chapter 6 provides an account of the research methodology and method used in this PhD 
thesis. The research philosophy, the design of the instrument, the ethical considerations 
and limitations of the researcher are discussed in this chapter. Chapter 7 elaborates on the 
findings of the Delphi method and juxtaposes the two rounds to identify whether a 
consensus was achieved among the stakeholders.  
Chapter 8 builds upon the theoretical and practical foundation laid down in the previous 
chapters and focuses on the discussion of the EU ETS and SES reforms. In this chapter, 
the critical issues for the success of the schemes are elaborated/examined in detail, 
leading to Chapter 9, namely the conclusions drawn and the recommendations of this 
research thesis. The recommendations are separately proposed for EU ETS and SES, but 
a common approach is developed taking into consideration how the policies interact. 
Lastly, the last part of Chapter 9 presents the limitations of the PhD thesis, as well as the 
contribution that this thesis attempts to offer to the body of knowledge on the specific 
academic field. Proposals for further research projects and are also out forward. 
The Appendices provide additional information for a better comprehension of the research 
thesis. The Appendices include the definitions of key terms, the first draft questionnaire, 
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the SES and EU ETS questionnaire of the first and the second round, the draft 





















2 Sustainable Aviation  
In the introductory chapter, it was argued that the rationale for this research is the non-
sustainable growth of aviation. Therefore, the first step of this study is to examine in more 
depth the sustainability of aviation. The chapter concludes that aviation is not sustainable 
since it leads to climate change and the negative externalities are not taken into account.  
A simplified way of considering aircraft operators is described by Banner (2008). He 
argued that today the air is full of flying objects; commercial jumbo jets, helicopters, small 
private planes, model rockets, etc. should share a sky, which once seemed unlimited 
(Banner, 2008). This rapid spread is due to the reduction of the cost of air travel 
(Piermartini & Rousova, 2008). With each new use of the air, the law must be adapted. 
The airspace is divided both vertically and horizontally into different areas, with different 
rules governing each area (Banner, 2008). 
This chapter deals with sustainable development and environmental economics. Aviation 
creates negative externalities, such as lowering the local air quality, creating noise 
pollution and causing climate change due to the emissions of Green House Gases (GHG). 
This chapter’s focus is the identification of the problem and its nature from an economic 
point of view. 
2.1 Sustainable Growth of Civil Aviation  
The air transport industry services are considered essential. Occasional shocks like the oil 
price shocks, pandemics, wars, security threats did not decrease traffic. The traffic 
continued to grow on average at 5% annually. Europe’s GDP grew by 1.4% in 2014 and is 
forecast to grow 1.8% annually through 2034 and aviation growth is expected to continue 
(Boeing, 2016).   
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According to a study prepared for EC the growth in terms of Revenue Passenger 
Kilometres (RPKs) was +5.2% on a worldwide basis in 2013 and 3.8 at Europe. On the 
other hand, the airline capacity growth, measured in Available Seat Kilometres (ASKs) was 
slightly slower (Mott MacDonald, 2015:7) As far as the Passenger Kilometres Performed 
(PKPs) is concerned, Europe (inclusive of Turkey and Russia) is expected to grow at 5.4% 
to 5.9% annually according to ICAO Medium Term Forecast 2014. The traffic growth 
across the EU28 countries was +1.6% in 2013 (Mott MacDonald, 2015).  
Moreover, there is a year-on-year decrease in aviation fatal accidents. In 2013, the 
number of accidents decreased by 10% compared to 2012 according to ICAO Safety 
report 2014. An audit protocol related to Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme 
(USOAP) was established acting as comprehensive checklist covering all areas of a 
State’s safety oversight system, i.e. aerodromes, Air Navigation Service (ANS), Accident 
investigation, Airworthiness, Operations, Licensing, Organisation and Legislation (ICAO, 
2014a). In 2013, 26 fatal commercial accidents were reported worldwide causing 281 
fatalities.  
Another important aspect in aviation industry is cost. As far as the cost of infrastructure is 
concerned according to IATA (2013a) “Airlines and passengers are estimated to have paid 
at least USD92.3 billion for the use of airport and air navigation infrastructure globally in 
2011, equivalent to 14.4% of the cost of transport”. Cost efficiency is quite critical for an 
airline to compete and survive in such a competitive market.  
Economies depend on natural resources, as an essential input. Environmental and natural 
resource economics is the application of the principles of economics to the study of how 
environmental and natural resources are developed and managed. According to EC 
(2015) one way of using economics is to ensure that the costs and the benefits of 
environmental measures are well balanced. Although it is difficult to estimate costs and 
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benefits, there is an increasing demand that this is done before environmental policy is 
decided on a European level. With the use of market-based instruments, environmental 
goals can sometimes be reached more efficiently than with traditional command and 
control regulations.  
Environmental policy is designed to tackle market failures, by controlling pollution, 
regulating resource use and protecting and managing the natural environment. It aims to 
achieve a more efficient use of resources in the economy, maintaining the environmental 
assets, which people value and which support a healthy economy and society, while 
reducing the costs to people and businesses of environmentally damaging activities. 
The environmental economics and natural resources has sailed at a parallel course with 
the general economic theory at least since the 18th century, and all the great classical 
economists have expressed, directly or indirectly, aspects concerning the management of 
goods and environmental services. Environmental Economics are the discipline that 
studies the environmental problems, in light of the analytical techniques of the economy 
(Field, 1994). 
The environmental economics are based on the assumption that all the functions provided 
by the natural environment, have an economic value, which would be evident if operations 
were integrated into a real market (Turner, Pearce, & Bateman, 1994). Factors holding a 
key role in the failure of market mechanisms are the problem of ownership of the 
commons and the difference between value and price, ultimately leading to the existence 
of externalities (Tietenberg, 2010; Harris and Roach, 2016). 
2.2 Negative external economies  
Air transportation is contributing to economic prosperity, facilitating growth particularly in 
developing countries. Air transportation facilitates world trade by transporting goods of 
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high value. The main benefit that aviation offers is the connectivity that encourages 
investments and improves productivity. Aviation has direct, indirect, induced and tourism 
catalytic economic impacts. Aviation according to ATAG (2014) is a major employer 
offering 58.1 million jobs globally (8.7 million direct jobs, 9.8 million indirect jobs and 35 
million aviation-enabled tourism jobs).  
Apart from the positive economic impact of aviation, aviation contributes to society. 
Aviation facilitates the transportation of people and goods. It increased cross-border travel 
which contributed to a closer relationship between states. The improved social and 
economic networks, encourages social and economic integration. Furthermore, it improves 
the living standards, alleviates poverty and increases revenues from taxes. Finally, air 
transportation is necessary for places with poor road or rail connections and offers 
connectivity in case of an emergency, like natural disasters, health epidemics or wars.  
If markets could solve all their problems, there would not be the need for state regulation. 
Environmental externalities are the proof that markets fail (Rao, 2003). External 
economies occur when the behaviour of a person or a company causes profit or loss to a 
third party (person or company), without having a mechanism that will internalize these 
effects through prices. A typical example is the pollution of the environment.  
There are two types of externalities, public e.g. air pollution, water which affects the 
welfare of many people and private e.g. a person throwing garbage in the garden of the 
neighbour (this move affects the welfare neighbour and nobody else). The cases where 
the activity of an individual or business to impose other costs referred to as negative 
externalities or external costs. 
According to Rao (2003) there are different kinds of externalities. For instance, there is 
Stock externality, i.e. the externality that arises from changes or accumulations of the 
inventory or stock of a specific commodity or other physical entity; a similar concept holds 
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for a ‘flow’ externality. For example, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are 
a stock pollutant with negative externalities. Urban smog is a stock externality as well as a 
flow externality. Strategic externality is the impact of strategic behaviour on other 
components of a system in relation to specific activities undertaken by direct participants; 
this occurs especially in resource-to-resource consumption with limited liability or cost 
sharing.  
One of the possible ways to address externalities in aviation is by imposing restrictions on 
travelling (Forsyth, 2008). The implementation is very difficult and the society loses the 
surplus from the sale of this service. On the other hand, the airlines can continue the 
volatile work, but to use more expensive inputs. For example, they use cleaner types of 
fuel that will emit less GHG. The use of more expensive input is also a cost to society. 
In the absence of corrective action, those who pollute will continue doing so up to the point 
where the marginal private benefit from production equals marginal private cost (Morgan et 
al, 2009). The company that pollutes incurs no additional cost as a result of its negative 
production externalities if there is no external regulation.  In this case, negative production 
externalities are not due to the failure, but due to the absence of the market, since there is 
no market for clean air or property rights (Morgan et al, 2009). 
All production activities generate pollutants, and therefore the requirement should not be to 
have zero pollution if that means a complete lack of production, but to have the "right 
amount of pollution"(Morgan et al, 2009).To address these externalities some actions must 
be taken. There must be private and/or state/government reaction. Private reactions 
associate with mergers, social contracts, negotiations, etc. (Morgan et al, 2009). 
State/government reactions involve control policies, redress taxes, market creation, etc. 
(Morgan et al, 2009).  
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One way the government can intervene in a market with externalities is through a system 
of "standards and charges". Whereby the government decides a fixed size of damage 
caused by the externality and then charges to force the responsible ones to reduce the 
externality to a desired level (Scotter, 2008). Some countries have imposed taxes such as 
the Air Passenger Duty (APD) in the UK (IATA, 2006).  
Maximization of social welfare does not imply the elimination of exogenous influence. That 
would mean the end of air transport, which is not considered socially desirable. To address 
the inefficiencies created by external influences various policy measures have been 
invented, which fall into two categories, management (CCM, Command and Control 
Measures) and measures work through the market mechanism (MBM, Market Based 
Measures/Instruments). 
Many countries follow a policy control to reduce external economies (e.g. Environmental 
Problems) (Morgan et al, 2009). Under the Command and Control regulation area, the 
polluter is obliged to reduce its emissions in order to avoid incurring legal penalties 
(Morgan et al, 2009).  
Taxes are one of the best-known MBM. Pigouvian tax is a tax levied on each unit of 
production that pollutes and is exactly equal to the marginal damage that creates the 
optimum level of production (Morgan et al, 2009). The theory assumes that the state is 
able to know the marginal rate of substitution of emissions and tax level, i.e. how much the 
negative externality costs, something that is not feasible in practice. The purpose of 
Pigouvian taxation is to act using the tax system to impose a cost on economic externality 
equal to the additional cost of a given effect. 
Taxes levied on passengers depending on the flight length and the class travel could only 
reduce emissions through their effect on air travel demand, and they would give rise to 
some leakage effects (Forsyth, 2008). Adopting a Pigouvian tax on aviation, carriers would 
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be forced to take into account the cost of the external economies they create; hence, 
carriers will be forced to produce in the optimum level of production. 
 
Figure 4: Implementing tax to correct the impact of negative externalities 
The equilibrium of the market if it runs smoothly is at point A, which is not optimal in 
Pareto. It is assumed that marginal private benefit equals to marginal social benefit, i.e. 
there is no demand side externalities and all externalities are related to production. Point B 
is an optimal point and the difference between social and private costs is BΓ. When 
imposing a tax t per unit in good/service that pollute and which is equal to BΓ, then the 
private cost curve is shifted to the position of the curve (Marginal Social Cost) MPC +1, 
which passes through the optimal point B.  
However, there are several practical problems in the enforcement of this tax. First, 
someone must define what activities produce pollution and how much. In addition, which 
polluting units actually cause damage and what is the value of the damage being caused 
(Morgan et al, 2009). The Pigouvian taxes aim at bringing marginal private costs, as these 
influence choice, into line with social costs, as these are objectively measured. Only with 
objective measurability can the proper corrective devices be introduced.  
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The existence of externalities like government intervention documentation was challenged 
by Coase theorem according to which if there are no transaction costs (TC) and 
negotiations, individuals affected by an externality will agree themselves in a distribution 
that is Pareto-optimal and independent of property rights. The presence of deficiency 
enables the parties involved to gain from working together to eliminate it (Morgan et al, 
2009). The rationale is that if the benefits to someone from an activity that has externalities 
exceed the costs incurred by the other, then the first can compensate (bribe) the second 
and improve the position of both. However, there are some practical problems with the 
theorem of Coase. Initially there is a cost of trading and the logic that each person has an 
incentive to let others bear the cost, when he enjoys the benefits (Morgan et al, 2009). 
Finally, there is difficulty in determining the source of loss and asymmetric information 
(Morgan et al, 2009). The assumption that TCs are negligible or equal to zero leads to a 
frictionless economic system according to Rao (2003). Coase aimed to examine the 
implications of such a system on efficient functioning and to throw light on the sub-
optimality of certain stipulations in a non-zero TC world (Rao, 2003).  
The problem of externalities is not that one part is harming another. The problem is how to 
use a scarce resource. In the case of air pollution, producers wish to use the air to emit, 
while residents wish to breathe clean air (North, 1992).  
Finally, a very important way of state regulation of external economies is creating market. 
The government increases economic efficiency by selling emission permit to producers 
(Morgan et al, 2009). Thus, a market for clean air is created. The price paid for the license 
to emit is called emission allowance (Morgan et al, 2009). According to Figure 5, the 
government decides to sell emission permits Z * and firms compete to buy the right to hold 
an allowance. The price charged is the one that equates the market supply and demand 
and so is set by government (P1). The offer of permits is perfectly inelastic in Z *. 
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Businesses that are not willing to buy at this price must either reduce their production or 
change their technology (Morgan et al, 2009). 
 
Figure 5: Market for pollution permits 
The creation of a market to be effective requires that someone knows who pollutes and in 
what quantities. Auctioning reduces the uncertainty on the upper level of pollution and acts 
as an economic incentive (Morgan et al, 2009). The problem of time inconsistency 
concerns situations where someone creates an expectation with the intention of inducing 
another in specific options, and then does not fulfil the expectation. Of particular interest is 
the case that the time inconsistency improves the position of all. A typical example is the 
EU ETS and «stop the clock». 
The main difference between the Pigouvian and Coasian approaches to this issue arises 
in their methods of dealing with economic externalities. The role of the state in assigning 
property rights versus the levying of taxes and/or subsidies has been the underlying 
difference between them. According to ATAG air travel is the only means with access to 
remote and isolated areas and therefore performs social work (ATAG, 2005).  
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Welfare economics is the part of the economic, where the possible effects of different 
kinds of economic policy on the welfare of society are studied (Nath, 1969). Welfare 
economics allow the separation of situations under which markets can bring good results 
from situations where they will produce undesirable results (Morgan et al, 2009). Pigou 
could be considered the founder of welfare economics. Pigou argued that it is obvious that 
any transfer of income from a relatively rich to a relatively poor man of similar 
temperament, should increase overall satisfaction, since it enables the overall satisfaction 
in being able to meet more pressing needs at the expense of less pressing needs, which 
provoked strong reactions from Robbins (Nath, 1969). 
A very important aspect of welfare economics is the social welfare function. Bergson in 
1939 was the first to introduce the concept of social welfare function (Nath, 1969). A 
general form of the function is: 
W=W(A1,…..Am) 
Where W is the social welfare and A is the variables which determine the social welfare 
(Nath, 1969). 
A Pareto-social welfare function can be expressed as follows: 
Fn=f (U1,…Un) 
Welfare economics is based on two fundamental theorems (Scotter, 2008). The first 
argues that any competitive equilibrium is a Pareto optimal balance for the economy. 
Thus, demand equals to the production when the economy reaches the competitive 
allocation. The second fundamental theorem is in a sense the opposite of the first, which 
tells us that each Pareto optimal allocation of an economy can be achieved as a 
competitive equilibrium for an appropriately defined distribution of income. 
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A situation is Pareto efficient if someone cannot be brought in a better situation without 
worsening someone else’s. An example can be the airlines that pollute the environment 
and create a negative externality on society.  
According to the Coase theorem ‘in the markets with externalities if property rights are 
clearly defined and if the parties can negotiate inexpensively, then the parties will reach a 
Pareto-optimal outcome regardless of who owns the property rights’ (Scotter, 2008: 579). 
A method of government intervention to mitigate the effects of externalities caused by 
pollution is creating tradable pollution permits (Scotter, 2008). Each permit allows a 
company to pollute up to a certain degree. The advantage of this method is that because 
firms can pollute only if authorized and because the government decides how many 
licenses will be available, knows exactly the amount of pollution after the sale of licenses 
(Scotter, 2008).  
For example, there are two airlines, A and B. Figure 6 shows the functions of the marginal 
cost of reducing pollution. The regulator decides that pollution should be reduced and 
decides to give allowances to allow a certain amount of pollution. Any company can 
choose whether to buy allowances to continue polluting or reduce its activities to comply 
with the regulation or take other measures (like operational improvements) to comply with 
the pollution limit.  
If airline A does not purchase further allowances, it will have to pay $ 4 for an equalizer 
with the first unit of pollution and $ 6 for the second, so $ 10 in total. Airline B has a higher 
marginal cost of reducing emissions, and will have to pay $ 14 to equal the emissions. 
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Figure 6: Functions of the marginal cost of reducing pollution for two airlines 
When these rights are auctioned for airlines A and B, Company A will reach up to $ 10, 
after that amount the company will not "bid" anymore since that would be the cost to "clean 
up" its emissions. Company B could bid up to $ 14, but since Company A will stop at $10, 
company B can earn additional rights with a price slightly above $ 10. By this way, a 
reduction of emissions for the society is achieved at the lowest possible cost. 
Because of the existence of external economies, people and companies do not pay the 
true social costs for specific resources, but fewer (Allen et al, 2012). The more a company 
pollutes the environment, the greater the social cost. The government can control the 
output by imposing an emission charge (effluent fee) or by issuing transferable emissions 
permits (Allen et al, 2012).  
2.3 Principal Environmental issues in aviation   
This section presents the principal environmental issues in aviation. Those issues are the 
production of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change, which is a global 
phenomenon. The other issues are the noise pollution and the lowering of local air quality.  
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2.3.1 Greenhouse Gases  
The combustion of fuel in the engines of airplanes results in emissions of carbon dioxide 
(CO2), nitrogen oxides (called NOx) and water vapour and particles. Carbon dioxide is a 
greenhouse gas and alters the balance of incoming and outgoing radiation from the earth's 
surface and contributes to the warming of the atmosphere. Emissions of carbon dioxide 
from the air have the same effect on the climate, such as terrestrial broadcasting, from 
power plants, industries etc. Carbon dioxide has an atmospheric lifetime of up to 200 
years, so it reaches the lowest point of the atmosphere for all that time and it does not 
matter where it is emitted from (Archer, 2011; Seinfeld and Pandis, 2006). 
Emissions of nitrogen cause a series of chemical reactions in the atmosphere. Nitrogen 
oxides form ozone (O3) in the presence of light, and as the light intensity is higher in 
altitude, the more ozone is formed because of altitude than from terrestrial sources of 
NOx. The nitrogen oxide emissions from subsonic aircraft accelerate local production of 
ozone in the lower atmosphere, where the aircraft usually flies. The increase in ozone 
concentration will generally be proportional to the amount of nitrogen oxides emitted by 
airplanes. 
Ozone is a powerful greenhouse gas, whose concentration is highly variable and 
controlled by the atmospheric chemistry and dynamics. The increase in the retention of 
radiation by ozone is greater than that of carbon dioxide emissions. However, ozone is 
responsible for the destruction of atmospheric methane (CH4). Methane is also a powerful 
greenhouse gas, with an atmospheric lifetime of 14 years. The destruction of methane as 
a direct result of civil aviation leads to the reduction of global warming caused by aviation 
emissions (Seinfeld and Pandis, 2006). 
Water vapour is also an important greenhouse gas, but emissions of water vapour only by 
air have little direct impact on the planet. Water vapour have short atmospheric lifetime 
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and is controlled by the hydrological cycle. The vapour emissions at high altitudes produce 
contrails, a cloud-like trail behind the aircraft and are visible from the ground. These 
contrails also trap heat in the atmosphere and their thermal effects are believed to be 
equivalent to that of carbon dioxide. The contrails are not formed at lower altitudes, so they 
could be avoided if the planes flew lower. This however could not be done because the 
density at lower altitudes is greater and airplanes will burn more fuel (Archer, 2011; 
Seinfeld and Pandis, 2006). 
Emissions of sulphate and soot from burning also have little effect on the temperature of 
the atmosphere. Traces of sulphate are present in the combustion and form aerosols of 
sulphate compounds. Those reflect the incoming solar radiation back into space, and thus 
have a small cooling effect. Conversely, small particles are produced from combustion 
(soot) trap outgoing infrared radiation into the atmosphere and thus have little effect on 
global warming. These are quantitatively insignificant and it is believed that they almost 
cancel each other (Archer, 2011). 
The key feature that is affected by "greenhouse gases" is radiation balance. This is the 
balance between incoming solar radiation and microwave outgoing long-wave infrared 
radiation. Any disturbance to the balance is called Radiative Forcing, RF and is expressed 
as the change in energy flow in W / m2 (Committee on Radiative Forcing Effects on 
Climate et al, 2005;Karakoc et al, 2016). 
The RF does not account for the influence of a single flight a day, but the overall impact of 
all known historical aviation emissions. IPCC has estimated that the change in RF 
emissions from aviation in the pre-season is 0,049 W / m2 (Karakoc et al, 2016). The 
effect of RF on aviation in terms of contribution to the general RF was estimated to be 
3.5% in 1992 and 5% in 2050 (IPCC, 1999). The Aviation Climate Change Research 
Initiative (ACCRI) researches the RF and claims that a 2% increase in fuel efficiency and a 
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decrease in NOx emissions thanks to advanced aircraft technologies and operational 
procedures, combined with alternative fuels use, will decrease significantly the aviation’s 
impact on climate change (Brasseuer et al, 2016).  
To provide lift to an aircraft, thrust is produced by means of the combustion of an energy 
source. This combustion produces noise due to the explosion processes of the energy 
carrier, combined with that of moving parts of the engine, and chemical pollutants. The 
exhaust composition is known to be 70% carbon dioxide (CO2), 29% water vapour (H2O) 
and 1% of other pollutants such as the various oxides of nitrogen (NOX), carbon monoxide 
(CO), oxides of sulphur (SOX), unburned hydrocarbons or volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs), soot or particulate matter (PM) and other trace compounds (EEA, 2016). These 
are considered to be local air quality (LAQ) pollutants or greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
depending on whether the emissions occur near the ground or at altitude respectively; 
though CO2 is always a GHG, not an LAQ pollutant. 
 
Figure 7: Sectoral GHG emissions by IPCC sector (EEA, 2016) 
Efforts to reduce NOX increase fuel consumption and other pollutants, while reducing 
noise increases NOX and fuel consumption. The combustion of 1kg (1.25 litres) of 
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conventional jet fuel emits 3.15 kg of CO2. There are also indirect effects – warming and 
cooling - due to contrails (though there are still major uncertainties regarding their precise 
impact) (FAO, 2011).  
2.3.2 Noise Pollution and Local Air Quality  
Aviation noise negatively affects many people living around an airport or under a flight 
path. Although noise performance has improved over the past fifty years, community 
perception of noise pollution due to airlines’ operations is becoming more negative.  
The traditional definition of noise is “unwanted or disturbing sound”.  Sound becomes 
unwanted when it either interferes with normal activities such as sleeping, conversation, or 
disrupts or diminishes one’s quality of life. The perception of noise pollution differs from 
person to person. The measurement of noise follows a standardised approach and noise 
reference points for aircraft operations are established, but the effect person by person 
differs. For instance, when a house is located far from a main road and it does not have 
any traffic noise, the residents of this house might be more annoyed by aircraft noise than 
others that are close to road traffic. For instance, when the noise is occurring when a 
person is sleeping can be perceived as more annoying than when a person is eating.  
Noise reference points from aircraft are (ICAO, 2010): 
1. Fly over: 6,5 Km from the point that airplanes push the brake during the take-off 
flight path 
2. Sideline: the greater noise intensity recorded at any point of 450m from the runway 
during take off  
3. Approach: 2Km from the threshold of the runway during the approach.  
According to Figure 8, in 2006 21.2 million people worldwide were exposed to noise due to 
air transport at the level of 55DNL. While in 2036 the population exposed to that noise 
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level ranges from 26.6 to 34.1 million people (using a prediction based on the year 2006) 
(ICAO, 2010: 23). Scenario 2 is considered quite possible and contains a number of 
initiatives such as NextGen and SESAR. 
 
Figure 8: World population exposed to noise exceeding 55DNL (ICAO, 2013a) 
Noise-related charges are one of several types of airport charge. According to CAA CAP 
1119 (2013) it is desirable that the airport authorities to consult the aircraft operators 
regarding the proposed charges and to consider their views as well as the effect the 
charges will have on them. Agreement between airports and operators is desirable, but 
where it is not reached, the airport is free to impose the charges proposed, subject to a 
right of appeal. According to ICAO Doc 9082 about the policies on Charges for Airports 
and Air Navigation Services, noise-related charges should:  
 be levied only at airports experiencing noise problems;  
 designed to recover no more than the costs applied to the alleviation or prevention 
of actual noise problems; 
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 be associated with the landing fee, possibly by means of surcharges or rebates, 
taking into account the noise certification provisions of ICAO Annex 16  in respect of 
aircraft noise levels;  
 be non-discriminatory between users and 
 not be established at such levels as to be prohibitively high for the operation of 
certain aircraft. 
Apart from noise, aviation operations are influencing the local air quality (LAQ). Whilst CO2 
is the greatest contributor towards climate change, at a local level several emissions are 
known to be contributors to local air quality problems. The main contributors according to 
CAA (2016) lowering the local air quality are a) nitrogen dioxide (NO2), b) nitric oxides 
(NOx) and particulate matter (PM). Air pollution at airports arises from a combination of 
aircraft and road traffic emissions (both passenger vehicles and vans and lorries collecting 
air freight). The largest source of NOx at airports is usually not the aircraft but the surface 
access routes. Unlike CO2, the production of NOx is not directly linked to fuel burn, and 
therefore there has been a strong push from industry to regulate and minimise NOx 
production (Independent Transport Commission, 2016).  
The ICAO technical design standards limit emissions of NOx, carbon monoxide (CO) and 
unburnt hydrocarbons (UHC). A specific EU legislation for aviation emissions contributing 
to lowering the local air quality does not exist, but the general EU legislation establishing 
limit values for the concerned pollutants (mainly NOx and particulates in the case of 
aircraft emissions), being Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for 
Europe and developing legislation, applies at and around airports just as they do 
everywhere else in the EU according to EC (2016). Different airports have differing 
obligations for monitoring and reporting air quality (CAA, 2016).  
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2.4 Measuring environmental impact  
Negative externalities are an area that becomes more and more regulated. In order to 
measure the efficiency of the regulations the externalities after they are identified they 
need to be measured in order to monitor and evaluate the result of the implementation of 
any solution. The environmental impacts of air transportation can be measured by certain 
indicators. One of those according to IPCC (2007) is: 
ΔΤs= λ ΔRF 
The linear relationship between the change in global mean RF multiplied by the constant λ 
and the global mean disordered surface temperature (ΔTs), where lambda is the 
parameter of the climate sensitivity (Κ(W m-2)-1). The climate parameter sensitivity, 
lambda, is found to be relatively stable in a Global climatic model (Global Climate Model, 










Where TH is the Time Horizon, ax is the radiative efficiency arising from a unit increase in 
atmospheric abundance of the substance (x) in question (in W m-2 kg-1), [x(t)] is the time-
dependent decay in the abundance of the instantaneous release of the substance, and r 
refers to the reference substance in the denominator (CE, 2005: 30). The GWP is defined 
as the ratio of the time-integrated RF resulting from the instantaneous release of 1kg of 
trace element, relative to that of 1 kg of the reference gas (IPCC, 1999, CE, 2005: 30).  
TED=P*PCI*ED 
The above equation is used to measure the environmental degradation (Janic, 2007: 2).  
Where: 
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TED is the total environmental degradation in monetary units 
P is the population (number of people) 
PCI is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita income (monetary units per 
inhabitant) 
ED is environmental degradation per unit gross domestic product 
The above equation in case of examining carbon dioxide emissions can be modified as 
follows (Janic, 2007: 13): 
TE=P*D*FC*SE 
Where:  
TE is the total GHG emissions (tonnes) 
P is the number of passengers 
D is the average travel distance (kilometres or miles) 
FC is the fuel consumption (tons per P / D) 
SE are the specific emissions (tonnes of pollution per tonne of fuel consumed) 
The Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC) is the quantity of fuel that produces a thrust unit in a 
given moment of time. It is expressed in kilograms (Kg) of fuel per kiloNewton (kN) of 
thrust per hour (Janic, 2007: 25). The SFC depends on the size of the aircraft (capacity) 
and the number of engines. The largest aircraft have greater thrust produced by engines. 
Furthermore, for large civil aircraft fuel consumption represents a large proportion of 
operating costs, about 30%. Airlines therefore look to reduce costs by exploiting the 
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engine efficiency (ηₑ). Lower fuel consumption per machine means lower consumption of 
non-renewable source of energy and therefore lower emissions of pollutants. 
The Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA) method for quantifying the emissions, resources 
consumed and environmental and health impacts associated with products (good and 
services) has been internationally standardised since 1997. LCA takes into account a 
product’s full life cycle from the extraction of resources, through production, use and 
recycling, to the disposal of waste. Indicators help quantify the contributions to 
environmental and health impacts such as climate change, smog, acidification, or cancer, 
as well as the resources consumed and their scarcity. 
The framework of an LCA is defined by a system boundary and a life-cycle inventory that 
can vary according to the goals of a particular survey. The system boundary is defined by 
the spatial, temporal and production chain limits (start and end points) of the process that 
is being analysed. For example, the GHG balance of a crop grown for biofuel depends on 
the size and location of the cultivation area (space boundary), the number of growing 
seasons considered (time boundary), and whether fertilizer inputs and post-harvest 
transport are considered (start and endpoint boundaries). Each step of the biofuel 
production process involves energy and GHG uptake (inputs, e.g. uptake by plants and by 
soil) as well as energy use and GHG emissions. 
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Figure 9: Changes in the proportion of CO2 emissions from EU and World international 
aviation and total CO2 emissions from all the industries (Data based in IEA statistics, 
2015) 
Table 2: CO2 emissions from EU and World international aviation and total CO2 emissions 
from all the industries (IEA statistics, 2015) 
Year World CO2 emissions 
World Intl aviation 
bunkers CO2 emissions 
EU Intl Aviation bunkers 
CO2 emissions 
1971 13994.7 169.2 36.32 
1975 15543.9 173.9 38.05 
1980 17779.6 202.2 43.13 
1985 18319.2 224.9 49.09 
1990 20623 258.8 71.19 
1995 21478 290.9 87.82 
2000 23321.6 355 116.8 
2005 27047.6 422.8 128.3 
2010 29838.2 459.8 127.39 
2012 31490.5 480.7 130.32 
2013 32189.7 490.4 130.69 
Table 2 shows the changes in CO2 emission indicator from international aviation in 
relation to fossil fuel use, the EU and the world. In the EU, emissions from fossil fuels 
reduce by about 5% in 1990-2009 (Leggett et al, 2012), while the emissions from aviation 
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more than the increase in total emissions from Spain. Globally, also, aviation emissions 
have increased faster than the total emissions of fossil fuels. ICAO estimates that CO2 
emissions from all air transport (not only international) almost doubled in 1990 - 2006 
(Leggett et al, 2012). 
2.5 Fuel 
The fuel cost is perhaps the biggest cost for the operation of a flight. The average price for 
fuel for 2013 was just under $125 a barrel to IATA (2014a). After labour, fuel represents 
the largest component of the cost for airlines. An effective and efficient way to reduce 
costs is to consume less fuel. The fuel consumption differs considerably from route to 
route compared to the weight of the aircraft, the wind conditions, altitude and more. In an 
hourly flight, fuel costs are not accurate but estimated approximately. Fuel costs include all 
relevant taxes for fuels established by each government and by some airport authorities 
(Wensveen, 2007: 306). 
Fuels account the global aviation industry is projected to reach $ 207 billion in 2012 
(representing 33% of operating expenses at $ 110.0 / barrel of oil type Brent). This is an 
increase of $ 31 billion for 2011. Operation of new, more direct routes, the realignment of 
unprofitable routes and the improvement of traffic flow in the ground can reduce the cost of 
the industry by 2.5 billion dollars annually. Individual efforts of airlines to improve their own 
operational efficiency can yield significant savings. Each 1% improvement in fuel efficiency 
across the industry can reduce the fuel bill by about $ 700 million per year according to 
IATA (2014a). 
The combustion of fuel depends on the stage / phase of the flight and the aircraft 
consumes different amount of fuel. Emissions during a) the landing and take-off (landing 
and take-off cycle, LTO), which includes all activities under 3,000 feet (1,000 meters) and 
requires a lot of fuel consumption, and b) phase the ascend, the fixed altitude and descent 
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(Climb, Cruise and Descent cycle, CCD), which concern all activities at over 3,000 feet 
and fuel consumption depends on the distance of the route. 
 
Figure 10: The stages of a flight (Emission Inventory Guidebook, 2001) 
Airplanes is calculated that are related to 70-80% of emissions from aviation, since they 
pollute and affect air quality at altitudes below 3,000 feet, while increasing their GHG at 
higher altitudes (Goodman, 2009). There is currently little information available to estimate 
emissions from start-up of engines and these are not included in the LTO cycle. This is not 
of great importance for total national emissions, but they may have an impact on the air 
quality near airports. 
Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) are used where no other power source is available for the 
aircraft and may vary from airport to airport (Winther et al, 2015). This is the case, for 
example, when the aircraft is parked away from the terminal building. The APU fuel use 
and the related emissions should be allocated based on aircraft operations (number of 
landings and take-offs). However, no methodology has currently been developed. The use 
of APUs is being severely restricted at some airports to maintain air quality, and therefore 
this source of fuel use and emissions may be declining. In total terms, the fuel 
consumption and emission contribution from this source is regarded as very small (Winther 
et al., 2006). 
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From time to time aircraft will have to dump fuel before landing so that they do not exceed 
a certain maximum landing weight. This is done at a location and altitude where there will 
be no local impact at ground level. Only large long-range aircraft will dump fuel. Non-
methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) emissions might become significant at 
very large airports with frequent long distance flights (Winther et al., 2006). However, since 
the most probable altitude of these emissions will be above 1 000 m, these are currently 
not relevant for United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) reporting 
(Winther et al., 2006). The airport authorities and airline companies might give information 
on the extent (frequency and amount) of dumping and the altitude at particular airports. 
To calculate fuel consumption on a flight within the EU ETS an operator can follow any of 
the following formulas that will give the same result (EC, 2012: 26): 
FN,A=TN-TN+1+UN+1 
Where: 
FN,A: The fuel consumed for the flight test (N = flight) 
TN: Amount of fuel contained in aircraft tanks after completion of fuel uplift for the flight 
TN+1: Amount of fuel contained in aircraft tanks after completion of fuel uplift for 
subsequent flight 
UN+1: Fuel uplift for subsequent flight 
FN,B=RN-1-RN+UN 
Where: 
FN,B: The fuel consumed for the flight test (N = flight) 
RN-1: Amount of fuel remaining in aircraft tanks at the end of the previous flight 
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RN: Amount of fuel remaining in aircraft tanks at the end of the flight concerned 
UN: Fuel uplift for the flight concerned 
Airlines spend about $ 100 per minute / flight in the total operating costs (labour, fuel, 
maintenance, etc.). If the paths were reduced by one minute that could reduce the total 
industry operating cost over $ 1 billion per year and significantly reduce environmental 
emissions. Improvements in traffic flows on the ground, departure and arrival and 
rationalization of the existing Noise Abatement Departure Procedures (NADPs) can further 
reduce fuel consumption and cost of the industry over 530 million dollars per year. Finally, 
improving fuel efficiency by 1% across the industry can lower the fuel bill by around $2bn 
per year at current fuel prices and reduce fuel costs by 700 million dollars per year (IATA, 
2015). Improvements in air traffic management (ATM) and other operational procedures 
could reduce the consumption of aviation fuel from 8 to 18%. The vast majority (6-12%) of 
these reductions comes from expected improvements in ATM (IPCC, 1999: 11).  
2.5.1 Biofuels  
While fossil fuels come from ancient biomass, are not considered as biomass as they 
contain carbon. As biomass is considered the biodegradable proportion of products, waste 
and residues of biological origin from agriculture (both plant and animal substances), 
forestry and related industries including fisheries and aquaculture, as well as the 
biodegradable fraction of industrial and municipal waste as well as biofuels and bioliquids 
(EC, 2012: 6). Biomass generally refers to any plant or material derived from a plant or 
biodegradable material that can be used as fuel. The biomass can be converted directly 
into liquid fuel or a biofuel for use as an alternative fuel. There are different types of 
biofuels. The best-known are: 
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 Ethanol, which is based on alcohol and is a high octane and clean burning 
renewable fuel 
 Cellulosic ethanol, known as cellanol, is a complex carbohydrate, which is found in 
plant cell walls. 
 Biodiesel is made through a chemical process called transesterification in which the 
glycerol is separated from the fat or vegetable oil. 
 Synthetic fuel is any liquid fuel produced from coal, natural gas, or biomass. 
Sometimes refers to fuels derived from other solids such as oil shale, tar, or waste 
made of plastic. 
The temperature, viscosity and opacity are a challenge for air quality biofuels. Such a fuel 
that has proven successful is ethanol. Ethanol (Aviation-Grade Ethanol, AGE-85) is a high 
performance, 85% ethanol content fuel mixture for use in any reciprocating aircraft engine. 
AGE-85 has begun to replace the 100 octane low lead content in gasoline, which was the 
standard leaded gasoline for aviation since World War II. The AGE-85 offers a substantial 
improvement in performance of the aircraft and produces at least 12 percent more 
horsepower and torque at typical cruising power. Lower operating temperatures are also 
achieved with engines tend to operate at 50 to 100 ° C lower than with the current fuel. 
Because the AGE-85 fuel causes significantly less accumulation of combustion products 
into the engine, the time between engine repairs is greater and maintenance costs are 
lower (Biedermann, 2015). 
Fischer-Tropsch and Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids (HEFA) fuels were the first 
alternative fuels approved for use in aviation (ICAO, 2013a). In 2006, the Commercial 
Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative (CAAFI), founded by U.S.-based aviation stakeholders, 
was the first worldwide initiative promoting the development of alternative fuels for aviation 
(ICAO, 2013a).  
54 
The CFM International has made a successful first test of the CFM56-7B engine using 
biofuel from ester. CFM56-7B is the exclusive engine for Boeing Next-Generation with 
airplanes 737-600 / -700 / -800 / -900. The thrust ranges from 18,500 to 27,300 Lb. The 
biofuel used for this test was 30% vegetable oil methyl ester blended with 70% 
conventional Jet A1-fuel. This test is designed to examine the operation of the jet engine 
using a fuel made from biomass, without making technical changes to the engine. With this 
type of biofuel, the target is a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions compared with current fuels 
(NASA, 2009). In contrast to the oil price, the price of biomass is far from homogeneous 
(De Laporte et al, 2016), i.e. shows large variations in European countries and depends on 
the quality. The Commission expects a large increase in the use of biomass in the energy 
sector until 2020 (Directive 2009/28/EC). 
Los Angeles (LAX) is the world’s second airport that has incorporated biofuel into its 
regular refuelling process. In 2016, KLM has signed a three-year contract for the supply of 
sustainable biofuel for all its flights from there (KLM, 2016). South African Airways (SAA) 
and Mango have operated a flight with a Boeing 737-800 from Johannesburg to Cape 
Town powered with tobacco-based biofuels (SAA, 2016).  
Environmental impact assessments show that the sustainability of alternative fuels 
depends on the precise feedstock and supply chain used and that, depending on the 
source, very low carbon fuels could be available as well as fuels that do not contribute to 
decarbonisation.  
The outcomes of different surveys have shown that Gas-to-Liquids (GTL) does not provide 
a reduction in GHGs compared with conventional kerosene, even when carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS) is used during the manufacturing process (EC DG ENER, 2014; 
Ecofys, 2014). There are studies in the literature that see the possibility of the equivalence 
of GTL emissions with kerosene, but only with very high carbon capture efficiency and this 
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may also depend on the type of kerosene. From other studies, life-cycle Coal-to-liquids 
(CTL) emissions are even higher than for GTL. 
Until recently, aircraft operators have been reluctant to integrate the energy dimension into 
their business models due to high costs of investment. Delta Airlines’ investment in the 
energy sector by purchasing an oil refinery to produce its own conventional jet fuel was the 
first of its kind, and represents a move towards a new business model (Coady et al, 2010). 
This is not only a question of energy security, it could also be profitable when considering 
the integration of bio-jet fuels, providing that airlines take the specificity of such end 
products associated with the whole value chain into consideration, and that policy makers 
address the price gap in order to provide a catalyst for the deployment of bio-jet fuels for 
aviation. In another development, the Solena biofuels company had a long-term 
agreement with British Airways to build a waste-to-biofuel plant (GreenAir, 2012).  
Economics, including the market context, are as important as environmental constraints in 
defining most promising alternative fuels for aviation. The cost of conventional jet fuel has 
followed a very uneven path over the last ten years or so and if the cost of carbon is 
factored in it could increase greatly over the next couple of decades.  
Bio-jet fuels show a significant potential for emission reduction, depending on the process. 
Biomass-to-Liquid (BTL) generally shows better performance than HRJ and while all the 
BTLs considered meet the EU Renewable Energy Directive(RED) thresholds, this is not 
always the case for HRJ. This is because hydro-processing uses hydrogen which induces 
emissions in its production from natural gas. HRJ performance is also more dependent on 
the type of feedstock and on the way this feedstock is produced or cultivated (Han et al., 
2013). Life-cycle emissions are very sensitive to the conditions considered for this 
cultivation (World Economic Forum, 2010).  
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The European Union has launched the “Initiative Towards Sustainable Kerosene for 
Aviation” (ITAKA) to produce sustainable bio-jet-fuel at a large enough scale to test its use 
in normal flight operations. The “Aviation Initiative for Renewable Energy” in Germany 
(AIREG) and “Bioqueroseno” in Spain, are also pursuing the development of a sustainable 
bio-jet fuel industry (ICAO, 2013a). 
Alternative fuels could make one of the highest contributions to reducing the carbon 
footprint of aviation, and can reduce emissions of other pollutants such as particulate 
matter responsible for air quality issues around airports. Biofuels should not be seen as 
panacea though, since biofuels’ production can create a series of problems from land use 
issues until high food prices. Nevertheless, biofuels are a considerable option for 
mitigating CO2 and PM emissions (Kousoulidou and Lonza, 2016).   
2.6 Summary   
This chapter aimed at the several external costs (negative externalities) of air 
transportation. The pollutants emitted noise and congestion costs both on the ground-
around airports and in the airspace adversely affect social welfare. The activities related to 
aviation pollution on the air, produce GHG and contribute to climate change. Airplanes 
pollute and affect air quality while increasing their GHG at higher altitudes.  
The emissions are directly related to the fuel burn. Therefore, the reduction of the fuel burn 
relates to the reduction of emissions. Airlines have an economic incentive to reduce the 
fuel burn. Another solution for the airlines that want to be more environmentally friendly is 
the use of alternative fuels. The alternative fuels and especially the biofuels can be a 
promising solution for the aviation industry when are sustainably developed and used.  A 
number of schemes have been introduced in order to improve the sustainability of aviation 
growth. The next chapter will explore the EU ETS regulation of climate change caused by 
the aircraft operators in Europe. 
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3 EU Emissions Trading Scheme in aviation 
Having discussed extensively about the negative externalities due to aviation in the 
previous chapter, the next question that this study aims to address is the environmental 
regulation through the Emissions Trading Scheme. Therefore, this chapter will examine its 
implementation. European Commission has adopted several regulations to ‘save 
environment’. In the aviation industry, the most important is the regulation about Noise 
Pollution, i.e. Regulation (EU) No 598/2014 and Climate Change, i.e. EU ETS regulation.  
3.1 Kyoto Protocol and European Union  
According to Barrett (2009: 59), ‘Climate change may or may not be the most important 
problem the world has ever faced, but it is certainly the greatest challenge for collective 
action’. Over the past 50 years, the air transport industry has experienced rapid expansion 
as technology has evolved and a steady decline in costs and prices was applied, which 
encouraged further traffic growth (IPCC, 1999: 296). Transport is one of the major factors 
for emissions in the planet. Emissions of carbon dioxide together with nitrogen oxide 
contribute to the creation of the greenhouse effect, which adversely affects the climate. 
Aviation has a severe contribution to global climate change. While total greenhouse gas 
emissions in the EU increased by 5.5% from 1990 to 2003, emissions of carbon dioxide 
caused only by international aviation in the 25 member states increased by 73% over the 
same period (CE, 2005; ESA, 2006). Air transport to destinations outside the EU-25 
accounted for 60% of these emissions. In 2005, CO2 emissions from all flights departing 
from the EU-25 amounted to 142 Mt CO2 compared to the total weighted emission of 
greenhouse gases of 4 980 Mt CO2 over the same period (EEA 2008, EC DG TREN, 
2007). 
The contribution of air transport in the EU-25 in the greenhouse emissions continue to rise, 
reaching 12% of total greenhouse gas emissions from transport as a whole in 2005 (EEA, 
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2008: 26). Even though there have been significant improvements in aircraft technology 
and operational efficiency, it was not enough to neutralize the effect of the growth in air 
traffic. The environmental economics and natural resources have sailed at a parallel 
course with the general economic theory at least since the 18th century, and all the great 
classical economists have expressed, directly or indirectly, aspects concerning the 
management of goods and environmental services. Environmental Economics is the 
discipline that has as its object the study of environmental problems, in light of the 
economics techniques (Field, 1994). 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has requested the 10% of aircraft fuel to 
be from alternative sources by 2017 (Chuck, 2016), a rate that is difficult to be reached by 
2017. Hydrogen has been proposed as a long-term alternative to fossil fuels with low 
emissions to power aircraft. Tests are done with unmanned airplanes using hydrogen-fuel 
(Bradley et al., 2007).  
On February 4, 1991, the Council authorized the Commission to participate on behalf of 
the European Community in negotiations on the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992. The Framework Convention has been 
ratified by the European Community by Council Decision 94/69 / EC of 15 December 
1993. This Convention entered into force on March 21, 1994.The Framework Convention 
has contributed significantly to the establishment of basic principles for combating climate 
change globally. It defines the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities." In 
addition, it helped to improve further the public awareness, worldwide, as well as to the 
problems associated with climate change. However, the contract does not include 
quantified and detailed commitments by country to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
The Contracting States to the Convention decided at the first meeting of the parties, held 
in Berlin in March 1995, to negotiate a protocol regarding measure for the emissions 
59 
reduction for the period beyond 2000, to the industrialized countries.  This protocol was 
developed in Kyoto on December 11, 1997. The European Community signed the Protocol 
on 29 April 1998. It represents a significant step in combating global warming as it includes 
binding and quantified objectives for reducing greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol 
tackles emissions of six greenhouse gases: 
1. carbon dioxide (CO2)  
2. methane (CH4)  
3. nitrous oxyde (N2O)  
4. hydrofluorocarbons (HFC)  
5. perfluorinated hydrocarbons (PFC)  
6. sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). 
To achieve these objectives, the Kyoto Protocol suggests various means: 
 stepping up or introducing national policies to reduce emissions (greater energy 
efficiency, promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture, development of renewable 
energy sources, etc.)  
 cooperation with other Contracting Parties (exchanges of experience or information, 
coordination of national policies through emission permits, joint implementation, and 
appropriate development mechanism). 
On May 31, 2002, the European Union ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol entered 
into force on February 16, 2005, following its ratification by Russia. Several industrialized 
countries have refused to ratify the Protocol, including the United States and Australia. The 
EU has reiterated its conditional offer to move to a 30% reduction by 2020 compared to 
1990 level (UNFCCC, 2014b).  
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Table 3: The four phases of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The Kyoto Protocol has defined two mechanisms for carbon offset projects: The Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI). The main difference 
between the two mechanisms is that the first concerns investments in projects in 
developing countries, whereas the second concerns investments in projects in developed 
countries.  
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows countries and companies to offset 
their GHG emissions, in order to meet their Kyoto obligations and targets and at the same 
time to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development (UNFCCC, 
2014a). The emissions reductions occurred by the CDM projects are reviewed and verified 
by the UN (The Gold Standard, 2012: 16). The CDM is the main source of income for the 
UNFCCC Adaptation Fund. This Fund was established to finance adaptation projects and 
programmes in developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. In addition, since September 2007, 
the CDM has self-financed its regulatory functions through fees charged to projects and no 
longer relies on grants from the countries (Kollmuss, et al., 2010). The tradable unit under 
the CDM is a Certified Emissions Reduction (CER). Each CER is equal to 1 metric ton of 
CO2 emissions abated (Kollmuss et al., 2010).  
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The Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism is the instrument for offset projects happening 
within countries with binding emission commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The goal of 
the program according to Kollmuss et al (2010: 59) is “to increase market efficiency by 
allowing industrialized countries to meet a part of their obligation by investing in GHG 
abatement projects in another industrialized or economies in transition (EIT) country if the 
cost of abatement is lower in the other country” (Kollmuss, et al., 2010: 59). The tradable 
unit under the JI program is an Emission Reduction Unit (ERU). Each ERU is equal to one 
metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (mtCO2E) (Kollmuss et al., 2010).  
Helm (2009:18) states that ‘Kyoto demonstrated how difficult it is to bring on board the 
major players; and that a better and more comprehensive agreement could be achieved 
without the Kyoto architecture getting in the way’. He also argues that the Kyoto and COP 
did not have a sufficient impact on climate change mitigation because they did not include 
aviation and shipping. The allocation of responsibility for the existing stock of carbon, the 
fact that some countries may benefit from climate change, the free-rider incentives and the 
difficult measuring of emissions make climate change intractable (Helm, 2009). According 
to Barrett (2009) what makes Montreal protocol work in comparison to Kyoto protocol is 
the permanent cuts in comparison to the five-year Kyoto target. Barrett (2009: 69) argues 
that ‘An effective climate agreement must impose obligations that can be ratcheted up, 
and that are immune to backsliding. 
The largest and most important emissions trading scheme is developed by European 
Union and is based on requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS concerns 25 
countries. It is the largest emissions trading system and the first interstate system because 
it contains more than one country (Anger & Kohler, 2010). The success of the system lies 
in its ability to maintain a relatively stable carbon price, which gives an incentive for 
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companies to take environmental protection measures (Anger & Kohler, 2010). The first 
phase, i.e. the period 2005-2007, was considered the trial period (Tietenberg, 2006). 
The European emissions trading scheme differs from other Emissions Trading Schemes in 
terms of (Grubb & Neuhoff, 2006): 
 The economic scale of the system, which exerts high pressure in the distribution 
and raises concerns about competitiveness, which paradoxically is the source of 
profit motivation unprecedented in the history of environmental policy 
 The small size of the cuts relative to the «business-as-usual» and resulting 
instabilities in the system 
 The corresponding high percentage of free allocation, which underlies legal 
pressures and the scope for distortions 
 The multi-periodic nature of the distributions 
 The responsibilities’ allocation to Member States and how it affects the sustainable 
solutions. 
3.2 EU Emissions Trading Scheme inclusion of Aviation  
The EU ETS is one of the main instruments used by the EU to reach the statutory 
reduction of greenhouse gas targets. The EU ETS is a «cap and trade» scheme. Under 
the EU ETS, the European Union (EU), plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway have set a 
ceiling or a maximum amount for annual emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from large 
industrial sources (Kantareva et al, 2016). 
Global carbon markets can be divided into two categories: the regulator (or compliance) 
and the voluntary market. The Emission Trading Scheme belongs to the first category, the 
regulatory market. Trade of pollutants is used by governments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG). The ETS uses various mechanisms of the economy to create a price on 
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emissions. The carbon trading involves trading of rights (permits, allowances, credits) to 
emit a certain amount of emissions. Because of this commercial dimension, an economic 
incentive is created (Preston et al, 2012). For example, airlines reduce their emissions or 
acquire emission units from other projects under the auspices of the ETS and / or by 
investing in reduction strategies. 
A quantity of "allowances" or permits to emit one metric ton of CO2 is given or it needs to 
be bought by each individual. At the end of each year, each emission source must return 
the allowances at least equal to its emissions for the year. In case, that the source does 
not return with sufficient allowances it will have to pay a fine. As time passes by, the 
emission ceilings will be reduced and fewer allowances will be issued, causing CO2 
emissions to be reduced because of the level established by the ceiling (Leggett et al, 
2012; Meleo et al, 2016). 
The original European application of the Kyoto Protocol did not include emissions from 
aviation. In 2008, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a new law, Directive 
2008/101 / EC, amending the EU ETS (Directive 2003/87 / EC) to include aviation 
activities. The EU ETS in aviation is only about CO2 emissions from airplanes (Kantareva 
et al, 2016).   
For every MT CO2 emitted by a source, should be transformed to a right/allowance. For 
2012, the 85% of emission allowances in aviation were offered free to aircraft users and 
the 15% were auctioned (EC, 2016).  For the period 2013-2020, the 83% are offered free, 
the 15% are auctioned whereas the remaining 3% are banked for new entrants in the 
market or for fast growing airlines (EC, 2016). This intertemporal flexibility reduces the 
overall compliance costs (Kling and Rubin 1997; Tietenberg 2010; Ellerman et al. 2003; 
Ellerman 2002; Ellerman and Montero, 2002, SchleichI, Ehrhart, Hoppe, Seifert, 2006). 
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The initial allocation to the units is done through a benchmark system regarding the tone-
kilometres that the aircraft flown from, to or within the EU during 2010. Every unit is 
receiving the 0.6797 free allowances (baseline) for every 1,000 tonkilometers of flight. For 
the period 2013-2020 the cap is reduced to 95% from the emissions from 2004-2006, the 
target is also further reduced (Leggett et al, 2012:12). In phase three, an airline receives 
0.6422 allowances per 1,000 tonne-kilometres flown (EC, 2016). The cap on total 
allowances for phase three has been set at 210,349,264 per year. This is equivalent to 
95% of 'historical' emissions (EC, 2016). As smaller the quantity of free allocated 
allowances is, the bigger the associated cost for the aircraft operators (ΙΑΤΑ economics, 
2013). 
Airlines requiring more allowances can purchase them from EU auctions, other carriers 
and other sources of emissions in the EU ETS or other international emissions trading 
mechanisms. A small reserve of free allowances will be available for new or rapidly 
expanding airlines (Anger & Kohler, 2010; EC, 2016).The entry into force of the EU 
legislation covering emissions from international aviation is a significant move in the last 
two decades regarding whether and how the aviation CO2 emissions can be mitigated. 
According to the rules of the UNFCCC (2014a), almost all the emissions are calculated in 
the country where they occur. Much of the emissions associated with international air 
transport, however, take place in international airspace. 
Aviation emissions could be counted and regulated by the country where the aviation fuel 
is sold. However, small countries (such as Malta), for which the aviation and shipping fuel 
sales are an unusually large part of the economy, have objections to this choice. Partly it 
will have little influence on technologies used by carriers based somewhere else. They 
also argue that, if not all countries, that sell aviation fuel, regulate emissions, fuel sales will 
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turn into uncontrollable point. This could result in financial transfers, losses and carbon 
leakage (Leggett et al, 2012). 
To minimize compliance costs and to provide flexibility to sources, the EU ETS permits 
allowances to be negotiated. A source that has more allowances than necessary can sell 
the extra to another source that needs more, or to other entities, such as "allowances 
agent". The amount of the purchased allowances affects the price for the allowances. It is 
the aim to establish price of allowances, which are higher compared to the costs of 
reducing emissions by one ton. This aim gives economic incentives to reduce the amount 
of emission and to sell unused allowances to other polluters. It also gives businesses (e.g., 
technology companies) incentive to develop new, lower-cost means of reducing emissions 
(Kantareva et al, 2016). 
Directive 2008/101/EC amended the EU ETS Directive 2003/87/EC and included aviation 
activities within the scope of the ETS as follows: 
 All Member states from the European Economic Area (EEA) – including Iceland, 
Norway, and Liechtenstein – participate in the EU ETS. 
 Total emissions are covered from flights that depart and arrive at EEA aerodromes 
(hereafter "intra-EEA flights"), from flights that depart from EEA aerodromes to 
destinations in third countries, and from flights that arrive at an EEA aerodrome 
from third countries (the flights to and from third countries are hereafter referred to 
as "extra-EEA flights"). 
 The emission cap from 2013 onwards has been set at 95 % of the average historic 
aviation emissions for the period from 2004 to 2006. 
 Aircraft operators have been obliged to start emissions reporting in 2010 and full 
compliance – including surrendering of allowances – in 2012. 
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The EU ETS excludes certain types of flights from the cap-and-trade system, such as 
flights from airports that do not belong to EU Member State, flights transferring governors, 
military aircraft, search and rescue flights, circular flights, Public Service Obligation (PSO) 
and flights for training purposes (EC, 2016). Furthermore, flights under the de minimis 
criteria are excluded. These criteria include flights with airplanes with maximum certified 
take-off weight of less than 5,700 kg, flights from airlines with less than 243 flights for 3 
continues 4-month periods or flights with annual emissions under 10,000 Mt per year 
(Kantareva et al, 2016)..  
An airline that needs more allowances that the ones that allocated to it for free, can bit in 
the auctions that are frequently organised by the national governments or the market that 
holds allowances that wants to sell (EC, 2016). Because the high needs of airlines are part 
of an open system of emissions trading, the allowances can be purchased from entities 
from other sources (i.e. non-airlines) that are part of EU ETS or from credible/approved 
sources that have excess allowances coming from projects of developing countries. 
Moreover, airlines that have excess allowances can sell to other entities too (Anger & 
Kohler, 2010). 
If an airline does not comply with the EU ETS there is a fine for excessing the permitted 
quantities. The fine is 100 € for every tome of CO2 that is above the allowances allocated, 
a quantity many times higher than the expected prices in the carbon market. The air carrier 
is also responsible for the submission of allowances for the next year’s emissions. The EC 
regulation took under consideration also the situation when an air carrier does not comply 
from for than a year to the regulation. The worst-case scenario is that the carrier will not be 
allowed to operate to the EU (Leggett et al, 2012). 
The Member State is required to inform and consult the EC on how they will use the profit 
coming from EU ETS. There are concerns if the revenue will be used for the aviation 
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industry and/or for the decrease of the Green House Gases (GHG) (Leggett et al, 2012). 
Within each Member State, a designated “competent authority” is responsible for 
administering the EU ETS with respect to airlines. To reduce administrative costs, each 
operator is administered by a single Member State, the one that issued its operating 
licence or by the state with the greatest estimated attributed aviation emissions from that 
operator in the base year (EC, 2016).  
Airlines can be allocated to the Member State to and from which most of their flights 
operate. Given the role of London’s Heathrow Airport as a significant hub for flights into 
and out of Europe, a large number of airlines have been assigned to the UK. Germany, 
France, Spain and the Netherlands also act as administering States for a large number of 
carriers. Thus, there is high administration cost related to EU ETS for those countries.  
Forsyth (2008) argues that an air transport specific ETS would be an inefficient means of 
achieving a country’s targets. He also argues that the emissions reductions in aviation may 
be quite small, because they do not have much scope to reduce. Nonetheless, if the ETS 
operates sufficiently overall, there is no problem if aviation does not achieve a great 
reduction in emissions. The regulation has different percentages for the different options 
for allowances in the area of aviation.  
The EC is following a multisectorial/multidimensional approach in handling the GHGs from 
aviation taking measures in the Member States separately and all together. According to 
EC (2016) EU ETS is one of the many measures the EC is using to handle environmental 
problems in aviation (Cui et al, 2016). Other measures are for example research projects 
for technology and biofuels, like Clean Sky Joint Undertaking or changes in the airspace 
structure like SES.  
New Zealand is using an emissions trading scheme for domestic flights. Under this 
scheme, biofuels with or without sustainability requirement are not included, whereas in 
68 
the EU ETS the biofuel need to comply with sustainability criteria. This would make the 
possible link between EU ETS and New Zealand ETS more complicated.  Australia 
introduced a single price for carbon as an additional charge for aviation in 2012. The 
airlines can choose if this extra charge is through the airlines or the fuel provider. Australia 
and EC agreed to connect their ETS from 2015 and both sides to acknowledge-accept the 
emission allowances until the 2018 the latest (ΙΑΤΑ, 2012). 
IATA (2013b) stated that ‘if the European Parliament and Council agree on the decision of 
derogating from Directive 2003/87/EC is adopted by and made permanent; the cost of the 
EU ETS is estimated at 30 million Euros in 2012 and 130 million Euros in 2020. That is 
significantly lower than the cost incurred without derogation, which is estimated at 300 
million Euros in 2012 and 1.5 billion Euros in 2020’.  
EC suspended the application of the Emissions Trading Scheme to all the airlines 
overflying Europe pending new impetus that might be given by the ICAO Council to find a 
multilateral solution to combating climate change in the aviation sector. European 
Commission decided to ‘stop the clock’ (Decision No. 377/2013/EU). According to this 
Decision air carries that depart or land to an EEA airport are not obliged to surrender any 
allowances back and are exempted from the EU ETS. Carriers that depart and land to an 
EEA airport are obliged to submit the same amount of allowances they were given. For 
example, a flight from JFK to FRA is not subject to EU ETS, but a flight from HRW is 
subject to EU ETS. Emissions from flights between aerodromes in the European Economic 
Area (EEA) remain fully covered under the EU ETS. Flights from and to outermost regions 
are excluded, with the exception of Canary Islands, Melilla, Ceuta Aland Islands, French 
Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion, Saint Martin, Azores, Madeira, Jan Mayen, 
Gibraltar (EC, 2013).  
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The emission factor from biofuels according to the EU ETS is zero. Therefore, there is no 
need to return allowances and possible future costs are avoided. If the materials or fuels 
containing both, and fossil and biomass percentage, the percentage of biomass is the 
‘calculation factor’ (EC, 2012). 
Sustainability criteria should be applied to biofuels and bio-liquids consumed in order to 
assure that they have a zero emissions of greenhouse gases in the activities of the aircraft 
operator covered by EU ETS. A biogenic material that does not comply with the 
sustainability criteria of the Directive on Renewable Energy, as applicable, is considered 
as a mineral, i.e. the emission factor is greater than zero (EC, 2012). Last year, nine 
additional ETS programs started in North America, Central Asia and East Asia. Three 
additional schemes are to follow in 2014 –2015, bringing the expected total up to 16 by 
2015. 
3.3 Principles of carbon offsetting 
Carbon Offsetting projects are an attempt to internalise the externalities associated with 
anthropogenic climate change. According to Golden Standards’ Carbon Offset Handbook, 
Carbon Offsetting is “the financing of emission reductions outside of your flight’s 
emissions.” (The Gold Standard, 2012: 8) There are several ways of offsetting carbon 
emissions, ranging from purchasing carbon allowances from a cap-and-trade scheme, to 
using carbon credits from unregulated or regulated carbon offset projects (The Gold 
Standard, 2012). Each airpassenger can pay to offset the emissions caused by their share 
of the flight’s emissions. Passengers can offset their emissions by investing in carbon 
reduction projects that generate carbon credits. For example a passenger when booking 
the ticket has the choise of donating money for instance to the Envira Amazonia Project. 
Envira Amazonia  is a payment for ecosystem services forest conservation project, 
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otherwise known as a Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) 
project, protecting nearly 500,000 acres / 200,000 hectares of tropical rainforest.  
In addition, IATA discribes market possibilities for Carbon Offsetting. There are two 
markets for carbon offsets in aviation and in the overall industry: the voluntary and the 
compliance market. Both of them are a way for individuals or organizations to “neutralize” 
the proportion of aircraft’s carbon emissions on a particular journey by investing in carbon 
reduction projects according to IATA (2016a).  Furthermore, there is also the possibility 
that indivudal customers participate directly in Carbon Ofsetting programs. Each 
airpassenger can pay to offset the emissions caused by their share of the flight’s 
emissions. Passengers can offset their emissions by investing in carbon reduction projects 
that generate carbon credits.  
The main goal of buying carbon offsets is that they should generate genuine emissions 
reductions. In order to ensure the quality of the offset programmes, the following principles 
should be respected (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2014) (IATA, 2008a): 
 Additionality. Additionality is the principle that carbon credits can only be awarded 
to projects that would not have happened under a “business as usual” scenario. 
 Verification. Verification is the process, through which an external independent 
party quantifies, verifies and confirms the accuracy of estimates. With respect to 
these guidelines, it applies in particular to emissions of CO2 from airlines and also 
to CO2 reductions achieved through offset programmes. 
 Traceability. Traceability is reached through a receipt given to the customer 
indicating the type of the project or the quality standard that the offset meets. By 
this way, it can be ensured that the carbon offset has not been used before and will 
not be resold to other customers in the future. 
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 Complementarity. Carbon offsets purchased should be part of wider efforts to 
reduce emissions alongside technological and operational improvements in fuel 
efficiency. 
 Registration. Registration is used to keep track of offsets and diminish the risk of 
double counting. Moreover, registries also clarify the ownership of the offsets by a 
serial number.  
 Guarantee. When purchasing emissions reduction, it should be guaranteed that in 
case of failure, and alternative and equivalent offset will be made.  
3.4 Trading Units and carbon prices  
According to ICAO, (Doc 9885, 2008) one allowance is generally defined as a permit to 
emit one tonne of CO2-equivalent. There are companies that have excess credits, 
meaning they stay under the cap and have spare allowances that they can sell to other 
companies that exceed their allowances. This practice is based on the financial incentive 
of the buying/selling process. Consequently, trading emissions allowances is a way to 
offset carbon (The Gold Standard, 2012: 16). The credits offered by the International 
Emissions Trading are called Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). Additionally, to AAUs 
tradable units and pricing information for offset credits under the EU ETS are based on 
those used for the CDM and JI project-based mechanisms respectively (Kollmuss, et al., 
2010). 
There are two principal types of carbon credits: certified emission reductions (CERs), 
which are backed by the UN, and voluntary emission reductions (VERs). VERs are backed 
by recognised quality standards such as the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and the 
Gold Standard. VERs play an important role in emission projects with high sustainable 
development benefits (IATA, 2008a).  
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Table 4: A comparison of CERs and VERs (IATA, 2008a) 
 
The project type, its location, the market demand and the stringency of the offset program 
requirements influence and set the offset prices. Offset prices in the compliance market 
are driven primarily by the supply of and demand for offsets and allowances. Therefore, 
the prices for mandatory market are higher than those of the voluntary offsets (Kollmuss et 
al, 2010).  
There is a close relationship between carbon prices and industrial production. When 
increasing industrial production, rising and associated carbon emissions, need higher 
allowances to cover their emissions. However, due to tighter restrictions on the demand 
side under ceteris paribus, the carbon prices rise (Chevallier, 2012).  
As stated earlier, the airlines have also the option to bank the excess allowances for future 
use. Allowing carriers to bank allowances for future use reduces social costs by efficiently 
distributing abatement choices among different time periods (Fell et al, 2008). The 
literature focuses on price versus quantity regulation and little attention is paid to prices 
versus bankable quantities. Wietzman (1974) researched extensively the topic price 
versus quantity regulation. He argues that differences in the relative efficiency between 
price and quantity controls are a result of the difference in marginal benefit and cost slopes 
as well as the degree of the prevailing uncertainty in the markets. According to Laffont 
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(1977), uncertainty in the marginal costs function creates an information gap on the side of 
the regulator. The regulator faces uncertainty about the demand that will arise for the 
allowances. If the expected marginal benefit function from reducing emissions is flater 
relative to the marginal cost of abatement, then a price control is preferred.  If, however, 
the marginal benefit function is steeper, then a quantity control is preferred (Weitzman, 
1974).  
According to Weitzman (2014), setting an internationally harmonized carbon price involves 
only one layer of negotiations as opposed to two on quantity side. The EU ETS includes 
many countries and a common decision needs to be reached. According to a quantity-
based system, the EU members need to agree on the single aggregate level of emissions 
or allowances as well as the distribution of aggregate allowances/emissions among them. 
On the other hand, under the price-based system they need to agree on a uniform price, 
which is more complicated and difficult to reach agreement.  
With cap-and-trade, the total carbon emissions are known but the price or (marginal) cost 
is uncertain, whereas in the carbon tax the opposite happens. According to Weitzman 
(2014) the political appeal of giving free allowance permits to carbon-intensive industry 
groups makes the ETS more favourable to politicians. Grodecka and Kuralbayeva (2015) 
argue that hybrid instruments, i.e. a combination of price and quantity mechanisms, are 
superior to the sole use of either policies considered. They conclude that a cap-and-trade 
mechanism with banking or borrowing possibilities when considered quantity based 
regulation, can make quantity policies more flexible. 
One key feature of EU ETS is its role in international efficiency and collaboration (Hepburn 
and Stern, 2009). The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol offers 
units falling in EU ETS able to reduce costs through the acquisition of emission rights from 
developing countries (Chevallier, 2012). The CDM concerns Certified Emissions 
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Reductions (CERs). One CER is equal to one tonne of emission reduction CO2, while one 
European Union Allowance (EUA) is equal to one tonne of CO2 emission allowances in the 
atmosphere (Chevallier, 2012: 106). However, there is a limitation in the amount of CER s 
purchased to comply with EU ETS. CDM received criticism due to the fact that it reduces 
the incentives of developing-country governments to enact policies reducing emissions 
(Hepburn and Stern, 2009). 
There is uncertainty in estimating the costs for aircraft operators. This is associated with 
the price of allowances. There are two types of allowances that can be used: The 
European Union Aviation Allowances (EUAAs) and the European Union Allowances 
(EUAs). Credits of carbon dioxide from the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol can 
also be used, but the limits imposed by EU ETS for 2013-2020 are significantly restricting 
the use of these funds (IATA, 2013b). 
Table 5 Cost of purchasing allowances in EU ETS (IATA, 2013b) 
 
Over the past years, the prices for EUAs have changed greatly, with the maximum value 
being 240% greater than the minimum by the examination of the same asset class. Policy 
makers are considering various proposals to support the prices of EUA either through 
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delayed auction either by removing rights to create greater market tightness (IATA, 
2013b). 
According to ICAO (Doc 9951, 2011) most airlines provide a fair degree of transparency 
about the price of offsetting a flight. There is a huge variation between the prices per tonne 
of CO2 that customers can pay to offset their aviation emissions. 
Countries, including developing and emerging economies, have taken action on emissions 
from aviation through more efficient airspace design, consideration of appropriate market-
based measures (MBMs), as well as initiatives relating to alternative fuels and the 
development of a comprehensive emissions inventory (WWF, 2012). 
3.5 Auction of Allowances and airlines’ decisions making  
The largest emissions trading market is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), which uses a combination of free allowances from governments and auctions. 
Initially the aircraft operators were given free allowances based on their historical 
emissions. This method is known as grandfathering allocation. The initial allowances were 
calculated with the benchmarking method that was only relying on the tone-kilometre and 
the aircraft type. The allocation from with the two above methods cannot be altered. The 
last allocation method that is used in the aviation sector is the allocation through auctions.  
Auctions compared with the allocation of free allowances offer the advantage of better 
distribution, as stakeholders who need more allowances can obtain those allowances 
(Cong & Wei, 2012). The Kyoto protocol in order to help countries to achieve an effective 
reduction of emissions, introduced three flexible mechanisms (Cong & Wei, 2012): 
 Emissions Trade (ET), 
 Joint Implementation (JI) and 
 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
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In auctions there is a seller or buyer of a particular product / service (or products / 
services) and a number of bidders or sellers competing by submitting bids. The auctioning 
is one of the «purer» market forms according to Vettas & Katsoulakos (2004). A 
Regulatory Authority may organize auctions where companies buy licenses (such as 
licenses spectrum uses) or auctions where companies compete for a specific offered 
service. The European Energy Exchange (EEX) is a secondary market and is the only 
exchange in Europe with experience in EUA auctions on a regular basis. During Phase II 
of the EU ETS, it has successfully carried out weekly EUA primary market auctions for 
Germany, The Netherlands (2011/12) and Lithuania (in 2011/2012) (EEX, 2012). 
Moreover, it has set a minimum amount of about 500 EUAAs (= 500 t CO2eq) (Minimum 
lot size) per transaction (EEX, 2013). 
A distinction of auctions is open type and sealed deals. The open type auctions may be 
with increasing bids (English style) or with decreasing bids (Dutch) (Vettas & Katsoulakos, 
2004). The English auction (Ascending price auction) is the oldest and most famous 
auction type. The sale is conducted by the auctioneer starting from a low value, which is 
increased by small increments. Here are at least two bidders. The auction ends when only 
one biller remains at the end. 
On the other hand, the Dutch auction (Descending price auction) is not widespread and 
rarely used. In this case, the auction with a price so high that probably no one is interested 
in buying and then the value decreases continuously until a bidder express an interest and 
purchases the product at the price proposed. 
There are two types of auctions, static / sealed and dynamic / clock auctions (Cong & Wei, 
2012). Static auction can be further divided into single price auction, discriminatory price 
auction and second price auction, according to the different settlement price of the market. 
Alsemgeest et al. (from (Cong & Wei, 2012)) based on an economic experiment compared 
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the English clock auction with sealed uniform price auctions, and found that when 
communication between candidates were prohibited and the market clearing price was 
announced after each round of the auction the sealed unit price gathered more revenue for 
the auctioneer from the English clock auction, which means that the bidders were easier to 
conspire in the English clock auction. 
According to Klemperer (2002) a well-designed auction is very important. The two issues 
that really matter are a) to attract entry and b) preventing collusion (Klemperer, 2002). He 
argued that a good auction mechanism should be able to prevent bidders from collusion 
between them. According to Vetta and Katsoulakos (2004) it should be given close 
attention to how precisely an auction is planned and executed. The auctions are more 
flexible than selling in a fixed price and less time consuming to negotiate a price (Menezes 
& Monteiro, 2008). 
The German auctions on the EEX follow the process of a single price, which is the EU's 
usual practice according to the German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt, 2012). It is a 
bidding round with closed 'book of bids". This simple and robust procedure protects 
against market manipulation and continued to be used for the auctions in the third trading 
period (2013-2020) for aviation. The common procedure in prices means that all 
contractors pay the same price. The auction clearing price is determined by ranking all 
eligible bids, beginning with the highest bid, according to the bid price. In case of equal 
tenders, bids are sorted by a random process. The number of tenders is counted starting 
from the highest offer until the volume of offered allowances is reached. The bid price at 
which the total volume of bids reaches or exceeds the offered volume of auctioned 
allowances determines the auction clearing price. 
Between October and December 2012, 23,531 million allowances of the third trading 
period (EUA), were auctioned weekly in EEX. In addition, 2.5 million EUAAs were 
78 
auctioned in 2012 for air transport in the ETS yielding 17.525 million Euro (DEHSt, 2012). 
Around 15% of EUAAs, i.e. around 30 million euro per year will be auctioned from 2012 
until 2020 (EEX, 2012). 
Table 6 German early auctions of the third trading period (Early Auctions) and the EUAA 
auction of 2012 (DEHSt, 2012) 
 
Table 7: EUAA auction in 2012 (EEX, 2012) 
 
The ‘Stop-the-clock’ Decision foresees auctioning of 15 % of 2012 aviation allowances in 
circulation. Returned 2012 aviation allowances were cancelled and thus were not 
considered as allowances in circulation. Allowances not auctioned before 1 May 2013, will 
be auctioned as 2013-2020 aviation allowances instead. Table 8 depicts slightly increasing 
prices on certain occasions. The increase is not considerable but it may be attributed to 
the flights number increase during the summer season.  
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14/01/15 6.99 5 7.16 12 10 1,494,000 10,443,060 
28/01/15 6.56 2 6.80 11 8 1,494,000 9,800,640 
11/02/15 6.87 6.42 7.10 9 8 1,494,000 10,263,780 
25/02/15 7.35 6.47 8 9 6 1,447,500 10,639,125 
11/03/15 6.48 6.32 6.77 11 8 1,494,000 9,681,120 
25/03/15 6.88 6.5 7.01 11 2 433,500 2,982,480 
22/04/15 6.75 6.38 7.10 11 11 1,493,500 10,081,125 
06/05/15 7.25 6.51 7.50 11 6 935,000 6,778,750 
01/07/15 7.16 6.94 7.50 12 6 935,000 6,694,600 
07/10/15 7.97 7.60 8.15 14 5 781,500 6,228,555 
04/11/15 8.25 8.01 8.38 11 3 933,000 7,697,250 
05/11/15 8.25 8.01 8.38 11 3 933,000 7,697,250 
20/01/16 6.57 5.95 6.65 12 5 683,500 4,490,595 
 
The seller seeks to maximize its income, which is through the price paid by the purchaser 
or, more precisely the expected utility of the price, as this is usually uncertain. The seller, 
however, can have also other purposes than profit maximization and can make another 
selection. For example, if a Greek carrier auctioning its extra allowances might be 
interested in the identity of those who acquire them (perhaps because they are competing 
carriers whose position is strengthened excessively with the sale of such allowances). 
In the process of the auction, a bidder faces three types of uncertainty, a) uncertainty 
regarding the value of the item being auctioned, b) strategic uncertainty related to the 










Sum of Auction Price €/tCO2 
Sum of Minimum Bid €/tCO2 
Sum of Maximum Bid €/tCO2 
Sum of Median €/tCO2 
Sum of Total Number of Bidders
Sum of Number of Successful Bidders
Sum of Mean €/tCO2 
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opponents (Laffont, 1997). It is like imperfect information games. Auctions according to 
Laffont (1997) are interesting since the rules of the game are well defined and many 
restrictions are available to define the structural models. In addition, the data are most 
public and accessible compared with the data of monopolies. Friedman presented a 
method to determine the best offer in a first-price of a sealed bid auction. Capen et al (in 
(Laffont, 1997) generalizing the model of Friedman, suggested that the bidders have to 
protect themselves from underbidding which should increase with the number of bidders. 
Auctions of emissions trading have a special feature; the bidders can "save" their unused 
allowances for future use. Saving of rights entails makes intertemporal bidders' abatement 
costs verge to equal, fact that offers flexibility in reducing emissions and the corresponding 
costs (Cong & Wei, 2012). The bidders’ attitude to risk (risk neutral, risk averse, risk 
loving) affects significantly their behaviour in auctions (Vettas & Katsoulakos, 2004). 
Finally, earnings from auctions can be invested in environmental protection programs and 
to limit distortions of this tax (Cong & Wei, 2012). 
According to Vickrey (from Tietenberg 2006) there are several types of auctions but for 
emission trading the focus is concentrated in the following separation a) auctions 
producing a profit for the government and b) those that do not. A common auction platform 
facilitates the widest participation from across the European Union and, therefore, 
mitigates at greatest risk of having participants undermining the auctions by using them as 
a means for money laundering, the financing of terrorism, criminal activities or for market 
abuse (EU No 1031/2010).  
To ensure that the operation of EEX is done without manipulation and influences, 
continuous surveillance is conducted by the independent Market Supervision Office 
(Handelsüberwachungsstelle, HÜSt), as required by the German law. HÜSt DEHSt refers 
to the results of monitoring activities through regular internal reporting. HÜST reported that 
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the auction of allowances was held in EEX on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for 
the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, in October, November and 
December 2012 in accordance with the procedure laid down without disturbance. For this 
period, the Market Supervision of EEX found no irregularities and especially no behaviour 
of bidders that sought to manipulate the price of the auction (German Emissions Trading 
Authority (DEHSt), 2012): 
Two very important concepts in the theory of auctions are: 
 Individual Rationality: The expected profit from the transactions for each participant 
of the mechanism should not be smaller than the gain for any other mechanism. 
The mechanism should give incentives from the beginning for the participation of 
agents at auction. 
 Auctioneer's Utility maximization: the utility function of auctioneer in relation to all 
other mechanisms implementations must be maximized. Typical parameters of this 
function are money gain and the estimation of what goods are not traded. 
Airlines are asked to take a decision if they will participate in an auction either for buying or 
selling allowances. Decision theory examines the processes of making rational decisions 
under uncertainty. However, when uncertainty provides an opportunity for some others to 
take advantage of this, then there is the theory of competitive sector decisions, i.e. game 
theory (Amadae, 2016). The game theory studies the strategic situations that are like 
games, i.e. how decisions are made by people who interact with each other (Nicholson & 
Snyder, 2016). The sectorial economics and particularly the dimensions of oligopolistic 
competition were areas where game theory has found fertile ground (Pacos, 1997).  
This is a situation where (a) N (> 1) individuals, businesses, governments, trade unions, 
etc. (so-called players) make some choices in order to satisfy everyone's interest and (b) 
the result of each player does not depend only on its own choice, but by the choices of the 
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other N-1 players (Amadae, 2016; Varoufakis, 2001). A game involves players, actions, 
information, strategies, benefits, results and balances (Waldman & Jensen, 2012). The 
games can be cooperative or non-cooperative (Nicholson & Snyder, 2016). The concept of 
Nash6 equilibrium is part of a broader set of tools used to analyse strategic behaviour, 
known as non-cooperative game theory (Morgan et al, 2009). In cooperative games, 
players can make agreements, while in non-cooperative such agreements are not possible 
(Nicholson & Snyder, 2016). 
In incomplete information games, players simply ignore the actions selected by other 
players. However, they know who the other players are, the possible strategies / actions. 
Therefore, the information on the other players in the incomplete information game is 
complete. In partly completed information games, players may know or not some 
information about other players, e.g. their type, their strategies. 
Information serves as a very important role in game theory. When each player knows 
every move that the other player will make before he makes it then this is called a game 
with perfect information. In game theory, a non-player who makes random effects is called 
nature. If a game includes nature, but it does not move first, or if the first movement of 
nature is observed by all the players, then the game is characterized by comprehensive 
information. If nature never moves after the opening of one of the players, then the game 
is certain information. 
However, if all players have the exact same information when each player is moving, the 
game is symmetric information, and if players have different information then the game is 
asymmetric information (Waldman & Jensen, 2012). A game called imperfect information 
                                            
6
 Nash equilibrium is defined as the dominant solution in which both players do their best, given the opponent 
decision (Waldman & Jensen, 2006, p. 170) 
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game where a player must make a move but is unable to know the previous or 
simultaneous movement of another player, and when one or more players are unsure 
about any part of the tree then there is incomplete information game (Morgan et al, 2009). 
The main models of the game theory are:  
 The first model is the so-called Nash equilibrium. According to this model, the 
strategy of each agent is the best response to the strategies of the other agents, 
regardless of their types, given that they select also an equilibrium strategy (best 
response). 
 A second, more powerful model is that of dominant strategies. In this model, the 
strategy of each agent is the best response to the strategies of the other agents, 
regardless of what those are. 
 The third and weakest of the above models is that of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
According to this, each agent chooses its strategy to maximize the expected utility 
based on beliefs about the distribution of all types. 
Harsanyri talked extensively about Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. His approach is to turn a 
game with imperfect information in a game with no perfect information (Menezes & 
Monteiro, 2008). Any buyer has imperfect information about the values of other buyers is 
considered as not sure of their type. It is like recommending one extra player (nature) 
which selects the type of each player. When there is nature it is referred to the 
randomness of with whom someone plays a game. A pair of strategies (a *, b *) is defined 
as a balance if the a * represents the optimal strategy of the player A when the player B 
selects the b *, and b * represents the optimal strategy of Player B when A chooses a *.  
A strategy that works at least as well as any other, no matter what the other player is 
doing, is called dominant strategy. The set of dominant strategies and outcomes arising is 
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called dominant strategy equilibrium (Morgan et al, 2009). Absolute strategy is a strategy 
that defines a particular action in each decision point, while the term mixed strategy is 
referred to the one that allows random arrangement between actions in some or all 
decision points (Morgan et al, 2009). 
According to Stabler, Papatheodorou and Sinclair (2010) game theory is extremely useful 
for explaining the behaviour and predicting the results of strategies for pricing, product 
selection and differentiation, advertising, investment capital, mergers and acquisitions, and 
the barriers to entry. Game theory has greatly improved the understanding of interactions 
of firms in monopolistic market and its results in dynamic situations (Stabler et al, 2010).  
An interesting phenomenon is the curse of the winner (winner's curse) suggesting that if 
someone wins an auction with common values, understands that submitted more 
"aggressive" offer from the others, who thus seem to have been less positive (for the value 
of the object / service) information, as a result, every buyer should be more conservative in 
the price tender (Vettas & Katsoulakos, 2004). Capen et al also studied extensively the 
"winner's curse" whereby the winner tends to be the one who exaggerates what is worth to 
him and one can win but has sacrificed too much evidence for this victory (Laffont, 1997).  
For example, assume two competitive airlines, airline A and airline B. Both airlines are 
FSNCs and serve the same market, have the same characteristics and they is intense 
rivalry between them. Both airlines have the same availability of resources, the same 
access to R&D and should comply with EU ETS. Airline A decides to make only 
operational improvements on the engines by washing them more often. The cost of this 
action is very small as well as the benefit for fuel consumption and emissions. Airline A will 
need to buy allowances in order to comply with the EU ETS.  
On the other hand, airline B decides to invest in fleet renewal. The total cost of its 
operations will increase due to the purchase cost of the new aircraft; it will reduce the fuel 
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consumption and will have more allowances available to sell or bank. Airline B will have 
increased its cost per available seat resulting to an increase in the ticket price. Hence, 
many passengers will choose airline A instead of the more expensive airline B. Moreover, 
Airline B will have excess allowances that it could either bank or sell. Banking all the 
allowances is not a necessity for airline B since next year it will still have excess 
allowances. Therefore, the airline B will need to sell allowances in the auction. Since there 
will be a larger supply of allowances in the market thanks to airline B strategic decision to 
renew all the airplanes, airline A can buy ‘cheap’ allowances. Should the airline A or the 
airline B have known the strategic choices of each other the result could have been 
different.  
According to Forsyth (2008) in the short run, competition in markets is not expected to 
decrease substantially: and prices will not rise to the level of the cost increase leading to 
reduced airline profitability. Reality proved that the EU ETS targets were not strict enough 
to create scarcity in the market. This would require an allowance price of € 20 to 
substantially increase the cost of operations.  
3.6 Calculation of carbon dioxide emissions by ICAO 
Technological improvements contribute to the reduction of fuel burn and emissions. 
According to International Council on Clean Transportation report (ICCT, 2016), the fuel 
consumption of new aircraft designs could be cut by 25% in 2024 and 40% in 2034. 
Although improvements in aircraft and engine technology and the efficiency of the ATM will 
bring environmental benefits, this will not fully offset the effects of pollutant emissions 
resulting from the projected growth in aviation (IPCC, 1999). The methodology followed by 
the ICAO (ICAO, 2014b) to measure the carbon dioxide emissions from aviation is based 
on distance travelled. The ICAO is using the best existing public display data on fuel 
consumption. It also seeks to improve the model, updating and searching data constantly 
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to have a better estimate of emissions. As emissions of passenger aviation affected by 
changing variables, specific to each flight, it is necessary to establish general parameters.  
The calculation of carbon dioxide emissions (Carbon Emissions Calculator, CEC) from 
ICAO requires the user to enter the departure and arrival airports for a direct flight, which 
is then compared to a published flight schedule to find the type of aircraft serving these 
airports and the number of departures for each aircraft. After fuel consumption is found for 
the aircraft, the load factor and passenger load index are introduced for finding the total 
fuel consumption. The system then calculates the average consumption for the trip 
weighted by the frequency of departures for each aircraft type. This is then divided by the 
total economy class passengers. The result is then multiplied by 3.157, which represents 
the number of tons of CO2 produced by burning one ton of aviation fuel to calculate the 
footprint of carbon dioxide from every passenger travelling between the two airports. 
 
Figure 11: Emission calculation procedure of carbon dioxide from the ICAO (2014b) 
Figure 11presents the process followed by the ICAO of calculating CO2 emissions. The 
first step is the introduction of the airports of origin and destination. Code share flights are 
treated as one, while those with a different flight number must be calculated separately 
and then added by the user. The second step is the distance of travel, calculated from the 
coordinates of airports and the optimal path (Great Circle Distance). Then a passenger 
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load factor is given in the defined by the user city pair, based on passenger load factor for 
the respective groups of path. Information about the load rate taken from the database, 
based on 17 groups of international routes and an additional 5 domestic areas. In the 
fourth phase, the aircraft from the database of scheduled flights is recognized and 
connected with the EMEP / CORINAIR base, which has a fuel consumption figure for 
aircraft. The relation of fuel consumption with the distance covered is shown by the 
Emissions Inventory Guidebook. The flight scheduling of passenger carriers is published 
on Official Airline Guide (OAG) and the ABC World Airways Guide (Wensveen, 2007). 
According to Figure 11, the parameters taken under consideration are (ICAO, 2014b):  
1. User input – The user enters the origin and destination airports. The database is 
searched for all flights, direct or non-direct, serving that city-pair. However, the tool does 
not compute total emissions for journeys with different flight numbers (connecting flights). 
To do this, the user can choose to build a total by calculating each of the journey legs 
separately and adding them up. 
Code share flights are treated as a single flight. This avoids a possible double counting of 
flight departures that would otherwise affect the calculations. 
The origin and destination database includes individual routings for single flight numbers 
with multiple stops. Hence, the passenger does not need to know, nor input the full 
itinerary of the flight. 
2. Trip distance – The ICAO Location Indicators database contains the longitude and 
latitude coordinates for the airports. From these coordinates the Great Circle Distance 
(GCD) 1 is then calculated and corrected by a factor depending on the distance between 
the two airports concerned. 
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3. Traffic data – A passenger load factor is assigned to the user-defined city-pair, based 
on the passenger load factor for the corresponding route groups. Load factor information is 
obtained from the database, based on 17 international route groups plus 5 domestic areas. 
4. Aircraft mapping – From the scheduled flights database, the scheduled aircraft is 
identified and linked to the aircraft fuel consumption database European Monitoring and 
Evaluation Programme/ Core Inventory of Air Emissions (EMEP/CORINAIR). When the 
scheduled aircraft is not in the database, the aircraft is mapped into one of the fifty 
equivalent aircraft types existing in the aircraft fuel consumption database. Appendix B 
provides details of how this mapping was done. This allows estimation of the total fuel use 
on each route serving the user-defined city-pair. 
5. Fuel burn data – The fuel burn to flight distance relationship is extrapolated from the 
Emissions Inventory Guidebook (EIG) prepared by EMEP/CORINAIR. The factors 
considered include passenger load factor, flight distance, the proportion of the overall 
payload represented by passenger traffic, cabin class flown, and type of equivalent aircraft 
flown. The amount of fuel used on a route is the weighted average of total fuel burnt based 
on the frequencies of the scheduled aircraft types flown. 
6. Economy Class (Y) seat capacity – From cabin floor plans obtained from the “Manual 
on Airplane Characteristics for Airport Planning”, which is developed by manufacturers to 
provide necessary data to airport operators and airlines for airport facilities planning, the 
maximum number of Y-seats that can be fitted per equivalent aircraft is determined. This 
“virtual” all economy configuration later allows the computation of cabin class factors 
(steps 9 & 10). 
7. / 8.  CO2 per economy passenger – Using the trip distance, equivalent aircraft fuel 
consumption, passenger to seat load factor and passenger to freight load factor for the 
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route group, and the number of Y-seats, the methodology calculates the CO2 associated to 
each passenger, as follows: 
𝐂𝐎𝟐 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐩𝐚𝐱 =
𝟑, 𝟏𝟓𝟕 ∗ 𝐭𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐟𝐮𝐞𝐥 ∗ 𝐩𝐚𝐱𝐭𝐨𝐟𝐫𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐭𝐟𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫
𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐘𝐬𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐬 ∗ 𝐩𝐚𝐱 𝐥𝐨𝐚𝐝 𝐟𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫
 
The estimated annual emissions can be calculated from the fuel consumed, using the 
following formula for jet kerosene: 





Note:  For aviation gasoline and jet gasoline the emission factor (EF) of 3.15 should 
replace with 3.10 (EC, 2016). 
Aircraft operators determine the CO2 emissions using a simplified version of the standard 
emission methodology using the following formula (EC, 2012): 
𝐄𝐦 = 𝐀𝐃 ∗ 𝐄𝐅 
Where: 
Em: CO2 emissions  
AD: Activity data (= amount of fuel consumed in tonnes)  
EF: emission factor (tonnes CO2/tonnes fuel) 
3.7 Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions play an important role in the 
reliability of any emissions trading scheme. Without MRV, there would not be transparency 
in compliance and it would be much more difficult to enforce. Therefore, MRV applies to 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). It is the complete, consistent, transparent 
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and accurate monitoring, reporting and controlling that creates trust in the emissions 
trading system. This is the only way to ensure that air carriers and aircraft operators 
comply with their obligation to surrender sufficient allowances (EC, 2012). 
The EU ETS is an instrument based on the market. The market participants therefore want 
to know the monetary value of the options granted to them, trade and must hand back. At 
the same time, it is a means of ensuring and achieving environmental benefits in Europe 
level. This requires a significant level of fairness among participants, ensuring a stable 
MRV system to ensure that a ton CO2 emitted "meets" the corresponding tonne mentioned 
(under the principle that: a tone must be a tone). The competent authorities monitor to 
ensure that the objectives set by the "cap" are achieved (EC, 2012). 
In order to ensure efficient implementation of the directive for EU ETS, every aircraft user 
is assigned to only one member-state. In case the aircraft user holds a valid Air Operator 
Certificate (AOC) that is given by a member state according to the EU regulation 2407/92, 
the member state that gave the licence is the one that is responsible. In all the rest cases, 
the member state where most of the emissions take place is the responsible one.  
Every aircraft user should monitor its annual emissions from activities that are involved in 
EU ETS (EC, 2012). The annual process of monitoring, submission of reports, compliance 
checks and acceptance of the reports about the emissions from the competent authority is 
usually referred as compliance cycle (EC, 2012).  
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Figure 12 The compliance cycle of EU ETS 
The cycle in the right side of Figure 12 is the main cycle. The airline is monitoring its 
emissions during all year. After the end of the calendar year (within 3 months), the airline 
should prepare its annual report about its emissions (AER), ask for verification and submit 
the verified report to the Competent Authority (CA) as indicated by Reg N0 100/2014. The 
last report should be associated with the surrender of the allowances to the system. 
Monitoring continues without any break until the end of the year. The process is very 
important for the trust towards the system and the credibility of EU ETS. The process 
should also be consistent during all the years thus the airline should ensure that the 
monitoring process is documented and cannot change without any notice. Regarding the 
EU ETS, the written process is called Monitoring Program (MP) (EC, 2012).  
Figure 12 also depicts some very important responsibilities of the CA. CA should focus on 
the compliance of the aircraft users. The first step is to approve every monitoring plan 
before its implementation. Nevertheless, the compliance cycle has a wider perspective. 
Finally, there is a second cycle. This is the tactical re-examination of the monitoring plan, 
for which the verified form might offer important information. Moreover, the aircraft users 
are requested to continuously try to improve the methodology of monitoring (EC, 2012).  
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The common information for the monitoring plan involve the following actions from the 
aircraft user (the application depends from specific situations/cases): 
 Gathering of information  
 Description and explanation of calculations used 
 Control activities (e.g. 4-eyes for the data collection) 
 Archiving of data 
 Frequent identification of areas of improvement  
The compliance cycle of EU ETS replies on the fact that the monitoring process is 
following the year calendar. The MP should be approved by the CA before the start of the 
first year for the emissions, i.e. the first year for the allowances trading like 2013. Whereas 
for new aircraft operators, it is obligatory their MP to be submitted to the CA at least 4 
months before they start operating flights that are controlled by the EU ETS (EC, 2012). 
In practice, what is difficult to be achieved is that many times the aircraft operators do not 
really know in advance that they will operate in EU destinations. In addition, some aircraft 
operators do not know early enough with state is theirs CA. Thus, article 51 allows the 
following deviations (EC, 2012):  
 An aircraft operator that flies a route that is under the EU ETS for the first time and 
it could not predict that it will fly this route 4 months in advance, should submit a MP 
to the CA without any delay but at least 6 weeks before is start flying this route.  
 When the CA is not known in advance, the airline without unjustified delay should 
submit the MP when the information about the CA becomes available.  
The EU ETS for MRV is a fundamental element for the success of the system. Every 
required parameter for the emissions monitoring has different levels of quality of data. 
Tier/Level means a set requirement used for determining activity data, calculation factors, 
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annual emission and annual average hourly emission, as well as for payload (EC Reg No 
601/2012, art 3).  
Most of the airline companies do not have information about how the used carbon credits 
are tracked or registered (Interview with Airline representative, 2016). Without registration 
and tracking, the credits (or the reductions/removals from which they were created) may 
be sold more than once. In most cases, this information is only available at the website of 
the offset provider. All CERs are tracked through national registries under the Kyoto 
Protocol, and Gold Standard VERs are tracked using the Gold Standard Registry. Beyond 
these two cases, it is not always easy, or even possible, to find information about how 
credits are tracked.  
3.8 Carbon Leakage  
The EU ETS has been criticized as having failed to provide the necessary incentives to 
reduce emissions, it produces undesirable distributional effects and that distorts 
competition because of divergent rules between the different sections (Clo, 2010). Carbon 
leakage is one of the main issues in environmental policies for climate change. The carbon 
leakage is defined as the increase in CO2 emissions outside of the countries with domestic 
policy mitigation7 divided by the reduction of emissions of these countries. The increase in 
local prices of fossil fuels resulting, for instance, from mitigation policies can lead to a shift 
of production to areas with less stringent mitigation rules (or no rules at all), resulting in 
increase of emissions in these regions and therefore to carbon leakage. Moreover, the 
decline in global demand for fossil fuels and the consequent reduction in the prices of 
fossil fuels can lead to increased consumption of fossil fuels in countries that have not 
                                            
7
 Climate Change Mitigation refers to efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases. Mitigation can mean 
using new technologies and renewable energies, making older equipment more energy efficient, or changing 
management practices or consumer behaviour (UNEP, 2016).  
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taken steps to mitigate and, therefore, at risk of carbon leakage. However, the investment 
attitude in many developing countries may be such that they are not ready yet to benefit 
from such a leakage. The different emission limitations in different areas can also affect 
the choice of technology and the emissions profile in areas with fewer or no restrictions 
(Metz et al, 2007).  
In short, carbon leakage is the prospect of rising GHG emissions when a company 
transfers production out of a country, because it cannot pass the cost increases caused by 
climate change policies to customers without significant loss of market share absence of a 
legally binding international climate agreement (Department of energy and climate change, 
2013).  
The leakage rate or index leakage reduction is the ratio between the increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions in countries that do not belong in Annex I because of climate 
policy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in other countries of Annex I 
because of that policy. The estimated leakage reduction rates in applied models vary 
significantly, from 2% to 130% (Monjon & Quirion, 2011). The mathematical formulation of 
the rate of carbon leakage can be defined as the increase in CO2 emissions in non-abating 
(NA) countries (who are not trying to reduce emissions) caused by domestic reduction 
measures in abating (A) countries as a percentage the absolute value of the volume 
reduction of CO2 emissions derived from compliant countries, according to the following 






 ∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
The Carbon leakage is a very important factor in the design of the 3rd phase of the EU ETS 
(De Bruyn, Nelissen, & Koopman, 2013). For the 3rd phase of the EU ETS auctioning is 
referred to be the basic mechanism for allocating emission allowances. However, an 
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important exception is made for the areas "deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage". These areas receive free allocation to the statutory limits at Community 
level, at least until 2020 (De Bruyn et al, 2013: 11).  
The two criteria presented in the revised Directive (2009/29/EC) to assess if an area is 
exposed to carbon leakage were related to the additional cost of carbon and the volume of 
trade. In short, areas with significantly high additional cost of carbon and / or highly 
exposed to the global market through international trade will take continued free allocation 
of emission allowances for 2013-2020 until the limits have been set at Community level 
(De Bruyn et al., 2013).  
Areas were classified as "at risk of carbon leakage" through the comitology procedure will 
receive free allowances each year to a fixed reference point by 2020. Areas not classified 
so received a free 80% of allowances in 2013 and will be reduced each year by small 
increments until reaching 30% in 2020. The rest of the required allowances need to be 
bought at the ETS market or one of the regular auctions for new allowances. Therefore, 
the decision about whether an area could be classified as "exposed in carbon leakage" 
has important economic consequences for businesses participating in EU ETS (De Bruyn 
et al., 2013). 
There are three distinct types of leakage. First, there is leakage through product markets, 
where competitors from the EU may face a competitive disadvantage because of the cost 
of carbon into the price of products. The products outside the EU will get a bigger share of 
the market, so the production that is not under an emissions cap is increased. Secondly, 
there is leakage through the capital markets, where investments are made in countries 
without climate policies, because these investments may have higher yields due to the 
absence of the cost of carbon. The third is the leakage through the energy market, where 
reduced energy demand in the EU leads to a lower price of fossil fuels worldwide, which 
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stimulates consumption in other countries (De Bruyn et al., 2013:.14). One of the proposed 
measures to limit carbon leakage is free allowances and easy access to international units 
(De Bruyn et al., 2013).  
3.9 Different Carbon offsetting programs 
Carbon offsets play a role in both compliance and voluntary carbon markets. In 
compliance markets, such those created by the Kyoto Protocol or the EU ETS, 
governments and regulated facilities have mandatory, legal emission obligations, and can 
use offsets, such as CERs, as an alternative to reducing their own emissions. The CDM is 
currently the only program that can issue offsets from developing countries for use in 
compliance markets. In contrast, voluntary market offset programs such as the Gold 
Standard (GS), the American Carbon Registry (ACR), and the Verified Carbon Standard 
(VCS) issue offsets that can be used by businesses, governments, NGOs, and individuals 











Table 9: Some project types (IATA, 2008a) 
 
Offsets can be sourced from various types of project activities (IATA, 2008a: 14): 
 LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) 
 Avoided deforestation 
 Reforestation of former forest areas 
 Afforestation of new areas 
 Other types of land use projects 
 Industrial greenhouse gas offsets 
 Reduction of emissions and/or destruction of hydrofluorocarbon compounds (HFCS) 
 Reduction of emissions and/or destruction of nitrous oxide (N2O) 
 Methane (CH4) capture and use in energy generation 
 From landfills  
 From mines 
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 From anaerobic digestion of, for example, livestock wastes 
 Energy efficiency 
 More efficient stoves 
 More efficient power generation  
 Light bulb replacement 
 Use of “waste” energy in co-generation 
 Renewable energy 
 Wind turbines 
 Hydroelectricity 
 Solar, thermal and photovoltaic systems 
The main points to consider when selecting a project include: Standard, i.e. what 
verification and auditing procedures are in place; Price, for instance, the VERs, from the 
voluntary carbon market, are generally cheaper than CERs from the regulated Kyoto 
market; Relevance to your business; Geographical location; and Resonance with 
customers, for instance, those projects with social and economic benefits to local 
communities may appeal more (IATA, 2008a).  
3.9.1 ICAO and the environment  
Under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol (article 2(2)) tasks ICAO to secure the reduction of GHGs from aviation. In 
2004, ICAO adopted three major environmental goals (ICAO Doc 9902, 2007), to: 
1. limit or reduce the number of people affected by significant aircraft noise; 
2. limit or reduce the impact of aviation emissions on local air quality and 
3. limit or reduce the impact of aviation greenhouse gas emissions on the global 
climate. 
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In July 2012, the ICAO Council’s Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) 
developed a range of Standards to address aircraft noise and local air quality. They 
adopted an Aircraft Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions Calculation System as the first 
building block towards a global CO2 standard for new aircraft (ICAO, 2014b).  
The ICAO Council formed a special High-level Group on International Aviation and 
Climate. Change (HGCC) to provide near-term recommendations on a series of policy 
issues related to the feasibility of a global MBM scheme appropriate to international 
aviation (ICAO, 2012). Its aim is to examine ICAO’s development of a policy framework to 
guide the general application of any proposed MBM measures to international air transport 
activity (ICAO, 2012). These steps on November 2012 led the EU to propose the 
suspension (Stop the clock) of the application of its ETS to international flights (EC, 2014).  
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly (191 members) meeting in 
2013 agreed to develop a global scheme based on market-based measures (MBM) to limit 
CO2 emissions from international aviation. The 39
th ICAO Assembly in October 2016, 
reached a global agreement for environmental protection. The member states agreed that 
environment is of critical importance and 65 states including US, China and all EU 
countries signed up for voluntarily participation between 2021 and 2026 in the Carbon 
Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). CORSIA is a carbon-
offsetting scheme and is the first global measure covering an entire industrial sector. 
CORSIA ‘is expected to offset around 80% of global airline carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions above 2020 levels between 2021 and 2035’ according to De Juniac, 
Director General of IATA (ATWonline.com, 2016).  
MBMs provide financial incentives and disincentives to guide the behaviour of regulated 
entities towards lowering emissions (ICAO, 2013b). Under the policy framework adopted 
by the ICAO in 2010, MBMs are included in a “basket of measures” that Member States 
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can use to address CO2 emissions produced by international aviation and presented in 
their Action Plan (ICAO, 2013b). MBMs offer flexibility to participants to select between the 
implementation of emission reduction measures within their own sector, or offsetting those 
CO2 emissions in other sectors. This is particularly important for the aviation industry, 
where in-sector emissions reductions are expensive and limited (ICAO, 2013b). Moreover, 
MBMs give financial incentives to guide behaviour towards environmentally responsible 
activity.  
In June 2012, the ICAO Council narrowed the MBM options to three (ICAO, 2013b): 
1. Global Mandatory Offsetting  
2. Global Mandatory Offsetting with Revenue 
3. Global Emissions Trading 
Moreover, ICAO Assembly resolved that when states were designing new schemes and 
implementing existing schemes, they should: 
 engage in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with other states to reach an 
agreement and  
 grant exemptions to developing states whose total revenue tonne kilometres of 
international civil aviation is less than 1%. 
ICAO and the European Commission (EC) signed in 2013 a Declaration of Intent, affirming 
their collaboration on assistance and capacity building activities to support actions to 
mitigate carbon emissions produced by international aviation (ICAO, 2013b). The Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) has approved the project concept, and has earmarked USD 2 
million toward a new joint assistance initiative between the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and ICAO to reduce aviation emissions (ICAO, 2013b).  
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Furthermore, ICAO is requested to continue with the ICAO Global Framework for Aviation 
Alternative Fuels (GFAAF) and to gather information on the progress of alternative fuels in 
aviation, including through State action plans, in order to attain a global view of the future 
use of alternative jet fuels, and to account for changes in life-cycle Green House Gas 
emissions to evaluate the progress toward sustainability (ICAO, 2013). 
In addition, the U.S. Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) is working on different programs to 
reduce emissions. In 2010, the FAA initiated the Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions and 
Noise (CLEEN) program to develop technologies to assist in reducing the environmental 
impact of commercial aviation (FAA, 2016). This Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions and 
Noise (CLEEN) program is a part of the FAA’s aviation and airspace improvement 
program “NextGen” and focus on helping to accelerate the development and commercial 
deployment of environmentally promising aircraft technologies (FAA, 2016). 
3.9.2 Voluntary carbon offsetting  
The voluntary carbon offsetting refers to all voluntary actions to reduce carbon emissions. 
In this case, there is not a formal exchange, since this action is not part of a cap-and-trade 
system. It can also be referred to as the voluntary Over-the-Counter market. Continental 
Airlines, SAS AB, Delta Air Lines, Cathay Pacific Airways, Virgin Blue are only some of the 
airlines that have launched a voluntary carbon-offsetting program for passengers who 
want to offset their flights carbon dioxide emissions. Airlines offer individual carbon offset 
programs for marketing reasons in order to appear environmentally conscious.  
IATA’s program brings standardisation to the process and makes it possible for airlines, 
either smaller or bigger, to easily introduce a credible and independently validated offset 
program (IATA.org, 2016b). Around 32 IATA airlines have launched their own schemes 
using different carbon calculators and investing in emission reductions with variable quality 
(Schneider, 2012). Airlines are offering carbon credits stemming from renewable or other 
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high quality projects that follow the stringent quality requirements of the Quality Assurance 
Standard for Carbon Offsetting (QAS) (IATA.org, 2016b). QAS-approved carbon offsets 
are audited against at least 40 criteria (Quality Assurance Standard, 2014).  
IATA approved offsets must carry one of the following high quality certificates: 
 CERs issued under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
 VERs -Gold Standard or VCS version 2007 onwards 
 Approved offsets based on land use employ sustainable REDD+ project8 
methodologies. 
IATA in addition offers a Carbon Calculator that follows the ICAO methodology enhanced 
with real airline data.  
3.9.3 Examples of other ETS outside of Europe 
In 2008, Québec, a province in east-central Canada, joined the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI) and actively contributed to the design of its regional carbon market. The Québec 
government launched its trading system in 2012. Its regulation was modelled on the 
architecture set up by the WCI. In its first two years, the Québec ETS covers electricity and 
industrial GHG emissions. However, from 2015, it also includes emissions from fossil fuels 
distribution (ICAP, 2016).  
                                            
8
 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is an effort to create a financial 
value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from 
forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. "REDD+" goes beyond 
deforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The implementation of REDD+ must co-exist with 
significant emission reductions in both developed and developing countries to curb climate change (UN-
REDD Programme, 2014).  
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The Québec Cap-and-Trade Regulation sets a minimum price for allowances sold at 
auction. At the first auction, which was held on Dec. 3, 2013, the minimum price, or “floor 
price”, was 10.75 CAD (about 7.25 EUR). The price will rise annually by five percent plus 
inflation until 2020. This guarantees a progressively stronger carbon price signal to the 
Québec economy (ICAP, 2014).  
Covered entities in the Québec ETS must report their GHG emissions using specific and 
internationally recognized protocols. Furthermore, emissions data must be verified 
independently by an accredited verifier in accordance with ISO standards. The WCI 
stipulates that regulations and standards must be harmonized among its members. This 
ensures that one ton of GHG emitted and calculated is the same across the partnership 
(ICAP, 2016). 
In October 2013, Québec and the California Air Resources Board signed an agreement to 
link their respective schemes from January 2014. A first joint auction of emission 
allowances is expected in 2014. As WCI members, Québec and California have 
cooperated closely for the past five years and have strengthened their partnership over 
this period. The signing of the agreement completed a year-long negotiation process, 
marked by excellent cooperation, to harmonize and integrate their respective ETS 
regulations. The link between the two systems creates the largest carbon market in North 
America, and the first transnational cap-and-trade system run by subnational governments 
in the world (ICAP, 2014).  
The Emission Trading Scheme of Shenzhen city (SZ ETS) was launched on June 18, 
2013, as the first carbon market in a developing country and in China (ICAP, 2014). The 
allocation to the power sector and the water supply sector was based on benchmarking. 
For manufacturing industries, given the large number of industry segments and the wide 
variety of products, processes and device facilities, the allocation team decided on a 
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carbon intensity allocation method, based on carbon emissions per unit of industrial added 
value (ICAP, 2014).  
3.10 Linking Emissions Trading Schemes  
The term “linking” describes that the one system’s allowances or another system’s 
commercial units can be used directly or indirectly by one system joining another system 
for compliance (Crubb, 2009). The linking of systems creates larger emission reduction 
systems with better financial liquidity and harmonized prices without distortions due to 
competition, and thus less vulnerable (Tuerk, et al., 2009). The existing emission trading 
systems differ in size, cognitive characteristics, cost-containment and geographical scale, 
but also the type and volume of trading units (Tuerk, et al., 2009). Nevertheless, all the 
emissions trading systems wish to connect to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
(Tuerk, et al., 2009). 
The direct connection allows transactions between different systems and can be 
distinguished by whether they allow trading in one or more directions. According to a 
unilateral connection, entities belonging to the system A can buy and use rights coming 
from the system B for compliance, but not vice versa (Tuerk, et al., 2009). If the system A 
establish a one-way connection recognizing rights from system B, and the rights price of 
system A is higher, trading between systems will occur until prices converge at an 
intermediate level. If the price of the system A is lower, there will be no incentive for trade 
between the two systems (Tuerk, et al., 2009). A critical factor in unilateral connections is 
the effect it will have the A system that will be connected to B system (Tuerk, et al., 2009). 
The connection of big cap and trade system with a smaller will increase the price of the 
small equalling to the value of the largest (Tuerk, et al., 2009). 
In a complete linking, emission rights are traded freely between two or more systems and 
are equally valuable for compliance (Tuerk, et al., 2009). There is the option of using as 
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intermediate link the Clean Development Mechanism (Tuerk, et al., 2009). In addition, 
areas with rising carbon prices due to linking systems will experience more leakages. The 
opposite will occur in areas with declining prices (Tuerk, et al., 2009). There is also the 
possibility the caps be relaxed to the countries in order to benefit from the additional sales 
(Tuerk, et al., 2009). The economic impact of linking emissions trading systems can be of 
three types (Flachsland et al., 2009): a) quasi-static, short-term gains efficiency; b) 
dynamic efficiency gains; and c) the distribution results.  
To link two or more emissions trading systems among themselves, the following 
parameters should be considered (Tuerk, et al., 2009): 
 Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) rules for allowances 
 Banking provisions 
 Registries 
 Rules governing new entrants and closures 
 Compliance periods 
 Allocation methods 
 Relative stringency of targets 
 Stringency of enforcement 
 Eligibility of offset credits 
 Intensity targets 
 Cost-containment measures. 
EU ETS involving aviation could be associated with a bilateral agreement with one or more 
of the following programs (Haites, 2009): 
 A domestic trading scheme in a country with an emission reduction commitment 
under the Kyoto Protocol or a future agreement, such as EU ETS or Swiss ETS 
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 A trading system that is not linked to the UNFCCC, such as RGGI or the Chicago 
Climate Exchange. 
The CDM does not require returning units or rights and thus a bilateral agreement with the 
CDM is not an option (Haites, 2009).  
3.11 Summary  
Carbon offsets should be part of a climate strategy by a company/organization. Aviation for 
instance, cannot be carbon neutral, since it operates in an energy mix based in fossil fuels. 
A climate strategy is not enough in order the company to eliminate internally the 
emissions. According to Gössling and Upham (2009) two developments have substantially 
affected aviation, EU ETS and the continuous rise in fuel prices. This trading scheme shall 
provide economic incentives to reduce CO2 emissions based on market principles as well 
as set fix limits of the mount of emitted emissions. The Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS are 
based on the principle that the emission of pollutants is a commodity and a measure is 
required to calculate the degree of equivalence between the different gases. 
Emissions trading is a market-based policy tool that can be used to promote economic 
efficiency in achieving environmental goals. By harnessing market forces, emissions 
trading regimes can create incentives for economic agents to discover and implement 
cost-effective approaches to complying with environmental targets. The aircraft operators 
are obliged to monitor and report their annual emissions to their Competent Authority (CA). 
The CA should make compliance checks on the surrendering of allowances, inspect the 
monitoring throughout the year and approve (or not) the GHG permit and monitoring plan 
pf the aircraft operators. It is evident that the aircraft operators and the CA have many 
responsibilities and a lot of documentation to fill in as well as well as management 
procedure. 
107 
4 Single European Sky  
As discussed in previous chapters the traffic in Europe is increasing and the Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) system is deemed insufficient to accommodate the traffic in a 
sustainable way. A proof of this insufficiency is the comparison between Europe and USA. 
EUROCONTROL and US Air Traffic Organization (FAA-ATO) identified the differences of 
ATM performance. As shown in Table 10, Europe is similar to USA in terms of total 
surface of continental airspace, but USA controls approximately 59% more flights 
operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) with less Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) and 
fewer facilities.  
Table 10: US/EUROPE Key ATM System Figures (EUROCONTROL and FAA, 2013) 
 
Moreover, Europe has 37 ANSPs, 63 Area Control Centres (ACCs), 260 Approach control 
units (APPs). The European states have individual military needs and requirements thus 
there is a difference in the number and locations of Special Use Airspace (SUA). 
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According to the study (EUROCONTROL and FAA, 2013), the number of restricted and 
segregated areas in Europe is higher and they are more scattered which potentially affects 
the level of flight inefficiency and capacity from the system point of view. Flight and cabin 
crew, aircraft ownership, fuel, maintenance, handling and catering infrastructure, 
passenger services and distribution and other costs are the main costs for all airlines and 
an airline is managing the costs according to its business model. For instance, the Low 
Cost Carriers (LCCs) have a different unit cost than the Full Service Network Carriers 
(FSNCs) and follow different cost reduction strategies. ANS costs are the only costs that 
are the same for every carrier and the way the carriers operate does not affect the ANS 
cost significantly. All carriers are charged the same unit rate when they fly above a 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) country.  
The European sky is one of the busiest skies in the world with as many as 33,000 flights a 
day (EC, 2015). The increased traffic, problems in capacity, climate change and the 
necessity of developing a more cost efficient system led to an ambitious initiative to reform 
the architecture of the Air Traffic Management (ATM). This initiative was first launched by 
the European Commission in 1999 and is called Single European Sky (SES).  
4.1 The Single European Sky concept  
European sky according to EUROCONTROL is fragmented in small insufficient blocks that 
use a wide variety of Air Traffic Control (ATC) technology. The fragmentation resulted in 
safety risks, delays in flights and increased cost. Thus, better coordination for transferring 
the responsibility of an airplane between two ATC sectors in Europe is needed.  
The European ANS system covers 37 ANSPs, 60 control centres, is 10.8 million km² and 
the estimated costs of fragmentation of airspace amounts to 4 billion EUR a year 
according to EC (2015).  
SES is based on the four following main regulations: 
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 the Framework Regulation establishes the European Commission as the regulator 
for the civil sector and the Single Sky Committee to assist it in its regulatory 
activities; 
 the Airspace Regulation which will establish a single European Upper Information 
Region and within it organize airspace into functional airspace blocks (FABs); 
 the Service Provision Regulation establishes a common licensing system for civil 
ATM providers; and 
 the Interoperability Regulation which aims to ensure that systems, equipment and 
procedures operate seamlessly. 
The main target of the Scheme is to restructure the European ATC in accordance with the 
traffic flows, to create additional capacity and to increase the efficiency of the system 
preserving and increasing the safety standards. Finally, the delays due to inefficiency will 
be reduced. Functional Airspace blocks (FABs) are one of the tools that where 
implemented by SES to overcome these problems (EUROCONTROL, 2008:1).  
The stakeholders of the SES are the following: 
 European Commission as regulator 
 The EU Member States in their capacity as Civil Aviation Authorities and National 
Supervisory Authorities  
 Airline associations like the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA), and the European Regions Airlines 
Associations (ERA) 
 Trade Unions such as the European Transport Workers Federation (EFT) and Air 
Traffic Controllers European Union’s Coordination (ATCEUC) 
 EUROCONTROL as Network Manager  
 SESAR JU, EASA, ICAO  
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The SES program aims at separating the regulatory role of the competent services and 
service providers to provide an improved governmental control of the increasing number of 
privatized service provider and to establish common rules and standards. Thus, the ANSP 
was separated by the CAAs. Furthermore, the program intends to reorganize the 
European airspace so as not to longer be limited by national borders. This allows the 
complete unification of European airspace between 29,000 ft and 46,000 ft and to 
establish more direct flight paths between origin and destination. With this unification of 
European airspace, each airline would be free to determine the route to be followed by the 
aircraft, saving time, fuel and money. 
4.2 Functional Airspace Blocks  
One of the core elements of the SES initiative are the FABs, which aim to reduce the 
inefficiencies – in terms of safety, capacity, and cost – that result from the European 
airspace fragmentation. A Functional Airspace Block (FAB) is an airspace block based on 
operational requirements, reflecting the need for integrated management of the airspace 
regardless the existing boundaries of Flight Information Regions (FIR's), where the 
provision of air navigation services and related functions are oriented to performance and 
are optimized looking forward to implementing of cooperative relationship between the 
ANSPs in each FAB. Because FIRs are often limited by national boundaries, FABs also 
provide the potential to overcome bilateral restrictions and to provide a more efficient 
overflight from one territory to the next. 
The functional airspace blocks follow the bottom up approach and are one of the tools 
introduced by the "Single European Sky (SES)”, in order to enhance the security, the 
overall system efficiency of air traffic management in Europe, to create additional capacity 
to meet the needs of airspace users and reduce delays. The FAB's can improve the 
planning and organization of airspace. 
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The Single European Sky (SES) is a flagship European initiative to overhaul the control of 
European air traffic, to meet future capacity and safety needs. Based on the steps taken in 
the late 90s, the Single Sky package I was adopted (SES I) in 2004 and the Single Sky II 
package (SES II) in 2009 (EC, 2012). 
According to the European Commission (2012), it is anticipated that with the 
implementation of the SES:  
 the safety will improve by ten times; 
 the capacity of airspace will triple; 
 the cost of air traffic management will reduce by 50%; 
 the impact on the environment will reduce by 10%. 
The weakness caused by the fragmented European airspace result in additional costs of 
nearly 5 billion annually. In any average flight added to the mileage of 42 km, resulting in 
the aircraft consumes more fuel, creating more emissions, increasing the burden on users 
and there are longer delays. U.S.A. controls the same volume of airspace with more traffic 
with almost half of the cost. With the consolidation of the European sky and the 
consolidation of related services, FABs will reduce the impact of aviation on the 
environment and reduce the cost of flights that today represent billion every year (EC, 
2012). 
The categorisation of FABs was done using geographical criteria according to European 
Commission. Nine FAB initiatives have been taken (as seen in Figure 13); two of these 
have already been implemented, namely the UK-Ireland and Denmark-Sweden FABs from 
2014: 
1. NEFAB (North European FAB): Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway. 
2. Denmark-Sweden: Denmark, Sweden 
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3. BALTIC FAB Poland, Lithuania 
4. FABEC (FAB Europe Central): France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland 
5. FABCE (FAB Central Europe): Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Austria, Hungary, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
6. DANUBE Bulgaria, Romania 
7. BLUE MED Italy, Malta, Greece, Cyprus, (and Egypt, Tunisia, Albania, Jordan as 
observers) 
8. UK- IRELAND FAB United Kingdom, Ireland 
9. SW FAB (South West FAB) Portugal, Spain 
 
Figure 13: The geographical scope of FABs (EUROCONTROL, 2016a) 
These initiatives extend beyond the borders of the EU. This proves the openness of 
approach for functional airspace blocks. 
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Table 11: Functional Airspace Blocks  
NEFAB (North European FAB) 
Member States - 
ANSPs  
1. Estonia -Estonian Air Navigation Services (EANS) 
2. Finland -Finavia 
3. Latvia -Latvijas Gaisa Satiksme (LGS)  
4. Norway – Avinor 




1. Denmark - Naviair 
2. Sweden - LFV (Luftfartsverket) 




1. Poland - Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (PANSA) 
2. Lithuania- Oro Navigacija 
Area (million km2)  0.4 
FABEC (FAB Europe Central) 
Member States- 
ANSPs 
1. France - Direction des Services de la navigation aérienne (DSNA) 
2. Germany - Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS) 
3. Belgium - Belgocontrol  
4. Netherlands- Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland (LVNL) 
5. Luxembourg 
6. Switzerland-  Skyguide  
Area (million km2)  1.8 
FABCE (FAB Central Europe) 
Member States- 
ANSPs 
1. Czech Republic - Air Navigation Services of the Czech Republic (ANS 
CR)   
2. Slovak Republic - Letové prevádzkové služby (LPS) 
3. Austria - Austro Control  
4. Hungary - HungaroControl 
5. Croatia - Croatia Control - Croatian Air Navigation Services 
6. Slovenia- Slovenia Control 
7. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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1. Bulgaria - Bulgarian Air Traffic Services Authority (BULATSA) 
2. Romania-  Romanian Air Traffic Services Administration (ROMATSA) 




1. Italy - ENAV (Ente Nazionale di Assistenza al Volo) 
2. Malta- Malta Air Traffic Services (MATS) 
3. Greece 
4. Cyprus 
(plus Egypt, Tunisia, Albania, Jordan as observers) 




1. United Kingdom 
2. Ireland - Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) 
Area (million km2)  1.3 
SW FAB (South West FAB) 
Member States- 
ANSPs 
1. Portugal - NAV Portugal (pt) (Navegação Aérea de Portugal) 
2. Spain -ENAIRE (ENAIRE) 
Area (million km2) 2.9 
It is evident from the map that the criteria were not only geographical. For example, 
NEFAB and Denmark-Sweden FAB prove that the criteria are also political and/or 
operational. In addition, in terms of geographical coverage the FABs are not equally 
categorised. For instance, Baltic FAB or Danube cover an area of 0.4 million Km2 whereas 
South West FAB covers an area of 2.9 million Km2. Another important element is the 
traffic. The annual total en-route service units in 2015 for SW FAB were 18.2 million 
whereas Danube had 7.8 million terminal service units (TSUs) (EUROCONTROL, 2016a). 
Another important element is the complexity of the airspace. Where there are special use 
airspace (SUA) areas, the complexity of navigation can be an issue and the workload of 
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the pilots and ATCOs is increasing. Thus, the categories are not equally balanced in terms 
of traffic, covered area, number of states, ANSPs and traffic complexity.  
 
Figure 14: Traffic complexity scores (EUROCONTROL, 2016a: 13) 
Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre (MUAC) is a successful example for the harmonised 
European sky. MUAC is an international non-profit air navigation service provider, 
operated by EUROCONTROL on behalf of four States – Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands. Someone could argue that MUAC should be extended to other 
countries, but this depends on the political willingness of the states in question to transfer 
control of their national airspace.  MUAC airspace size is 260,000km2, has around 4,470 
flights per day, 1.6 million flights per annum and the 98.9% of the flights are on time with 
an average delay per flight of 0.17minutes.  
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To manage this busy and complex airspace, MUAC is organised on a multinational, cross-
border basis. The area of responsibility of MUAC in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands consists of the Brussels UIR (Upper Information Region), the Amsterdam 
FIR and the Hannover UIR from flight level 245 to flight level 660. It has to be noted that 
over 17% of all European flights use MUAC’s airspace (EUROCONTROL, 2016b). It is 
part of FABEC that covers the 55% of the European traffic (FABEC.eu, 2016). 
For the 11th consecutive year, the ATM Cost-Effectiveness (ACE) 2012 Benchmarking 
Report confirms MUAC as one of Europe’s best-performing Air Navigation Service 
Providers with the highest controller productivity. The Free Route Airspace Maastricht and 
Karlsruhe (FRAMaK) project delivers a total of 466 direct routes in the upper airspace 
controlled by MUAC and the Karlsruhe UAC, creating a large-scale, cross-border direct 
route network over Belgium, most of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
Traffic is one of the main issues that affect the productivity and the profitability of the 
ANSPs. Traffic flows are related to the number of passengers and the origin-destination 
airport. The gentle flow of traffic can explain schedules, which seem excessive in relation 
to traffic origin-destination (Wensveen, 2007). By nature, traffic flows differ from case to 
case, depending on the geography, route structure and alternative services available. 
Some cities because of favourable conditions to their geography derive more benefit from 
the traffic flow, unlike some other cities. A company cannot change that, and a carrier may 
not assume that a city A can support a specific type of service because a city B receives 
such services. The traffic can therefore vary from city to city depending on the geography 
and route structure, but even in the same city varies from year to year depending on the 
type and intensity of nonstop services that can bypass this city (Wensveen, 2007). The 
main aim of Air Traffic Flow Management is to balance air traffic demand with system 
capacity to ensure a safe, efficient utilization of the Airspace System.  
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In 2021 according to EUROCONTROL (2015a) forecasts there will be 11.4 million IFR 
movements (±1 million) in Europe figure that is 19% more than in 2014. In 2014, the 
number of flights increased by 1.7% compared to 2013. As for the flights, this forecast is 
partly driven by a weak economic growth in some parts of Europe. Sport events, like 
EURO and Olympics, swifts to traffic flows due to airspace unavailability, like parts of 
Eastern Ukraine, Syria, Iraq and Libya, or GDP changes are aspects that influence traffic 
and are taken into consideration on the forecasts.  
 
Figure 15: Average annual flight growth 2014-2021 per state (EUROCONTROL, 2015a) 
France, Germany, Spain followed by UK, Italy and Belgium/Luxembourg are still the 
busiest states in terms of number of extra flights per day, but Turkey has the fastest 
growth rates (6.0% as average annual growth rate over the 7 years) and the highest 
number of extra flights per day (2,330 additional flights per day in 2021) and is the biggest 
contributor to the growth in Europe (EUROCONTROL, 2015a: 38).  
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Figure 16 Average Annual Growth per FAB, 2021 v 2014 (EUROCONTROL, 2015a) 
Danube FAB is expected to have the highest average annual growth rate (4.1%, ±1.7 pp) 
over the next seven years. Blue Med FAB and South West FAB are the busiest European 
FABs with respectively 3.4% and 3% average annual growth rate. NEFAB and DK-SE FAB 
will experience more limited average annual growth rates of respectively 1% and 1.6% by 
2021 (EUROCONTROL, 2015a: 38). 
The income of the ANSP is under the use pays principle and is coming from en-route 
charges and from terminal charges. There are different sorts of air navigation charges; 
route charges, terminal navigation charges, and communication charges 
(EUROCONTROL, 2016a). The charging is defined according to the zone the airspace 
user is flying at. The zones are of two kinds: en route charging zones and terminal 
charging zone. The ‘en route charging zone means a volume of airspace for which a single 
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cost base and a single unit rate are established and the ‘‘terminal charging zone means an 
airport or a group of airports for which a single cost base and a single unit rate are 
established according to the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1794/2006 of 6 December 
2006 laying down a common charging scheme for air navigation services. Charges are 
directly cost-related. If the traffic is very low in one airspace, the charges could be 
increased in order for the ANSP to recover the cost of the offered service. Thus, the traffic 
forecasts affect the charges of the services by the ANSPs 
4.3 Charges for the ANS provision  
The Chicago Convention established the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) 
and introduced the charges for airports and air navigation services (Huet, 2011). In 1958, 5 
types of charges were examined: a. a weight factor only, b) weight and distance factors, c) 
a parameter depending on the kind of flight and nature of facilities required, d) a parameter 
depending to the route flown, or e) general levies on fuel and oil provided at international 
airports. After 9 years, at 1967, ICAO Conference on Charges for Airports and Route Air 
Navigation Facilities (CARF) decided that it should be only one charging price per flight 
that will cover all the air navigation services and be based on the achieved distance and 
the weight of the aircraft (Huet, 2011).  
At 1970, a multicriterial charging system was established that exists until today. From the 
1st January 1986 there is a simple charging system according to which there is only one 
charging price per flight that is paid in one currency, euro (since 1991) and is collected by 
one body, EUROCONTROL, on behalf of its Member States (41 states) 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010). The CRCO operates the EUROCONTROL Route Charges 
System on behalf of the EUROCONTROL Member States under the provisions of the 
Multilateral Agreement relating to Route Charges. In addition, the CRCO bills and collects 
120 
terminal charges and communication charges for Member States as well as air navigation 
charges for non-Member States, on the basis of bilateral agreements.  
At 2011, EUROCONTROL collected the charges for 38 Member States and the forecasts 
were that it would collect 6.5 million euro with a recovery rate of more than 99%and has an 
administrative cost of some 0.3% of the amount collected (Huet, 2011:150). At this 
collecting system, there is not any difference between the upper and the lower airspace.  
In 1998, the charging system of the Most Frequent Used Route (MFUR) to a Route per 
State Overflown (RSO) charging system, allowing a more accurate billing, closer to where 
the costs and services are generated. The first exemption to the full recovery mechanism 
was UK. UK requested an alternative charging system that is based on independent 
economic regulation as precondition to the partial privatization of its air navigation service 
provider, NATS, to allow private investors to drive cost-efficiency, decrease charges and 
generate profit (Huet, 2011:151). There are two different methods for the calculation of unit 
rate, full cost recovery method and determined costs method.  
SES aimed to implement a common single charging system for the provision of the Air 
Navigation Services for the whole duration of the flight (EUROCONTROL.int, 2016b). 
According to EC (2012) the so called ‘common charging scheme’ is of vital importance for 
the implementation of a harmonised system of ATC in Europe. The common charging 
scheme enhances a) the transparency of charging and collecting of the charges for the 
airspace users, b) the efficient provision of ANS for the airspaces users that are funding 
the system and c) the provision of harmonised services that is a fundamental step for the 
implementation of Single European Sky.  
The Route Charges System ensures the interoperability of SES rules and the fundamental 
principles of EUROCONTROL regarding the application and collection of aeronautical 
charges. The total charge (R) per flight that is collected by EUROCONTROL equals to the 
121 
sum of charges (ri) that are produced in the zone of charges that are established by the 
states (EUROCONTROL.int, 2016c):  
R=∑ 𝐫𝐢𝒏  
The single charge (ri) is calculated by multiplying the distance factor (di) to weight factor 
and to the unit rate (ti) 
ri= di x p x ti 
di x p) is defined as the number of service units in charging zone (i) for this flight. 
The current charging system for ANS offered transparency among the European ANSPs 
since the calculation is done with a common system and with the same formula (Huet, 
2011). A very important step for the charging system is that it implemented the charging 
zones without splitting it to upper and lower airspace.  
Search and rescue flights authorised by the appropriate competent body, flights performed 
by aircraft of which the maximum take-off weight authorised is less than two (2) metric 
tonnes, flights performed exclusively for the transport, on official mission, humanitarian 
flights authorised by the appropriate competent body, customs and police flights, circular 
flights and flights performed exclusively under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) within this 
charging zone are exempted  from the payment of route charges (EUROCONTROL.int, 
2016c).  
Route charges are a type of reimbursement for the costs occurring for the States and the 
ANSPs as well as the cost of EUROCONTROL. The costs of ANSPs are mainly costs for 
the provision of ATC, COM, NAV, MET, AIS, overheads, training, research and 
development. The costs for the States are mainly regulatory services and oversight 
services (EUROCONTROL.int, 2016c).   
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The tariffs are calculated based on the forecast of the traffic. There is an adjustment 
mechanism that balances the losses and gains on a year n+2 scale. Additionally, the 
mechanism is calculated on a full costs recovery and it provides the application of 
economic regulation (SES Performance Regulation). The states are taking under 
consideration the depreciation cost, operating costs, costs of capital and EUROCONTROL 
cost and establish a forecast cost-base for each charging zone. Thus, a unit rate is 
established for each charging zone. The unit rate for Greece in 2013 was 33.89 euro and 
34.53 in 2014 whereas for UK was 83.98 in 2013 and 83.73 in 2014 (EUROCONTROL, 
2014; EUROCONTROL; 2015b). The unit rate is reducing year by year. The average 
weighted unit rate for 2011 was 58.09 euro, whereas the average unit rate for 2016 was 













Table 12: Cost-bases and national unit rates for 2016 (EUROCONTROL, 2016c)  
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EUROCONTROL has bilateral agreements for aeronautical charges with 4 no-member 
states, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Morocco and Egypt, but also with the Ukraine (until its full 
technological incorporation to the multilateral route charging system). The terminal 
charges for Ukraine, Belarus and Egypt for 2011 are around 35.3 million euros. The total 
route charges for 2011 were 390.1 million euro and correspond to 1.25 million flights 
(EUROCONTROL, 2012). 
According to Crespo and Mendes De Leon (2011) it would be a utopia to say that in the 
long-term FABs could establish one charging zone with strict common rules. The article 4 
of the charging regulation says that FABs should have harmonisation and consequently 
the implantation of this regulation to the maximum extent. European Commission admits 
that it would be more beneficial for the European Network to have big charging zones 
according to the business needs, but with slightly differentiated rules than to continue with 
the same tradition charging zones following national borders.  
The charging regulation utilised the economic sides of the performance system and 
introduces economic incentives with a cost risk sharing system. FABs are tools for the 
restructuring of the ANS service provision and enhancement of cost efficiency. FABs are 
encouraged to define a charging zone or a common cooperation net by which it will be 
easier to reach economies of scale (Huet, 2011). The full cost-recovery system offers 
financial stability to ANSPs and allows users to get back any over-recoveries, but it does 
not act as economic incentive for the ANSP to be cost-efficient since they face low 
financial risk.  
4.4 The economics of Air Transport Management  
Single European Sky is a quite ambitious initiative. The implementation of SES is proven 
hectic. In order to understand SES’s importance for the aviation sustainability as well as 
the possible reasons why it is not fully implemented, it is of critical importance to explain 
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the business environment. Industrial economics theory will be applied to better understand 
the aviation environment of SES.  
Industrial economics deal with economic problems of the industries, as well as their 
relationship with the society (Stigler, 1968). Industrial economics will be used to 
understand the economic aspects of ATM seeking to analyse their behaviour and draw 
normative implications for the aviation system. This part will concentrate on the constraints 
which impede the achievement of the SES goals and will try to remove them emphasising 
on empiricism. 
One of the key issues in industrial economics is assessing whether a market is 
competitive. The elements of market structure and market concentration are critical for 
modelling firm behaviour. It deals with the information about the competitors, natural 
resources and factors of production and government rules and regulations related to the 
aviation industry. Furthermore, it deals with the business policy and decision-making. 
Those two elements are interdependent, since without adequate information no one can 
take proper decision about any aspect of business. 
Industrial economics are closely related to the concept of efficiency or performance. ‘The 
appropriate decision making and efficient implementation of the decisions are the vital 
determinants for the efficiency conditions in business’ (Barthwal, 2004:31). The market 
structure and market power in ATM is affecting the performance of SES and the 
implementation of the regulations.  
The main players in SES are the Air Navigation Service Providers, European Commission 
and CAAs/NSAs. To determine the degree of competition in an industry, an initial 
indication is the number of enterprises, which is not the most appropriate. Another way to 
measure the degree of competition is the production concentration level. The simplest 
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indicator of the concentration of an industry is the sum of the market share for the industry 





CRk: concentration ratio 
S: share of the firm i 
K: number of the 3, 4, 8 ... larger firms in the industry 
Another way of measuring is the index Herfindahl -Hirschman (index HHI). The H index 
has the advantage over the CRk that it takes into account, in addition to 3.4... larger 








Cv: represents the variation coefficient of the size of the companies in the industry 
Cv2 / n: measures the contribution of inequality in the degree of concentration 
1 / n: the inverse of the number of enterprises 
The more firms there are in an industry, the lower the value of HHI, ceteris paribus 
(Waldman & Jensen, 2012). This index takes account of all firms in the industry. Their 
market shares are weighted by the market share itself. The larger the firm, the more will be 
its weight in the index. The maximum value for the index is one where only one firm 
occupies the whole market. This is the case of a monopoly. When the scope is national, 
then the ANSPs are natural monopolies. When the scope is ECAC then the ANSPs are 
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considered Oligopolies. When considering though the services, the market structure 
becomes more complicated.  
According to the European Commission (2016) the five biggest ANSPs, i.e. DFS for 
Germany, DSNA for France, ENAIRE for Spain, ENAV for Italy and NATS for the UK bear 
60 % of total European gate-to-gate service provision costs and operate 54 % of European 
traffic. Only 40 % of remaining gate-to-gate costs are borne by 32 other smaller ANSPs 
that operate the 46% of European traffic. Consequently, the traffic is concentrated to the 5 
big ANSPs.  
When the scope of the services provided is not a country and the ANS are provided to 
more than one country or a country has more than one ANSP then the market is 
considered oligopolistic. An oligopolistic market is created when a small number of 
producers dominate the industry (Stabler, et al., 2010). In the market, there are often a 
number of competitors, but so that everyone has a negligible influence on the price 
(Varian, 1992). 
If firms of an oligopolistic industry manage to communicate with each other (in terms of 
pricing, market shares, etc.) they achieve a restriction to competition and reduce 
uncertainty, all of which reduce the total profits of the industry. A formal or informal 
agreement / partnership between businesses for market exploitation is called cartel. 
Conditions for the creation of a cartel are the production of homogeneous product, the 
strong interdependence and knowledge of the demand conditions. Where a cartel 
operates in accordance with the intentions of its members, it acts as individual practical 
monopolist, which maximizes the total profit of the industry (Besanko & Braeutigam, 2011). 
The cartel achieves maximization of profits when it is acting as a monopoly (Varian, 1992).  
Air Navigation Service Providers after 2010 started forming alliances. The ATM reforms 
were first mention in 1999 and they were implemented in 2012 through the Sky 
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harmonisation. ANSPs may cooperate for different reason, the most important are a) a 
good cost benefit business case; b) synergies in technologies and expertise; c) 
optimisation in the production and achievement of economies of scale or scope; and d) 
forced by government regulation or legislation (Singh, 2011). 
 
Figure 17: Drivers for ANSP cooperation (Singh, 2011: 343) 
Air Navigation Service Providers are taking advantage of economies of scale. The main 
point on the economies of scale lies in cost conditions, namely the way in which unit cost 
varies as the amount of product produced by a production unit (Pacos, 1997). If production 
increases and the long-term average cost decreases, then the cost exhibits economies of 
scale (Vettas & Rector, 2004). In addition, economies of scale in cost function are 
interrelated with the returns to scale production function and so ‘when the input product 
exhibits constant returns to scale, the long-run average cost remains constant when 
changing the level of production’ (Morgan et al, 2009). Economies of scale simply are 
factors that cause the average cost of producing something to fall as the volume of its 
output increases. When economies of scale are strong, which means that the market has 
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very few companies, the average cost curve falls abruptly to a large range of production 
levels (Morgan et al, 2009). 
Unlike the traditional microeconomic approach under real conditions, competition is not 
perfect. Perfect competitive or monopolistic markets are simply the opposite ends within 
which there are several gradations of organization of the market. Business’s attitude 
affects their performance, i.e. prices, profits, etc. In many cases, it even affects the 
performance of other companies in the sector. The behaviour of all firms in an industry 
affects the performance of the entire sector. Thus, the performance of airlines or the 
performance of airports, or the performance of ANSPs is affecting the performance of 
aviation as a sector.  
ANSPs within a country are considered natural monopolies. Monopoly is a situation in 
which only a producer of a commodity exists for which there is no substitute (Stabler et al, 
2010; Waldman & Jensen, 2012). The fact that a company does not face competition from 
other operators does not mean that it can set the highest price of all feasible (Vettas & 
Rector, 2004). 
The cases of monopoly according to Katz & Rosen, (2007: 581) are a) the sellers are price 
modulators, i.e. the demand curve for a price modulator now has a downward slope as the 
price falls as the quantity of product sold increases; b) the sellers do not behave 
strategically because the supplier does not encounter resistance from the other suppliers 
in the selection of its own actions; c) entering the industry is impossible; and d) buyers are 
price-receivers. The ANSPs are charging according to the cost of the service taking under 
consideration the traffic volume. Thus, the airspace users are price receivers. The 
airspace management belongs to the ANSP and the government either as Ministry of 
Transport or as CAA has given the company the exclusive right to serve an airport and the 
130 
cost of service provision makes the provider more productive than many (natural 
monopoly).  
If for any level of production in the sector the overall cost of production of that level in a 
company is less than the total cost to be borne by two or more companies if they share 
this production together, then a market is characterised as natural monopoly (Besanko & 
Braeutigam, 2011; Morgan et al, 2009; Scotter, 2008). This happens when there are 
several strong economies of scale or economies of scope (Vettas & Katsoulakos, 2004). In 
the long-run equilibrium, each firm in monopolistic competition has a normal economic 
profit and produce on the downward part of the curve of average cost (Waldman & Jensen, 
2012, p.366). According to Schumpeter, the ideal way for market structure is not perfect 
competition, but large firms with monopoly power (Waldman & Jensen, 2012). 
Moreover, Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (2005), distinguish between permanent and 
temporary natural monopoly. The Long-Run Average Cost (LRAC) of permanent natural 
monopoly continuously decreases as output increases. In temporary natural monopoly, the 
LRAC decreases but after a certain point it becomes constant.  
Natural monopolies in most cases are regulated or operated by state (Varian, 1992). In 
cases where the regulated monopoly does not take subsidy, it should operate on the 
average cost curve or above in order not to have negative earnings. If a natural monopolist 
operates in conditions of equal price and marginal cost, it will produce an effective amount 
of product MC, but without covering its costs (Varian, 1992).  
The existence of natural monopoly does not guarantee that a company will be able to 
prevent competitors from entering the market. The natural monopoly can put other barriers 
to entry in the market called monopoly viable (sustainable monopoly) (Scotter, 2008). So it 
(Scotter, 2008: 330) has cost function C (q) and demand function D (p) if  
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1. The 1st condition is applied, under which the company meets the market demand at 
any price [q = D (p)]. 
2. The 2nd condition is applied, under which the company covers the cost of [p * q = C 
(q)]. 
3. The 3rd condition is applied, whereby the company sets a price p such that any 
competitive company trying to enter the market by selling a smaller quantity at a 
lower price, would suffer [p΄*q΄<C(q΄) for all p΄<p and all q΄≤D(p΄)]. 
 
Figure 18: Price and Quantity in monopoly market 
In Figure 18, it can be seen that the profit-maximizing price is pm and qm quantity as at this 
point the MC = MR. The supernormal profits of the company equal to the size of pmdcf. 
The supernormal profits are probably attracting competitive companies. If a competitor 
enters the market, then the company will lower the price to ps, which is sustainable and 
market price, where ATC = D. The company assumes that consumers will stay inactive 
and will not move the demand to the competitor immediately and the company will have 
time to amend the price properly and thus preventing the competitor from taking the 
market share (Scotter, 2008). 
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One key characteristic of natural monopoly is subadditivity. This means that it is cheaper 
to produce the same production level when only one company produces, and that the 
same production level becomes more expensive when a second company joins the 
market. On the other hand, economies of scale exist when additional units of production 
are associated with a lower average cost, but costs per unit begin to rise after a certain 
level.  
 
Figure 19: Economies of scale versus subadditivity  
Figure 19 depicts the case of economics of scale versus subadditivity. The orange 
demand curve, within the economies of scale region, is a viable natural monopoly. The 
purple line indicates a non-sustainable natural monopoly. The red line indicates the border 
case of a profit generating monopoly (which would attract competitors) and the blue line 
indicates a viable duopoly. Subadditivity is considered a necessary but insufficient 
condition for a natural monopoly to be considered optimal, whereas if economies of scale 
exist, this is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a natural monopoly to be 
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sustainable.  In multiple-output case where the interdependence among outputs becomes 
important, economies of scale are neither necessary nor sufficient for costs to be 
subadditive according to Viscusi et al (2005).  
4.5 Economic regulation of Air Navigation Services  
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) as explained above operate as natural 
monopolists. There are different organisational forms. There are a) governmental agencies 
(e.g. FAA-Federal Aviation Administration in USA), b) state owned or government 
business enterprise (e.g. DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH in Germany), c) private-
public-partnership (PPP9) (e.g. NATS in UK) and d) private entity (e.g. Nav Canada). All 
the different ownership and organisational forms exist and all have the potential according 
to ICAO (Doc 9161, 2013) to deliver excellent service under the condition of an 
appropriate government structure.  
Most of the ANSPs are not private entities or PPPs. The idea behind privatization is to 
increase the role of market forces, thus to improve industry performance. Apart from that 
freeing of entry to an industry, encouraging competition and permitting joint ventures can 
contribute to improvements on industry performance. Market forces can also be increased 
by restructuring the nationalized industry, to create several successor companies that may 
be publicly owned. 
Privatisation can bring benefit to consumers, since private companies tend to produce the 
quantities and varieties the customers want, thus by covering customers’ need, private 
companies generate earnings. The companies though are becoming profit-orientated and 
                                            
9
 Public-private partnership (PPP) provides private financing for infrastructure investment without immediately adding 
to government borrowing and debt, and can be a source of government revenue (ICAO-9980, 2012).  
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are unwilling to offer uneconomic services, are orientated towards eliminating inefficient 
production and restrictive labour practices.  
Nav Canada is the first fully private ANSP. It was created in 1996 and is the world’s 
second largest ANSP by traffic volume. Nav Canada is following self-regulation, which 
means that it has an unlimited ability to set fees to airlines at a level sufficient to cover all 
of its costs, including reasonable reserves. Nav Canada is monitored by airline customers 
through membership on the board of directors (ICAO Doc 9980, 2012). On the other hand, 
AEROTHAI, Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Limited, is a State enterprise in which 89 
airlines had minority equity stakes in 2008, but the government controls the charges (ICAO 
Doc 9980, 2012). Charges for ANS is an important cost for airlines and thus for 
passengers’ fairs.  
Within Europe, UK is by far the most liberalised market. NATS was proposed as PPP in 
1998 and was finally formed as PPP in 2001. In 2001, Airline Group acquired 46% of 
NATS, the NATS staff took 5% and the remaining 49% was held by government. In 2009 
joined the A6 alliance. In 2011, NATS crated a partnership with Ferrovial Servicios, called 
FerroNATS. FerroNATS provides air traffic control services in the airports of Alicante, 
Valencia, Ibiza, Sevilla, Jerez, Sabadell, Cuatro Vientos, Vigo, La Coruña and Melilla 
(NATS 2015). Prices of NATS are regulated in accordance with the price-capping formula 
(RPI-X) to create incentives for efficiency and are revised every 5 years taking into 
account, inter alia, major investment projects. 
Both airports and ANSPs are characterised by sunk costs. The central economic rationale 
for airport regulation is the maximisation of conventional economic welfare or, equivalently, 
the minimisation of deadweight loss according to Biggar (2012). Czerny, Guiomard and 
Zhang (2016) identify airport market power per se; airport market power in combination 
with potential airline market power (which relates to vertical governance and/or integration 
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in air transport markets); airport congestion; distributional issues; investment in airport 
infrastructure; and the supply of airport concession services, as the main issues of concern 
in price regulation of airport monopolies from an theoretical viewpoint. Large airports with 
substantial market power are usually subject to detailed and strict regulation (Biggar, 2012; 
Bel and Fageda, 2010).  
According to Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (2005) when an industry is regulated, market 
forces and administrative processes codetermine industry performance in terms of 
allocative and productive efficiency. It is very difficult for the government to perfectly 
monitor firms and market forces play a predominant role regardless of the degree of 
government intervention.  
Moreover, Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (2005) point three key decision variables for the 
economic regulation of an industry, a) price, b) quantity and c) number of firms. The 
regulator may control the entry and/or exit of firms. Control over entering the marker 
usually applies in public utilities areas. The control of exit aims to have services provided 
to a wider area. This regulatory principle is applied in the railway sector. Restrictions on 
the quantity of production can be used with or without price regulation.  
In price regulation, the regulator sets a particular price (or price structure) that firms must 
charge or restricts firms to setting price within some range. One of the main issues the 
regulator faces when regulating a monopolist is related to Ramsey pricing. This means 
that the price margins should be inversely proportional to the demand elasticity for the 
various products/services. Ramsey pricing is economically efficient in the sense that can 
maximize welfare under certain circumstances. Ramsey pricing is effective only if all 
markets are equally monopolistic or equally competitive. The services/products with more 
elastic demands are charged less, likewise, the more inelastic the demand, the higher the 
price ceteris paribus.  
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Under the rate of return regulation (also called cost of service or cost plus regulation) 
ANSPs are required to obtain approval for the level of charges and investment. This 
regulation aims to limit the provider’s rate of return on capital at the level prevailing in a 
competitive market. According to ICAO Doc 9161 (2013) it allows cost pass-through for 
both operating and capital expenditures, but it may provide the ANSP with a strong 
incentive for over-investment in order to increase the volume of its profit. The solution to 
this could be price cap regulation, under which the regulator sets a maximum chargeable 
rate. Under performance regulation, ANSPs can charge up to a specific amount following a 
traffic risk sharing mechanism. 
ANSPS transition phase began in the 1980’s rather slower in comparison to the airports 
and airlines, and traditionally have been operated directly by governments. Each structural 
situation, strategy or legal regulation that limits the chances or entry speed is a factor of 
protection for established business like air carriers or ANSPs, and it affects the potential 
competition (Pacos, 1997). Thus, the entry barriers are considered very important. Equally 
important are considered the exit barriers. The exit barriers raise the issue of non-
recoverability of an investment cost (Pacos, 1997) 
Bain defined barriers to entry as market conditions that allow a dominant firm to raise 
prices above the level of competition, without attracting new entry. A barrier to entry exists 
when there is a new business entering the market is not able to achieve the same profit 
levels with those of the dominant firm before the new entrant (Waldman & Jensen, 2012). 
Bain found economies of scale, absolute cost advantages, the necessary capital 
expenditure and product differentiation advantages as four elements of the market 
structure that act as barriers to entry (Waldman & Jensen, 2012). Economies of scale act 
as a barrier to entry, in the sense that the new entrant is unable to ensure that the size of 
the sector demand, which would allow it to benefit from economies of scale without 
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simultaneously increasing the overall supply resulting in compression of the selling price in 
below the minimum unit cost (Pacos, 1997).  
Hence, the entry of a new ANSP is considered much more difficult than the entry of a new 
airline due to the high sunk costs as well as the authorisation dependence from the 
government authorities. All the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) states and the 
organisational and corporate arrangements for the ANS provider are gathered in the Table 
13.  
Table 13: Organisation and Corporate arrangements of the ECAA states (Efthymiou et al, 
2016) 
ANSP Country Organisational & Corporate Arrangements 
Aena Spain State enterprise 
ANS CR Czech Republic State enterprise 
ARMATS Armenia Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
Austro Control Austria Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
Avinor Norway Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
Belgocontrol Belgium State enterprise 
BULATSA Bulgaria State enterprise 
Croatia Control Croatia Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
DCAC Cyprus Cyprus State body 
DFS Germany Limited liability company (State‐owned) 
DSNA France State body (autonomous budget) 
EANS Estonia Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
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ANSP Country Organisational & Corporate Arrangements 
ENAV Italy Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
Finavia Finland State enterprise 
HCAA Greece State body 
HungaroControl Hungary State enterprise 
IAA Ireland Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
LFV Sweden State enterprise 
LGS Latvia Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
LPS Slovak Republic State enterprise 
LVNL Netherlands Independent administrative body 
MATS Malta Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
M‐NAV F.Y.R.O.M. Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
MUAC - International organisation 
NATA Albania Albania Joint‐stock company (State‐owned) 
NATS United Kingdom Joint‐stock company (part‐private) 
NAV Portugal Portugal State enterprise 
NAVIAIR Denmark State enterprise 
Oro Navigacija Lithuania State enterprise 
PANSA Poland 
State body (acting as a legal entity with an 
autonomous budget) 
ROMATSA Romania State enterprise 
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ANSP Country Organisational & Corporate Arrangements 
Skyguide Switzerland Joint‐stock company (part‐private) 
Slovenia 
Control 
Slovenia State Enterprise 
SMATSA 
Serbia 
Limited liability company 
Montenegro 
Cyprus ANSP before was Government department and in 2015 started to be reformed 
again. DFS in Germany in 2002 was Limited Liability Company. LVNL (The Netherlands) 
in 2002 was State enterprise and Slovenia Control was a government department. State 
enterprise is a government-owned corporate entity operating under a special statute, not 
normal commercial law (PRU, 2004). Commercialization in ANSPS is deemed as a 
possible answer to financing and budgets constraints, as ANSPs were generally 
dependent on government budget for their capital and operational expenses. One 
important factor is reinvesting in the operational systems and enhancing performance and 
efficiency.  
According to ICAO Doc 9587 (2008) the objective of ongoing regulatory evolution is to 
create an environment in which international air transport may develop and flourish in a 
stable, efficient and economical manner without compromising safety and security and 
while respecting social and labour standards. One also very important aspect in aviation 
industry is cost. As far as the cost of infrastructure is concerned according to IATA (2013a) 
airlines and passengers are estimated to have paid at least US$92.3 billion for the use of 
airport and air navigation infrastructure globally in 2011, equivalent to 14.4% of the cost of 
transport. Cost efficiency is quite critical for an airline to compete and survive in such a 
competitive market. Cockpit and cabin crew, aircraft ownership, fuel, maintenance, 
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handling and catering infrastructure, passenger services and distribution and other costs 
are the main costs for all airlines. ANS costs are the only costs that are the same for every 
carrier and the way the carriers operate does not affect the ANS cost significantly. All 
carriers are charged the same unit rate when they fly above a country.  
The Cost Effectiveness of ANSPs is measured by the annual ATM Cost-Effectiveness 
(ACE) Benchmarking Report conducted by Performance Review Unit of EUROCONTROL. 
The main indicators that are taken under consideration are the ATCO-hour productivity, 
i.e. the number of flight hours handled by each ATCO hour. This is can be influenced by 
sector productivity (reflecting whether the number of sectors is optimal for the volume and 
pattern of traffic), staffing per sector and ATCO productivity (reflecting, for example, the 
efficiency and flexibility of ATCO rostering) (PRU, 2004). On the other hand, it is important 
to recognise that a single flight hour can make different demands on ATCOs, depending 
on the nature of the flight and the extent to which it interacts with other traffic. Thus, the 
productivity is related to the complexity of the airspace.  
The second main indicator is ATCO employment costs, which is closely related to the 
wages and working practices (the trade unions power plays an important role in the 
negotiations of the salaries) but will also reflect local economic conditions that are outside 
of management’s control. The last main indicator for the cost effectiveness of ANS is the 
support costs, and in particular, the ratio of total ATM/CNS provision costs to ATCO 
employment costs.  
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Figure 20: PRU Framework for Cost Effectiveness Analysis (PRU, 2004: vii) 
One of the main cost drivers for ANSPs costs is the complexity of the controlled airspace. 
The complexity of the airspace is closely related with the ATCO’s workload. Complexity 
covers anything that increases the possibility of airplanes interacting with each other and 
therefore ATCOs may need to take action to ensure that safe distances are maintained 
(NERA, 2006). Apart from the volume of airplanes handled, the complexity is affected by 
whether certain routes cross each other and therefore give rise to potential conflict 
situations, i.e. in the horizontal routes level. Moreover, whether there is a mix of traffic that 
may be either climbing, descending or cruising within a particular area of airspace, i.e. the 
vertical evolution of airplanes is affecting the complexity of the airspace. Finally yet 
importantly, the mix of traffic speeds is influencing the complexity. Even if all planes are 
following the same route and flying in the same direction, if some are faster than others 
are, then ATCOs will need to ensure that faster planes do not catch up with preceding 
slower planes. Thus when the airspace is more complex, more ATCOs will be needed to 
ensure the safe separation between planes and in general safe operations.  
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The risks related to the revenues of ANSPs are the demand, the exchange rate and the 
debt. The politic/economic climate, the changes in air traveller preferences and climate 
events like volcanic eruptions can affect the revenues of ANSPs since the traffic is 
affected. The traffic risk sharing arrangement from SES Charging Regulation can mitigate 
the risk and will be explained in a later chapter. Unlike in other industries, demand is not 
affected by competition, as ANSPs are monopoly service providers. One other risk for 
those ANSPs that are not in Eurozone is the exchange rate. ANSP charges are initially 
fixed in terms of the domestic currency and converted to Euros using estimates of monthly 
average exchange rates thus there can be a positive or negative effect on revenues of the 
ANSP. Finally, ANSPs face a small risk of non-payment from airlines with hectic economic 
situation.  
On the other hand, the risk associated with cost are related to the cost variations, 
exchange rations and policy and regulation. There is a possibility that increases in charges 
do not keep pace with increases in the cost base due to for instance inflation. The 
difference in the exchange rate between euro and other currencies has an impact on the 
costs of the ANSPs too. Finally risk in cost associated with possible changes to the 
regulatory framework and relatively frequent changes to regulated charges can increase 
the uncertainty of ANSP. Nevertheless, ICAO requires that states offer support to an 
ANSP by providing distress finance or direct grants (Steer Davies Gleave, 2014).  
The liberalization in the Air Navigation Service Provision was preceded by the liberalization 
of airline activities. ANS in Europe started being liberalised through Single European Sky 
and Functional Airspace Blocks. First proposed in 2004 and established in 2009, the FABs 
were implemented 4 December 2012. Although on the air carrier side the private 
participation, privatization and commercialization was faster than for airports and Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ICAO, 2003), it is deemed necessary to liberalise the ANS 
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provision in order to improve the efficiency of aviation system and deliver a better value for 
money and time for the passenger. Small ANSPs face difficulties in fully taking advantage 
of economies of scale and dealing with the high cost of investments. ATC services like 
meteorology and data communication services could be unbundled and outsourced, thus 
leading to reduced costs and overall efficiency gains (Efthymiou et al, 2016). 
The ANSPs and the airports have some similarities in terms of the sunk costs and the 
natural monopoly forms. Niemeier (2002) researched the German airports regulatory 
system in the first stages of liberalisation and concluded that the inefficient cost-plus 
regulation does not increase the economic welfare and it is necessary to install an 
independent regulator (to price cap airports) and to intensify competition by privatization, 
cross-ownership restrictions, competition from near airport sites, slot auctioning and open 
skies. 
Since transport infrastructure is characterised by very high asset-specificity due to the 
sunk costs on durable and immobile investments, it is important to prevent market abuse, 
opportunistic behaviour and provide adequate levels and quality of service at reasonable 
process according to ITF/OECD (2011). Moreover, an independent regulator ‘shields 
market interventions from interference from ‘captured’ politicians and bureaucrats’ (OECD 
2002). The regulator should be independent of government and operate in a transparent 
fixed framework set by legislative act maintaining their independence.  
Within the last years, the examples of changes in the ownership forms, pricing and 
investment regulation and the liberation on service provision are quite impressive. The 
Performance Regulation 550/2004 brought a relative liberalisation by stating that the issue 
of certificates shall confer on ANSPs the possibility of offering their services to other 
ANSPs, airspace users and airports within the Community. By this way, there is no 
obligation on choice and the management of performance of the service provider is done 
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through an arm’s length commercial contract. For instance, NATS, the ANSP of UK, has 
no monopoly on terminal ATM service provision and it provides such services at 15 of the 
90 or so UK airports where terminal ATC services is required.  
Furthermore, according to the EC Regulation 2015/340 laying down technical 
requirements and administrative procedures relating to air traffic controllers' licences and 
certificates pursuant, a mutual recognition of the certificates issued by ATCO training 
organisations across the European Union and harmonises the medical requirements for 
pilots and controllers facilitating the mobility of Air Traffic Controllers in Europe. 
The system before SES was deemed insufficient and costly. For instance, the estimated 
costs of fragmentation of airspace amounts to 4 billion EUR a year and the five biggest 
ANSPs (AENA-Spain, DSNA-France, NATS-UK, DFS-Germany and ENAV-Italy) bear 
60.3% of total European gate-to-gate ATM/CNS provision costs and they operate 54% of 
European traffic according to EC (2015). SES separated the NSA/CAAs from the ANSPs 
to ensure safety and efficient supervision on the targets achievement.  
A random example of the situation is the traffic in April 2015. That month traffic increased 
by 1.7% compared to April 2014 and despite crisis traffic is increasing. En-route ATFM 
delays increased by 117% compared to April 2014 and airport ATFM delays increased by 
74%. Based on airline data, the average departure delay per flight from “All-Causes” was 
9.7 min per flight; this was an increase of 4% in comparison to the record low of 9.3 min 
per flight in 2013 according to EUROCONTROL (2015c).  
Bessley (1997) noted that the benefits of privatization derive partly from the ability to 
diversify and redeploy assets, unconstrained by nationalization statutes. Bessley (1997) 
also highlighted that privatisation is not just selling share, but it should be part of a whole 
scheme tailored to the particular conditions of each industry. Privatization schemes should 
be designed to maximize net consumer benefits, in terms of lower prices and improved 
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quality of service. It should be noted that competition in privatisation is the moving power 
for effective means of maximizing consumer benefits and curbing monopoly power. 
Moreover, Stricter competition policy is preferable to rate-of-return regulation, efficiency 
audits and related forms of government ‘nannying’” (Bessley, 1997) as well as it is 
essential to deal with social negative outcomes, such as transitional unemployment.  
The adjustment results depend on a variety of factors, which are a) motivation for 
regulation, b) the types of methods of regulation, c) the structure of the setup process, d) 
the characteristics of the industry/sector and e) the economic and legal environment in 
which the regulation takes place (Joskow & Rose, 1989, p. 1451).  
In natural monopoly, the producer can minimize the cost, but an unregulated market may 
lead to prices or costs to quite high level (Joskow & Rose, 1989, p. 1454). Price regulation 
and absence of market entry may be a good practice in regulatory perspective if a) the 
production of a single company of one or more goods minimizes costs, b) a company with 
a statutory/legal monopoly chooses average prices and earnings, which are too high and 
individual prices can be either too high or too low, c) the fear of entry of new competitors in 
the market cannot teach a 'lesson' to the monopolist and e) the insufficient market entry 
may result from the absence of a legal monopolist even if the prices are under regulation  
(Joskow & Rose, 1989, p. 1454). The regulation aims to regulate the entry of potential 
competitors in the market to achieve economies of a business, to set the price so that 
there are insufficient or supernormal profits and to regulate the structure of values so as 
the individual values to be profitable  (Joskow & Rose, 1989, p. 1454). 
Measuring the effects of economic regulation is achieved through some indicators 
considering the behaviour and performance of the company and/or the market. The most 
important indicators are  (Joskow & Rose, 1989, p. 1457):  
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 The average price level and structure of prices (e.g. non-unified and non-linear 
tariff, pricing for natural monopolies of many products) 
 Static costs of production, including: 
 Distortion of input 
 Ineffectiveness under imperfect competition  
 Direct costs of regulation 
 Paid input prices  
 Dynamic efficiency, including the degree and direction of innovation and productivity 
 The quality and type of the product 
 The distribution of income and leases including 
 Profitability of regulated firms 
 Sharing leases with production factors 
 Income transfers between customer groups 
 Income transfers between producers group  
According to Salvatore Sciacchitano, executive secretary of ECAC ‘liberalization of market 
entry and fair competition go together and are keywords that have characterized the 
development of aviation in the last decades in Europe’  (Sciacchitano, 2013). According to 
O’Connell and Warnock-Smith (2013) yield decreased due to continued liberalization of air 
services, high levels of competition, rising fuel bills and volatile operating environments.  
According to Matthew Baldwin, Director for Aviation and International Transport Affairs, 
European Commission (Baldwin, 2013) Europe is the most liberalized market for aviation 
in the world. Airfares can be set freely, routes can be free in single aviation market 
(including cabotage), there is no limit to the number of carriers and frequency, as well as 
the ownership and control of European airlines. Moreover, the last ten (10) years have 
been at the forefront agreements with Morocco, the Western Balkans, Jordan, Georgia, 
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Moldova, Ukraine, Lebanon, Azerbaijan and Tunisia. Agreements with Morocco and the 
Western Balkans signed in 2006, reduced tariffs by 40% and benefits from 2006 to 2011 is 
estimated at 6 billion euros (Baldwin, 2013). 
The central issue of regulatory economics according to Train (1991) is the design of 
mechanisms that regulators can apply to induce firms to achieve optimal outcomes. It 
should be noticed that uncertainty has important implications for the behaviour of the firm 
and consequently for the design of appropriate regulation. According to Armstrong and 
Sappington (2007: 1607) ‘the policies are sorted on four dimensions: (1) the extent of 
pricing flexibility granted to the regulated firm; (2) the manner in which regulatory policy is 
implemented and revised over time; (3) the degree to which regulated prices are linked to 
realized costs; and (4) the discretion that regulators themselves have when they formulate 
policy’. 
There are different forms of regulation. For instance, there is the rate of return regulation 
and the RPI-X regulation. Apart from those, tree other alternative types of regulation are 
market-based instruments, self-regulation and co-regulation approaches, and information 
and education schemes. 
Rate of Return (ROR) regulation follows the process described below (Bessley, 2005: 57):  
“The regulated company files a tariff when it wishes to revise its prices. For an agreed test 
period (‘frequently the latest 12-month period for which complete data are available’ 
(Phillips 1969)), the company calculates operating costs, capital employed and cost of 
capital. The regulator audits these calculations and determines a fair rate of return on 
capital employed. These data plus assumptions about demand are used to calculate the 
total revenue requirement. This determines the level of the tariff. The structure of the tariff 
has to avoid unfairness and unjust or unreasonable discrimination. The tariff therefore has 
to be approved on a line-by-line or service-by-service basis, which typically requires the 
allocation of common costs on the basis of, for example, output, direct costs, revenues, 
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etc. An approved tariff generally stands until the company files to change it, usually on the 
grounds that the achieved rate of return has become inadequate.” 
According to Adler et al (2015) the RoR regulation has few incentives for the regulated firm 
to control costs and could lead to over-capitalization. The rate of return on capital is 
defined (Train, 1991:33-34) as (PQ-wL)/K, where L is the only one noncapital input and K 
the level of capital investment and wL the cost for noncapital inputs. Based on ROR 
regulation an ANSP can choose any K, L, Q and P as long as the fair rate of return f is: 
f≥ (PQ-wL) K 
Thus, the maximum economic profit an ANSP is allowed to earn is (f-r) K since economic 
profits are the difference between the ANSP’s revenue and its costs for all inputs, including 
capital, meaning  
π=PQ-wL-rK 
Under the ROR regulation (Train, 1991) the hypothesis that an ANSP faces two scenarios, 
bad and good luck, exists. Good luck means that the ANSP is able to earn greater profits 
at each input combination than under bad luck. In addition, each ANSP does not know its 
exact profits at each level of capital and it calculates the expected. It is assumed that there 
are equal chances for the two scenarios to occur. The ANSP ‘s expected profit then is the 
average of its sliced-off good luck and bad luck hills. 
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Figure 21: Example of regulated ANSP under uncertainty (Train, 1991: 102) 
According to Figure 21, the ANSP in the good luck scenario would earn excessive profit 
over a range of capital levels. The constraint plane slices off this part. In the case of the 
bad luck scenario, the ANSP earns less than the cap. The maximum expected profits 
occur at capital KR. If the ANSP knew that the good (bad) luck scenario would prevail, it 
would choose KG (KB). Because of uncertainty, the ANSP chooses KR as a weighted 
average solution. The constraint plane depends on the shapes of the good and bad luck 
scenario hills and the maximum allowed rate of return (cap).  
This regulatory system aims to control prices. For a period of 4-5 years, the ANSP should 
not make any increase in the average price of a pre-specified basket of its goods and 
services larger than RPI-X, where RPI is the retail price index (i.e. the rate of inflation) and 
X is a performance related figure specified by the regulator. At the end of the specified 
period, the level of X is reset by the regulator, and the process is repeated.  
According to Bessley (2005) RPI—X is less vulnerable to ‘cost-plus’ inefficiency and 
overcapitalization (the ‘Averch-Johnson effect’) than the rate of return (RoR) regulation. 
Furthermore, RPI—X system offers more scope for bargaining, especially on productivity 
and offers the company more flexibility in pricing.  
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The ‘cost of capital’ to a company and the required rate of return to the prospective 
provider of finance are not identical. Divergences will occur under respective transactions 
costs and tax positions. The regulators in order to control prices and assure competition 
needs to be fully informed concerning the scope for cost reductions and the extent and 
effects of new entry. Bessley (2005: 371) stated “the aim of an RPI/CPI—X regime is to set 
up a total allowed revenue stream for a period of years ahead, with the intention to create 
an incentive to beat the productivity gains built into that allowed revenue”. 
Table 14: Price cap versus rate of return regulation (Armstrong and Sappington, 
2007:1608) 
 Price Cap Rate of return 
Firm’s flexibility over relative prices  Yes No 
Regulatory lag  Long Short 
Sensitivity of prices to realized costs  Low High 
Regulatory discretion  Substantial Limited 
Incentives for cost reduction  Strong Limited 
Incentives for durable sunk investment  Limited Strong 
According to Train (1991) the aspects of monopoly control that regulation is intended to 
address such as high prices are not necessarily mitigated and could made worse, by the 
regulation. Averch and Johnson created a model, known as A-J model that shows that the 
regulatory procedure does not induce the firm to choose the socially optimal outcome, but 
can be used to identify other types of regulation that do.  
Under rate of return regulation, the firm can earn only up to the “fair rate” of return on its 
capital investment. The firm is free to choose the price, output level and inputs under the 
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condition that its profits do not exceed the fair rate. This regulation can sometimes lead to 
the opposite outcome, since firms face perverse incentives that operate against optimality.  
ICAO Doc 9161 (2013) states that the rate of return regulation (also called cost of service 
or cost plus regulation) may provide the ANSP with a strong incentive for over-investment 
in order to increase the volume of its profit. Where there are no other incentives on 
efficiency (for example, through governance) rate of return regulation may provide limited 
incentive to cost-effectiveness and may also encourage overinvestment beyond the 
requirement of users.  
On the other hand, under the price cap regulation if the ANSP exceeds the target, it may 
keep any over-recoveries according to ICAO Doc 9161 (2013). Where the target is not 
met, the ANSP would not be allowed to increase charges to compensate for the under-
recovery and would have to find the means to balance its accounts during the regulated 
period. Under this scenario, the ANSP has a strong incentive to improve its efficiency and 
reduce its costs. On the other hand, an ANSP may have an incentive to overstate capital 
expenditure prior to the price cap being set and, subsequently, not to undertake the full 
programme (the price cap can give the ANSP a short-term return on the assets without 
actually having to invest in them). It can be proven quite complex and hence expensive for 
a regulator to monitor and evaluate the efficiency of such a regulation.  
Output-based price caps may mitigate this problem. Prices set instead in relation to output 
performance may provide better incentives to invest efficiently. The price can be varied up 
or down based on meeting performance specifications. If price caps can be linked closely 
to outputs over time, the ANSP will have fewer incentives to delay or not undertake 
productive investments. The barriers to this form of regulation are the long lead times to 
investment such that the benefits in terms of outputs are often achieved only many years 
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later and the challenge of defining outputs in such a way that they cover service quality as 
well as capacity (ICAO Doc 9161, 2013).  
Market based regulatory instruments according to OECD act to change or modify 
behaviour through the economic incentives facing businesses. Trading schemes are a 
common form of market-based instrument. MBI change relative prices and/or create 
trading opportunities. Fiscal measures like taxes and subsidies, are also commonly used 
MBI. Taxes are often imposed on harmful activities, such as tobacco products to make 
them relatively more expensive and discourage their consumption. Subsides on the 
contrary are used to encourage consumption or production of activities or products which 
are considered desirable. OECD stated “the key advantage of market-based instruments is 
that they reflect decisions made by citizens and businesses in response to the incentives 
they face, therefore Market-based instruments are generally very flexible instruments”. 
MBI are extensively used in environment and natural resource management issues.  
Another type of regulation is Return on Output (ROO) regulation. The firm under this 
regulation can earn a certain amount of profit up to the allowed amount per unit of output it 
sells, being free to choose its output and input level as well as the price (Train, 1991). 
Under the Return on Sales (ROS) regulation, the firm is allowed to earn a specific amount 
of profit on each euro (Train, 1991). If marginal revenue is positive up to the second best 
output then the firm behaves like under the ROO regulation, approaching arbitrarily 
closely. On the other hand, Return on Cost (ROC) regulation allows to the firm a certain 
amount of profit on each euro it expends. The firm increases its allowed profit by 
increasing its costs. However, if marginal revenue is negative, then the firm obtains more 
revenues by not increasing output. Self-regulation and co-regulation is another type of 
alternative regulation. Industry self-regulation, broadly defined, can be seen as taking 
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place when a group of firms exerts control over its own membership and their behaviour 
(Baldwin et al, 2013). 
According to Coglianese, Nash and Olmstead (2002) the regulatory system is performance 
based when performance is used as:  
 the basis for the legal commands found in regulatory standards,  
 a criterion for allocating enforcement and compliance resources,  
 a trigger for the application of differentiated (or tiered) regulatory standards, and  
 a basis for evaluating regulatory programs and agencies. 
The performance based standards rely on the ability of the regulator to specify, measure 
and monitor the performance. The information may be extremely difficult to be obtained. 
When the implementation is hectic, the effect will be poor and the target of the regulation 
will not be reached (Coglianese et al, 2002) 
According to ICAO Doc 9980 (2012) the characteristics of ANS provision are much 
different from those of the airports. ANS rely on facilities and services provided by other 
states, since they extend over all the territory of the State concerned and sometimes 
beyond. ANS provision has an international dimension based on necessary multistate 
cooperation especially for route facilities and services.  
4.6 Performance  
The performance in Single European Sky is focusing on four Key Performance Areas 
(KPAs) a) Safety, b) Capacity, c) Cost-Efficiency and d) Environment. The 4 KPAs are part 
of the wider set of 11 ICAO KPAs, which also include efficiency, flexibility, predictability, 
security, access & equity, interoperability and participation. The implementation as from 1 
January 2012 of the performance scheme aims at setting and implementing binding 
targets for EU Member States through the adoption of European-Union wide performance 
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targets and approval of consistent National or Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB) 
performance plans.  
Commercial aircraft operate at cruise altitudes of 8 to 13 km, where they release gases 
and particulates that alter the atmospheric composition and contribute to climate change. 
The effects of non-CO2 emissions (which have no Kyoto Protocol equivalent values) are 
still scientifically less well understood although there are indications that certain non-CO2 
emissions could have effects in some cases. In the case of contrails, the impact could be 
significant, but scientific understanding of the direction and magnitude of the impact is not 
currently well consolidated. To control the beyond CO2 emissions, environment is included 
in the Key Performance Areas.  
The Performance Scheme is developed in different periods, which are called Reference 
Periods (RP). The first RP is covering the years 2012-2014. The second RP starts at 2015 
and finishes at 2019. A critical point in Performance Regulation is the Monitoring, including 
data collection and dissemination. If there is an evidence that the targets will not be 
reached, then the introduction of corrective measures is necessary.  
The estimated Total Economic Cost (TEC) for 2012 is around €10.5 bn for the SES area 
(Grififths, 2014). The user charges are estimated to 7.5 bn euro. In another presentation in 
2011 (Grififths, 2013), the ANS total economic cost was €14 bn p.a., where the user 
charges were estimated to €9 Bn p.a. The cost of ATFM delays in 2011 was estimated at 
€1.4B and the flight efficiency €3.8 B (en-route for €2B and TMA, taxi for €1.8B) whereas 
the ATFM delays cost in 2012 was estimated to be €0.8B and the flight efficiency €2.2B 
(en route for €1B and TMA, taxi for €1.2B). There are no available data after 2012. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the efficiency is improving. The ATFM delay and flight-
efficiency cost estimates are not included in the user charges. Airborne ANS cost, SESAR 
and NEXTGEN cost is not included.  
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4.6.1 KPA: Safety  
Safety is the first priority in air transportation. The role of ATM is vital in ensuring overall 
aviation safety for example by providing separation between aircraft. Uniform safety 
standards and risk and safety management practices should be applied systematically to 
the Air Navigation System. To ensure safety to the maximum extent, criteria and 
standardised safety management processes and practices should be implemented to the 
global aviation system.  
4.6.2 KPA: Capacity  
The area of Capacity is another important area for the European Airspace. The system 
should find a way to meet airspace user demand at peak times and locations and to keep 
up with the demand of the traffic flows. To respond to future growth, capacity must 
increase, along with corresponding increases in efficiency, flexibility, and predictability 
while ensuring that there are no adverse impacts to safety giving due consideration to the 
environment.  
For the first Reference Period (RP1) a Union-Wide target has been set for en-route ATFM 
delays per flight. Furthermore, the performance regulation stipulates that the three PIs 
related to airport capacity (i.e. a. Arrival ATFM delay, b. additional Arrival sequencing and 
metering area (ASMA) time and c. Additional Taxi Out time) be monitored on. No targets 
have been set for ANS capacity at airports in RP1. Arrival ATFM delay and additional taxi-
out time is monitored for 77 airports that are subject to the Performance Regulation. As far 
as the ASMA is concerned, only airports accommodating more than 100,000 movements 
per annum, i.e. 39 airports, are subject to monitoring of additional ASMA time (PRB, 
2013).  
The Union-wide target for en-route ATFM delays in 2014 is 0.5 minutes per flight, with 
intermediate targets of 0.7 min/flight in 2012 and 0.6 min/flight in 2013 (PRB, 2013). The 
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Union-wide capacity performance is the aggregation of both national and FAB capacity 
performance. As far as the ASMA is concerned, additional taxi-out times are higher in 
winter than in summer due to remote de-icing and snow removal operations. In addition, it 
is recognised at several airports that Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) can 
significantly reduce taxi-out time (PRB, 2013).  
4.6.3 KPA: Cost-Efficiency  
The third area that the Single European Sky is regulating is the cost-efficiency. Any 
proposals for changes in the ATM (e.g. investments in infrastructure) should always take 
under consideration the cost of service to airspace users for improving ATM service quality 
or performance. In addition, the ICAO guidelines regarding user charge policies and 
principles should be followed. 
Under the cost efficiency KPA, Union-wide targets have been set for the average 
determined unit rate (DUR) for en-route ANS in 2012 (€57.88), 2013 (€55.87) and 2014 
(€53.92). The aggregation of the individual national cost-efficiency targets for RP1 
provides for a slightly lower figure for 2012 (€57.75) and higher figures for 2013 (€56.69) 
and 2014 (€54.84) (EUROCONTROL, 2015b).  
The results of the second year of RP1, under the Deducted Costs (DCs) method with 
specific risk-sharing arrangements according to the PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2013 
(PRB, 2013) were as expected. The ANSPs took action and complied with the new 
calculation method. In a 2014 report one of the recommendations of PRB to EC is the 
provision of more detailed information on the computation of the cost of capital (CAPEX) in 
Annual Monitoring Reports and in the Performance Plans for RP2 (PRB, 2014b). This is 
related to the lack of clarity for the calculation of the cost of the service and therefore the 
determination of the charge. The en-route cost-efficiency performance is improving since 
2012. The en-route unit costs decreased 5% compared to 2013 mainly due to the notable 
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traffic growth (5.9%) according to EUROCONTROL/Performance Review Commission 
report for 2015 (2016).  
4.6.4 KPA: Environment  
The Air Navigation System should contribute to the protection of the environment by 
considering noise, gaseous emissions, and other environmental issues in the 
implementation and operation of the global Air Navigation System. According to 
Regulation 691/2010 “the Performance Scheme” the main objective is to reduce ANS 
related CO2 emissions and Local Air Quality (LAQ) through flight efficiency improvements, 
both in the air and on the ground.  
The first Reference Period (RP1) focused on improvements on average horizontal en 
route flight efficiency of last filed flight plan (KEP) in European Network level (reduction of -
0.75% of the route extension in 2014 compared to the 2009 baseline equal to 5.42%) only 
and not mandatory to national/FAB level and monitoring on Effective use of Civil/Military 
airspace structures (PRB, 2013). The other objectives of RP1 are:  
1. Develop and support the deployment of 500 airspace changes in 2012 – 2014. 
2. Support the implementation of Free Route Airspace (FRA) in 25 ACCs by 2014. 
3. Increase annually the number of Conditional Routes (CDR) by 5% annually 
according to the Flexible Use of Airspace Concept (FUAC). 
4. Increase annually the CDR1/2 availability and usage by an average of 5% annually 
(FUA). 
5. Reduce the route unavailability (in time and quantity) by 10% in 2013 and 2014 
(FUA). 
6. Reduction of vertical flight inefficiency by 5% in 2014. 
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The FUA indicators (bullet 3-5) are reported on quarterly. Flight efficiency (bullet 6) is 
reported on only twice per year. 
Whereas the main objective for the second Reference Period (RP2) is in EU wide level 
and in national/FAB level (PRB, 2014a). The focus of RP2 is on: 
1. Average horizontal en route flight efficiency of last filed flight plan (target is set in 
European Network level (KEP=4.1%); 
2. Horizontal flight efficiency of actual trajectory (KEA) (target is set in EU wide level 
(KEA=2.6%) and in FAB level-different for every FAB); 
3. Effectiveness of booking procedures for Free Use of Airspace (only monitoring in 
EU wide level and in national/FAB level); 
4. Rate of planning of CDRs (only monitoring in EU wide level and in national/FAB 
level); 
5. Effective use of CDRs (only monitoring in EU wide level and in national/FAB level); 
6. Additional time in taxi-out phase (only monitoring in National/FAB level and in 
airport level); 
7. Additional time in terminal airspace (ASMA) (only monitoring in National / FAB level 
and in airport level).  
Monitoring of the ASMA and Additional taxi-out time indicators has started during RP1, 
under the Capacity KPA. The rationale for monitoring is to gain experience with the 










Table 15: Estimated ANS-related impact on fuel burn and CO2 emissions savings 
(EUROCONTROL/Performance Review Commission, 2015) 
 
Environmental impact assessment studies were conducted by EUROCONTROL in order 
to evaluate the impact of the FABs creation the environmental performance of SES. For 
instance, the DANUBE FAB Environmental Impact Assessment Study was carried out 
using the System for traffic Assignment and Analysis at a Macroscopic level (SAAM) fast-
time simulation tool to calculate the changes in fuel use and CO2 emissions n the Danube 
FAB airspace above FL09 (Kantareva et al, 2016). The study concluded that the annual 
fuel saving due to the FAB implementation will be 45,000 tonnes by 2020 and 80,000 
tonnes by 2030. The annual CO2 savings are expected to be 143,000 tonnes by 2020 and 
255,000 by 2030 (Kantareva et al, 2016). 
4.6.4.1 Flight efficiency improvements  
During the last decade, a higher increase in capacity than the traffic growth was achieved, 
while maintaining safety standards. At the same time, more efficient routes were 
implemented. Currently, the European ATS route network distances are only 3.6% longer 
than the Great Circle distances (for intra-European flights) (IATA, EUROCONTROL, 
CANSO, 2008). An initial assessment of the European ATS route network design, 
availability and utilisation indicates that flight efficiency could further improve by enhancing 
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both route availability and utilisation. The restrictions imposed on the utilisation of the 
European ATS route network contribute with approximately 0.4% to the airspace utilisation 
inefficiency.  
EUROCONTROL developed a Flight Efficiency Plan (FEP) containing 5 Action Points that 
required immediate attention (EUROCONTROL.int, 2016d): 
1. Enhancing European en-route airspace design 
2. Improving airspace utilization and route network availability 
3. Efficient TMA design and utilization 
4. Optimizing airport operations 
5. Improving awareness of performance 
These action points could save the airlines 470,000 tons of fuel each year – the equivalent 
of 390 million euros and 1.5 million tons of CO2 emissions (EUROCONTROL.int, 2016d). 
In Figure 22, the comparison of US and Europe in terms of en route flight efficiency is 
shown. The data of Europe (i.e. the 41 member states of EUROCONTROL) appear from 
2011 and afterwards. Data were not gathered prior to SES. An “inefficiency” of 5% means 
for instance that the extra distance over 1 000NM was 50NM. One interesting element to 
note is the difference between the actual and filed plan. Airlines fly more direct routes (i.e. 
closer to the great distance cycle).  
161 
 
Figure 22: Evolution of horizontal flight efficiency (actual and flight plan) (2008-2015) (FAA 
and EUROCONTROL, 2016)  
Airframe design, weight, weather conditions and the airspace they are flying in influences 
the optimum cruise conditions. Flight Management Systems on board of aircraft can 
determine the most efficient cruise altitude and speed to optimise fuel burn. ATM can 
assist in this process by enabling capacity in the en-route phase of flight to offer aircraft 
the cruise levels and speeds they request to burn less fuel. Furthermore, taking advantage 
of the wind can offer efficiency gains. 
Flight efficiency can be measured horizontally or vertically. The factors influencing 
horizontal flight efficiency are illustrated in Figure 23 created by ICAO (Doc 030, 2013). 
The figure also describes the planning process of an optimized Flight Plan Routing. States 
that do not have a central archive of surveillance data use indicator option A based on the 
last filed flight plan trajectory. If surveillance data are available (radar data, ADS-B data or 
other), States use the actual trajectory (indicator option B). 
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Figure 23: The planning process of an optimized Flight Plan Routing (ICAO Doc 030, 
2013) 
Furthermore, according to ICAO (Doc 030, 2013) the desired outcome is not to achieve 
zero extra distance, since that would create operational and economic problems. The 
user-preferred trajectory rarely corresponds to the direct route. Computing the indicator for 
wind-optimum trajectories (assuming such data are available), for example, can produce 
an extra distance compared to the direct route. This is because more favourable wind 
situations (e.g. high wind speed bands over the Northern Atlantic Ocean) can increase the 
groundspeed of an airplane and so reduce flight time based costs (e.g. aircraft or fuel). 
Hence, it is not advised to attempt a reduction of the horizontal en route flight efficiency 
indicator towards its theoretical limit (zero). 
4.6.4.1.1 The NATS’s 3Di inefficiency scoring model 
NATS has developed a flight efficiency metric, called 3Di inefficiency score 3Di (NATS, 
2014). The 3Di is an average efficiency rating for vertical and horizontal trajectories. It 
applies to domestic airspace, for the airborne portion of flight only. It needs to be 
highlighted that because aircraft performance and in particular fuel flow rates vary across 
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the different phases of flight the metric applies different weightings for level flight occurring 
in climb, cruise, and descent phases of flight. The combination of those two factors (i.e. 
deviation from the optimal trajectory and flight phase related rating) gives the inefficiency 
score for each flight in the considered airspace. Scores run from 0, which represents zero 
inefficiency to over 100, with most flights typically having a score in the range between 15 
and 35. The score can be improved by better airspace design, controllers’ tools, flow 
management techniques, changes to procedures, awareness training, flexible use of 
airspace and optimised co-ordination across sectors. The score is also affected by the 
number of flights, the traffic demand on sectors, the weather, any unusual events (e.g. 
runway closure) and changes in the runway capacity.  
In the horizontal plane, it compares the actual radar ground-track against the (most direct) 
great circle track – between first and last radar point. Inefficiency in the horizontal plane is 
defined by the difference between these two distances, which describes the ‘additional 
miles flown’. In the vertical plane, it compares the actual vertical profile from radar data 
against a modelled ideal flight, defined as a continuous climb to the aircraft’s Requested 
Flight Level (for cruise), and followed by a continuous descent approach. Inefficiency is the 
difference between the ‘actual’ and ‘ideal’ flight profile. The vertical inefficiency is defined 
by the amount of flight time spent in level flight and the deviation from its requested cruise 
level. Level portions of flight at low altitude are more fuel penalising than at higher levels.  
By providing the most direct possible routes, smooth continuous climbs and descents and 
optimum flight levels during cruise, air traffic controllers aim to help reduce aircraft fuel 
burn and carbon emissions, earning a low 3Di score. The combination of 3Di airspace 
efficiency metric with the Flight Optimisation System, or ‘FLOSYS’ enables the Air traffic 
controllers to analyse the environmental efficiency of flights in near real-time.  
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By having access to this granularity of data for the first time, controllers and airspace 
managers will be able to better identify the opportunities for operational improvements that 
will save airlines fuel and cut carbon emissions. 
4.6.4.2 Continuous Descent Operation and Continuous Climb Operations 
During normal approaches, aircraft are often required by Air Traffic Control to descend 
early and to level off at intermediate altitudes. The flight phases at these lower altitudes 
are more fuel inefficient compared to flights in higher altitudes. Nowadays, it is the aim to 
keep aircraft as long as possible in the cruising level and to perform the succeeding 
descent with idle engine power to increase the fuel and noise efficiency. Therefore. 
Continuous Descent Operations (CDO) describes a descent technique whereby engines 
are as far as possible operated at idle thrust to reduce engine noise, fuel burn and exhaust 
gas emission during descent (Shresta, Neskovic and Williams, 2009).  
In ICAO Document 9931 (Doc 9931, 2010), the ‘Continuous Descent Operations Manual’, 
CDO is defined as “an aircraft operating technique aided by appropriate airspace and 
procedure design and appropriate ATC clearances enabling the execution of a flight profile 
optimized to the operating capability of the aircraft, with low engine thrust settings and, 
where possible, a low drag configuration, thereby reducing fuel burn and emissions during 
descent. The optimum vertical profile takes the form of a continuously descending path, 
with a minimum of level flight segments only as needed to decelerate and configure the 
aircraft or to establish on a landing guidance system (e.g. ILS).” 
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Figure 24 General CDO concept (EUROCONTROL, 2011a: 2) 
To achieve the maximum possible benefits of CDO in terms of fuel savings and noise 
reduction, the descent should be flown from the Top-of-Descent (TOD) to the Final 
Approach Fix (FAF) closed to the airport (ICAO Doc 9931, 2010). CDOs create 
measurable benefits concerning fuel burn and emission reductions even though if they are 
not introduced or flown to the full extend starting at the TOD. The establishment of some 
parts of continuous descents and the removal of only some level offs during a descent can 
also create measurable benefits (Shresta,  Neskovic and Williams, 2009). Resulting of 
such optimised descents according to the ICAO CDO manual can provide the following 
advantages ( ICAO Doc 9931, 2010): 
 more efficient use of airspace and arrival route placement 
 more consistent flight paths and stabilised approach paths 
 reduction in both, pilot and controller workload  
 reduction in the number of required radio transmissions  
 cost savings and environmental benefits caused by reduced fuel burn 
 reduction in the incidence of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) 
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 authorisation of operations where noise limitations would otherwise result in 
operations being curtailed or restricted.  
Also if the actual focus is on the descent phase of a flight, the principle of avoiding level 
offs at lower altitudes can be applied conversely to the climb phase of a flight. This method 
is called Continuous Climb Operations (CCO). ICAO Document 9993 (Doc 9993, 2013) 
defines CCO as “An operation, enabled by airspace design, procedure design and ATC, in 
which a departing aircraft climbs without interruption, to the greatest possible extent, by 
employing optimum climb engine thrust, at climb speeds until reaching the cruise flight 
level”. 
4.6.4.3 KPI: Average horizontal en-route flight efficiency: 
As described in section 4.6.4.1,  the average horizontal en-route flight efficiency (indicator) 
is the difference between the distance of the en-route part of the trajectory and the 
optimum trajectory which is, on average, the great circle distance. Thereby, “en-route” is 
defined as the distance flown outside a circle of 40 NM around the airport. The flights 
considered for the purpose of this indicator are: 
 all commercial IFR flights within European airspace; 
 where a flight departs or arrives outside the European airspace, only that part inside 
the European airspace is considered; 
 circular flights and flights with a great circle distance shorter than 80NM between 
terminal areas are excluded. 
4.6.4.4 Conditional Routes 
One other aspect that contributes to the improvement on the environment area are 
Conditional Routes (CDRs). A Conditional Route (CDR) is an ATS route that is only 
available for flight planning and is used under specified conditions. A Conditional Route 
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may have more than one category, and those categories may change at specified times 
(EUROCONTROL.int 2016e): 
 Category One - Permanently Plannable CDR: CDR1 routes are in general available 
for flight planning during times published in the relevant national Aeronautical 
Information Publication (AIP). Updated information on the availability in accordance 
with conditions published daily in EAUP/EUUPs. CDRs1 can either be established 
on an H 24 basis or for fixed time periods or at fixed flight level bands. 
 Category Two - Non-Permanently Plannable CDR: CDR2 routes may be available 
for flight planning. Flights may only be planned on a CDR2 in accordance with 
conditions published daily in the EAUP/EUUPs, and 
 Category Three - Not Plannable CDR: CDR3 routes are not available for flight 
planning; however, ATC Units may issue tactical clearances on such route 
segments. CDR3 are not subject to allocation the day before by Airspace 
Management Cell (AMCs).  
Figure 25 depicts the percentage of filed plans that used CDRs. The left shide shows that 
74% of airplanes that could have used CDR1s (that are permanently plannable) have 
planned to use CDR1. The right side though shows the CDR2 (that are not permanently 
plannable). The 64% of the airplanes planned on CDR2 (EUROCONTROL, 2013). The 
use of CDRs should be increased since the occurring benefits both for the environment 
and the economy are high.  
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Figure 25: Use of CDRs (EUROCONTROL, 2013: 22) 
For instance, improving flight plan quality and utilisation of civil/military airspace structures 
can lead to reduction on emissions. Figure 26 depicts Conditional Routes (CDR) that could 
have been used during one peak day by the aircraft operators. The green routes are the 
available, but not used routes and the red routes are the used ones. In case all the 
available routes would be used at their full potential, annual savings of 30.000 tons of 
fuel/year or reduced emissions of 100.000 tons of CO2/year could be achieved.  
 
Figure 26: Conditional Routes (CDR) during one peak day 
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Apart from improving airspace utilisation and route network availability, enhancing 
European airspace design and introducing a more efficient Terminal Airspace, by 
improving Terminal Airspace design and implementing Continuous Descent Approaches 
(CDAs), or optimising airport operations, by Implementing Airport Collaborative Decision 
Making (A-CDM) can lead to carbon offsetting. 
Through Collaborative Decision Making (CDM) procedures airport and aircraft operators, 
ground handlers and air traffic control share information, creating a common situational 
awareness for all actors. CDM is a concept to be implemented in an airport environment 
through the introduction of a set of operational procedures and automated processes.  
4.6.4.5 Free Route Airspace 
Free Route Airspace (FRA) is a specific airspace within which users shall freely plan their 
routes between an entry point and an exit point without reference to the ATS route 
network. In this airspace, flights will remain subject to air traffic control (SkyBrary, 2016). 
Despite FRA aims to its permanent implementation it is used during specific time periods. 
In complicated airspaces like MUAC, FRA plays an important role in its capacity. 
The main benefit from the implementation of FRA are straighter routes and the consequent 
reductions in the total flown distance, carried and burned fuel and emissions. This will 
reduce the weight of the aircraft during flight and hence will give a further benefit of 
reduced fuel burn and CO2 emissions during the whole flight. Additionally, FRA will 
significantly reduce complexity of the route structure and flight planning. Therefore, there 
are also opportunities to rationalise some legacy inefficiencies in the network. 
FRA is based on full trajectory operations. Thus, FRA concept brings increased flight 
predictability, reduced uncertainty for the Network which in turn can lead to capacity 
increases for ATM which will also benefit the user (SESAR, 2014).  
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Several ACCs and ANSPs already implemented fully or partially Free Route Airspace with 
further phased implementations planned by all FABs/ANSPs over the period 2013-2019, 
including cross border operations then full free route implementation. Free Route 
operations are already operational in Portugal (24hrs), Maastricht (24hrs, night and week-
end in parts of the Area of Responsibility- AoR), Karlsruhe (24hrs in parts of the AoR), 
Ireland (24 hrs), Austria - night, Finland - night and weekend, Zagreb, Belgrade, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and joint Free Route in Denmark and Sweden. 
The implementation is coordinated through the NM European Route Network Improvement 
Plan (ERNIP) and the Network Operations Plan following the Strategic Objectives and 
Targets set in the Network Strategic Plan and in the Network Manager Performance Plan 
(SESAR, 2014).  
In Europe, there are many initiatives for the implementation of free route airspace. The first 
states, in which the FRA was implemented, were Sweden, Portugal and Ireland. The 
introduction of the FRA is easier to Portugal and Ireland due to the fact that their airspace 
extends above the Atlantic Ocean, through which leads the transit flight paths Europe - 
America thus to almost zero climbing / descent to / from the defined FRA area. 
From March 2011 142 ‘new direct routes’ become available to the airspace controlled by 
MUAC (EUROCONTROL, 2011b). Those routes contributed to the reduction of the flight 
time and the engine use, reduction of the fuel use, CO2 emissions and to the costs 
occurring from the high traffic density in the European airspace. For safety reasons those 
routes were conducted during the night but also during the weekend. They are also the 
first step to the «Free Route Airspace Maastricht (FRAM) programme» that aims to 
implement those routes to a daily and 24hours scale. The expected benefit of this change 
is 1.16 million Km less per year, meaning 3,700 tonnes of fuel less, 12,000 tonnes of CO2 
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and 37 tonnes less NOX in comparison to the previous routes (EUROCONTROL, 2011b). 
In Figure 27, the estimated implementation progress of FRA is presented during the years.  
 
 
Figure 27: Free Route Airspace Implementation 2014-2019 (NM, 2015) 
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The main problem is an insufficient ATC system, which cannot cope with the requirements 
of the FRAs. For example, it can be expected that a free-selected trajectories of a given 
number of aircraft will create a higher workload to Air Traffic Controller compared to an 
adherence of predefined airways serving for the same amount of aircraft. Another example 
is that a dynamic Flight Data Processing (FDP) makes a correct ordering of sectors for 
flights more difficult. Therefore, today’s ATC systems only support FRAs to a limited 
extent. 
4.6.4.6 Flexible Use of Airspace Concept 
The Flexible Use of Airspace Concept (FUAC) uses airspace structures and procedures 
that are particularly suited for temporary allocation and/or utilisation, such as Conditional 
Routes (CDRs), Temporary Reserved Areas (TRAs), Temporary Segregated areas 
(TSAs), Cross-Border Areas (CBAs), Reduced Coordination Airspace (RCA) and Prior 
Coordination Airspace (PCA). In order to improve the airspace utilisation in both a fixed 
route network and a free route environment, these airspace structures will be implemented 
according to the specific requirements (EUROCONTROL.int, 2016f).  
According to Commission Regulation 2150/2005 Flexible Use of Airspace is “an airspace 
management concept described by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
and developed by the European Organisation for the Safety of Aviation 
(EUROCONTROL), according to which airspace should not be designated as either purely 
civil or purely military airspace, but should rather be considered as one continuum in which 
all users’ requirements have to be accommodated to the maximum extent possible.” 
According to Commission Regulation 2150/2005 ‘airspace management cell (AMC)’ 
means a cell responsible for the day-to-day management of the airspace under the 
responsibility of one or more Member States. According to Commission Regulation 
2150/2005 ‘airspace restriction’ means a defined volume of airspace within which, 
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variously, activities dangerous to the flight of aircraft may be conducted at specified times 
(a ‘Danger Area’); or such airspace situated above the land areas or territorial waters of a 
State, within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in accordance with certain specified 
conditions (a ‘Restricted Area’); or airspace situated above the land areas or territorial 
waters of a State, within which the flight of aircraft is prohibited (a ‘Prohibited Area’)”.  
According to the Commission Regulation 2150/2005 the following principles shall be 
applied for the FUAC: 
(a) coordination between civil and military authorities shall be organised at the strategic, 
pre-tactical and tactical levels of airspace management through the establishment of 
agreements and procedures in order to increase safety and airspace capacity, and to 
improve the efficiency and flexibility of aircraft operations; 
(b) consistency between airspace management, air traffic flow management and air traffic 
services shall be established and maintained at the three levels of airspace management 
enumerated in point (a) in order to ensure, for the benefit of all users, efficiency in airspace 
planning, allocation and use; 
(c) the airspace reservation for exclusive or specific use of categories of users shall be of a 
temporary nature, applied only during limited periods of time based on actual use and 
released as soon as the activity having caused its establishment ceases; 
(d) Member States shall develop cooperation for the efficient and consistent application of 
the concept of flexible use of airspace across national borders and/or the boundaries of 
flight information regions, and shall in particular address cross-border activities; this 
cooperation shall cover all relevant legal, operational and technical issues; 
(e) air traffic services units and users shall make the best use of the available airspace. 
4.7 Summary  
The Single European Sky is an ambitious initiative of the European Commission. The SES 
aims to improve safety and capacity of the airspace, to make the air traffic management 
more cost efficient and to reduce the environmental impact of aviation operations. The 
most important regulation for SES is the Performance Regulation. The performance 
regulation sets targets, the so-called Performance Indicators, to the ANSPs in the four Key 
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Performance Areas, the Capacity, Safety, Cost Efficiency and Environment. In the 
environment area, the most important KPI is the horizontal en-route flight efficiency.  
After 2012, the horizontal en-route flight efficiency continued to improve. That trend 
continues until today. In 2012, the actual horizontal en-route extension was 5.15% of the 
GCD, quite close to the desired target (5.12%). Regional initiatives regarding FRA 
continue to bring benefit to environment and the harmonised approach in relation to 
Network Manager (NM) ensures the linkage of the different initiatives (EUROCONTROL, 
2013). Finally, the KPAs are characterised by trade-offs and synergies. For instance, 
improving safety reduces the cost efficiency due to the high investment in infrastructure.  
Reducing delays improves the flight efficiency.  
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5 Elaborations from Literature Review and Experts Consultation  
The environment is a dynamic and evolving system of natural and human factors. In the 
environment, living organisms operate or human activities take place. Environment has a 
direct or indirect, immediate or long-term effect or influence on the living beings or on 
human actions at a given time, and in a circumscribed area (Raven et al, 2015). 
The environmental awareness differs from airline to airline. There are some airlines that 
they take measured to reduce their carbon footprint and mitigate their negative 
externalities. The Lufthansa group for example, has taken many actions ranging from fleet 
modernisation to green buildings. The Lufthansa Group is also a member of the 
Sustainable Aviation Fuel Users Group (SAFUG) and of the Aviation Initiative for 
Renewable Energy in Germany e.V. (aireg) (Lufthansa Group, 2016). Environmental 
actions depend on the size of the airline. It should be noted that being environmentally 
friendly is a costly practice. Small airlines for instance may not be in position to afford 
green actions (e.g. use of biofuels) 
Developing environmental projects increases the cost of the airline, but at the same time, 
the economic objectives of firms may not conflict the environmental objectives. Following 
an environmental strategy might be a plan for operational expansion of an airline. For 
instance, it is very common airlines to sign MoU with biofuel providers. Some airlines (like 
KLM, Iberia, Virgin Atlantic, Azul airlines, Air France, United, American Airlines and Alaska 
airlines) have used biofuels and other airlines have not (e.g. Astra Airlines). It is evident 
then that within the same category of stakeholders there are different objectives and 
behaviours that need to be managed. Apart from that complying with environmental 
regulations and improving the environmental performance, is an action that requires effort 
and hides transaction costs.  
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It is unquestionable that the environment is priceless for the social welfare. Hence, there 
are several government policies to regulate actions and operations related to the 
environmental impact. In order for regulation to be implemented in the most efficient way 
and be followed ethically and fully, the understanding of the stakeholders is critical in order 
to manage them. This chapter will discuss the theory of multi-stakeholder analysis and 
management as well as the importance of transaction costs for environmental regulations.  
5.1 Multi-stakeholder Analysis and Management  
Stakeholder Analysis (SA) is a methodology used to facilitate institutional and policy 
reform processes by accounting for and often incorporating the needs of those who have a 
‘stake’ or an interest in the reforms under consideration (Pigman, 2007). In order to 
conduct an effective stakeholder analysis interviews were conducted directly with the 
stakeholders involved in the specific policy area. The content and questions of the 
interviews focused on background information on the policy making process, information 
that identifies key stakeholders from a variety of groups in the reform process, and 
questions about stakeholder power and interest in EU ETS and SES. The number of 
interviews was determined by taking into consideration field conditions and logistical 
constraints (e.g. sensitivity, access, time, budget, etc.). 
It is of critical importance to evaluate each stakeholder’s power and likely impact on the 
policy making process and this is done through several steps. The first step is to form a 
consortium and then to identify their position to the reform. This leads to the creation of 
groups/clusters that support, oppose or are indifferent to reform. The next step is to 
categorise the stakeholder data according to the power/influence and salience of each 
stakeholder. The regulator needs to understand their position in terms of the reform 
therefore it is critical to categorise the stakeholders according to the following attributes 
(worldbank.org, 2001):  
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 Promoters: Stakeholders who prioritise high the policy reform and their actions can 
impact the implementation of the policy. 
 Defenders: Stakeholders who prioritise high the policy reform but their actions do 
not have an impact on the implementation of the policy. 
 Latents: Stakeholders whose actions can affect the implementation of the policy but 
who prioritise low the reform policy • 
 Apathetics: Stakeholders whose actions cannot affect the implementation of the 
reform policy and at the same time attach a low priority to this policy  
The identification of the stakeholders and the application of the above categories, are 
necessary so at to determine appropriate responsive strategies (e.g. which stakeholders to 
target for negotiations and trade-offs, or which to buttress with resources and information, 
etc.). The Stakeholder Analysis among others aims to reveal and hence supports the 
stakeholder management approaches for balancing the power among weaker groups.  
According to Stoney and Winstanley (2001) stakeholder management approaches can be 
described following the five dimensions: political perspectives; purpose and objectives of 
considering stakeholders; value of considering stakeholders; considering stakeholder 
intervention levels; degree of stakeholder enforcement. There are different methodologies 
developed by individuals, companies, universities and government bodies for stakeholder 
identification and management.  
The stakeholders face four major attributes (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001), the 
stakeholders’ position on the reform issue, i.e. SES and EU ETS; the level of influence 
(negotiation power) they hold; the level of interest they have in SES and/or EU ETS; and 
the group/coalition to which they belong or can reasonably be associated with. These 
attributes are identified through various data collection methods, including interviews with 
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experts and with the actual stakeholders directly, as well as from literature review and 
public announcements.  
Jones et al. (2007) claimed that there are five categories of stakeholder cultures that are 
further subdivided into three typologies: amoral (i.e. agency culture or managerial egoism), 
limited morality (i.e. corporate egoism and instrumentalism) and broad morality (i.e. 
morality and altruism). Moreover, the position is related with the motives someone has. 
The motives can be idealistic/altruistic, individual, corporate or strategic (Jones et al. 
2007).  
Moreover, the stakeholders have power over a regulation. The power is described as the 
capacity to induce, persuade or coerce the actions of others and is displayed. Moreover, it 
can be displayed in different ways. It can be displayed as force, i.e. coercive power, 
material or financial resources, i.e. utilitarian power, or symbolic resources, i.e. normative 
power (Johnson et al., 2010; Ihlen and Berntzen, 2007).  
The level of influence depends on the stakeholder’s power for promoting its position on the 
regulatory reform. The priority and importance the stakeholder attaches to SES and/or EU 
ETS shows the level of interest or salience it has. The following matrix depicts the 
relationship of power and interest in an organisation. The power differential between an 
entity and its stakeholders will inform the strategies and tactics for dealing with each other 
(Kolk and Pinkse, 2006). The list of stakeholders is long and they have different opinions 
and interest that many times are a major source of conflict. Hence, SES and EU ETS 
regulations are influenced on several dimensions and in different ways.  
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Table 16: Power-Interest Matrix (Johnson and Scholes, 2010; Olander, 2007) 
 
Managing relationships in order to motivate stakeholders to behave in ways that support 
the objectives of SES and EU ETS is of critical importance for the social welfare. Thus, 
stakeholder management should be applied. According to Moloney (2006) stakeholder 
management can be an effective way to influence the achievement of the goals. For 
Vogwell (from Chinyio and Olomolaiye, 2010) stakeholder management is about creating 
the most positive environment in which to develop a project. According to Goodpaster 
(from Chinyio and Olomolaiye, 2010) there are 3 approaches for dealing with stakeholders: 
the strategic approach; the Multi-fiduciary approach; and the Stakeholder synthesis 
approach. Due to the nature of the stakeholders and the complexity of the relationships 
and interest, a mixed approach is more appropriate for handling the situation. The 
Stakeholder synthesis approach assumes a moral responsibility of the stakeholders which 
in this case cannot be granted since most of the stakeholders are competing with each 
other and/or don’t have a direct benefit from the achievements of the regulatory schemes, 
Maintain these 
















High Power & 
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i.e. SES and EU ETS. The Multi-fiduciary approach assumes a fiduciary responsibility to 
stakeholders, allotting them equal stakes with shareholders, something that cannot be 
achieved since by nature they cannot have the same stakes/benefits. The strategic 
approach allots shareholders’ profit a greater priority above the interests of other 
stakeholders. In this case, since the decision taker is the regulator the point of concern is 
the passenger in the narrow sense of SES and EU ETS, but when considering the general 
equilibrium of the system the industry and the research and development enables should 
be taken under considerations.  
5.2 Transaction Cost Economics theory and externalities  
Transaction costs are extremely high for solving externalities (Rao, 2003). Externality is 
the basis of environmental economics, whereas transaction is the basis of transaction cost 
economics. Environmental problems are a kind of competition over conflicting uses for 
scarce resources and the question that arises is who has the property rights of the 
resource. Who owns the clean air? Obviously, everyone has the right for clean air, but at 
the same time, the airspace users have the right to use the sky. Assigning property rights 
faces tremendous legal, cultural and technological barriers. 
Transaction cost theory deals with the coordination problem between more than two 
parties in conflict over resource use and potentially involves a transfer of property rights 
(McCann, 2013; Schniederjans and Hales, 2016). Environmental problems are 
fundamentally problems of poorly defined property rights (Coase, 1960). Once property 
rights have been assigned, the goods can be traded and the market place will reach a 
Pareto-efficient outcome according to Nalebuff (Rao, 2003). According to Coase when one 
assigns property rights, the market will be completed and efficient outcomes would be 
produced, since traditional externalities are the reflection of a missing market.  
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Nalebuff (from Rao, 2003) noticed that TC show that a market-based property rights (PR) 
approach is not a universal solution for environmental problems. Specifying PR aims to 
identify the stakeholders, and their rights and duties, in the sustainable use of specific 
resources. There are two big categories of environmental resources, a) res communis and 
b) res nullius. Res communis are “assets of global common interest but not amenable to 
state sovereign control; these are also referred to as common property resources”. Res 
nullius is “an asset amenable to control/acquisition/ownership or use but not yet in the 
possession of any entity of legal existence; these are also referred to as open-access 
resources” (Rao, 2003: 153). PR as well as liability rules (LR) apply to the resources in the 
res communis category (Rao, 2003).  
Since legally valid methods of global environmental accounting and sharing of 
responsibilities do not exist, global environmental externalities remain the norm (Rao, 
2003). PR and LR are very important for sharing of responsibilities in the governance of 
the global environment and coherent with the role of TC (Rao, 2003).  
Frequency, asset specificity, and uncertainty of the transaction depend on the size and the 
type of the stakeholder (McCann, 2013; Cacho et al, 2013). For example, a small airline 
like Bluebird Airways has higher costs to develop a trading strategy than Lufthansa for 
instance due to the necessary expertise already being developed in the big company. The 
same concept can be applied to ANSPs. Moreover, the more complex the regulatory 
scheme is, the higher the transaction costs. Companies need time to adapt to changes.  
Another important concept is Institutional Transaction Costs (ITC). ITC consist of (Rao, 
2003: 155):  
 Legislative or regulatory enactment costs;  
 Implementation costs;  
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 Monitoring costs and  
 Enforcement costs 
This part of TCE makes sense when it is applied to the Performance Regulation Scheme 
of the Single European Sky (SES). The performance scheme has legislative or regulatory 
enactment cost, cost related to setting the targets for the KPAs, implementation cost for 
the targets, monitoring cost to check the progress of the states/FABs as well as 
enforcement cost.  
Trading pollution rights is a policy instrument for controlling environmental externalities that 
first appeared during 1970s as cost-effective alternative to direct regulation by the 
government (Rao, 2003). Dales proposed the concept of marketable permits to allocate 
pollution reduction to private entities as a mechanism for cost-effective implementation, 
which was also explored by Montgomery (Rao, 2003).  
There is interdependence between the governmental institutions and the private market 
institutions. The government of private market institutions depends on the quality of the 
governance of the governmental institutions (Rao, 2003). This observation though 
depends on the country, since there are some countries where the general quality of these 
institutions is still lagging far behind those of some of the developed economies.  
According to Rao (2003) what are considered to be costs in the short term may essentially 
be viewed as investments for a return in the long run. This means that in case adaptation 
costs involve or lead to higher efficiency, these costs become negative and thus net 
benefits.  
The Coase theorem states that the assignment of private property rights could lead to an 
efficient outcome assuming zero transaction costs and common knowledge among 
participants in the environmental damage resolution or compensation negotiation (Brunner 
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and Enting, 2014). The fact is that the ill-defined enforceable property rights create 
externalities, but the application of property rights does not mean that efficient 
environmental solutions are given.  
Since expenditures for the obligations of the emissions trade cannot be used to realize 
emission abatement measures, all transaction costs are “deadweight losses”. According to 
Stavins (from Frasch, 2007:48) “Macroeconomic theory states that transaction costs 
hinder the cost-effective allocation of tradable permits as the volume traded decreases, 
which results in an increase of macroeconomic abatement costs”. In EU ETS the occurred 
Transaction Costs derive from non-trade related activities, therefore the above aspect is 
less important, since the effect on trade volume is not as significant as new institutional 
economics would expect.  
According to Stavins (1995) the following three sources for transaction costs exist in the 
context of emissions trading (Owen & Hanley, 2004: 144): 
1. search and information; 
2. bargaining and decision; 
3. monitoring and enforcement. 
Montero (from Owen & Hanley, 2004) expanded the approach of Stavins (1995), explained 
further the issue of transaction costs in a tradable permit system and confirmed the result 
that in the presence of transaction costs and uncertainty, the resulting permit price will be 
higher than that of a least cost solution. Montero (from Owen & Hanley, 2004) shows for 
the case of NOX abatement in the US, that despite considerable transaction cost, the cost-
saving potential of a tradable permit system as compared with a command and control 
approach is substantial. In emissions trading, the net buyers in the carbon market have to 
pay for the transactions costs via increased permit prices, whereas for carbon tax the TC 
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are commonly borne by the regulator, or may partially be rolled over to the taxpayer (Owen 
& Hanley, 2004).  
According to Helndl (2012) if, for example, transaction costs from environmental regulation 
are non-linear, alter the marginal condition for cost-minimization of firms and have a more 
severe impact on smaller firms or emitters compared to larger ones, then those policies 
induced ‘frictions’ could lead to larger optimal firm-size or larger optimal size of regulated 
sources of emissions in equilibrium. This may also work as a market entry barrier; thus, 
weakening competition.  
According to Montero (from Owen & Hanley, 2004) provided that agents willing to trade 
have to enter the market, find one another, communicate (negotiate price and quantity), 
and sign the corresponding legal contract, some level of transaction costs is always likely 
to exist – as in any market transaction. The regulatory requirements of trading permits are 
low.  
Stavins (from Heindl, 2012) states that if TC enters in a non-linear fashion into the cost 
function, the optimal amount of emissions under regulation e*TC  is no longer independent 
of initial free allocation received by a carrier, which also implies that actual emissions 
levels under transaction costs differ from first-best emissions levels e*TCi ≠e*i. This means 
that the permit price in equilibrium differs no matter of transaction costs (Helndl, 2012).  
Every carrier is having different TC, since the carriers differ in size and strength. Carriers 
are free to choose how much effort they will put in ETS after they met minimal 
requirements for compliance. The basis for creating equations on ETS and TC is the 
following (Helndl, 2012): 
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Costs for a single firm depend on individual abatement costs c(e) ≥0, the exogenous 
permit price p≥0 and emissions e≥ 0. The firm for a given level of production faces the 
problem (Heindl, 2012:6): 
𝐦𝐢𝐧𝒆[𝒄(𝒆) + 𝒑 ∗ 𝒆]  (1) 
Deriving by e yields the cost-minimizing level of emissions e* where the permit price 
equals marginal abatement costs: 
-c’(e)=p  (2) 
Overall emissions e are decomposed by e=a+u, where a is the free allocation received by 
the firm with a≥ 0 and u is the amount of permits that must be purchased for compliance or 
can be sold due to over-allocation.  
Bargaining is itself a transaction cost (Usher, 1998). Thus, there are inherent fundamental 
flaws in the assertions with Coasean proposals (Rao, 2003: 51). Bargaining/negotiations 
costs can be reduced substantially by exchanges like European Climate Exchange, 
because they provide standardized contracts and historical price information to facilitate 
negotiation. 
When a carrier chooses to trade then the p ∗ e, becomes p(a+u). Since carriers choose 
the optimal amount of transactions and consequently aim to minimize transaction costs 
given their specific needs then the corresponding condition for minimizing costs and the 
marginal condition are: 
𝐦𝐢𝐧𝒆[𝒄(𝒆) + 𝒑𝒆 + 𝒇(𝒆 − 𝒂)] (3) 
-c’(e)=p+f’(e-a)   (4) 
For airlines, the highest transaction costs occur from Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification (MRV) of emissions and permit trading. Carriers are obligated to measure or 
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calculate emissions. This process is time demanding because data on emissions have to 
be collected on the installation level and have to be analysed for emissions reporting each 
year. Emissions data must be verified by a certified and independent third party, which 
generates costs. Finally, the data have to be reported to the national authorities in a 
standardized form, which again is time demanding.  
These costs are likely to be dependent on emissions-levels with relatively high fixed costs 
and resulting scale economies in MRV activities. So, if MRV related TC are g(e)≥0, the 
cost function will be:  
𝐦𝐢𝐧𝒆[𝒄(𝒆) + 𝒑𝒆 + 𝒈(𝒆)] (5) 
and the corresponding marginal condition: 
-c’(e)=p+g’(e)   (6) 
Many airlines in order not to have Transaction costs related to MRV chose to ask for help 
from intermediaries to outsource this service to others, e.g. EUROCONTROL. Another 
important cost is the one related to abatement strategies. Carriers face informational costs 
when searching for appropriate technology for carbon offsetting or alternative solutions. 
Reinvestment and replacement of existing fleet for instance is an extremely costly action. 
Given the abatement and the related transaction costs term h(e)≥0, the cost function will 
be:  
𝐦𝐢𝐧𝒆[𝒄(𝒆) + 𝒑𝒆 + 𝒉(𝒆)] (7) 
and the corresponding marginal condition: 
-c’(e)=p+h’(e)   (8) 
Nevertheless, innovations and changes might occur outside of the environment of the 
carriers and can prove beneficial for carbon offsetting and thus costs. For instance, the 
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harmonisation of European Sky through Functional Airspace Blocks, can lead to better 
flight efficiency and thus less fuel consumption, costs and emissions.  
As far as the search transaction costs are concerned, they are reduced substantially, since 
greenhouse gas markets are facilitated by exchanges such as the European Climate 
Exchange (ECX) and buyers and sellers find each other quite easily. Carriers can obtain 
up to a specific percentage credits from the Kyoto Mechanisms. The Joint Implementation 
(JI) provides for the creation of emissions reduction units (ERUs), whereas the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) provides for the creation of certified emissions reductions 
(CERs). Therefore, CDM and JI are directly connected to EU ETS.  
McKloskey et al. (from Chadwick, 2006:260) defined CDM transaction costs as “that part 
of a CER’s price that cannot be attributed to the physical process of removing GHGs from 
the atmosphere”. Chadwick (2006) argued that this definition does not take under 
consideration the demand effects on CER market prices and thus adjustment is required to 
separate the TC effects from the demand effects. According to Chadwick (2006) CDM 
transaction costs are especially important because the financial sustainability of CDM 
projects is so closely linked to the size of the CER revenue stream.  
Under the existence of TC market outcomes rely on the structure and the rules of 
surrounding institutions. Institutions have the effect of giving some actors more influence 
or less costly influence (so that one party can shift the outcome to their favour with less 
effort than the other can), over outcomes than others and shift market equilibria away from 
the original “optimum” (Chadwick, 2006).  
5.2.1 Transaction Costs Categories in EU ETS and SES 
Transaction Costs Economic (TCE) theory may be used to highlight certain issues in the 
Performance Regulation Scheme of the Single European Sky (SES) and European Union 
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Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).  This is because there are legislative and regulatory 
enactment costs related to the KPAs, such as implementation costs to meet the targets; 
monitoring costs to check the progress of the states/FABs; and enforcement costs to make 
the scheme work. Search and information, bargaining and decision, monitoring and 
enforcement of the Performance scheme create transaction costs (TC) for the SES 
stakeholders.  
The stakeholders experience the SES in a different way. For instance, the ANSPs are the 
ones that are regulated and the CAAs or the EC are the regulators. The transaction costs 
differ among the stakeholders because they focus on different elements. For instance, an 
ANSP is not responsible for considering alternative policies, but a policymaker/regulator is. 
Thus, the ANSP would have zero transaction costs for the category alternative policies. 
The importance of every category is different for the different stakeholders. The focus on 
the SES is on the policy makers, since for the ANSPs the main cost are the compliance 
measures, i.e. the cost of considering and adopting new systems and infrastructure. 
Transaction costs for policymakers/regulators emerging from the Performance scheme 
regarding the KPA of environment may be categorised as follows: 
Table 17: Transaction costs categories for policymakers/regulators emerging from the 
Performance scheme regarding the KPA of environment (Source: own elaboration) 
Categories  Description  
Alternative 
policies  
 Develop alternative solutions 
 Evaluate the alternative solutions  





 Quantification of historic emissions 
 Development of emission outlooks 
 Decision for an application rule 
 Measures to overcome “frictions” and negotiation with 
stakeholders  
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Categories  Description  
 Assessment of participants  
 Adaptation or purchase of software 
 Material costs Set up of organizational structures and 
assignment of responsibilities 
 Fees for Information, training 
Monitoring  
 Design of a monitoring concept 
 Implementation of an internal monitoring system 
 Ongoing monitoring 
Reporting and 
verification  
 Quantification of annual emissions 
 Compilation of an emissions report 
 Verification of an emissions report 
 Delivery of data for ex-post-control 
Compliance 
measures  
 Identification of compliance measures 
 Offering recommendations and support 
 Decision about imposing non-compliance penalties  
Strategy  
 Design of the strategy for NSAs, ANSPs 
 Design of the regulation enforcement procedure 
 Design of the abatement strategy 
As already mentioned, SES and consequently FABs aim to improve the performance of 
airspace through ANSPs and NSAs for airspace users. FABs aim to achieve carbon 
offsetting through setting environmental targets. Another scheme that can use the benefits 
deriving from FABs is the EU ETS. The EU ETS is a Market Based Mechanism (MBM) and 
introduced the 'cap and trade' principle, according to which a cap is set on the total amount 
of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by all participating installations. 'Allowances' for 
emissions are then auctioned off or allocated for free, and can subsequently be traded. 
Installations must monitor and report their CO2 emissions, ensuring they hand in enough 
allowances to the authorities to cover their emissions. Monitoring, reporting and verification 
result in transaction costs whose largest part is passed to the airspace users. To lower 
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transaction costs, many airlines related to monitoring chose to outsource this service to 
others, e.g. EUROCONTROL.  Transaction costs for airlines deriving from the inclusion of 
aviation in EU ETS can be categorised in the following categories: 
Table 18: Transaction costs categories for airlines deriving from the inclusion of aviation in 
EU ETS (Source: own elaboration)  
Categories  Description  
Application 
(Scheme design) 
 Quantification of historic emissions 
 Development of emission outlooks 
 Decision for an application rule 
 Compilation of an application 
 Where necessary, compilation of a benchmark 
 Verification of the application 
 Fees for annual allocation 




 Information, training 
 Assessment of obligation to participate in the EU ETS 
 Set up of organizational structures and assignment of 
responsibilities 
 Adaptation or purchase of software 
 Material costs 
Monitoring  
 Design of a monitoring concept 
 Implementation of an internal monitoring system 
 Ongoing monitoring 
Reporting and 
verification  
 Quantification of annual emissions 
 Compilation of an emissions report 
 Verification of an emissions report 
 Delivery of data for ex-post-control 
Abatement 
measures  
 Identification of abatement measures 
 Decision about abatement measures 
Trade  
 Transactions fees (exchange fees, broker fees, 
clearing) 
 Trade and negotiation  
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Categories  Description  
 Market observation 
Strategy  
 Definition of the risk strategy 
 Definition of the trade strategy 
 Definition of the abatement strategy 
As far as EU Emissions Trading Scheme in aviation is concerned, the focus is on the 
airlines and the policy makers. The categories of transaction costs are different. The 
transaction costs for the policy makers/regulators are similar to those of the SES. The 
regulator spends a lot of effort on developing alternative policies, evaluating the options 
and deciding on the policy to be implemented, i.e. the EU ETS. The second category is the 
development and the implementation of the regulation scheme. The policy maker needs to 
understand the aviation industry and its effect on the environment and set the parameters 
for the regulation. This phase of the reform bears high transaction costs, since during this 
period, experts from different areas are needed to set the regulatory framework. The 
categories of Monitoring, Reporting and Verification related to the quantification of 
emissions, the compilation of reports, the verification of report and the delivery of data for 
ex-post-control. Another important category of TC for the regulator is the compliance 
measures and the strategy. In this category the guidelines for the companies is included 
as well as the strategy for enforcing the regulation and any abatement strategy. 
Transaction costs for policy makers/regulators deriving from the inclusion of aviation in EU 
ETS can be categorised in the following categories: 
Table 19: Transaction costs categories for policy makers/regulators deriving from the 
inclusion of aviation in EU ETS (Source: own elaboration) 
Categories  Description  
Alternative 
policies  
 Develop alternative solutions 
 Evaluate the alternative solutions  
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Categories  Description  





 Quantification of historic emissions 
 Development of emission outlooks 
 Decision for an application rule 
 Measures to overcome “frictions” and negotiation with 
stakeholders  
 Compilation of an application 
 Where necessary, compilation of a benchmark 
 Verification of the application 
 Assessment of participants in the EU ETS 
 Adaptation or purchase of software 
 Material costs Set up of organizational structures and 
assignment of responsibilities 
 Fees for Information, training 
Monitoring  
 Design of a monitoring concept 
 Implementation of an internal monitoring system 
 Ongoing monitoring 
Reporting and 
verification  
 Quantification of annual emissions 
 Compilation of an emissions report 
 Verification of an emissions report 
 Delivery of data for ex-post-control 
Compliance 
measures  
 Identification of compliance measures 
 Decision about imposing non-compliance penalties  
Strategy  
 Definition of the strategy for companies  
 Definition of the enforcing the regulation 
 Definition of the abatement strategy 
All companies by nature look for lower costs thus are looking for lower TC. Through de-
minimis rule for airlines the smallest carries are protected from TC and at the same time 
the regulators. The benefit of including them to EU ETS is smaller than the cost. TC are 
also closely related to the spot price of permits. If the price is too low and Transaction 
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costs too high, then some airlines might prefer not to optimise their green policy as much 
as possible. When policies like EU ETS are implemented there are usually complaints or 
resistance towards the policy itself or the way the policy is implemented. These “frictions” 
are basically costs, as Hicks (1935) supported.  
Apparent rigidities and frictions towards a full scope EU ETS from the early beginning 
might exert a positive role as a buffer against excessive fluctuations in traffic, prices and 
fair competition. It needs to be highlighted that apart from economic agents, but also 
organizations and companies react to “frictions”. Everyone from the stakeholders can be 
the source of the “friction” or the reaction to the “friction”. For instance, in the case of stop 
the clock, A4A was the “friction” and AEA was the reaction.  
5.3 Summary  
Both EU ATS and SES are quite complex reforms and their management can be quite 
difficult. The management of the stakeholders in proved very demanding due to the fact 
that the geographical scope is very extended, there are a lot of companies and entities to 
manage, but most importantly there are quite diverse stakeholders. The regulators should 
manage the airspace users, the other regulators, the institutions, the system suppliers, the 
manufacturers, the ANSPs, the military entities, etc. The regulator should understand the 
stakeholders, their level of influence as well as their power.  As explained above the level 
of influence depends on the stakeholder’s power for promoting its position on the 
regulatory reform. 
The most difficult part is not developing the concepts and the regulations around the 
schemes, but implementing them. There are many hidden cost around the implementation 
of the reforms. The theory of transaction costs was initially developed for the 
environmental regulations and can be adopted in the SES and EU ETS reforms. The 
researcher base on literature review, participant observation and consultation developed 
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some categories of transaction costs in EU ETS and SES. Those categories involve costs 
associated with the alternative policies, the development and implementation of the 
regulation scheme, the monitoring, reporting and verification, the compliance measures 
and strategies.   
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6 Research methodology  
Research is a process of steps used to collect and analyse information to increase our 
understanding of a topic or issue”. It consists of three steps: Pose a question, collect data 
to answer the question, and present an answer to the question according to Creswell 
(2008).  
According to Williams (2007: 65) the research process is ‘systematic in that defining the 
objective, managing the data, and communicating the findings occur within established 
frameworks and in accordance with existing guidelines’. Saunders et al. (2015) classified 
research into six stages and named the model as ‘the research onion’. This model is 
depicting the issues underlying the choice of data collection techniques and analysis 
procedures (Saunders et al., 2015).  
6.1 Research philosophy 
Ontologies is ‘the term used to refer to the shared understanding of some domain of 
interest which may be used as a unifying framework to solve the above problems in the 
above described manner’ (Uschold & Gruninger, 1996:5).  Ontology is the study of being, 
that is, the nature of existence and what constitutes reality (Gray, 2014: 19). According to 
Saunders et al. (2015) ontology relates to assumptions regarding the nature of reality. 
While ontology embodies understanding what is, epistemology tries to understand what it 
means to know. Epistemology provides a philosophical background for deciding what 
kinds of knowledge are legitimate and adequate. Epistemology concerns what is 
acceptable and legitimate. A similar concept is worldviews. Worldview means ‘a basic set 
of beliefs that guide action’ according to Guba (1990, 17). Another type of research 
assumptions is axiology, which refers to values and ethics.  
After defining ontology and epistemology, the terms objectivism and subjectivism need to 
be clarified too. Objectivism, ontologically defined embraces realism. This means that 
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reality exists independently of consciousness (Saunders et al., 2015). The target is to find 
the objective truth without influenced from feelings and values. At the same time though, 
objectivism does not entail the rejection of subjectivity: subjective views can be studied 
(their values, attitudes and beliefs) but it should be done objectively (Bunge, 1993). 
 
Figure 28: The research onion (Saunders et al., 2015) 
There are four major philosophies of research, positivism, realism, interpretivism, 
postmodernism and pragmatism (Figure 28). Positivism regards the attempt to obtain 
predictive and descriptive information related to the social reality and the external world as 
the main purpose of science. According to this philosophy, only phenomena that can be 
observed will lead to the production of credible data. Moreover, the researcher is very 
independent of and neither affects nor is affected by the subject of the research (Remenyi 
et al., 1998).  
Another epistemological position is this of realism. According to this position, the senses 
show us the truth and not our mind as the idealism supports. Realism can be categorised 
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to critical realism and direct realism. Direct realism states that element itself and the 
sensations it conveys is enough to explain the element. On the other hand, critical realism 
makes an extra step by saying that it is also the mental processing that goes on sometime 
after that sensation meets our senses. Pragmatism is a deconstructive paradigm that 
advocates the use of mixed methods in research, “sidesteps the contentious issues of 
truth and reality” (Feilzer, 2010: 8), and “focuses instead on ‘what works’ as the truth 
regarding the research questions under investigation” (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010: 713). 
Hence this approach focuses more on the ‘What’ and ‘How’.  
Interpretivism claims that it is important for the researcher to find differences between 
humans in their roles. The challenge of this research philosophy is that the researcher 
should understand the research subjects and see the world from their point of view. The 
philosophy that is followed in this PhD Thesis is Interpretivism. In this thesis, the methods 
used capitalised on a dynamic setting resulting from different expert opinions expressed 
with the help of Delphi method and unstructured interviews. The latter were based on a 
free flow discussion and expressed subjective opinions. Based on those subjective 
opinions the researcher tried to interpret the socially constructed reality.   
When examining concepts like EU ETS and SES, interpretivism is more appropriate to 
capture the complexity of those reforms, explain the governance issues and implement a 
causal effect analysis. Many researchers in the area of business and management, 
particularly in the fields of organisational behaviour, marketing and human resource 
management have used interpretivism. It should be noted that generalizability of EU ETS 
and SES is not of critical importance for this philosophy, since the aviation environment is 
constantly changing, but generalizability for the aviation governance and policy is.  
One step ahead of interpretivism is constructionism, also known as social constructionism. 
This views reality as being socially constructed. The constructionism research 
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philosophy was also followed in the PhD thesis since it deemed vital to identify the 
subjective meaning that motivate the actions of the aviation stakeholders involved in SES 
and EU ETS. Aviation players in respect to their group, placed many different 
interpretations of the situations in which they found themselves. These interpretations 
affect their actions and the interaction they have with other players. The aviation players 
may not share the same mentality. Therefore, the aim of the researcher is to understand 
the subjective reality of each aviation player and explain their motives and actions 
regarding EU ETS and SES in a meaningful way.  
6.2 Data collection techniques  
Data selection is of critical importance for all researches. Date can be qualitative and 
quantitative, so the research can be categorised as qualitative or quantitative research. 
What constitutes a quantitative research method involves a numeric or statistical approach 
to research design. Leedy and Ormrod (2012) alleged that quantitative research is specific 
in its surveying and experimentation, as it builds upon existing theories. The methodology 
of a quantitative research maintains the assumption of an empiricist paradigm (Creswell, 
2013). Qualitative research provides an important insight into interpersonal relationships 
(Tracy, 2013). It can be used to understand groups and organisations or even a range of 
societal issues that arise from particular cultural contexts (Yin, 2015; Hogan et al, 2011). 
Qualitative research builds its premises on inductive, rather than deductive reasoning. It is 
from the observational elements that pose questions that the researcher attempts to 
explain. The strong correlation between the observer and the data is a marked difference 
from quantitative research (Williams, 2007).  
The mixed methods approach to research is an extension of rather than a replacement for 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches to research, as the latter two research 
approaches will continue to be useful and important (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
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According to Creswell (2013) a mixed methods approach is one in which the researcher 
tends to base knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds (e.g., consequence-oriented, 
problem-cantered, and pluralistic). It employs strategies of inquiry that involve collecting 
data either simultaneously or sequentially to best understand research problems. The data 
collection also involves gathering both numeric information (e.g., on instruments) as well 
as text information (e.g., on interviews) so that the final database represents both 
quantitative and qualitative information.  
Qualitative research is a holistic approach that involves discovery (Williams, 2007). 
Qualitative research can also be described as an effective model that occurs in a natural 
setting that enables the researcher to develop a level of detail from being highly involved in 
the actual experiences (Creswell, 2013). According to Flick (2009) the qualitative research 
features are the following: 
 Appropriateness of methods and theories 
 The perspectives of the participants and their diversity 
 Reflexivity of the researcher and the research 
 Variety or approaches and methods in qualitative research  
For qualitative data collection, there are three broad categories, the indirect observation, 
the direct observation and the elicitation or talking to people (Bernard et al, 2016). 
Elicitation is interviewing, asking questions to people. The interviews can be structured, 
semi-structured or unstructured. The main advantage of unstructured or semi-structured 
interviews is that it offers flexibility and the interviewer can modify the order and details of 
how topics are covered. This requires self-discipline and a trained memory to recall the 
information. Unstructured interviews look and sound like casual conversations, but they 
are not. Many times is the only way to get information from some experts. On the other 
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hand, if one wants to compare ideas and practices across people or groups then similarity 
in the level and the kind of information is necessary.  
The research methodologies that were selected for this research project are two: a) 
participant observation combined with unstructured interviews based on a free flow 
discussion and b) the Delphi Method. Each method has a different process and objective. 
Having different and complementary methods offers a better insight to the aviation 
governance issues and benefits the discussion and the arguments developed by the 
researcher and complements the Multi- Stakeholder Analysis and Management that is 
used to better analyse the results and contribute to the development of an ideal reform 
mechanism.  
6.2.1 Participant Observation 
Participant observation is a process where the researcher can observe a setting to collect 
data (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992). Participant observation is widely used in social sciences 
and especially to ethnographic research. The participant observer comes to a social 
situation with two purposes: a) to engage in activities appropriate to the situation and b) to 
observe the activities, people, and physical aspects of the situation (Spradley, 2016; 
Weissinger, 2005). This qualitative method aims at understanding the diverse perspectives 
of any given community and at the interplay among them. The researcher accomplishes 
this by either only observing or by both observing and participating to the activities held by 
the community (Musante and DeWalt, 2010). The participants’ observation for 
ethnographic research takes place in the location/environment of the community.  
The participant observation was conducted at EUROCONTROL for the continuous period 
between December 2013 and August 2015. During this period, the researcher participated 
to projects related to SES and ETS as well as meetings like the NSA Coordination 
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Platform. After August 2015, the researcher participated to a meeting organised by 
European Commission about the EU ETS.  
During the period of participant observation research, unstructured interviews were 
conducted that contributed also to the development of some of the Delphi research 
questions. In total seven interviews were conducted. The seven interviewees had different 
backgrounds. Two of them are senior experts at IATA (interviewee N.07 and interviewee 
N.06), the other two are senior consultants/academics in aviation and environment 
(interviewee N.05 and interviewee N.04), one expert is working in the NGO Transport and 
the Environment (interviewee N.03), one senior expert at European Commission 
(interviewee N.02) and one senior expert at EUROCONTROL (interviewee N.01). The 
interviewees requested their profile to remain anonymous without stating their roles or 
backgrounds. The airlines’ opinions are represented via IATA and the passengers’ opinion 
is represented by the NGO. Their help was valuable and due to their anonymity they had a 
more sincere and critical approach to SES and EU ETS.  
The information and data obtained through participant observation enhance the 
understanding of the social, cultural and economic contexts of the participants’ 
environment; the relationship among and between people, ideas, norms and events; and 
peoples’ behaviours and activities. The researcher obtains a nuanced understanding of 
communities’ complexities than can come only from personal experience. Through this 
research method, the researcher can get information previously unknown that is crucial for 
project design, data collection as well as interpretation of other data. On the other hand, 
participant observation is very time consuming and extremely difficult to keep notes and 
document the data while the researcher is in the act of participating and observing. Finally, 
a third challenge is being objective. The researcher should diversify what is observed and 
what is interpreted from what is seen. Hence, it is important to filter out personal biases.  
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It is of critical importance to establish categories of information that are worth observing. 
For this specific research, the elements that were observed looking only at the people are 
the following: 
 Verbal behaviour and interactions: Who speaks to whom and for how long; who 
initiates interaction; languages or dialects spoken; tone of voice; their rank. 
 Physical behaviour and gestures: What experts do, who does what, who interacts 
with whom, who is not interacting 
 Expert rotation: In which meetings experts participate, who they are (ethnicity, age, 
educational profile); turnaround of the experts and directors.  
 Experts who stand out: The characteristics of these experts and their group; what 
differentiates them from others; whether other experts consult them or they 
approach other experts.  
The participant observation was used in this PhD thesis in order to identify the different 
players of the aviation game and to better understand the relationships among the 
participants as well as the complexity of the positions. Moreover, participants’ observation 
was selected as the first stage of this research project in order to facilitate and develop 
relationships with key informants, stakeholders and gate keepers whose assistance was 
needed for the research topic to become a reality. Often participant observation is used in 
conjunction with interviewing to collect data in the participant’s words (Bogdan & Biklen, 
2006). 
6.2.2 Delphi Method 
The Delphi method can be characterized as the one that forms the communication process 
of a group so that this process is effective allowing a group of individuals, to enable as a 
whole to deal with a complex issue (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). According to Linstone & 
Turoff (2002) the traditional application of Delphi technique was forecasting, but it has 
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been used in gathering current and historical data not accurately known or available, 
exploring urban and regional planning options, putting together the structure of a model, 
delineating the pros and cons associated with potential policy options, developing causual 
relationships in complex economic or social phenomena and distinguising and clarifying 
real and perceived human motibations. Delphi method has been succesfully been used in 
various fields. Delphi is the best tool to gather in-depth information from a panel of aviation 
experts who are geographically dispersed.  
To achieve this structured communication someone should (Linstone & Turoff, 2002):  
 Provide feedback of the individual contributions of information and knowledge 
 Provide an assessment of the crisis and the views of the group 
 Offer the opportunity to the individuals to revise their views 
 Provide some degree of anonymity for individual answers. 
The Delphi method has several applications. It can be used for example as (Linstone & 
Turoff, 2002): a) prediction method, b) for the collection of current and historical data not 
accurately known or available, c) for identifying the significance of historical events, d) to 
outline the pros and cons associated with potential policy options, e) to development of 
causal relationships in complex economic or social phenomena, g) distinguish and clarify 
the real and perceived human motivation. 
Furthermore, the Delphi method is a method for structuring a group communication 
process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals as a whole to 
deal with a complex problem (Van der Duin, 2016). The implementation of SES and EU 
ETS is problematic and lacks of substantial knowledge regarding the governance issues 
and the difficulties associated with their implementation and success.  
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This method is used in order to study in more details a specific or contemporary topic and 
is conducted during multiple rounds. In the first round, a panel of experts, either as a group 
in the same room or individually in different areas, are asked about their opinion regarding 
the specific topic. The opinions of all the participants are summarised and sent back to the 
participants in order to develop new ideas or to revise their already stated ideas. This can 
be done many times in order to reform ideas and summarise opinions.  
Table 20: Use of Delphi method  
Researcher Topic Rounds Participants 
Gustafson, Shukla, 
Delbecq, & Walster 
(1973).  
Estimate almanac events to investigate Delphi 
accuracy 
2 4 
Czinkota & Ronkainen 
(1997)  
Impact analysis of changes to the International 
business environment. 
3 1 
Kuo & Yu (1999) Identify national park selection criteria.   1 28 
Nambisan et al. 
(1999) 
Develop a taxonomy of organizational 
mechanisms. 
3 6 
Lam, Petri, & Smith 
(2000) 
Develop rules for a ceramic casting process. 3 3 
Delbari et al (2016)  
An investigation of key competitiveness 
indicators and drivers of full-service airlines using 
Delphi and AHP techniques 
2 30 
Varho et al (2016) 
Futures od distributed small scale renewable 
energy in Finland- a Delphi study of the 
opportunities and obstacles up to 2025  
2 18 
There are two types of Delphi, the Delphi Exercise and the Delphi Conference (Linstone & 
Turoff, 2002). The first one is like the ‘paper and pencil’ version, according to which a 
questionnaire is sent to a group and after it is answered, it is returned to the researcher in 
order to summarise the results. The researched based on the results, designs a new 
questionnaire for the group. The group will have at least one opportunity to reconsider its 
initial statements based on the collective position of the group towards the topic. This is 
the most common form of Delphi.  
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Delphi Conference is the most modern form of Delphi research and it substitutes in a high 
degree the research team with the computer that is programmed to conduct the drawing of 
the results. This version of Delphi has the advantage that it eliminates the delay from 
summarising/consolidating every round, making the process in more real time 
communication system. Unfortunately, it does not offer any flexibility, since the terms of 
communication should be clearly defined before the start of the research (Linstone & 
Turoff, 2002).  
Delphi method is conducted in four phases no matter which form it has (Linstone & Turoff, 
2002). The first phase is related with the search of the topic, where every individual offers 
additional information that believes is related to the topic. The second phase is about the 
understanding of the opinions of the group regarding the topic. If there is a disagreement 
among the participants for the topic, this disagreement is researched in the third phase of 
the Delphi so as to understand the reasons of the disagreement. Finally, the last phase is 
the analysis and evaluation of the findings.   
The Delphi method is successful only when emphasis is given to specific aspects (Van der 
Duin, 2016). The researcher should not pass his/her ideas and opinions to the participants, 
or to oversimplify the structure of the Delphi method and not to allow other aspects of the 
problem to be expressed.   
In terms of communication with the groups, there are different ways of doing that. The 
main techniques of communication with a group are conference telephone call, committee 
meeting, formal conference or seminar, conventional Delphi and real time Delphi. The 
effectiveness of the group communication technique is related mainly to the size of the 
group, the length and the number of interactions and the occurrence of interaction by 
individual. When Delphi is conducted with a small group size, psychological effects may be 
minimised. Conducting a Delphi study can be time-consuming (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).  
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Linstone and Turoff (2002) stated that Delphi may be characterized as a method for 
structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a 
group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem. To accomplish this 
‘‘structured communication’’ the following are provided: some feedback of individual 
contributions of information and knowledge; some assessment of the group judgment or 
view; some opportunity for individuals to revise views; and some degree of anonymity for 
the individual responses. 
Anonymity, iteration, controlled feedback and statistical aggregation of group response are 
the four key features that define and characterise Delphi method (Skulmoski et al, 2007). 
In the traditional Delphi method, participants are not usually aware of the identity of other 
panellists. By protecting the identity of participants, the potential risk of self-censorship is 
reduced (Ballantyne, Hughes & Bond, 2016). Moreover, it offers panellists the opportunity 
to modify their views as they respond to those of others without the social pressure that 
exists in face-to-face meetings. Using individual communication or online research the 
potential of individual group members dominating the group-decision process as often 
occurs in planning meetings and focus groups can be avoided.  
Iteration, i.e. the repetition of the questionnaires over a number of rounds, gave to 
individuals the opportunity to change their initially stated opinions and judgement without 
any pressure from the group. The process is mainly as a series of rounds; in each round 
every participant worked through a questionnaire which was returned to the researcher 
who collected, edited, and returned to every participant a statement of the position of the 
whole group and the participant’s own position. A summation of comments made each 
participant aware of the range of opinions and the reasons underlying those opinions 
Ludwig (1997).  
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The Delphi method is very different from the traditional survey in terms of the procedure. 
Regarding sampling Delphi’s power does not rely on statistical power of the group size, but 
rather on group dynamics and expertise. Finally, in Delphi method the participants are not 
anonymous to the researcher; hence construct validation is permitted. It needs to be 
highlighted that respondents are always anonymous to each other, but the researcher 
knows them and has the opportunity to follow up for clarifications and further qualitative 
data offering richness of data.  
6.3 Design of the instrument  
Research design according to Yin (2013) is the logical sequence that connects the 
empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and ultimately to its conclusions. The 
PhD thesis has two main pillars, the literature review and the primary research. The 
literature review is the basis for understanding sustainable development in aviation. In the 
literature review, two case studies, the SES and the EU ETS reforms, were examined by 
looking at their aims and technical details. The research methods that were applied in the 
order they were conducted are the participant observation, the Delphi method and the 
unstructured interviews. The flow chart (Figure 29) shows the process that was followed to 
conduct this research.  
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Figure 29: The Research Journey 
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The participant observation was done at EUROCONTROL that is the Network Manager of 
Single European Sky and the Reporting, Verification and Monitoring of emissions facilitator 
for European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. The researcher stayed at 
EUROCONTROL from December 2013 to August 2015, i.e. 20 months. During this period, 
the researcher participated in a number of meetings with the EC, NSAs, CAAs, ANSPs, 
Airlines and other Institutions. Those meetings offered an excellent opportunity to identify 
the relevant stakeholders and define the groups. Moreover, many participants were 
approached through those meetings and using the snowball effect the sample was 
defined. This research method was invaluable in determining whom to recruit for the study 
and how best to recruit them.  
The researcher used data collected through participant observation in order to improve the 
design of Delphi method. The first questionnaire was developed based on the literature 
review and then it was circulated to EUROCONTROL members for their valuable opinion. 
Then a second version of the questionnaire was developed, where the questionnaire was 
split in two having different set of questions but having the same approach and objective. 
Then the two new questionnaires were given to a panel of experts (consisting of CAAs, 
EUROCONTROL, EC and ANSPs representatives) for their consideration and as a pilot 
survey. The questionnaires were then reviewed again based on their feedback and a new 
set of questionnaires were developed. Those questionnaires after three revisions were the 
final questionnaires that were distributed for the first round of Delphi Method (please see 
Appendix5 and 6).  
6.3.1 Questionnaires design and Pilot Survey  
The first questionnaire was developed by the researcher during April 2014 (see 
Appendix4) and was test on two employees of EUROCONTROL, two employees of 
ANSPs and two employee of airlines. The questionnaire was returned less than half filled 
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in. The respondents reported that they could not reply to most of the questions because it 
was either too sensitive information and had political implications or it was out of their 
expertise. Therefore, it was decided to have two set of questionnaires, one for the EU ETS 
and one for the SES that would have a link with each other.  
The researcher developed two set of questionnaires that were sent for consultation to two 
academics and two EUROCONTROL members. After two weeks of revisions and 
corrections and thanks to their valuable experience and kind guidance the final version of 
questionnaires was developed. The two questionnaires had different cover page to help 
the participants diversify them. The second page of the questionnaires was a thank 
you/welcome note by the researcher and the principal supervisor. Finally, each 
questionnaire had a project description to introduce the participants to all the elements of 
the research areas. The questionnaires started with briefly explaining the Single European 
Sky and the Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs). Then a brief description of EU ETS was 
given. In a separate section, the focus of the questionnaires was stated. Moreover, the 
nature of the questions and the time requirements as well as the next step were clearly 
expressed. The final part of the introduction section was the brief presentation of the 
research team, i.e. the PhD candidate and the principal supervisor. The questionnaires 
that were developed after consultation can be found in the Appendix 5 and 6. The 1st 
questionnaire was returned on the 11th June 2014 and the last one on the 11th May 2015. 
The 1st questionnaire of the second round was received on the 1st July 2015 and the last 
on the 29th April 2016. The process proved very time consuming, but the results were very 
satisfying.   
The participants were asked to rate some statements using a scale from 1-5, where 1 
stands for strong disagreement and 5 for strong agreement giving also an opportunity to 
make comments. Summated scales (or Likert-type scales) are developed by utilizing the 
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item analysis approach wherein a particular item is evaluated based on how well it 
discriminates between those persons whose total score is high and those whose score is 
low. In some other questions, the participants were asked to divide 100 points to different 
parameters. This method is the method of rank order: Under this method of comparative 
scaling, the respondents are asked to rank their choices. The participants in this case were 
given the opportunity to add other factors they deemed appropriate.  
The last two questions in both questionnaires are the connecting questions for the two 
schemes, but there were also some other underlying questions that had similarities 
between the two questionnaires. The question about the factors that lead to carbon neutral 
growth is one of the most important questions for linking the EU ETS with the SES. In this 
question different options to achieve carbon neutral growth are given. The participants 
were asked to share 100 point to the options among the different options. The critical point 
is whether the participants regard a single option as the only one possible to achieve for 
carbon neutral growth: alternatively, in case of combined options what other ways to be 
used.  If the participants choose more than one option then this proves the need for policy 
coordination. In particular, the options considered are the following:   
1. The EU ETS leads to carbon neutral growth 
2. Individual carbon offsetting programs from airlines lead to carbon neutral growth 
3. Individual carbon offsetting programmes from states lead to carbon neutral growth 
4. Horizontal en route flight efficiency  
a. Direct routes lead to carbon neutral growth  
b. Wind optimal routes lead to carbon neutral growth 
c. Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) leads to carbon neutral growth 
d. Free Route Airspace (FRA) leads to carbon neutral growth 
5. Other 
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The factors 1, 2 and 3 are related to Market Based Measures, whereas the factor 4, i.e. 
Horizontal en route flight efficiency is related to operational improvements. The factor 5 
was given for the participants to give points if they wish to other factors, for example 
vertical flight efficiency, or biofuels, or technological improvements. The last question was 
an open-ended question to give the respondents the opportunity to give their opinion on 
the connection of EU ETS and SES.  
For the second round of the Delphi method, one additional element was introduced. In was 
evident from the individual/separate unstructured interviews that one element that was 
leading to the slow implementation and deliverables of SES and secondly EU ETS was the 
complexity of the mechanism and hence the additional time and effort the stakeholders 
had to give. Hence, the element of transaction costs was implemented. Following the 
interviews and advices from key experts the transaction costs were categorised in groups 
and subgroups and the Delphi survey participants were asked to do a comparative scaling, 
i.e. to rank them in terms of their importance for the success of the reform schemes and to 
state their opinion for their importance in general (see Appendix 7 and 8).  
The survey stopped in the second round because there were no major changes of the 
experts’ opinions. There are three parametric statistical methods to check the consensus 
and reliability in a Delphi study (Shah and Kalaian, 2009): a) the coefficient of variation 
(CV); b) the Pearson correlation coefficient and c) the F-test. English and Kernan (from 
Shah and Kalaian, 2009) used the coefficient of variation (CV) to determine the stopping 
rule. According to Shah and Kalaian (2009) the CV is the best procedure to obtain 
reliability in a Delphi study. If the magnitude of CV for an item was found to be too large, 
the corresponding statement was needed to be modified and required an additional 
round(s) of questionnaire administration. That was the case in this survey; hence, the 
second round was the last round of the research.  
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The Coefficient of Variation can take values between 0 and √𝑁 − 1 , where N refers to the 
sample size. The maximum value of CV is reached when all observations but one are 
equal to zero (Abdi, 2010). Therefore, the CV in the EU ETS survey may take values 
ranging from 0-5.48. In the case of SES survey, the CV can take values from 0-5.39. 
When the CV is closer to 0 it is considered low and when it is closer to 5 it is considered 
high.  
6.3.2 Target participants and sample  
All elements in a population must be examined in order to collect accurate data. When the 
data is collected from the entire population, it is considered a census. When the population 
of a study is big, a sample is considered as the most appropriate and realistic way of 
research. Sampling is observing a part in order to glean information about the whole is an 
almost instinctive human act (Creswell, 2013). Given the complexity of the problem, the 
following groups were selected to participate in the survey: 
 Industry: Senior managers working in airlines and ANS provision companies  
 Government: Senior managers working in Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), 
National (NSAs) and aviation organisations  
 Academia: Academic institutions and researchers working on aviation management 
related programs  
The Chain-referral sampling or snowball sampling is a non-random (nonprobability) 
sampling technique in which a research participant is selected who then identifies further 
participants whom he or she knows, often useful for finding hidden populations (Beins and 
McCarthy, 2012). Because it was very difficult to identify the real expert and to make 
contact with him or her, the researcher kindly asked the participants and other people that 
were approached to participate to provide references to others that might be interested 
and qualified to participate in the survey.  
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Quota sampling was an aim in order to achieve balance among the backgrounds of the 
participants. Quota sampling is ‘a non-random (nonprobability) sampling technique in 
which subgroups, usually convenience samples, are identified and a specified number of 
individuals from each group are included in the research (Beins and McCarthy, 2012).  
To select the candidates, two types of non-random sampling were used, a) purposive 
sampling and b) snowball sampling. Purposive sampling is also known as judgmental, 
selective or subjective sampling, is a type of non-probability sampling technique. 
Purposive sampling is a non-random (nonprobability) sampling technique in which 
participants are selected for a study because of some desirable characteristics, like 
expertise in some area (Beins and McCarthy, 2012). In this specific area, the participants 
were requested to have knowledge in both areas of ANSPs environmental regulations and 
Airlines environmental regulations. Finding someone who is an expert in both regulating 
the supply and the demand side of aviation was proven extremely difficult. Thus, the 
approach of two different questionnaires with some common questions was decided. No 
incentives were provided to the respondents for completing the questionnaires.  
The stakeholders involved in SES and ETS are the following:  
1. ANSPs 
2. Airport Operators  
3. Air Traffic Navigation staff 
4. Airspace users 
5. Regulators and Administrators  
6. Academics and individuals   
The target population are the stakeholders involved in both Single European Sky and 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme in Aviation. According to EASA there are 
almost 6,000 individual aircraft operators that provide commercial passenger and cargo 
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services in Europe. The fact that there are 6,000 aircraft operators does not mean that the 
population for this survey is 6,000, because some of them are in the minimum criteria for 
EU ETS and thus they are excluded from obligatory submission of allowances. According 
to Sandbag (2013) 1169 airlines and operators participated in the EU ETS, 788 (67%) of 
which were international, with the remaining 381 (33%) being EU airline. The USA has the 
highest number of airlines participating in the scheme, 470 (40% of the total), but the 
majority are smaller operators, such as company or private jets. Thus under the stop the 
clock principle the airlines obliged to comply with EU ETS are only 381.  
The European ANS system covers 37 Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). The 
provision of air traffic services is the responsibility of every State under the ICAO 
Convention, and thus almost every State has its own Air Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP). There are 29 ANSPs that are part of SES (28 EU Member States plus Norway 
and Switzerland). Luxembourg does not have its own ANSPs. Belgocontrol (Belgian 
ANSP) controls the lower Luxembourg airspace (up to FL 245), and the upper airspace 
(more than FL 245) is controlled by Maastricht UAC.  
In terms of government authorities, regulators, administrators and institutions, the main 
stakeholders are European Commission (Directorate General for Climate Action and 
Directorate General for Mobility and Transport), Civil Aviation Authorities, 
EUROCONTROL (Network Manager for SES and MRV facilitator for EU ETS), 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), Ministries of Transport (when CAA is not 
managing the ETS). Moreover, individuals may be also considered as stakeholders of 
those changes. As Individuals we may consider the general aviation enthusiasts, the 
passengers and researchers. The passengers are not familiar with the implemented 
changes and thus their interest remains on the final product. The passengers are 
concerned about their safety, the travelling time and scheduling issues, the price of their 
216 
tickets and some of them about their environmental footprint. This though does not qualify 
them to participate in such a study. The ones that hold a Private Pilot License (PPL) are 
not familiar with the en-route level and are under the minimum criteria of EU ETS, thus it is 
doubtful if they are familiar with SES and EU ETS implementation.  
Individual researchers and academics that conduct research in this topic are considered 
as qualified participants. The population of those individuals is difficult to be estimated. 
Both inclusion of aviation in EU ETS and Single European Sky are new topics and the 
researchers working on those topics are limited. Furthermore, researchers are not that 
interested in ANSPs from the management perspective because ANSP is considered very 
technical and up to now the management of ANSPs was and it remains in a big part 
government owned and non-profit orientated.  
Identification and attraction of qualified participants is considered very difficult. 
Nevertheless, the questionnaire was send to more than 260 qualified experts. The 
participation rate was around 15%. On the SES questionnaire 30 experts took part to the 
survey and on EU ETS 31 experts participated to the survey. The literature recommends 
10-18 experts on a Delphi panel. Due to the complexity of the scheme as well as to the 
number of stakeholders involved, the number of 30 experts is deemed necessary.  
6.4 Ethical considerations 
In order to conduct participant observation, the researcher went to EUROCONTROL and 
the institution was informed about the presence of the researcher. The researcher did not 
publish or reveal any confidential or sensitive information obtained during the staying at 
the institution. The researcher when conducting participant observation, was discreet 
enough about who she was and what she was doing so as not to disrupt the usual 
activities, so people the researcher observed and interacted with did not feel that their 
privacy was in danger. When participating in meetings the identity of the researcher was 
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revealed stating that she is member of the team and at the same is a researcher working 
on SES and EU ETS.  
The researcher was extremely careful not to mislead the members about her role and 
purpose. When the researcher was participating only as observer and was informed that 
the issues and topics discussed are sensitive and confidential, the researcher did not state 
any of the points discussed. Some coded records were kept, but due to confidentiality 
reasons, this information cannot be shared. Nevertheless, thanks to those meetings the 
researcher obtained a more solid understanding and knowledge.  
Anonymity is ensured to the participants of the Delphi survey. The implementation of FAB 
and in general the slow implementation of SES is a quite sensitive topic. In addition, the 
positions of Airlines and other stakeholders towards EU ETS due to the high competition 
and the political sense of the scheme is also considered as ‘hot potato’ and demands 
special treatment. Thus the participants wish to remain anonymous and their position as 
well as their company/organisation to remain secret.  
Furthermore, participants were informed that they do not have to participate in the 
research and they can terminate their responses at any time. This constitutes voluntary 
participation. The participation is voluntary and the researcher’s identity was made 
available to respondents. The respondents’ anonymity is respected and it will remain 
anonymous. Moreover, the security/privacy of the data is of high importance. Respondents 
that requested not to be further contacted, were not sent any email and weren’t further 
contacted by the researcher.  
Response bias was avoided as much as possible. Response bias is ‘a tendency for a 
respondent to answer in predictable ways, independent of the question content, such as 
always agreeing with a statement or always providing high or low ratings on a Likert scale’ 
(Beins and McCarthy, 2012:100). Some of the questions are worded in such way to 
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identify when the participant is biased. It was not any case where the respondent thought 
that he or she will be evaluated so as to tailor their responses to the survey. Shulruf, 
Hattie, and Dixon (2008) created a five-stage model of how people comprehend and 
respond to survey questions. In this model, respondents are seen as progressing through 
the following steps: (a) understanding the question, (b) establishing the context, (c) 
retrieving available information about related behaviours, (d) integrating information and 
assessing impression management, and (e) evaluating all the information and aligning it 
with the available range of responses. All the participants that fill in the questionnaire with 
the presence of the researcher seemed to spend a considerable mental processing and 
their answers were irrelevant to the researcher’s personal opinion that was not at all 
communicated to them.   
Accurate and credible findings are a function of validity and reliability (Creswell, 2013). 
According to Creswell (2012), validity can be achieved by any two of the eight strategies: 
prolonged engagement and persistent observation in the field; triangulation; peer review or 
debriefing; refining hypotheses as the inquiry advances; clarifying researcher bias from the 
outset of the study; the researcher solicits participants’ views of the credibility of the 
findings and interpretations; ‘rich and thick description’ and external audits. Table 21 
illustrates the validation strategies and how they were adopted.  
Table 21: The Research Validation Strategies followed by the researcher (based on 
Creswell, 2012) 
Validation strategies Adoption in the research 
1. Prolonged engagement 
and persistent 
observation in the field 
Working almost two years at EUROCONTROL 
2. Peer review or debriefing 
3. External audits’ 
This PhD thesis was supervised by one key professor and an 
advisory committee. In total 4 professors and 1 industry 
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expert reviewed either the whole thesis or key parts of it. 
4. The researcher solicits 
participants’ views of the 
credibility of the findings 
and interpretations 
Expert panel views were counted. This research was 
presented in workshops (COST Action TU 1408 Air Transport 
And Regional Development, German Aviation Research 
Society, EUROCONTROL) to get more feedback from the 
conference audience to adjust it and to increase its credibility. 
One-paged feedback was received from academics and 
industry experts. 
5. Rich and thick description 
Qualitative data (e.g. interviews) were collected and 
presented to give as much in depth information as possible 
Finally, approval for reproducing the figures and table was granted from EUROCONTROL, 
the European Commission, the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
(see Appendix 9).  
6.5 Limitations of the research  
Although the research was carefully prepared and had reached the aims, there were some 
unavoidable limitations. Because both SES and EU ETS in aviation are relevantly new 
schemes, the research was conducted on a small size of the population. It was extremely 
difficult to find qualified participants, but should more experts had participated in the 
research the results could be covering more areas and capture better the complexity of the 
systems and the need for interlinkages. The opinions of the fuel suppliers, the 
manufacturers and the system suppliers are not captured in this research. In addition, the 
literature review covers the contemporary expertise about environmental performance. 
Should further research be conducted about the emissions contributing to climate change, 
the focus of the regulations may be shifted to other areas.  
Finally, the Delphi Method is a method that requires a lot of time to find and engage the 
participants that are based in different countries. Some participants shared more 
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information than others did, leading to asymmetries of information regarding the 
organisations. There were some countries that were not represented. There were no 
participants from South West FAB and Performance Review Unit. The latest would have 
given a very important added value to the results.  
The participant observation was conducted at EUROCONTROL that gave an excellent 
insight about the SES reform but a limited insight at the EU ETS reform. Should the 
participant observation be conducted at European Commission the researcher could have 
an insight of both the SES and the EU ETS. The interviewees did not allow the researcher 
to keep any records or notes of the interviews neither to reproduce their exact words. 
Therefore, the credibility and proper use of the findings of this method rely on the ability of 
the researcher to capture the position of the interviewees.  
6.6 Summary  
The research was conducted by a mix of methods. Semi structured interviews based on 
free flow discussions were used to research additional elements that a questionnaire could 
not capture. The participant observation taking place at EUROCONTROL enabled the 
researcher to obtain a wide knowledge of the topic, identify experts of SES and EU ETS 
areas and build a professional network. Moreover, the researcher participated to a series 
of meetings where due to confidentiality reasons, the information cannot be reproduced, 
but gave a more in depth knowledge and understanding to the researcher that helped her 
to build and better interpret the results collected by the Delphi method.  
The elements that were taken under consideration for selecting Delphi method as the most 
appropriate method for this PhD thesis were a) the scope and object of enquiry, b) the 
precision required, c) the participants’ engagement and d) the impartiality of the 
researcher. The Delphi method was deemed as the most appropriate to research the SES 
and EU ETS topics. The Delphi method due to the complexity of the topic and the lack of 
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experts being familiar with both areas, was conducted using two sets of questionnaires, 
the SES/FAB questionnaire and the EU ETS questionnaire. The Delphi method was 
terminated in the second round since the Difference of Coefficient of Variation was very 















7 The findings of the Delphi Method 
This chapter presents the data collected by the questionnaires following the Delphi Method 
and their discussion. The research methods followed are the Delphi method, semi 
structured interviews and participant observation. The Delphi method is conducted in two 
rounds. The Delphi method was applied for both cases, i.e. SES and EU ETS, having two 
separate questionnaires with some common areas. For every set of questionnaire, there 
were around 30 participants. The Likert scale was used in some of the questions ranging 
from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for strong disagreement, 2 for disagreement, 3 for neutral 
position, 4 for agreement and 5 for strong agreement. In other questions, the participants 
were asked to share 100 points among the statements. In both questionnaires, an 
additional question about the Transaction Costs was added in the second round. The 
questions of the two questionnaires are listed in section 7.1. 
For the second method, around seven experts were interviewed. The interviews replies 
are presented in different parts of this PhD thesis as by this way more added value was 
added in the arguments. The last method that was followed is the participant observation, 
where the researcher attended a series of meetings with the EC, CAAs, NSAs, ANSPs, 
EUROCONTROL, airlines and academics as well as by spending a big amount of time at 
EUROCONTROL. The participant observation results are depicted as the critical analysis 
of the theoretical framework and at the identification of the factors affecting the 
implementation and the performance of SES and EU ETS.  
7.1 First round of the Delphi Method  
The Delphi method was conducted in two rounds. In this section, the first round is 
presented. The questions for the first round of EU ETS questionnaire are the following: 
 Q1. Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following statements.  
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 Q2. Please assess the impact of different allowances allocation methods to the 
aviation sector (was removed in the 2nd round) 
 Q3. Please divide 100 points over the different allowance allocation methods that 
you deem as appropriate for the allocation of allowances to the airlines, where the 
most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are allowed to allocate 
points to as many factors as you wish. 
 Q4. In order to link the different ETSs (like New Zealand or Shanghai ETS) with 
entire scheme and not only in aviation, the following factors should be applied to the 
same degree. Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements. 
 Q5. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that lead to carbon neutral 
growth, where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are 
allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you wish.  
 Q6. Do you think that there is a connection between EU ETS and Functional 
Airspace Blocks (FABs)? If yes, why? (was removed in the 2nd round) 
The questions for the first round of SES questionnaire are: 
 Q1. Please evaluate the major FAB Improvement Areas (FIAs) that have been 
identified as the most promising areas according to the degree of the potential 
benefit coming from the establishment of FABs.  
 Q2. Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following statements  
 Q3. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that affect horizontal en route 
flight efficiency, where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. 
You are allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you wish. 
 Q4. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that affect the use of the 
civil/military airspace structures (Free Route Airspace, Flexible use of Airspace), 
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where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are allowed 
to allocate points to as many factors as you wish.  
 Q5. Please evaluate the following factors according to their contribution to 
emissions’ reduction. 
 Q6. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that lead to carbon neutral 
growth, where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are 
allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you wish. 
 Q.7. Do you think that the present charging scheme is enough to avoid 
fragmentation because of intra and inter FAB competition? What do you propose? 
(was removed in the 2nd round) 
 Q8. Do you think that there is a connection between FABs and Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS)? If yes, why? (was removed in the 2nd round) 
7.1.1 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme Questionnaire descriptive analysis  
This section is devoted to the descriptive presentation of the finding of the first round for 
the EU ETS questionnaire and will proceed question by question. The tables provide 
information about the participation rate (N), the range of the replies given (Min for 
minimum value and Max for maximum value given), the mean, Standard Deviation (SD) 
and Coefficient of Variation (CV) also known as Relative Standard Deviation (RSD). The 
coefficient of variation (CV) is the ratio of the standard deviation of an item’s rating score to 
its corresponding mean across panellists. This coefficient, unlike the standard deviation, is 
not affected by the unit of measurement. The statements are ordered by higher to lower 
mean.  
As may be seen in Table 22, for some of the statements all the 31 participants expressed 
their opinion for some others there were 27 replies. The standard deviation values show 
that there is a small spread of the replies and indicates that despite the groups where they 
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belong they have consensus in their opinions. One interesting statement is that lobbying 
around allocation of allowances affects the economic dimension of the EU ETS. The 
majority of 27 participants agreed with these statements. The average value is 4 which 
stands for agreement, the Standard Deviation (SD) was 0.83 and the coefficient of 
variation (CV) was 0.21. The statements ‘It is possible to link the EU ETS and the other 
Emissions Trading schemes and have a global ETS’; ‘The carbon market’s stability is 
vulnerable because of the continuous changes in legislation’; ‘Additional fuel savings will 
also be achieved owing to better fuel use predictability’; and ‘The EU ETS is causing 
competition issues to airlines’ had a mean ranging from 3.5-3.9. The factors ‘The EU ETS 
will lead the airlines to merge in order to obtain more emissions allowances’ and ‘Route 
optimisation is sufficient enough for carbon neutral growth’ had the lowest means.  
Table 22: Q1 Position of participants on EU ETS (1st round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
The economic dimension of the EU ETS drives 
heavy lobbying around allocation of EU ETS 
allowances. 
27 2 5 4.00 0.83 0.21 
It is possible to link the EU ETS and the other 
Emissions Trading schemes and have a global 
ETS. 
31 1 5 3.87 1.06 0.27 
The carbon market’s stability is vulnerable 
because of the continuous changes in legislation. 
30 2 5 3.73 0.98 0.26 
Additional fuel savings will also be achieved 
owing to better fuel use predictability. 
28 1 5 3.64 0.95 0.26 
The EU ETS is causing competition issues to 
airlines 
31 1 5 3.52 1.39 0.40 
Using biofuels is a promising solution for carbon 
offsetting. 
30 1 5 3.33 1.24 0.37 
The EU ETS can result in carbon leakage. 29 1 5 3.31 1.04 0.31 
The multi-period nature of allocations (i.e. 
banking and borrowing flexibility) drives 
dependence both upon post-2012 decisions and 
creates risk of perverse incentives 
28 1 5 3.29 0.90 0.27 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
The monitoring, reporting and verification of 
emissions in the EU ETS is effective. 
31 1 5 3.26 1.13 0.35 
The EU ETS is vulnerable to frauds, for instance 
VAT fraud and ‘phishing’ scams. 
28 1 5 3.25 1.35 0.42 
The carbon market stability is vulnerable 
because of the low prices of the allowances. 
29 1 5 3.21 1.15 0.36 
Postponing the auctions can force the prices of 
allowances to increase. 
29 1 5 3.17 1.14 0.36 
The EU ETS is source of profit-making incentives 
unprecedented in the history of environmental 
policy 
27 1 5 3.04 1.40 0.46 
The creation of carbon as a “financial 
instrument” can lead to sufficient carbon 
reduction. 
28 1 5 3.00 1.09 0.36 
The corresponding large proportion of free 
allocation underlies legal stresses and a scope for 
distortions. 
28 1 4 2.89 0.96 0.33 
There are small emissions reductions relative to 
‘business-as-usual’ and this leads to instabilities 
related to economics, policies and time frames) 
in the EU ETS. 
28 1 4 2.75 0.89 0.32 
The free allocation of allowances to the airlines 
must be stricter. 
31 1 5 2.71 1.27 0.47 
The cap of EU ETS is too generous. 30 1 5 2.67 1.32 0.50 
The inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS will 
influence negatively the development of non-
European airlines if they are included in EU ETS. 
31 1 5 2.65 1.36 0.51 
The EU ETS will lead the airlines to merge in 
order to obtain more emissions allowances. 
31 1 5 2.42 1.34 0.55 
Route optimisation is sufficient enough for 
carbon neutral growth. 
30 1 5 2.03 1.22 0.60 
The second question was about the impact of different allowances allocation methods to 
the aviation sector (Table 23). This question was not taken under consideration because 
many participants found it difficult to reply and the participation rate was too low to extract 
results. Due to that it was not added to the second round.  
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Table 23: Question about the impact of different allowance allocation methods (1st round 
EU ETS Q) 





The cost of EU ETS is passed 
to ticket or freight prices  
    
Airlines have windfall 
profits  
    
Airlines demands more 
allowances  
    
Technical improvements 
and industry measures are 
implemented 
    
The third question about the different allowance allocation methods received 24 replies 
(Table 24). When the mean is taken under consideration, the allocation method with the 
highest mark is benchmarking (mean=39%) followed by auctioning (mean=37%) and the 
least ideal method taking under consideration the mean is the grandfathering rights 
(mean=24%). The Standard deviation for all the allocation methods is very high, which 
shows that the mean is not representative. The CV as explained in the methodology 
chapter can take values from 0-5.48. In this case, the CV is higher compared to the other 
question, but it is still considered as low.    
Table 24: Ideal allocation method (1st round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
Benchmarking 24 0 100 39.25 26.12 0.67 
Auctioning 24 0 90 36.58 26.08 0.71 
Grandfathering 24 0 90 24.17 27.17 1.12 
The next question is very important given the recent developments with ICAO Assembly 
and the proposed Global Market Based Measure (Table 25). The participants were given a 
set of factors that need to be the same for linking the different ETSs (like New Zealand or 
Shanghai ETS) across the world to create a global scheme. The 27 participants agreed 
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with all the factors stated and did not add any additional factor. The average for all the 
statements is 4.2.  
Table 25: Factors to be considered for linking different ETSs (1st round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
There are the same Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification (MRV) rules 
for allowances 
27 1 5 4.56 1.81 0.40 
There is the same eligibility of offset 
credits 
26 1 5 4.39 1.81 0.41 
There are the same rules governing new 
entrants and closures 
27 1 5 4.33 1.82 0.40 
There is the same stringency of 
enforcement 
27 1 5 4.33 1.80 0.42 
There are the same registries’ rules 26 1 5 4.31 1.83 0.42 
The same allocation methods are 
applied 
27 1 5 4.22 1.87 0.44 
There is the same stringency of targets 27 1 5 4.15 1.88 0.45 
There are the same compliance periods 27 1 5 3.89 2.03 0.52 
There are the same banking provisions 27 1 5 3.67 1.04 0.28 
Both the SES and the EU ETS questionnaires, as explained in the methodology chapter, 
have a common question. The replies of the EU ETS participants are summarised in Table 
26. The 26 participants who replied to this question gave the most points to the horizontal 
en-route flight efficiency that is related with the 4 following factors: Direct routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth; Wind optimal routes lead to carbon neutral growth; Flexible Use of 
Airspace (FUA) leads to carbon neutral growth; and Free Route Airspace (FRA) leads to 
carbon neutral growth. The second most important factor is the EU ETS according to 26 
experts. The CV are very high in all factors. The comparison between the SES and the EU 
ETS replies to this question is done in the second/final round of Delphi.  
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Table 26: Factors leading to carbon neutral growth (1st round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
The EU ETS leads to carbon neutral 
growth. 
26 0 94 21.46 25.31 1.18 
Individual carbon offsetting programs 
from airlines lead to carbon neutral 
growth. 
26 0 40 12.39 12.32 1.00 
Other 26 0 60 11.35 17.75 1.57 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) leads to 
carbon neutral growth 
26 0 30 11.31 8.21 0.73 
Wind optimal routes lead to carbon 
neutral growth 
25 0 45 10.76 10.29 0.96 
Free Route Airspace (FRA) leads to 
carbon neutral growth 
26 0 40 10.35 9.17 0.89 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programmes from states lead to carbon 
neutral growth. 
26 0 30 10.15 10.19 1.00 
Direct routes lead to carbon neutral 
growth 
26 0 40 10.15 8.67 0.85 
Other 26 0 45 2.41 9.34 3.88 
The final question of the EU ETS questionnaire asked the participants if they believe that 
there is a connection between SES (FABs) and Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
The 45% of the participants believe that there is a connection between SES and EU ETS. 
The 16% believe that there is no connection between the two schemes. The 39% of the 
participants did not reply to the question (Figure 30).   
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Figure 30: Connection between SES (FABs) and EU ETS (1st round of EU ETS Q) 
 
7.1.2 The Single European Sky (FABs) Questionnaire descriptive analysis  
This section gives a descriptive presentation of the finding of the first round for the Single 
European Sky questionnaire. Around 30 experts participated voluntarily and anonymously 
to the first round of the SES questionnaire.  
The participants were asked to evaluate the major FAB Improvement Areas (FIAs) that 
have been identified as the most promising areas according to the degree of the potential 
benefit coming from the establishment of FABs (Table 27).  Most of the participants kept a 
neutral position regarding the FAB Improvement Areas (FIAs) that have been identified as 
the most promising areas according to the degree of the potential benefit coming from the 
establishment of FABs. The areas that noted a positive position are the Common 
Operational Procedures, Synergies in Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management 
(ATFCM), Communication Data Sharing, Harmonised ATM system and Reduction of 
Emissions. Having an average CV at 30%, it is proven that there is consensus among the 










Table 27: Areas benefitted from the establishment of FABs (1st round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
Synergies in ATFCM 28 2 5 3.96 0.79 0.20 
Harmonised ATM system 28 1 5 3.96 1.20 0.30 
Reduction of emissions 28 2 5 3.96 0.96 0.24 
Common Operational Procedures 28 2 5 3.93 0.77 0.20 
Common Flight Inspection 28 1 5 2.93 0.81 0.28 
Communication Data Sharing 28 2 5 3.89 0.83 0.21 
Airspace consolidation 28 1 5 3.82 1.12 0.29 
Common Routes Network design 28 1 5 3.79 1.03 0.27 
Common Sector Design 28 1 5 3.64 1.03 0.28 
Common Safety Management System 28 2 5 3.64 0.95 0.26 
Surveillance Data sharing 27 1 5 3.63 1.12 0.31 
Improved cooperation with Militaries 28 1 5 3.54 1.11 0.31 
Common ATCO Training 28 2 5 3.50 0.84 0.24 
Common R&D 27 1 5 3.15 0.99 0.31 
Common Procurement 27 1 5 3.15 1.17 0.37 
Sharing of navigation aids 27 1 5 3.15 1.03 0.33 
Common AIS & MET 28 1 5 3.14 1.18 0.38 
Other 4 3 5 4.00 1.16 0.29 
The most important replies in the second question are for the importance and need of SES 
and the contribution of SES to the environmental performance (Table 28). Almost all the 
participants agreed that the European airspace was necessary to change (statement: ‘The 
airspace before SES did not need to be changed’ mean= 1.93), but not all FABs are fully 
operational (statement ‘All FABs are fully operational’: mean= 2.04). The CV in all the 
statements with the exemption of the ‘All FABs are fully operational’ and the ‘the airspace 
before SES did not need to be changed’ gather consensus among the participants.  
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Table 28: Position of participants on SES and the environment (1st round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
The reorganisation of the European Sky 
was necessary. 
29 1 5 4.04 1.12 0.28 
The European airspace network today 
can benefit from a significant level of 
dynamism through the application of the 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) concept. 
28 1 5 3.79 0.96 0.25 
Due to inherent safety (minimum 
separation requirements between 
aircraft) requirements, the level of 
“inefficiencies” cannot be reduced to 
zero at system level. 
29 1 5 3.66 1.08 0.30 
FABs bring routes closer to the optimum 
“Great Circle” route and reduce 
extended flight paths. 
29 1 5 3.55 1.12 0.32 
Due to capacity (organisation of traffic 
flows) requirements, the level of 
“inefficiencies” cannot be reduced to 
zero at system level. 
29 1 5 3.45 1.24 0.36 
The main environmental KPI should be 
the estimated economic value of CO2 
emissions due to route extension. 
29 1 5 2.83 1.34 0.47 
The horizontal component is of higher 
economic and environmental importance 
than the vertical component of the Flight 
efficiency. 
29 1 4 2.59 0.95 0.37 
All FABs are fully operational. 27 1 5 2.04 1.09 0.54 
The airspace before SES did not need to 
be changed. 
29 1 5 1.93 1.19 0.62 
The horizontal en route flight efficiency is a key factor for reducing the emissions in en 
route level (Table 29). The participants characterised as the most important factors 
affecting the horizontal en route flight efficiency: a) the airspace structure; b) the flight 
planning capabilities; and c) the user preferences. The high CV suggests different opinions 
among the participants and lack of consensus.   
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Table 29: Factors affecting horizontal en route flight efficiency (1st round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
Route structure and availability 
affect horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. 
24 5 50 27.71 12.25 0.44 
Availability of airspace (utilisation of 
civil military structures) affects 
horizontal en route flight efficiency. 
24 5 40 18.67 10.43 0.56 
Flight planning capabilities (use of 
software, repetitive flight planning) 
affect horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. 
24 0 30 14.25 7.43 0.52 
User preferences regarding fuel 
affect horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. 
24 0 40 10.58 10.48 0.99 
Tactical ATC routings affect 
horizontal en route flight efficiency. 
24 0 20 10.42 5.30 0.51 
User preferences regarding time 
affect horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. 
24 0 30 8.58 6.65 0.78 
Special events such as ATC strikes 
affect horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. 
24 0 30 8.33 6.54 0.79 
Other 24 0 25 1.46 5.41 3.71 
According to 27 participants, the most important factor affecting the use of the civil/military 
airspace structures (Free Route Airspace, Flexible use of Airspace) are political issues 
(Table 30). This factor gathered on average 43% with a standard deviation equal to 29. 




Table 30: Factors affecting the Civil Military cooperation (1st round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
Political issues 27 0 100 42.96 28.93 0.67 
Flight planning capabilities (use of 
software, repetitive flight planning) 
27 0 60 13.41 13.08 0.98 
Special events 27 0 60 13.41 16.53 1.23 
Existing ICAO ATM procedures 27 0 30 9.70 9.53 0.98 
Aspects related to position information 
and radar vectoring 
27 0 30 9.33 8.09 0.87 
Other 27 0 100 10.82 27.14 2.51 
The fifth question focused on the factors contributing to emissions’ reduction (Table 31). 
The 30 participants agreed that the most important factors contributing to emissions’ 
reduction are the operational measures, like FUA, FRA and CDOs. Whereas they stated 
that the emissions trading does not contribute to emissions’ reductions. For the SES in 
general the average was 3.67 and the SD 1.09. The SD was on average below 30% 
proving consensus among the participants. One participant added two factors that 
contribute to the emissions reduction. One of those was the ‘ICAO Global Market Based 
Measure (GMBM)’ and the other was the ‘new technologies’.  
Table 31: Factors contributing to emissions’ reduction (1st round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
Shortest feasible routes 29 1 5 4.14 0.88 0.21 
Implementing continuous descent 
approaches 
30 2 5 4.10 0.71 0.17 
Use of Eco-friendly engines 30 1 5 4.10 0.85 0.21 
Flexible Use of Airspace 30 2 5 4.07 0.83 0.20 
Free Route Airspace 29 2 5 4.03 0.82 0.20 
Improving load factors 30 2 5 3.70 0.79 0.22 
Use of Bio fuels 30 1 5 3.67 1.12 0.31 
Single European Sky 30 1 5 3.67 1.09 0.30 
Reduced traffic because of economic 
crisis 
30 1 5 3.27 1.11 0.34 
Airlines develop offsetting programs 29 1 5 3.24 1.15 0.36 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme 30 1 5 2.90 1.19 0.41 
Trading Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs) 
29 1 5 2.83 1.14 0.40 
Trading Verified or Voluntary Emissions 
Reductions (VERs) 
29 1 5 2.62 1.12 0.43 
Other 3 5 5 3.33 2.89 0.87 
Other 1 5 5 5.00   
The common question with the EU ETS questionnaire about the factors leading to carbon 
neutral growth was answered by 25 participants (Table 32). The EU ETS and the carbon 
offsetting schemes gathered around 43% and the en route flight efficiency scored 48%. 
The replies to this question are quite diverse and there is very low consensus among the 
participants. This is proven by the relatively high standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation.  
Table 32: Factors leading to carbon neutral growth (1st round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
The EU ETS leads to carbon neutral 
growth. 
25 0 50 17.52 13.94 0.80 
Individual carbon offsetting programs 




40 15.12 12.02 0.80 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) leads to 
carbon neutral growth 
25 3 40 12.72 8.39 0.66 
Free Route Airspace (FRA) leads to 
carbon neutral growth 
25 
0 
50 12.32 10.29 0.84 




40 11.72 8.84 0.75 




40 11.68 9.75 0.83 
Individual carbon offsetting 




30 10.72 9.74 0.91 
Other 25 0 35 6.00 11.18 1.86 
Other 25 0 45 2.60 9.70 3.73 
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The seventh question about the charging scheme received the following replies:  
‘A common charging scheme based on the ideal route and not on the actual 
trajectory can be the solution’ (IATA; CAA; EUROCONTROL; CAA)’.  
An ANSP added ‘Common FAB unit-rate (or EU wide) with compensation scheme 
could be the answer’.  
A representative of a government body stated that ‘it depends on the political 
strength of the EU to reduce charges’.  
An airline’s representative said that ‘There is no such a thing as a “present charging 
scheme” because the regulations change every year. The charging scheme which is 
currently on the table (cost relative to route in European airspace) will move flights to 
routes passing just outside of Europe, extending flight times and increasing CO2 
emissions’.  
No. For some ANSP's the targets were not very ambitious as their unit rates were 
below target so they only raised the unit rates. For some others, the target was 
unrealistic. It was very ambitious to set same targets for all but I don't think it works in 
practice. Should we allow those FAB's that deliver to take over those FAB's who 
don't? (Airline)  
Another expert stated that ‘Present charging scheme goal is to return the additional 
ANS revenues to the Users. In addition, the ultimate goal is to create single charging 
zone within the FABs – with one unit rate per FAB.  FAB single unit rate would 
ensure equal distribution of flights that are based on operational requirements and 
not on cost efficiency requirements as the flights are organized today within the FABs 
(some states are more expensive than others within the FAB and thus Users would 
rather fly cheaper route than more direct route – while this would have negative 
impact on CO2 emission – but this would be more cost effective for the User, even 
though they would have higher CO2 emission)’. 
It is evident from the above replies that the participants are not happy with the charging 
scheme. The current charging scheme is not set realistically, the implementation is lacking 
political strength and there are consequences to the environmental performance, since 
airlines select routes with cheaper unit rates and the charging scheme is not done based 
on the Great Distance Cycle between the city pairs. Therefore, the airlines fly longer routes 
to pay less for ANS, consuming more fuel and having higher emissions.   
The last and eighth question was the same as the EU ETS questionnaire. As illustrated in 
Figure 31 Figure 31: Connection between SES (FABs) and EU ETS (1st round of SES 
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Q)the 33% of the participants believe that there is a connection between SES (FABs) and 
EU ETS and the 33% believes that there is not. The 1/3 of the participants did not reply to 
the question.  
 
Figure 31: Connection between SES (FABs) and EU ETS (1st round of SES Q) 
 
7.2 Second round of Delphi Method  
The second round is the final round of the Delphi Method. In this round two additional 
questions were added to the SES and the EU ETS questionnaires based on the 5th 
chapter of the literature review and as explained in the methodology chapter. In the EU 
ETS two questions from the first round was removed. The one question that was removed 
is “Please assess the impact of different allowances allocation methods to the aviation 
sector”. The participation to this question was very low to extract any credible results. 
Hence it was removed. Finally, the 5th question ‘Do you think that there is a connection 
between EU ETS and Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)? If yes, why?’ was also 
removed. This question was already answered indirectly by other questions within the 
questionnaire. Apart from this, its elimination will counterbalance the introduction of two 
other questions. The following questions were added to the EU ETS questionnaire in the 







 Q5: In the following table, please allocate 100 points over the various factors 
associated with transaction costs for policymakers/regulators emerging from the 
aviation EU ETS scheme.  The most important factor gets the highest number of 
points and the least important factor gets the lowest number of points. You are 
allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you wish. 
 Q6: Overall, how important do you consider transactions costs to be for the effective 
functioning of the aviation inclusion in the EU ETS scheme? Please mark the box. 
As far the SES questionnaire is concerned, two questions were replaced by new. The 
questions that were deleted are the ‘Do you think that the present charging scheme is 
enough to avoid fragmentation because of intra and inter FAB competition? What do you 
propose?’ and ‘Do you think that there is a connection between FABs and Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS)? If yes, why?’. The participation to the first question was very 
low and therefore, findings and conclusions could not be drowned from this. The second 
question as in the case of EU ETS questionnaire was addressed indirectly by other 
statements within the questionnaire. The following questions were added to the SES 
questionnaire in the 2nd round of Delphi Method:  
 Q7. In the following table, please allocate 100 points over the various factors 
associated with transaction costs for stakeholders emerging from the environment 
KPA in the SES Performance scheme.  The most important factor gets the highest 
number of points and the least important factor gets the lowest number of points. 
You are allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you wish. 
 Q8. Overall, how important do you consider transactions costs to be for the effective 
functioning of the environment KPA in the SES Performance scheme? Please mark 
the box. 
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In this section, the findings will be presented using descriptive statistics. Descriptive 
statistics describe, show or summarize data in a meaningful way. The tables give 
information about the participants’ number, the minimum and the maximum values, the 
mean, the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation. Firstly, the finding of the EU 
ETS questionnaire are given and the findings of the SES questionnaire.  
Moreover, this section will also present the differences of the first and second round of the 
Delphi method. The comparison will be made based on the difference of coefficient of 
variation between the first round and the second round of the EU ETS and the SES 
questionnaires. Moreover, the common questions of the EU ETS and the SES 
questionnaires will be analysed in order to identify any commonalities or differences to the 
options of the experts. It should be highlighted that the profiles of the experts participating 
in the EU ETS questionnaires are more orientated to the airline business whereas the 
experts participating to the SES questionnaire are more orientated to the ANSPs business. 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter the CV will be used to compare the two rounds 
of the Delphi method. A small CV value is an indication that the amount of variation was 
small. A large value of the coefficient of variation (CV) for an item in the Delphi survey 
(larger than 1) indicates that the responses of the experts are scattered compared to the 
mean of the responses for the item. As stated in the methodology chapter the absolute 
difference of the coefficient of variation will be used to identify any changed between the 
rounds and prove the stability of responses. Should the absolute difference of the CV 
(ΔCV) in round 1 (CV_R1) and the CV in round 2 (CV_R2) is small, there is no need to 
add an additional round since the participants did not revise their opinions.   
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7.2.1 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme Questionnaire descriptive analysis (2nd 
round)  
Around 30 experts participated in the second round of the EU ETS questionnaire (Table 
33). Most of the respondents do not believe that EU ETS causes competition issues, since 
they disagreed with the first three statements. They also do not believe that the route 
optimisation is sufficient for achieving carbon neutral growth. One important statement that 
had a mean of 4.03 (SD=0.94), i.e. the participants agreed with the statement is that it is 
possible to link the EU ETS and the other Emissions Trading schemes and have a global 
ETS. Surprisingly, the average for the statement ‘the cap of EU ETS is too generous’ is 
2.71 which is a disagreement. Finally, they have a neutral position towards agreement with 
mean=3.93 and Standard Deviation=0.8 that the economic dimension of the EU ETS 
drives heavy lobbying around allocation of EU ETS allowances. Consensus, as proved by 
the low CV, is achieved in this question.  
The absolute difference of CV (ΔCV) is calculated by deducting the CV of round 1 
(CV_R1) from the CV of round two (CV_R2). The first question of the EU ETS 
questionnaire had on average 0.056 ΔCV. The values ranged from 0.00 to 0.13. The 
participants gave the exact same value to the additional fuel savings statement. The 
statements that the participants slightly revised their opinions in this question were ‘The 
cap of EU ETS is too generous’; ‘The EU ETS is source of profit-making incentives 
unprecedented in the history of environmental policy’; ‘There are small emissions 
reductions relative to ‘business-as-usual’ and this leads to instabilities related to 
economics, policies and time frames) in the EU ETS’; ‘Route optimization is sufficient 
enough for carbon neutral growth’ and ‘Postponing the auctions can force the prices of 
allowances to increase’.  
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Table 33: Q1 Position of participants on EU ETS (2nd round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
It is possible to link the EU ETS and the other 
Emissions Trading schemes and have a global 
ETS. 
29 1 5 4.03 0.94 0.23 0.04 
The economic dimension of the EU ETS 
drives heavy lobbying around allocation of 
EU ETS allowances. 
29 2 5 3.93 0.80 0.20 0.01 
The carbon market’s stability is vulnerable 
because of the continuous changes in 
legislation. 
30 2 5 3.70 0.88 0.24 0.02 
Additional fuel savings will also be achieved 
owing to better fuel use predictability. 
28 1 5 3.68 0.94 0.26 0.00 
The EU ETS is causing competition issues to 
airlines 
30 1 5 3.47 1.20 0.34 0.06 
Using biofuels is a promising solution for 
carbon offsetting. 
28 1 5 3.39 1.23 0.36 0.01 
Postponing the auctions can force the prices 
of allowances to increase. 
28 2 5 3.36 0.78 0.23 0.13 
The monitoring, reporting and verification of 
emissions in the EU ETS is effective. 
30 1 5 3.27 0.91 0.28 0.07 
The multi-period nature of allocations (i.e. 
banking and borrowing flexibility) drives 
dependence both upon post-2012 decisions 
and creates risk of perverse incentives 
28 1 4 3.25 0.84 0.26 0.01 
The EU ETS can result in carbon leakage. 29 2 5 3.24 0.91 0.28 0.03 
The EU ETS is vulnerable to frauds, for 
instance VAT fraud and ‘phishing’ scams. 
29 1 5 3.17 1.10 0.35 0.07 
The carbon market stability is vulnerable 
because of the low prices of the allowances. 
28 1 5 3.11 0.96 0.31 0.05 
The creation of carbon as a “financial 
instrument” can lead to sufficient carbon 
reduction. 
29 1 5 3.00 0.93 0.31 0.05 
The corresponding large proportion of free 
allocation underlies legal stresses and a 
scope for distortions. 
28 1 4 2.86 0.76 0.26 0.07 
The EU ETS is source of profit-making 
incentives unprecedented in the history of 
environmental policy 
30 1 5 2.83 0.99 0.35 0.11 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
There are small emissions reductions relative 
to ‘business-as-usual’ and this leads to 
instabilities related to economics, policies 
and time frames) in the EU ETS. 
29 1 4 2.76 0.58 0.21 0.11 
The inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS will 
influence negatively the development of 
non-European airlines if they are included in 
EU ETS. 
30 1 5 2.73 1.17 0.43 0.08 
The cap of EU ETS is too generous. 30 1 5 2.71 1.07 0.40 0.10 
The free allocation of allowances to the 
airlines must be stricter. 
30 1 5 2.70 1.21 0.45 0.02 
The EU ETS will lead the airlines to merge in 
order to obtain more emissions allowances. 
30 1 5 2.29 1.19 0.52 0.03 
Route optimisation is sufficient enough for 
carbon neutral growth. 
30 1 4 1.77 0.86 0.49 0.11 
Most of the 24 participants believe that benchmarking is the ideal method of allowances 
allocation (Table 34). The auctioning method had a mean of around 36% and the 
grandfathering method gathered 23 points. It should be noted that most of the participants 
selected more than two methods of allocations had quite different opinions. 
The participants in the second round gave almost the same points as in the first round in 
the auctioning method. The ΔCV was 0.05. Moreover, the participants gave less points to 
the grandfathering method and more points to the benchmarking method in the second 
round. This is also supported by the ΔCV result.  
Table 34: Ideal allocation method (2nd round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 




Benchmarking 24 0 80 41.04 24.27 0.59 0.08 
Auctioning 24 0 90 36.25 24.10 0.66 0.05 
Grandfathering 24 0 75 22.71 22.02 0.97 0.15 
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In the Q1 question of this questionnaire the average reply from the 29 participants to the 
statement about the possibility of linking EU ETS with other schemes was 4.03 showing 
that they agree that it can happen(Table 35). The Q3 question is related to this and is: ‘Q3. 
In order to link the different ETSs (like New Zealand or Shanghai ETS), the following 
factors should be applied to the same degree’. Please assess the extent to which you 
agree with the following statements (1 stands for strong disagreement, 2 for disagreement, 
3 for neutral position, 4 for agreement and 5 for strong agreement). The 26-27 participants 
replied that the main factor that needs to be the same is the Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification (MRV) rules for allowances (mean=4.26). They expressed a rather neutral 
opinion for the banking provisions, the compliance periods and the stringency of the 
targets.  
The question about the factor for linking different ETSs had a ΔCV ranging from 0.06 to 
0.26. The lowest ΔCV value was noted in the banking provisions factor, whereas the 
highest value was in the allocation methods and the compliance periods. The ΔCV 
average in this question was equal to 0.20.  
Table 35: Factors to be considered for linking different ETSs (2nd round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
There are the same Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification (MRV) rules for allowances 
27 1 5 4.26 0.90 0.21 
0.1
9 
There is the same stringency of enforcement 
26 2 5 4.19 0.85 0.20 
0.2
1 
There is the same eligibility of offset credits 
26 2 5 4.19 0.80 0.19 
0.2
1 
There are the same rules governing new 
entrants and closures 
26 3 5 4.15 0.73 0.18 
0.2
2 
The same allocation methods are applied 
26 2 5 4.12 0.82 0.20 
0.2
4 
There are the same registries’ rules 





 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
There are the same banking provisions 
26 2 5 3.65 0.80 0.22 
0.0
6 
There are the same compliance periods 
26 2 5 3.65 0.94 0.26 
0.2
6 
There is the same stringency of targets 
26 2 5 3.88 0.95 0.25 
0.2
0 
The question about the factors leading to carbon neutral growth was answered by 26-27 
experts (Table 36). The operational factors contributing to carbon neutral growth had an 
average score of 44% and the EU ETS and carbon offsetting schemes received 32%. 
There was one participant that gave 94% to EU ETS and there was no consensus among 
the participants. The CV in all the cases was high compared to the other questions.  
The average ΔCV was 0.08. The prices of ΔCV ranged from 0 to 0.15. All prices were very 
low, which indicates that the participants did not revise their opinions regarding the factors 
leading to carbon neutral growth in the second round of the Delphi method.  
Table 36: Factors leading to carbon neutral growth (2nd round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
The EU ETS leads to carbon 
neutral growth. 
27 0 94 20.67 25.16 1.22 
0.04 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 
leads to carbon neutral growth 
27 0 50 12.74 10.97 0.86 
0.13 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programs from airlines lead to 
carbon neutral growth. 
27 0 40 12.11 12.17 1.00 
0.00 
Free Route Airspace (FRA) leads 
to  neutral growth carbon 
27 0 40 11.07 9.75 0.88 
0.15 
Wind optimal routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth 
27 0 45 10.33 10.10 0.98 
0.02 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programmes from states lead to 
carbon neutral growth. 




 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
Direct routes lead to carbon 
neutral growth 
27 0 40 9.85 8.65 0.88 
0.12 
Other 27 0 60 10.93 17.54 1.61 0.07 
Other 27 0 45 2.50 9.51 3.81 0.07 
The CV in the second round was smaller than the CV in the first round. Moreover, the 
absolute difference of CV between the two rounds reached a small value. Therefore, 
stability is reached and no additional round or action is needed.  
In the second round of the questionnaires, the element of Transaction cost was 
introduced. The participants were asked to share 100 points over the different categories 
(identified by the researcher) where the most important factor gets the highest number of 
points (Table 37). They were also given the option of adding a category themselves. The 
highest score was noted to the Implementation of Emissions Management category, 
followed by the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification as well as the application. The 
Abatement measures category had the lowest score (mean=6.97%). There was 
consensus for the category of ‘Application’ (CV=0.42) and ‘Implementation of Emissions 
Management’ (CV=0.49), but there was no agreement on the other categories.  
Table 37: Transaction costs categories (2nd round EU ETS Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
Application 26 0 30 14.78 6.24 0.42 
Implementation of Emissions 
Management 
26 0 50 22.66 11.09 0.49 
Monitoring 26 0 45 14.01 11.05 0.79 
Reporting and verification 26 0 45 16.86 10.28 0.61 
Abatement measures 25 0 15 6.97 5.16 0.74 
Trade 26 0 25 10.01 7.54 0.75 
Strategy 26 0 30 9.40 6.23 0.66 
Other 25 0 10 1.40 3.07 2.19 
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Regarding the question about how important the transactions costs are for the effective 
functioning of the aviation inclusion in the EU ETS scheme, the 26 participants gave on 
average 3,65 which stands for neutral towards important. The important was the prevailing 
opinion.  
7.2.2 The Single European Sky Questionnaire descriptive analysis (2nd round) 
This section is about the responses of the participants in the SES questionnaire in the 
second round. Table 38 is about the areas that are benefited by the establishment of 
Functional Airspace Blocks. On average 26 participants replied to this question. The 
participants kept a neutral towards positive position regarding the FAB improvement areas 
that have been identified as the most promising areas according to the degree of the 
potential benefit coming from the establishment of FABs. The respondents identified the 
Common Operational Procedures, Synergies in ATFCM, Harmonised ATM system and 
Reduction of emissions as important FIAs. The Common Flight Inspection has been 
identified as unimportant FIA.  
The absolute difference of coefficient of variation is used to identify if there are any 
changes in the opinions of the experts and groups in the second round of the SES 
questionnaire of the Delphi method. The first question about the areas benefitted by FABs 
had a very low ΔCV ranging from 0 to 0.07. Hence, stability was achieved.  
Table 38: Areas benefitted from the establishment of FABs (2nd round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
Harmonised ATM system 26 1 5 4.12 0.95 0.23 0.07 
Common Operational 
Procedures 
26 2 5 4.04 0.77 0.19 
0.01 
Reduction of emissions 25 2 5 4.04 0.89 0.22 0.02 
Airspace consolidation 26 1 5 3.88 0.95 0.25 0.04 
Common Routes Network 
design 




 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
Communication Data Sharing 26 2 5 3.81 0.75 0.20 0.01 
Common Sector Design 26 1 5 3.77 0.95 0.25 0.03 
Common Safety Management 
System 
26 2 5 3.69 0.88 0.24 
0.02 
Improved cooperation with 
Militaries 
26 1 5 3.65 1.09 0.30 
0.01 
Surveillance Data sharing 26 1 5 3.54 0.99 0.28 0.03 
Common ATCO Training 26 2 5 3.42 0.81 0.24 0.00 
Common R&D 25 2 5 3.20 0.87 0.27 0.04 
Common AIS & MET 26 1 5 3.15 1.19 0.38  
Common Procurement 26 1 5 3.08 1.02 0.33 0.04 
Sharing of navigation aids 26 1 4 3.00 0.85 0.28 0.05 
Common Flight Inspection 25 1 5 2.80 0.76 0.27 0.01 
Other, 5 3 5 3.60 0.89 0.25 0.04 
On average, 27 participants replied the question about SES and the environment in the 
second round (Table 39). Most of them agreed that the reorganisation of the European 
Sky was necessary and that the airspace had to change. They also agreed that the FABs 
are not fully operational. There were extremely small differences compared to the first 
round. The ΔCV ranged from 0.01 to 0.11. The maximum ΔCV was for the statement The 
airspace before SES did not need to be changed. More experts disagreed with this 
statement in the second round.  
Table 39: Position of participants on SES and the environment (2nd round SES Q) 
Descriptive statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
The reorganisation of the 
European Sky was necessary. 
28 1 5 4.21 0.96 0.23 0.05 
The European airspace network 
today can benefit from a 
significant level of dynamism 
through the application of the 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 
concept. 
27 1 5 3.78 0.97 0.26 0.01 
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Descriptive statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
Due to inherent safety 
(minimum separation 
requirements between aircraft) 
requirements, the level of 
“inefficiencies” cannot be 
reduced to zero at system level. 
28 1 5 3.75 1.00 0.27 0.03 
FABs bring routes closer to the 
optimum “Great Circle” route 
and reduce extended flight 
paths. 
27 1 5 3.52 0.98 0.28 0.04 
Due to capacity (organisation of 
traffic flows) requirements, the 
level of “inefficiencies” cannot 
be reduced to zero at system 
level. 
28 1 5 3.46 1.17 0.34 0.02 
The main environmental KPI 
should be the estimated 
economic value of CO2 
emissions due to route 
extension. 
27 1 5 2.96 1.22 0.41 0.06 
The horizontal component is of 
higher economic and 
environmental importance than 
the vertical component of the 
Flight efficiency. 
28 1 4 2.54 0.88 0.35 0.02 
All FABs are fully operational. 26 1 5 1.92 0.89 0.46 0.08 
The airspace before SES did not 
need to be changed. 
28 1 5 1.79 0.92 0.51 0.11 
The third question about the different factors that affect horizontal en route flight efficiency, 
was answered by 24 experts (Table 40). The experts suggested that the most important 
factors are the airspace structure, the flight planning capabilities and then the user 
preferences. The question about the factors affecting horizontal en route flight efficiency 
was the question that the experts revised their opinion the most compared to the rest of 
the questions. Nevertheless, the ΔCV was quite low. The average ΔCV was 0.19. The 
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price is influenced by the high ΔCV of the factor ‘other’. This factor was an optional 
additional factor and many of the experts did add one and it was marked with 0 points. 
Therefore, when considering stability and consensus for the replies, it is not taken under 
consideration. Stability was achieved in the question 
Table 40: Factors affecting horizontal en route flight efficiency (2nd round SES Q) 
Descriptive statistics  
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
Route structure and availability 
affect horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. 
24 5 50 27.92 10.52 0.38 0.06 
Availability of airspace 
(utilisation of civil military 
structures) affects horizontal 
en route flight efficiency. 
24 5 40 17.83 8.51 0.48 0.08 
Flight planning capabilities (use 
of software, repetitive flight 
planning) affect horizontal en 
route flight efficiency. 
24 5 25 14.67 5.83 0.40 0.11 
Tactical ATC routings affect 
horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. 
24 5 20 10.63 4.25 0.40 0.12 
User preferences regarding 
fuel affect horizontal en route 
flight efficiency. 
24 0 40 10.38 8.97 0.86 0.13 
User preferences regarding 
time affect horizontal en route 
flight efficiency. 
24 0 25 8.58 5.59 0.65 0.13 
Special events such as ATC 
strikes affect horizontal en 
route flight efficiency. 
24 0 20 7.96 5.07 0.64 0.15 
Other 24 0 25 1.83 5.47 2.99 0.72 
The Civil-Military cooperation is a very important element for the reorganisation of the 
airspace. Therefore, the participants were asked to prioritise the factors that affect the use 
of the civil/military airspace structures (Free Route Airspace, Flexible use of Airspace) as 
seen in Table 41. The factor ‘political issues’ gathered on average 43% and the remaining 
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factors gathered 13-9%. The ΔCV of the Civil Military cooperation was very low, indicating 
that stability was achieved. The values ranged from 0.03 to 0.39. As explained above 
when the factor ‘other’ has a relative high ΔCV, it is not taken under consideration when 
examining if stability is achieved.  
Table 41: Factors affecting the Civil Military cooperation (2nd round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Min Max Mean SD 
CV 
ΔCV 
Political issues 26 0 100 43.12 27.13 0.63 0.04 
Flight planning capabilities 
(use of software, repetitive 
flight planning) 
26 0 35 13.04 9.49 0.73 0.25 
Special events 26 0 50 12.85 15.37 1.20 0.03 
Existing ICAO ATM procedures 26 0 30 9.12 7.92 0.87 0.11 
Aspects related to position 
information and radar 
vectoring 
26 0 30 9.12 7.66 0.84 0.03 
Other 26 0 100 12.77 27.10 2.12 0.39 
Around 27 participants evaluated the factors according to their contribution to emissions’ 
reduction and only 3 added a factor (Table 42). The factors that are considered the most 
important by the participants are the FUA, the FRA, shortest routes, CDOs and use of eco-
friendly engines. The factors Trading Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) (mean=2.78), 
Trading Verified or Voluntary Emissions Reductions (VERs) (mean=2.54) and EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (mean=2.93) were evaluated as unimportant. As listed in 
Table 42, the ΔCV of the opinions about factors contributing to emissions reduction is very 
low, proving stability among the Delphi method rounds. The minimum value of ΔCV was 0 
and the maximum value was 0.08.  
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Table 42: Factors contributing to emissions’ reduction (2nd round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
Shortest feasible routes 27 3 5 4.30 0.67 0.16 0.05 
Flexible Use of Airspace 28 2 5 4.18 0.72 0.17 0.03 
Implementing continuous 
descent approaches 
28 3 5 4.14 0.71 0.17 0.00 
Use of Eco-friendly engines 28 1 5 4.14 0.89 0.22 0.01 
Free Route Airspace 27 2 5 4.11 0.70 0.17 0.03 
Single European Sky 28 1 5 3.82 0.94 0.25 0.05 
Improving load factors 28 2 5 3.68 0.77 0.21 0.01 
Use of Bio fuels 28 1 5 3.57 1.14 0.32 0.01 
Reduced traffic because of 
economic crisis 
28 1 5 3.43 1.00 0.29 0.05 
Airlines develop offsetting 
programs 
27 1 5 3.26 1.02 0.31 0.05 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme 28 1 5 2.93 0.98 0.33 0.08 
Trading Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs) 
27 1 5 2.78 1.01 0.36 0.04 
Trading Verified or Voluntary 
Emissions Reductions (VERs) 
26 1 4 2.54 0.99 0.39 0.04 
Other 3 5 5 5.00    
Other 1 5 5 5.00    
The 24 participants that replied to the question about the factors leading to carbon neutral 
growth in the second round of the Delphi method gave points ranging from 0-50 (Table 
43). The en-route flight efficiency factors gathered 47.21% and the EU ETS 17.5%, 
airlines’ carbon offsetting schemes 15.67% and states’ carbon offsetting schemes 
gathered 10.08%. The difference on replies from the first round of the Delphi method are 
minor. The ΔCV took prices ranging from 0 to 0.13. The average ΔCV was 0.042. 
Consensus and stability was achieved in this question too.  
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Table 43: Factors leading to carbon neutral growth (2nd round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV ΔCV 
The EU ETS leads to carbon 
neutral growth. 
24 0 40 17.50 11.59 0.66 0.04 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programs from airlines lead to 
carbon neutral growth. 
24 0 40 15.67 10.48 0.67 0.00 
Free Route Airspace (FRA) 
leads to carbon neutral growth 
24 0 50 12.58 9.94 0.79 0.01 
Wind optimal routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth 
24 0 40 12.17 8.13 0.67 0.04 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 
leads to carbon neutral growth 
24 0 20 11.54 4.90 0.42 0.13 
Direct routes lead to carbon 
neutral growth 
24 0 30 10.92 6.80 0.62 0.03 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programmes from states lead 
to carbon neutral growth. 
24 0 25 10.08 7.47 0.74 0.02 
Other 24 0 30 5.50 9.13   
Other 24 0 37 2.38 8.43   
In the second round of the questionnaires, the element of Transaction cost was introduced 
(Table 44). The participants were asked to share 100 points over the different categories 
(identified by the researcher) where the most important factor gets the highest number of 
points. They were also given the option of adding a category themselves. On average 24 
participants replied to this question. The category Development and Implementation of the 
regulatory scheme received 27%, the Monitoring 18%, the strategy received around 17.5% 
followed by the Reporting and verification (13%), the Alternative Policies (12%) and the 
Compliance category (9.5%). Less than 5 participants gave 5-15% to an additional 
category.  
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Table 44: Transaction costs categories (2nd round SES Q) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean SD CV 
Development and Implementation of 
the regulatory scheme 
24 10 45 27.15 9.46 0.35 
Monitoring 24 10 45 18.07 10.02 0.55 
Strategy 24 5 60 17.69 11.09 0.63 
Reporting and verification 24 10 35 13.19 5.90 0.45 
Alternative Policies 24 0 20 12.15 5.55 0.46 
Compliance 23 0 17 9.20 4.29 0.47 
Other 25 0 15 1.80 4.05 2.25 
The mean for the question ‘Overall, how important do you consider transactions costs to 
be for the effective functioning of the environment KPA in the SES Performance scheme’ 
is 3.83 (standard deviation=0.64 and Coefficient of Variation=0.17). The minimum score 
was 3, i.e. neutral importance and the maximum was 5. The 24 participants either kept a 
neutral position or marked transaction costs as important for the effectiveness of 
environment KPA.  
7.2.3 Comparison of the common questions of SES and EU ETS Questionnaires 
The questionnaires of SES and EU ETS are connected. Apart from the two common 
questions, i.e. the question about the about factors leading to carbon neutral growth and 
the question if they believe that there is a connection between SES (FABs) and Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), there were some common elements that were researched.  
The SES questionnaire participants were asked about the biofuels use, the carbon 
offsetting schemes developed by airlines and the EU ETS. The EU ETS questionnaire 
participants were asked also about the biofuels use, and operational measures like the 
route optimisation and fuel predictability. 17 out of 29 experts in the EU ETS questionnaire 
had a positive opinion about the contribution of biofuels to the improvement of 
environmental performance and 7 had a negative opinion. The situation is the same at the 
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SES questionnaire where 16 out of the 28 experts expressed a positive opinion and only 4 
expressed a negative opinion.  
As far as the common question is concerned, Table 45 presents the average points the 
participants of the EU ETS and SES 2nd round questionnaire gave to the factors 
contributing to carbon neutral growth and the difference of mean. The difference in the 
mean is very low. Consequently, it can be assumed that consensus was reached among 
the experts in both questionnaires. As expected the EU ETS questionnaire shared more 
points to the EU ETS reform and less points to flight efficiency. Moreover, the experts in 
the first case shared more points to additional factors like the biofuel use and the fleet 
renewal.  
Table 45: Differences of EU ETS and SES questionnaire participants of opinions about the 
factors leading to carbon neutral growth 
Factors  
EU ETS Q 
All Experts’ position  
SES Q  
All Experts’ position 
Difference of EU 
ETS – SES Mean  
Mean(a)  SD  Mean(b)  SD  ΔMean (a-b) 
The EU ETS leads to carbon 
neutral growth. 
20.26 25.16 17.50 11.59 2.76 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programs from airlines lead to 
carbon neutral growth. 
12.11 12.17 15.67 10.48 -3.56 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programmes from states lead to 
carbon neutral growth. 
9.89 10.09 10.08 7.47 0.19 
Direct routes lead to carbon 
neutral growth 
9.85 8.65 10.92 6.80 -1.07 
Wind optimal routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth 
10.33 10.10 12.17 8.13 -1.84 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 
leads to carbon neutral growth 
12.74 10.97 11.54 4.90 1.2 
Free Route Airspace (FRA) leads 
to carbon neutral growth 
11.07 9.75 12.58 9.94 -1.51 
Other 10.93 17.54 5.50 9.13 5.43 
Other 2.50 9.51 2.38 8.43 0.12 
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The common question if they believe that there is a connection between SES (FABs) and 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) the 45% of the EU ETS questionnaire participants in 
the first round replied that there is a connection, while only the 33% of the SES 
questionnaire participants replied yes. The 16% of the EU ETS questionnaire participants 
kept a negative position as well as the 1/3 of the SES questionnaire experts. Despite those 
replies, as proven in Table 45, the EU ETS and SES are connected through their 
contribution to emissions reduction. The aim of EU ETS is to reduce the emissions where 
as one of the targets of SES is also the environmental efficiency.  
7.2.4 Cross Tabulation of SES and EU ETS questionnaires (2nd round) 
Cross-tabulation analysis, also known as contingency table analysis, will be used to 
analyse the categorical data. The importance of the Delphi method was to identify the 
existence or lack of consensus among the groups and within the groups regarding the 
reform occurring from the inclusion of aviation in EU ETS and the implementation of SES. 
It was decided to illustrate the cross tabulation of the second round only since this round is 
more important in terms of findings and conclusions. The findings should rely on a 
stabilised environment where the participants are less possible to change their opinion. 
Therefore, cross tabulation is applied only to the second round. 
On the left side of the table are the statements/parameters, the second column are the 
scales and then the different categories of the respondents are given. The categories are 
Airlines, ANSPs, CAA/NSA, individual experts, governmental bodies (like PRB, Ministries 
and EUROCONTROL) and IATA. The number of the respondents is given in brackets. It 
should be noted that only European airlines participated in the survey.  
7.2.4.1 Cross tabulation of EU ETS questionnaire (2nd round)  
Table 46 lists all the 21 statements/positions that the different stakeholders were asked 
about. The first element that was evaluated is the effects of EU ETS to competition. It is 
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interesting to see the differences in the replies of the different stakeholders. The 83% of 
the EU airlines that participated in the Delphi method believe that if EU ETS decided to 
extent the scope and include all the airlines, i.e. if the stop the clock decision is not 
renewed, those airlines will not be influenced negatively. On the other hand, IATA (84%) 
that represent the interests of many airlines across the world, believes that those non-EU 
airlines will be negatively affected. Moreover, almost all the participants believe that 
airlines will not be ‘forced’ to merge so as to get more allowances. Despite that, many of 
the participants believe that EU ETS is causing competition issues to airlines.  
The seventh statement in Table 46 refers to the supply of allowances. Airlines, ANSPs, 
IATA and some experts believe that the amount of allowances that was given was fair. The 
60% of the Government Bodies, the 40% of CAA/NSAs and the 29% of individual experts 
believe that the cap of EU ETS is too generous. The gap between the regulator and the 
airlines is quite evident in this statement. When the participants were asked about making 
the free allocation of allowances stricter (statement 11), the airline representatives (83%) 
and IATA (67%) commented that the allocation shouldn’t be stricter, whereas all the 
ANSPs, the 40% of CAA/NSAs, the 29% of individual experts and surprisingly the 17% of 
IATA experts suggested stricter allocations. The government bodies’ representatives kept 
a neutral position.  
Moreover, the 20th statement ‘The corresponding large proportion of free allocation 
underlies legal stresses and a scope for distortions’ was not commented by the 
government bodies, whereas almost all the remaining respondents disagreed with the 
statement. This leads to the conclusion that the allocation method of the free allowances 
was not a result of strong lobbying and is not associated with distortions (distortions are 
associated with grandfathering of allowances). The replies of the participants regarding the 
lobbying around the allocation of allowance had an average value of 4, i.e. agreed that the 
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economic dimension of EU ETS drives heavy lobbying. This finding is broadly consistent 
with the general expectations. 80% of the government bodies, 83% of IATA experts, 50% 
of ANSPs, 50% of CAAs, 83% of individual experts and 66% of airlines agreed with the 
statement. Surprisingly, 17% of airlines disagreed with the statement.  
The element of globalisation of the reform was accessed through statement number 4 in 
Table 46. Only the 10% of the participants (i.e. 3 airline representatives) argued that 
linking the EU ETS with other ETSs around the world and creating a global scheme is not 
possible. The remaining 67% of airlines, 50% of the ANSPs, 100% of the CAAs, 72% of 
experts, the 50% of the government bodies and all the IATA experts participating in the 
survey believe that it is possible to link the ETS and create a global scheme10. The 
parameters that need to be taken under consideration are accessed in Table 35.  
There is overwhelming evidence corroborating the issues that EU ETS is facing. 
Regarding the MRV effectiveness, the participants kept a quite neutral to positive position. 
The majority of the participants indicated that the continuous changes in the legislation (for 
instance the stop the clock in the first year of EU ETS and the CORSIA in less than 5 
years from the enforcement of EU ETS) make the carbon market less stable. 40% of 
government bodies disagreed with the above statement, but surprisingly 20% of them 
agreed.  
The individuals regardless of their group, had diverse opinions regarding the vulnerability 
of EU ETS to frauds. The minimum value they gave was 2 and the maximum was 5. 1/5 of 
the experts from governmental bodies disagreed with the statement and 2/5 agreed with 
the statement. The same findings were noted for the 9th statement too. 50% of the 
                                            
10
 It should be noted that the EU ETS is incorporated in the ICAO Basket of Measures, but is not necessarily taken into 
consideration by ICAO CORSIA (see 3.9.1 section).  
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governmental bodies, 50% of IATA experts, 33% of airlines representatives and 67% of 
independent experts agreed that the carbon market stability is vulnerable due to low prices 
of the allowances. The majority of the participants agreed that postponing the auctions can 
force the prices of allowances to increase. 17% of airlines and 33% of IATA experts 
disagreed with that statement.  
In the literature, several concerns were expressed about the carbon leakage. 50% of 
governmental bodies, 29% of individual experts and 17% of airlines believe that EU ETS 
can result to carbon leakage. However, the opposite opinion is supported by 33% of 
airlines, 50% of CAAs, 17% of IATA experts and 43% of experts. None of the 
representatives of government bodies believes that EU ETS can result in carbon leakage. 
There are quotas for receiving emissions from the flexible mechanism of Kyoto. The 21st 
statement in Table 46 received diverse opinions. There are some participants, regardless 
of their group that believe that the multi-period nature of allocations (i.e. banking and 
borrowing flexibility) drives dependence both upon post-2012 decisions and creates risk of 
perverse incentives, and others that do not.  
In this question, various approaches to environmental problems were investigated. The 
participants were given statements about operational changes that may lead to carbon 
neutral growth. The use of biofuels is an issue that is more familiar to the airlines, IATA 
experts, individual experts and government bodies.  All of those stakeholders though share 
a different opinion in this matter. The airlines are divided. 50% believes that the use of 
biofuels is a promising solution for carbon offsetting and the other half do not. This is 
related to the culture of the airline and the strategy of using biofuels or not is related with 
the availability. The northern European airlines like SAS and central Europe airlines with 
extended network like Lufthansa have invested in biofuels and have access to. Therefore, 
it is hypothesized that those airlines are more familiar with its use and are strong 
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supporters of biofuels and others are not. 57% of the experts support the statement and 
the remaining 43% keep a neutral position. The 75% of the government bodies agreed 
with the statement.  
Apart from biofuels use, the additional fuel savings will also be achieved owing to better 
fuel use predictability according to the participants. 83% of airlines, 100% of ANSPs, 75% 
of CAAs, 71% of individual experts and 50% of IATA experts agreed with the statement. 
67% of government bodies disagreed. The airlines and the ANSPs are more familiar with 
route structures and excess fuel’s contribution to fuel consumption. Therefore, their 
opinion is much more important in this statement.  
An important finding is the fact that the participants have diverse opinions whether the 
carbon markets can lead to sufficient carbon reductions. In addition, the participants do not 
believe that route optimisation is sufficient for carbon neutral growth. It is important that 
50% of ANSPs, 100% of airlines and IATA experts as well as 80% of government bodies 
supported this statement (Table 46). This means that neither SES nor EU ETS are 
sufficient to lead to carbon neutral growth and needs complementary policies.  
Table 46: Crosstab Groups positions on EU ETS  
















1. The inclusion of aviation in 
the EU ETS will influence 
negatively the 
development of non-
European airlines if they 
are included in EU ETS. 
1 50% 0% 0% 29% 0% 17% 
2 33% 50% 0% 14% 40% 0% 
3 17% 50% 100% 29% 20% 0% 
4 0% 0% 0% 29% 40% 67% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
















2. The EU ETS will lead the 
airlines to merge in order 
to obtain more emissions 
allowances. 
1 67% 50% 20% 29% 40% 0% 
2 17% 0% 20% 14% 20% 83% 
3 0% 0% 40% 43% 20% 0% 
4 0% 50% 20% 14% 20% 17% 
5 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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3. The EU ETS is causing 
competition issues to 
airlines 
1 17% 0% 0% 14% 20% 0% 
2 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 33% 
3 17% 0% 25% 29% 20% 17% 
4 33% 100% 50% 43% 40% 33% 
5 33% 0% 0% 14% 20% 17% 
















4. It is possible to link the EU 
ETS and the other 
Emissions Trading schemes 
and have a global ETS. 
1 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 17% 50% 0% 29% 50% 0% 
4 50% 0% 100% 43% 0% 33% 
5 17% 50% 0% 29% 50% 67% 
















5. The monitoring, reporting 
and verification of 
emissions in the EU ETS is 
effective. 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
2 17% 0% 0% 14% 0% 33% 
3 50% 100% 25% 29% 60% 33% 
4 17% 0% 75% 57% 20% 17% 
5 17% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 
















6. The EU ETS is vulnerable to 
frauds, for instance VAT 
fraud and ‘phishing’ scams. 
1 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
2 33% 0% 0% 17% 20% 17% 
3 50% 50% 25% 33% 40% 50% 
4 0% 0% 25% 17% 40% 33% 
5 17% 50% 0% 33% 0% 0% 
















7. The cap of EU ETS is too 
generous. 
1 17% 0% 0% 14% 0% 17% 
2 50% 100% 0% 43% 20% 59% 
3 33% 0% 60% 14% 20% 33% 
4 0% 0% 40% 0% 60% 0% 
5 0% 0% 0% 29% 0% 0% 
















8. The carbon market’s 
stability is vulnerable 
because of the continuous 
changes in legislation. 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 0% 0% 0% 40% 0% 
3 17% 100% 0% 43% 40% 0% 
4 50% 0% 100% 29% 20% 67% 
5 17% 0% 0% 29% 0% 33% 
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9. The carbon market stability 
is vulnerable because of the 
low prices of the 
allowances. 
1 0% 0% 0% 14% 25% 0% 
2 17% 0% 33% 0% 0% 33% 
3 50% 100% 0% 71% 25% 17% 
4 33% 0% 67% 14% 25% 50% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 
















10. Postponing the auctions 
can force the prices of 
allowances to increase. 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 
3 33% 50% 33% 57% 75% 50% 
4 33% 50% 67% 29% 25% 17% 
5 17% 0% 0% 14% 0% 0% 
















11. The free allocation of 
allowances to the airlines 
must be stricter. 
1 50% 0% 0% 14% 0% 50% 
2 33% 0% 0% 14% 0% 17% 
3 17% 0% 60% 43% 100% 17% 
4 0% 100% 40% 0% 0% 17% 
5 0% 0% 0% 29% 0% 0% 
















12. Using biofuels is a 
promising solution for 
carbon offsetting. 
1 17% 0% 0% 0% 25% 17% 
2 33% 50% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
3 0% 0% 0% 43% 0% 17% 
4 33% 50% 100% 57% 75% 0% 
5 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 
















13. The creation of carbon as a 
“financial instrument” can 
lead to sufficient carbon 
reduction. 
1 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
2 17% 0% 0% 43% 20% 0% 
3 17% 50% 33% 43% 80% 67% 
4 33% 50% 67% 14% 0% 17% 
5 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
















14. Additional fuel savings will 
also be achieved owing to 
better fuel use 
predictability. 
1 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 14% 67% 17% 
3 0% 0% 25% 14% 33% 33% 
4 50% 50% 75% 57% 0% 50% 
5 33% 50% 0% 14% 0% 0% 
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15. Route optimisation is 
sufficient enough for 
carbon neutral growth. 
1 67% 50% 0% 43% 60% 50% 
2 33% 0% 25% 43% 20% 50% 
3 0% 50% 50% 14% 20% 0% 
4 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
















16. The EU ETS can result in 
carbon leakage. 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 0% 0% 29% 50% 0% 
3 50% 100% 50% 29% 50% 83% 
4 0% 0% 50% 29% 0% 0% 
5 33% 0% 0% 14% 0% 17% 
















17. The economic dimension of 
the EU ETS drives heavy 
lobbying around allocation 
of EU ETS allowances. 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 17% 50% 50% 17% 20% 17% 
4 33% 0% 50% 50% 80% 50% 
5 33% 50% 0% 33% 0% 33% 
















18. The EU ETS is source of 
profit-making incentives 
unprecedented in the 
history of environmental 
policy 
1 0% 0% 20% 17% 0% 17% 
2 17% 0% 0% 33% 40% 17% 
3 83% 50% 40% 33% 60% 50% 
4 0% 50% 20% 17% 0% 0% 
5 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 17% 
















19. There are small emissions 
reductions relative to 
‘business-as-usual’ and this 
leads to instabilities related 
to economics, policies and 
time frames) in the EU ETS. 
1 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 0% 0% 43% 0% 33% 
3 83% 100% 75% 43% 100% 67% 
4 0% 0% 0% 14% 0% 0% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
















20. The corresponding large 
proportion of free 
allocation underlies legal 
stresses and a scope for 
1 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
2 17% 50% 25% 17% 0% 0% 
3 67% 50% 75% 33% 100% 67% 
4 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 17% 
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distortions. 5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
















21. The multi-period nature of 
allocations (i.e. banking and 
borrowing flexibility) drives 
dependence both upon 
post-2012 decisions and 
creates risk of perverse 
incentives 
1 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 0% 0% 17% 25% 17% 
3 17% 0% 100% 17% 50% 33% 
4 50% 100% 0% 67% 25% 50% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
The method of allocation for allowances is of critical importance. There are three methods, 
benchmarking, grandfathering and auctioning. According to Table 47 the least preferred 
method for the airlines is the auctioning (max points=25%) and the most favourite is the 
benchmarking (max points=80%). The CAA/NSA showed almost equal preference for 
auctioning and benchmarking. The individual experts shared the least point to the 
grandfathering method and showed a preference for auctioning (max points=90%) and 
benchmarking (max points=60%).  
The government bodies representatives deemed auctioning as a better method for 
allowances allocation. 60% of government representatives gave 0-10% to grandfathering 
and 80% gave less than 30 points (out of 100 points) to benchmarking, whereas 40% of 
government representatives gave 80-90 point to auctioning. The remaining 60% of 
government representatives with respect to auctioning gave less than 30 points. Despite 
that the policy makers believe that auctioning is a more appropriate method for allocation 
of emissions, the EU ETS for aviation is based on grandfathering. Both under 
grandfathering and benchmarking, allowances are allocated free of charge. The auctioning 
of allowances in aviation is quite limited. One element that is extremely interesting is that 
in the statement 17 of Table 46, 80% of government representatives supported that the 
economic dimension of EU ETS drives heavy lobbying around allocation of EU ETS 
allowances and in this section, they claim that auctioning is a better method for allocating 
allowances. The regulators though supports the grandfathering and benchmarking. A 
265 
logical speculation would be that the heavy lobbying affected the regulation. For 
consistency purposes, the reported results are groups in scale increments of 10 points (i.e. 
0-9, 10-19, etc.).  

















0-9 0% 0% 67% 50% 40% 0% 
10-19 25% 0% 0% 25% 20% 33% 
20-29 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
30-39 25% 0% 33% 0% 0% 17% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 25% 20% 0% 
50-59 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 17% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Benchmarking 
0-9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
10-19 0% 0% 0% 25% 60% 17% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 100% 33% 0% 20% 17% 
40-49 25% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 33% 25% 0% 33% 
60-69 25% 0% 33% 25% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 
80-89 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Auctioning 
0-9 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 25% 50% 0% 0% 20% 33% 
20-29 50% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 25% 40% 17% 
40-49 0% 0% 67% 0% 0% 33% 
50-59 0% 50% 33% 25% 0% 17% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 25% 20% 0% 
The element of global measures for the climate change was addressed with the question 
about linking the different ETSs (Table 48). Overall, the participants agreed with all the 
statements and have consensus for all the statements apart the statement for the 
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stringency of targets. 17% of airlines, 50% of ANSPs and 25% of CAAs disagreed with the 
statement that in order to link the different ETS around the world with the EU ETS the 
same stringency of targets should be granted. The ANSPs opinion is not that important in 
this question and the airlines most probably had the benchmarking in mind and mainly the 
differences among the airlines in terms of readiness. None of the participants added an 
additional factor to the list created by the researcher.  
















There are the same 
Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification (MRV) rules 
for allowances 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 17% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
4 17% 50% 50% 80% 50% 33% 
















There are the same 
banking provisions 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 83% 0% 50% 40% 33% 17% 
4 0% 50% 50% 40% 67% 50% 
















There are the same 
registries’ rules 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 17% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
4 33% 50% 75% 80% 75% 50% 
















There are the same rules 
governing new entrants 
and closures 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 33% 0% 25% 40% 0% 0% 
4 17% 100% 50% 40% 33% 67% 
















The same allocation 
methods are applied 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 

































There is the same 
stringency of targets 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 50% 25% 0% 0% 0% 
3 17% 50% 0% 40% 0% 0% 
4 33% 0% 75% 40% 33% 67% 
















There is the same 
stringency of enforcement 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 
4 33% 50% 75% 60% 33% 50% 
















There is the same 
eligibility of offset credits 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 50% 0% 20% 25% 0% 
4 17% 50% 33% 60% 75% 50% 
5 67% 0% 67% 20% 0% 50% 
The 87% of the Delphi method participants replied to the question about the factors 
leading to carbon neutral growth (Table 49). The factor that contributes the least to carbon 
neutral growth is the individual carbon offsetting programmes from states. The maximum 
point this factor gathered was 30 points. The second least effective factor is individual 
carbon offsetting programmes implemented by airlines. Only 17% of airlines 
representatives gave to this factor more than 20 points. Surprisingly, 50% of individual 
experts gave more points than the airlines representatives. 25% of government bodies 
shared 40 points out of 100 to the individual carbon offsetting programmes from airlines.  
As depicted in Table 49, 83% of airlines, 100% of ANSPs, 33% of CAAs, 68% of individual 
experts, 75% of government bodies and 83% of IATA experts shared less than 20 points 
to EU ETS. This factor did not reach the level of consensus of the other factors. There 
were 2 participants (individual expert and expert from government body) that gave more 
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than 90 points to this factor and 3 participants (one expert from an airline, one CAA and 
one IATA expert) that gave 40-50/100 points. On average, the EU ETS gathered 21/100 
points, the airlines’ carbon offsetting schemes 12/100 points and the states’ carbon 
offsetting schemes 10/100 points. Despite those findings, the policy makers give more 
emphasis to those solutions than the operational improvements. The operational 
improvements focus on the horizontal en-route efficiency. The researcher based on 
literature review and with the help of participants observation held at EUROCONTROL 
identified some factors contributing to flight efficiency. Those factors are: a) the direct 
routes; b) wind optimal routes; c) Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA); and d) Free Route 
Airspace (FRA).  
The horizontal en-route flight efficiency gathered 45 out of 100 points. The ANSPs gave 
most of the points to FRA and FUA that contribute to direct routes and the least points to 
wind optimal routes. It should be noted that the ANSPs are responsible for their areas, 
where the wind optimal routes are not that important due to the short distance covered and 
the geography. The jet stream is mostly used for transatlantic routes. The airlines that 
have a network outside Europe and IATA gave more points to this factor. The airlines, 
IATA some individual experts and Government bodies added as a factor the technological 
changes to the airplanes and the use of alternative fuels. Those factors gathered on 
average 14 out of 100 points.  

















The EU ETS leads to carbon 
neutral growth 
0-9 33% 100% 0% 50% 0% 33% 
10-19 17% 0% 33% 0% 25% 33% 
20-29 33% 0% 0% 33% 50% 17% 
30-39 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
50-59 17% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 


















70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 17% 25% 0% 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programs from airlines lead to 
carbon neutral growth 
0-9 50% 100% 33% 17% 50% 50% 
10-19 0% 0% 67% 17% 0% 33% 
20-29 33% 0% 0% 50% 0% 17% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 
40-49 17% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Individual carbon offsetting 
programmes from states lead 
to carbon neutral growth 
0-9 50% 100% 33% 33% 50% 83% 
10-19 33 0% 67% 0% 25% 17% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 
30-39 17% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Direct routes lead to carbon 
neutral growth 
0-9 100% 50% 0% 33% 100% 50% 
10-19 33% 0% 67% 50% 25% 17% 
20-29 0% 0% 33% 17% 0% 33% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Wind optimal routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth 
0-9 67% 50% 0% 50% 50% 33% 
10-19 17% 50% 100% 33% 50% 17% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 33% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
40-49 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 
leads to carbon neutral growth 
0-9 50% 0% 0% 67% 75% 17% 
10-19 33% 0% 66% 17% 25% 50% 


















30-39 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Free Route Airspace (FRA) 
leads to carbon neutral growth 
0-9 67% 0% 0% 50% 75% 33% 
10-19 33% 0% 66% 33% 25% 33% 
20-29 0% 0% 33% 17% 0% 33% 
30-39 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 
0-9 33% 100% 100% 83% 50% 67% 
10-19 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
20-29 17% 0% 0% 17% 0% 17% 
30-39 17% 0% 0% 0% 25% 17% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 
0-9 83% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 
10-19 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
20-29 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
The second round of the Delphi method included two questions about the transaction 
costs as categorised by the researcher based on the literature review and participant 
observation (Table 50). The 26 experts that replied to this question deemed the 
implementation of emissions management as the costliest procedure. There is consensus 
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among the participants regarding the application of EU ETS in comparison to the 
implementation. 100% of IATA experts and ANSPs, 17% of airlines and 60% of 
government bodies gave 30-50 points to the implementation of emissions management. 
66% of airlines, 50% of individual experts and 40% of government bodies gave less than 
15 points. This proves the different opinions for this factor.  
The factor of monitoring gathered on average 11% of the points. 50% of the individual 
experts gave 25 points and 33% of airlines gave 45 points to this category. Consensus 
wasn’t achieved by the participants. Surprisingly the government bodies and the CAAs, 
that are responsible for the monitoring, marked this category low. The category of 
reporting and verification that is mainly the responsibility of airlines gathered 17 points on 
average. The airlines, the individual experts and the government bodies gave most of the 
points to this category. Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) gathered 31 points 
out of 100 making it the costliest procedure for EU ETS.  
Consensus was achieved in the abatement measures (Table 50). The replies ranged from 
0 to 15 points. The 100% of airlines gave 0-5 points. Moreover, all the participants gave 0-
25 points to the trade category. The category of strategy received points ranging from 0-
30. 100% of airlines, 25% of CAAs, 75% of individual experts, 80% of government bodies 
and 83% of IATA experts gave 0-10 points to the strategy category. Only 20% of 
government bodies and 17% of IATA experts gave 20-30 points. 
Table 50: Crosstab Groups and Transaction Cost categories  


















0-9 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 33% 100% 100% 100% 40% 83% 
20-29 33% 0% 0% 0% 60% 17% 
30-39 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 




0-9 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 33% 0% 0% 50% 40% 0% 
20-29 17% 0% 100% 50% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 100% 0% 0% 40% 100% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 
50-59 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Monitoring 
0-9 17% 0% 0% 0% 20% 67% 
10-19 33% 0% 100% 50% 60% 33% 
20-29 17% 100% 0% 50% 20% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Reporting and 
verification 
0-9 33% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 33% 100% 50% 50% 20% 33% 
20-29 17% 0% 0% 0% 80% 67% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 
40-49 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Abatement measures 
0-9 100% 0% 0% 50% 75% 33% 
10-19 0% 100% 100% 50% 25% 67% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Trade 
0-9 67% 100% 0% 25% 60% 83% 
10-19 33% 0% 0% 50% 20% 17% 
20-29 0% 0% 100% 25% 20% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Strategy 
0-9 50% 0% 25% 75% 20% 67% 
10-19 50% 100% 25% 25% 60% 17% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other  
0-9 100% 100% 75% 75% 100% 100% 
10-19 0% 0% 25% 25% 0% 0% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Regarding the question about how important the transactions costs are for the effective 
functioning of the aviation inclusion in the EU ETS scheme (Table 51), 33.3% of the 
airlines, 100% of ANSPs, 75% of individual experts, 80% of CAA/NSAs, 75% of the 
government bodies and 100% of IATA experts responded that it is an important cost. 
16.7% of the airlines stated that TC are very important for the effectiveness of EU ETS.  
Table 51: Crosstab Groups and importance of transaction costs  
















Overall, how important do you 
consider transactions costs to 
be for the effective functioning 
of the aviation inclusion in the 
EU ETS scheme? 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 50% 0% 20% 25% 25% 0% 
4 33% 100% 80% 75% 75% 100% 
5 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
7.2.4.2 Cross tabulation SES (2nd round)  
As seen in Table 52, the creation of Single European Sky (SES) and Functional Airspace 
Blocks (FABs) aim to major reforms of the European airspace management and 
architecture. The participants reached consensus regarding the areas of improvement. 
IATA and the European airlines share very similar opinions. The government bodies have 
some differences with the ANSPs regarding the common ATCO training and research and 
development. EUROCONTROL and ANSPs have opposite opinions regarding the 
common flight inspection and the sector design. Nevertheless, on average the participants 
agreed on the factors.  






















1 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 67% 25% 25% 50% 0% 33% 20% 
4 0% 50% 50% 50% 80% 67% 40% 





















Common Sector Design 
1 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 33% 50% 25% 50% 0% 67% 40% 
4 0% 25% 75% 0% 80% 33% 20% 






















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
3 0% 0% 25% 50% 20% 33% 0% 
4 33% 75% 75% 0% 60% 67% 40% 





















1 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
3 0% 25% 0% 50% 20% 33% 0% 
4 33% 75% 100% 0% 60% 67% 20% 




















Synergies in ATFCM 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 25% 0% 20% 0% 0% 
4 33% 75% 75% 0% 60% 67% 80% 





















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 67% 20% 
3 33% 100% 67% 0% 80% 33% 60% 
4 33% 0% 33% 50% 0% 0% 0% 






















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
2 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
4 0% 100% 75% 0% 60% 67% 40% 









































1 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 25% 50% 0% 0% 67% 40% 
3 67% 25% 0% 0% 80% 0% 40% 
4 0% 50% 50% 50% 0% 33% 20% 




















Common AIS & MET 
1 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
2 33% 25% 50% 50% 20% 33% 0% 
3 0% 25% 0% 0% 40% 0% 40% 
4 33% 50% 50% 0% 20% 33% 40% 






















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 25% 0% 50% 80% 67% 20% 
4 33% 50% 100% 50% 0% 33% 60% 






















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
3 33% 0% 0% 50% 60% 67% 0% 
4 0% 75% 100% 50% 40% 33% 60% 




















Sharing of navigation 
aids 
1 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
2 67% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 50% 25% 100% 100% 67% 40% 
4 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 33% 40% 






















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
2 0% 0% 0% 50% 20% 33% 0% 
3 33% 25% 25% 0% 40% 0% 20% 
4 33% 50% 75% 0% 40% 0% 40% 























1 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
2 33% 50% 25% 0% 20% 0% 20% 
3 67% 50% 50% 0% 60% 100% 80% 
4 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 






















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 20% 
3 67% 0% 25% 0% 40% 0% 20% 
4 0% 75% 75% 0% 60% 67% 40% 




















Common ATCO Training 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 33% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
3 33% 50% 50% 50% 80% 0% 20% 
4 0% 25% 50% 50% 20% 67% 60% 




















Reduction of emissions 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 25% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
3 33% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
4 0% 50% 50% 0% 100% 100% 20% 





















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
The environmental performance is correlated to Air Traffic Management. Table 53 lists the 
replies of 28 experts to 9 statements regarding SES and the environment. Surprisingly, 
25% of airlines totally agreed with the statement that the airspace before SES did not need 
to be changed. The replies in this statement are in line with the replies to the ‘The 
reorganisation of the European Sky was necessary’ statement. The flight efficiency can be 
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improved by optimal flight distances, i.e. horizontal component, and/or by optimal flight 
level, i.e. vertical component. One airline representative mentioned that the technological 
advances of airplanes are such that the airplanes can flight higher but are limited by ICAO 
standards. An ATCO mentioned that for capacity reasons the flight levels are altered by 
ATCOs. With respect to vertical and horizontal efficiency only 25% of CAAs and 20% of 
IATA experts expressed a positive opinion to that statement.  
Moreover, most of the participants also agreed that due to capacity and safety 
requirements the inefficiencies cannot be reduced to zero at system level (Table 53). Only 
25% of airlines, 33% of government bodies and 20% of IATA experts disagreed with the 
safety statement. The capacity requirements gathered more negative replies. Apart from 
the above mentioned participants, 50% of EUROCONTROL experts, 25% of ANSPs and 
an additional 33% of government bodies suggest that despite capacity requirements the 
level of inefficiencies can be reduced to zero at system level.  
The 28 participants shared different opinions regarding the statement ‘The main 
environmental KPI should be the estimated economic value of CO2 emissions due to route 
extension’. Route extension may be caused by airspace congestion or restrictions. 
Airlines, CAAs, individual experts, government bodies and IATA had diverse opinions 
within their groups and among the groups. This is the case for the FABs and great cycle 
routes. It should be noted that on many occasions the Great Distance Circle may not be 
flown many times due to bad weather conditions that restrict the use of the airspace. 
Nevertheless, regarding the statement ‘The European airspace network today can benefit 
from a significant level of dynamism through the application of the Flexible Use of Airspace 
(FUA) concept’ the groups reached consensus towards a positive opinion with the 
exception of airlines representatives that kept a negative position.  
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The airspace before SES did not 
need to be changed. 
1 50% 25% 0% 50% 50% 33% 80% 
2 25% 75% 50% 50% 50% 33% 20% 
3 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 




















FABs bring routes closer to the 
optimum “Great Circle” route and 
reduce extended flight paths. 
1 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 25% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 20% 
3 25% 0% 25% 50% 40% 33% 20% 
4 25% 75% 50% 0% 60% 33% 60% 




















The European airspace network 
today can benefit from a significant 
level of dynamism through the 
application of the Flexible Use of 
Airspace (FUA) concept. 
1 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 25% 0% 17% 33% 20% 
4 0% 75% 75% 50% 67% 33% 60% 




















The reorganisation of the European 
Sky was necessary. 
1 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 25% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
4 0% 25% 50% 100% 67% 33% 0% 




















The horizontal component is of 
higher economic and environmental 
importance than the vertical 
component of the Flight efficiency. 
1 50% 0% 0% 50% 0% 33% 20% 
2 25% 50% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 
3 25% 50% 75% 50% 67% 67% 60% 
4 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 20% 








































Due to inherent safety (minimum 
separation requirements between 
aircraft) requirements, the level of 
“inefficiencies” cannot be reduced 
to zero at system level. 
1 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 20% 
3 25% 25% 25% 0% 50% 0% 0% 
4 25% 75% 75% 0% 50% 33% 40% 




















Due to capacity (organisation of 
traffic flows) requirements, the level 
of “inefficiencies” cannot be 
reduced to zero at system level. 
1 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
2 0% 25% 0% 50% 0% 33% 20% 
3 25% 0% 25% 0% 33% 33% 20% 
4 25% 75% 50% 0% 50% 0% 40% 




















The main environmental KPI should 
be the estimated economic value of 
CO2 emissions due to route 
extension. 
1 50% 0% 25% 50% 0% 0% 20% 
2 0% 0% 25% 0% 40% 33% 0% 
3 0% 50% 25% 50% 0% 33% 20% 
4 50% 50% 25% 0% 40% 33% 60% 




















All FABs are fully operational. 
1 75% 25% 25% 50% 25% 0% 20% 
2 0% 75% 75% 50% 50% 33% 80% 
3 25% 0% 0% 0% 25% 33% 0% 
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
The participants were provided with some factors affecting the horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. The most important factor in terms of the mean (mean=27.52) is the route 
structure and availability. The SES reform aims at improving this factor. The range of the 
points given was 5-50 and received an average value of 27.52 points out of 100. 
According to Table 54, 33% of airlines, 25% of ANSPs, 33% of CAAs, 50% of individual 
experts, 66% of government bodies gave 0-20 points. EUROCONTROL experts and 
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ANSPs that are the ones responsible for the route structure and availability gave 30-50 
points.  
The second most important factor (mean=17.83) is the utilisation of civil military structures. 
33% of airlines, 25% of ANSPs, 50% of EUROCONTROL experts, 33% of government 
bodies and 20% of IATA experts gave 25-40 points. This element affects the route 
structure and availability factor. The good flight planning factor was higher evaluated by 
the non-airlines related experts. The Operational Control Centres (OCC) of airlines invest 
a lot of time to design their flights in the most efficient way focusing on the fleet availability 
and scheduling issues, therefore the environmental aspect is put aside in this part. The 
remaining of the factors received less than 10 points on average and there was consensus 
among the participants.  




















Route structure and 
availability affect 
horizontal en route 
flight efficiency. 
0-9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
10-19 33% 25% 33% 0% 50% 33% 0% 
20-29 0% 25% 33% 0% 25% 33% 60% 
30-39 33% 50% 0% 50% 50% 33% 20% 
40-49 33% 25% 33% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Availability of airspace 
(utilisation of civil 
military structures) 
affects horizontal en 
route flight efficiency. 
0-9 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
10-19 33% 0% 33% 50% 0% 0% 60% 
20-29 33% 75% 33% 50% 50% 33% 20% 
30-39 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 






















capabilities (use of 
software, repetitive 
flight planning) affect 
horizontal en route 
flight efficiency. 
0-9 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 66% 50% 33% 50% 50% 33% 80% 
20-29 0% 50% 33% 50% 50% 67% 20% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
User preferences 
regarding time affect 
horizontal en route 
flight efficiency. 
0-9 67% 50% 66% 50% 0% 67% 40% 
10-19 33% 50% 0% 50% 100% 33% 40% 
20-29 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
User preferences 
regarding fuel affect 
horizontal en route 
flight efficiency. 
0-9 67% 25% 33% 50% 0% 66% 40% 
10-19 33% 75% 33% 5% 75% 0% 60% 
20-29 0% 0% 33% 0% 25% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Tactical ATC routings 
affect horizontal en 
route flight efficiency. 
0-9 33% 25% 33% 50% 0% 33% 0% 
10-19 66% 75% 66% 50% 100% 0% 100% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 67% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 





















ATC strikes affect 
horizontal en route 
flight efficiency. 
10-19 66% 50% 33% 50% 50% 0% 60% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 
0-9 33% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10-19 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
20-29 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
The reserved airspace for the military was foe many years a controversial topic of 
discussions for capacity issues. Undoubtedly, the cooperation of Civil and Military 
dimensions of aviation should be enhanced. The participants were asked to rank 
hierarchically the factors given by the researcher and to add any factor they deem 
important. The 26 experts shared 100 points and did not reach consensus within the group 
or among the groups (Table 55).  
The political issues factor received on average 43 points. The points ranged from 0-100. 
33% of airlines, 25% of CAAs, 100% of EUROCONTROL experts, 20% of individual 
experts and 33% of governmental bodies shared 0-10 points in this factor. 50% of ANSPs, 
50% of CAAs, 20% of individual experts, 33% of airlines, 33% government bodies and 
60% of IATA experts gave 30-45 points. 50% of ANSPs, 40% of individual experts and 
40% of IATA experts gave to the political issues factor 50-70 points, whereas 33% of 
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airlines and government bodies gave 80 points. 25% of individual experts gave 90 points 
and 20% of individual experts gave the maximum possible, i.e. 100 points to the political 
issues factor. The most important opinions are those of the ANSPs, the CAAs, 
EUROCONTROL and the government bodies (that include the Ministries of Transport). 
Those participants had diverse opinions on this factor. The flight planning capabilities, the 
special events, the ICAO ATM procedures, the position of information and radar vectoring 
had on average 10 points out of the 100. Those factors received 0-50 points and did not 
reach consensus within their group.  
Five participants added a factor. One EUROCONTROL expert gave 40 points to Other 
Airspace management and route structure. One expert representing government bodies 
gave all the points, i.e. 100 points to the ‘Existing agreements and procedures at national 
level on one side, and on FAB level at the other side’. An individual expert gave 10 points 
to ‘Airline fleet modernization and equipment availability and rules and regulations of 
aircraft registering State’. An airline representative gave 100 points to the ‘Overall flight 
efficiency’. Lastly, one IATA expert representative gave 20 point to the communications of 
military airspace availability. The expert mentioned that many times that the military 
airspace is open e.g. on weekends, the flight planners and pilots are not aware of that 
route options. This is supported by the literature review regarding the use of Conditional 
Routes. Figure 25 in the Single European Sky chapter illustrated that many times despite 
that the CDRs are available, the airspace users do not take advantage of it.  





















0-9 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
10-19 0% 0% 25% 100% 20% 0% 0% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 25% 0% 20% 0% 20% 





















50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20% 
60-69 0% 50% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
80-89 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 25% 0% 20% 0% 0% 
Flight planning 
capabilities (use of 
software, repetitive 
flight planning) 
0-9 66% 0% 25% 0% 20% 66% 20% 
10-19 33% 50% 50% 0% 40% 0% 80% 
20-29 0% 25% 25% 50% 40% 33% 0% 
30-39 0% 25% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Special events 
0-9 67% 25% 25% 50% 20% 66% 20% 
10-19 0% 75% 25% 0% 80% 33% 60% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 33% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 25% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Existing ICAO ATM 
procedures 
0-9 67% 50% 50% 50% 20% 66% 20% 
10-19 33% 50% 50% 50% 60% 33% 40% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Aspects related to 
position information 
and radar vectoring 
0-9 100% 25% 50% 0% 20% 66% 0% 
10-19 0% 75% 50% 50% 60% 33% 80% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 50% 20% 0% 00% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 





















90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 
0-9 67% 75% 75% 50% 60% 33% 60% 
10-19 0% 25% 25% 0% 40% 33% 40% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
The literature on environmental protection shows a variety of approached for emissions 
reduction. The 28 participants were given a list of factor that according to the literature 
contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions (Table 56). The FUA and FRA reached 
consensus among the participants with only one individual experts disagree with the 
statement. The shortest feasible routes and the CDOs (that is mostly contributing to the 
local air quality) reached consensus. The factor ‘use of biofuels’ had a low CV (0.32) which 
means that consensus was reached across all the experts. Nevertheless, within the group 
of airlines, CAAs, IATA and government bodies there were different opinions expressed by 
the experts. Moreover, one EUROCONTROL expert questioned the use of eco-friendly 
engines contribution emissions reduction. In addition, one expert of IATA suggested that 
the load factors are improved to the maximum and there is no area of improvement in this 
factor. Someone, could argue that the replacement of small airplanes with bigger airplanes 
could improve the emissions per Revenue Passenger Kilometre (RPK).  
The factor ‘reduced traffic due to economic crisis’ gathered different replies (Table 56). 
Despite the economic crisis the Air Transport Movements (ATM) have not decreased in 
reality. Nevertheless, should the ATM decrease the emissions will be decreased too. The 
trading of emissions, both Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) and Verified Emissions 
Reductions (VERs), gathered many negative opinions. Only 33% of individual experts, 
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50% of EUROCONTROL experts and 33% of government bodies expressed a positive 
opinion to CERs. As far as VERs is concerned only 60% of individual experts suggested 
that could contribute to emissions reductions.  
It is quite interesting that some airline (33%) and IATA (20%) experts that do not believe 
that offsetting schemes developed by airlines can reduce emissions. The government 
bodies kept a neutral position regarding this. Likewise, some experts do not believe that 
ETS can lead to emissions reduction. But there are also others that agree to the 
statements. There was no consensus among the experts regarding the offsetting and 
emission trading schemes. In addition, 50% of airlines did not believe that SES can 
contribute to emissions reduction. The airlines had a totally different opinion than IATA in 
this factor. A participant added the factor Airlines Fuel Saving Policy / System which can 
indeed reduce the fuel consumption. The fleet renewal can improve the fuel consumption 
hence the emissions. Finally, one expert commented that the complementarity of the 
measures could have a more positive effect to environmental performance.  
The findings were quite unexpected regarding some of the statements. The most likely 
explanation of the negative opinions regarding some of the statements is that the 
participants wanted to make a point on the limitations of the measure or the unmatched 
expectations about their implementation.  




















Flexible Use of Airspace 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 
3 25% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 
4 50% 50% 100% 50% 50% 33% 60% 




















Free Route Airspace 1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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2 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 
3 25% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 
4 75% 50% 100% 50% 40% 33% 80% 




















Shortest feasible routes 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 
4 50% 75% 50% 100% 50% 33% 20% 























1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 25% 0% 50% 0% 17% 33% 0% 
4 25% 75% 50% 100% 50% 0% 60% 




















Use of Bio fuels 
1 25% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 20% 
3 25% 75% 50% 0% 0% 33% 20% 
4 25% 25% 25% 50% 67% 33% 20% 




















Use of Eco-friendly 
engines 
1 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
3 25% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
4 0% 50% 50% 50% 67% 67% 60% 




















Improving load factors 
1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
3 0% 75% 75% 0% 33% 33% 40% 
4 50% 25% 25% 100% 33% 67% 40% 




















Reduced traffic because 
of economic crisis 
1 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 25% 25% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 25% 50% 17% 33% 80% 
4 25% 75% 75% 50% 33% 33% 20% 
























1 67% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 33% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 40% 
3 0% 100% 75% 50% 17% 67% 60% 
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 




















Trading Verified or 
Voluntary Emissions 
Reductions (VERs) 
1 67% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 33% 0% 0% 0% 20% 33% 60% 
3 0% 100% 75% 100% 20% 67% 40% 
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 60% 0% 0% 






















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 20% 
2 33% 25% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 
3 33% 50% 50% 50% 0% 100% 20% 
4 0% 25% 50% 50% 50% 0% 60% 




















EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
1 50% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 
3 25% 75% 25% 50% 67% 67% 40% 
4 0% 0% 50% 0% 33% 33% 20% 




















Single European Sky 
1 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 25% 50% 50% 17% 33% 0% 
4 50% 75% 50% 0% 67% 67% 20% 





















1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 




















Other  1 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
3 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
5 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
The question that its replies are illustrated in Table 57 is the same question as the one in 
the SES questionnaire and refers to the different ways the carbon neutral growth can be 
achieved. 66% of airlines, 25% of individual the experts and ANSPs, 50% of 
EUROCONTROL experts, 60% of IATA experts and 33% of CAAs gave 0-10 points to the 
EU ETS. 50% of ANSPs, 33% of airlines, 67% of CAA/NSAs, 75% of individual experts 
and the 100% of government bodies gave 15-25 points to EU ETS. 25% of ANSPs, 50% of 
EUROCONTROL experts and 40% of IATA experts believe that the EU ETS contributes to 
carbon neutral growth by 30-40 points. The EU ETS received 18 points on average.  
Regarding the individual carbon offsetting programs from airlines the 24 experts gave 16 
points on average. 66% of airlines, 75% of ANSPs, 100% of CAAs, 100% of 
EUROCONTROL experts, 50% of individual experts, the 335 of government bodies and 
100% of IATA experts gave 0-20 points. The remaining 33% of airlines, 25% of ANSPs, 
50% of individual experts and 66% of government bodies gave 25-40 points (Table 57). 
The individual carbon offsetting programs from states received less points, with minimum 0 
and maximum only 25 points. The airlines and IATA reached consensus in this question. 
Some induvial experts and ANSPs trust the states more than the governmental bodies and 
the CAAs that would be the ones responsible should state carbon offsetting schemes be 
implemented by states. The carbon offsetting schemes gathered on average 26 points out 
of 100.  
The horizontal flight efficiency factor gathered on average 48 points out of 100. Some 
experts of the CAAs (33%) proved to be the biggest supporters of operational changes 
giving to the direct routes factor 30 points, whereas the FRA factor received 50 points. The 
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airlines gave more factors to wind optimal routes, FUA and FRA than to direct routes. Yet 
IATA gave less points to FRA.  
The participants added two more factors to the list. The additional factors that were 
proposed by more than one experts are the alternative fuels and the fleet renewal. Apart 
from those, the vertical flight efficiency and the Global market-based mechanism as 
collective programme by States were added. The additional factors gathered on average 8 
points.   




















The EU ETS leads to 
carbon neutral growth. 
0-9 66% 0% 33% 0% 25% 0% 20% 
10-19 0% 50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 40% 
20-29 33% 25% 67% 0% 75% 100% 0% 
30-39 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 20% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Individual carbon 
offsetting programs 
from airlines lead to 
carbon neutral growth. 
0-9 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 40% 
10-19 0% 75% 67% 100% 50% 33% 60% 
20-29 33% 25% 0% 0% 50% 33% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Individual carbon 
offsetting programmes 
from states lead to 
carbon neutral growth. 
0-9 100% 0% 33% 0% 25% 33% 60% 
10-19 0% 75% 67% 100% 50% 33% 40% 
20-29 0% 25% 0% 0% 25% 33% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 





















80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Direct routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth 
0-9 66% 25% 0% 0% 50% 33% 20% 
10-19 33% 50% 66% 100% 50% 67% 40% 
20-29 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 
30-39 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Wind optimal routes 
lead to carbon neutral 
growth 
0-9 0% 25% 33% 0% 50% 67% 20% 
10-19 33% 75% 67% 50% 50% 33% 40% 
20-29 33% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 40% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Flexible Use of 
Airspace (FUA) leads to 
carbon neutral growth 
0-9 0% 25% 0% 0% 50% 33% 20% 
10-19 100% 50% 100% 100% 50% 66% 60% 
20-29 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Free Route Airspace 
(FRA) leads to carbon 
neutral growth 
0-9 0% 25% 0% 0% 50% 33% 60% 
10-19 100% 50% 66% 50% 50% 33% 20% 
20-29 0% 25% 0% 50% 0% 33% 20% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 
0-9 67% 100% 100% 100% 50% 67% 60% 





















20-29 33% 0% 0% 0% 25% 33% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other  
0-9 67% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 
10-19 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
20-29 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
The new question about TCE was answered by 24 participants (Table 58). The most 
important category of transaction costs was the ‘Development and Implementation of the 
regulatory scheme’ with 27 points on average. This category did not reach consensus 
among the participants. 100% of airlines, 25% of CAAs, 75% of individual experts and 
20% of IATA experts gave 10-20 points to this category, whereas 100% of government 
bodies gave 25-30 points, 80% of IATA experts gave 25-35 points, 75% of CAA gave 30-
40 points and 100% of ANSPs gave 30-45 out of 100 points.  
The monitoring category gathered on average 18 points. Most of the participants gave less 
than 20 points with the exception of 67% of airlines that gave 45 points, 33% of ANSPS 
giving 30 points and 25% of individual experts that gave more than 50 points to this 
category. The reporting and verification category gathered less points (mean=13). Almost 
all the participants gave 10 point to this category. The most points (35) were given by 25% 
of individual experts. This category reached consensus by the experts. The compliance 
category with mean equal to 9 reached also consensus among the experts.  
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The ‘alternative policies’ category received 0 to 20 points and there was consensus among 
the respected experts. On the other hand, the category ‘strategy’ gathered on average 18 
points out of 100 but the expert did not agree on its value. This category received 5-60 
points. All the participants gave less than 30 points to this category, apart from 33% of 
airlines that gave 60 points. Nevertheless, there was consensus within the groups but not 
across the groups. Out of the 24, 5 participants added an additional category. This 
category received 5-15 points. The participants did not add any further details.  





















0-9 33% 100% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 
10-19 67% 0% 100% 50% 50% 67% 80% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 50% 25% 33% 20% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Development and 
Implementation of the 
regulatory scheme 
0-9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 100% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0% 
20-29 0% 0% 25% 50% 50% 33% 40% 
30-39 0% 33% 50% 0% 0% 67% 60% 
40-49 0% 66% 25% 50% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Monitoring 
0-9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 33% 0% 75% 100% 25% 33% 100% 
20-29 0% 67% 25% 0% 75% 67% 0% 
30-39 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 25% 0% 25% 0% 20% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 





















90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Reporting and 
verification 
0-9 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 100% 100% 100% 100% 75% 66% 60% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 40% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Compliance 
0-9 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 
10-19 33% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 60% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Strategy 
0-9 0% 33% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
10-19 67% 0% 50% 0% 50% 67% 60% 
20-29 0% 33% 25% 100% 50% 33% 40% 
30-39 0% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Other 
0-9 100% 100% 75% 100% 100% 100% 60% 
10-19 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 40% 
20-29 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30-39 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
40-49 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
50-59 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
60-69 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
70-79 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
80-89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
90-100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Regarding the transaction costs in SES the participants in the question ‘Overall, how 
important do you consider transactions costs to be for the effective functioning of the 
environment KPA in the SES Performance scheme?’ reported that this cost is important. 
67% of airlines, 67% of ANSPs, 75% of CAA/NSAs, 50% of EUROCONTROL experts, 
50% of individual experts, 67% of government bodies and 40% of IATA experts stated that 
is an important cost for the effectiveness of SES performance scheme. 20% of IATA 
experts, 33% of government bodies and 50% of EUROCONTROL experts marked it as a 
very important parameter.  
7.3 Summary  
The questionnaires developed after consultation with key aviation professionals proved 
effective for the purpose of the present research. With few exceptions, the participants 
seem to have comprehended the questions and did not add other factors or.  From the 
Delphi research that has been carried out in two rounds from May 2014 until May 2016, it 
may be deduced that the experts identified some key issues affecting the efficiency of the 
EU ETS and SES reforms. The majority of the participants agreed that reorganization of 
the airspace and the implementation of the SES were necessary. Moreover, the 
participants agreed that the implementation of the SES is quite slow. The different 
components of SES were evaluated and the added value of SES and FABs was verified.  
As far as the inclusion of aviation to the EU ETS is concerned, the participants agreed that 
the EU ETS contributes towards the reduction of aviation emissions. Concerns were 
expressed regarding the technical terms and conditions of EU ETS. Nevertheless, all the 
participants agreed that the carbon neutral growth cannot be achieved only via EU ETS. 
Factors such as flight efficiency were highly prioritized. This was also the result that 
emerged from the SES questionnaires.  
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Stability and consensus were achieved in most of the factors both within the group but also 
among the groups for both questionnaires. Summing up the results from the Delphi 
method, it may be concluded that there is no single factor leading to carbon neutral 
growth, albeit a combination. The factors that contribute to carbon neutral growth in the 
aviation sector are the EU ETS and carbon-offsetting scheme, flight efficiency, 
technological fleet improvements and the use of alternative fuels.  
The addition of the question regarding the transaction cost categories of the EU ETS and 
SES reforms in to the Delphi second round proved very wise because the participants’ 
replies offered valuable information. All the participants in both questionnaires agreed that 
transactions costs occur due to the implemented reforms. Different importance factors 
were given to the different categories. As far the EU ETS is concerned, the most important 
categories were the implementation of emissions management and the monitoring, 
reporting and verification of allowances. As far as the SES is concerned, the most 
important transaction cost categories were the development and implementation of the 
regulatory scheme, the monitoring of the scheme and the strategy of the scheme.  
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8 Discussion  
This section analyses the aviation environment stakeholders and the dynamics in relation 
to Single European Sky and European Union Emissions Trading Scheme as captured from 
the participant observation, the unstructured interviews and the Delphi Method. In this 
chapter, the results from the primary research, i.e. the participant observation, the 
unstructured interviews and the Delphi Method, enriched with any other necessary 
information are combined, analysed and discussed.  
It is evident that most schemes are not delivering to the degree to which they should. For 
instance, the horizontal en-route flight efficiency (shorter routes) of the last filed flight plan 
trajectory improved slightly in 2013, but this was not enough to meet the target profile. The 
results from 2014 (4.9%), measured in deviations of the flight plan trajectory from the great 
circle distance and summed over all IFR (instrument flights rules) in the European Union, 
indicate that the RP1 target of 4.67% was not achieved.   
8.1 Aviation Governance  
Governance is the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented. 
Governance in Europe is multi-level where ‘supranational, national, regional, and local 
governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks’ (Marks, 1993: 
402). There is a growing interdependence between governments operating at different 
territorial levels. This makes the arrangements complex for taking decisions in increasingly 
dense networks of public and private, individual and collective actors. In the aviation 
industry mainly due to its international nature, governance is a very important element. In 
addition to the multi-level aviation governance, there is also multi-stakeholder governance 
which is the approach followed in this PhD thesis. The multi-stakeholder governance 
approach considers the different states as stakeholders. The main issues that are 
important with respect to EU ETS and SES reforms are the readiness of the states, the 
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incentive mechanism (associated with the willingness to take action) and the trade-offs 
between the different areas. Governance has emerged as an approach to understanding 
the dynamic inter-relationship within and between different levels and groups of 
stakeholders.  
8.1.1 Member States Readiness  
The interviewees N.02, N.05 and N.04 discussed at length the differences in the countries. 
They mentioned that not all countries are ready for the reforms or at least progress at the 
same rate as others. This was also noted by the researcher in the participant observation 
and in the meeting held with the different member states. Not all the states are in the same 
position neither do they have the capability to deliver results at the same level. To prove 
that not all the states are the same the Global Competitiveness Report prepared by the 
World Economic Forum (2015) is used to assess the readiness of each state involved in 
EU ETS and SES. To undertake structural changes. The examples of Greece and The 
Netherlands will be used to shed further light in this context.  
The Global Competitiveness Report is used because it gives a Growth Competitiveness 
Index, which is based on three broad components: macroeconomic environment; quality of 
public institutions; and technology. Within each component are major subcomponents, for 
example, the macroeconomic environment consists of macroeconomic stability, 
government waste, and country credit rating. Furthermore, this report gives an insight on 
the willingness/openness of a country to the reforms by taking into consideration the 
openness of the economy to trade and finance; the role of the government budget and 
regulation; the development of financial markets; the quality of infrastructure; the quality of 
technology; the quality of business management; the labour market flexibility; and the 
quality of judicial and political institutions. 
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Figure 32: The Global Competitiveness Index framework (WEF, 2015) 
Table 59 focuses on the sustainable growth and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI). 
The sustainable growth sub-index is measuring the extent to which the natural 
environment is contributing to overall national competitiveness and the preservation of a 
pollution-free environment (WEF, 2014).  
Table 59: Sustainable Growth Sub-index in the 2014 Edition and Global Competitiveness 







Austria 5.12 5.43 
Belgium 5.20 4.62 
Bulgaria 4.32 3.94 








Cyprus 4.23 3.96 
Czech Republic 4.69 4.18 
Denmark 5.33 5.27 
Estonia 4.74 4.67 
Finland 5.45 5.75 
France 5.13 5.03 
Germany 5.53 5.18 
Greece 4.02 4.27 
Hungary 4.25 3.59 
Ireland 5.11 4.42 
Italy 4.46 4.36 
Latvia 4.45 5.48 
Lithuania 4.55 4.93 
Luxembourg 5.20 4.68 
Malta 4.39 3.89 
Netherlands 5.50 4.77 
Poland 4.49 4.07 
Portugal 4.52 5.06 
Romania 4.32 3.94 
Slovak Republic 4.22 4.34 
Slovenia 4.28 5.17 
Spain 4.59 4.86 
Sweden 5.43 5.83 
United Kingdom 5.43 4.77 
 
8.1.1.1 Readiness issue: The case of Greece vs The Netherlands  
The Dutch economy remains one of the most sophisticated and innovative in the world. Its 
GDP per capita is 51,373 US$. The Netherlands’ Global Competitiveness Index is 5.5/7. 
The 1st Pillar of Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) is institutions. With regard to the 
institutions, the country received a score of 6/7. The infrastructure was ranked 3rd out of 
the 140 participating countries with a score of 6.3. In particular, the Quality of air transport 
infrastructure received 6.4/7 and was ranked 4/140. The macroeconomic environment 
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received 5.7/7, the financial market development got 4.4 and the technological readiness 
got 6.1/7 position the Netherlands in the 10th position out of 140.  
 
Figure 33: Comparison of the Netherlands with the advanced economies in the 12 pillars 
of GCI (1: low score and 7: high score) (WEF, 2015: 276) 
The figure above shows the comparison of the Netherlands with other advanced 
economies. The Dutch economy is quite strong. It has risen from 8th to 5th place in the 
Global Competitiveness Report due to its excellent school system, efficient infrastructure, 
reliable public administration and permanent focus on innovation.  
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Figure 34: The most problematic factors for doing business in the Netherlands (WEF, 
2015) 
In the Netherlands, 52% of the flights are overflights, 46% are international departures and 
arrivals and 2% are domestic flights. Based on NM archived data, traffic in the Netherlands 
increased by 2.9% during summer 2015 (May to October), when compared to summer 
2014. The average en-route delay per flight slightly decreased from 0.17 minutes per flight 
during summer 2014 to 0.13 minutes per flight in summer 2015. 46% of the delays were 
due to ATC Capacity, and 28% because of Weather (LSSIP the Netherlands, 2015). The 
main National Stakeholders involved in ATM in the Netherlands are the following:  
 The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (MoI&M, “Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu”); - The Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate 
(ILT (CAA-NL), “Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport”);  
 The Ministry of Defence (MoD, “Ministerie van Defensie”) / Military Aviation 
Authority (MAA, “Militaire Luchtvaart Autoriteit”);  
 Air Traffic Control The Netherlands (LVNL, “Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland”);  
 Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF, “Koninklijke Nederlandse Luchtmacht”);  
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 The Netherlands Air Traffic Committee (LVC, “Luchtverkeerscommissie);  
 The EUROCONTROL Maastricht Upper Area Centre (Maastricht UAC).  
Their activities are detailed in the following subchapters and their relationships are shown 
in the diagram below (Figure 35). 
 
Figure 35: The main National Stakeholders involved in ATM in the Netherlands (LSSIP the 
Netherlands, 2015) 
On the other hand, Greece has GDP per capita 21,653 US$. The GCI score for 2015-2016 
is 4/7 which puts Greece in 81st position out of 140. The first pillar of GCR, i.e. Institutions 
received 3.7/7 points. In terms of infrastructure Greece was ranked 34th out of 140 with a 
score of 4.8/7. The quality of air transport infrastructure received 5.1/7 points putting 
Greece in the 37th position. The macroeconomic environment is quite hectic with a score 
3.3/7 positioning Greece in the 132nd position out the 140 participating countries. The 
technological readiness received 4.9/7 points. According to the WEF report the most 
problematic factors for doing business in Greece is the access to financing, the inefficient 
government bureaucracy, the political instability and the corruption.  
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Figure 36: The most problematic factors for doing business in Greece (WEF, 2015) 
 
Figure 37: Comparison of Greece with the advanced economies in the 12 pillars of GCI (1: 
low score and 7: high score) (WEF, 2015: 276) 
Greece has one ANSP. In 2014 48% of the flights were overflights, 37% were international 
departures/arrivals and the remaining 14% was domestic flights (LSSIP Greece, 2015).  In 
Athinai ACC the average en-route delay per flight increased from 0.67 minutes per flight in 
summer 2014 to 1.46 minutes per flight in summer 2015. 60% of delays were due to ATC 
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capacity and 39% because of ATC staffing. In Macedonia ACC the average en-route delay 
increased from 0.24 minutes per flight in summer 2014 to 0.75 minutes per flight in 
summer 2015. 62% of delays were due to ATC staffing, and 37% because of ATC 
capacity.  
In the Local Single Sky ImPlementation (LSSIP) GREECE report of 2015 (2015:23) it is 
stated that:   
‘The main reasons for shortfalls in the Greek ANS system are the economic and 
social problems prevailing in Greece in the recent years. That has resulted in lack 
of investments in ANS infrastructure and lack of personnel. New approaches to 
allow timely developments and implementation of operational plans including staff 
availability/recruitment are expected to be put in place.’ 
The main National Stakeholders involved in ATM in Greece (LSSIP Greece, 2015) are the 
following:  
 Ministry of Infrastructure, Transport & Networks (MITaN)  
 Ministry of National Defence (MND)  
 Hellenic Air Force (HAF)  
 Hellenic Air Navigation Service Provider (HANSP) – Air Navigation Services 
Provider  
 Hellenic Military Air Navigation Services Oversight Division (H-MANSOD)  
 Hellenic Air Force- Search and Rescue Service (HAF/SAR)  
 Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board (AAIASB)  
 Hellenic National Meteorological Service (HNMS) – Meteorological Service Provider  
 Hellenic Air Navigation Supervisory Authority (HANSA) – National Supervisory 
Authority  
 Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA) – Civil Aviation Regulator  
o Regional Services (HCAA/REGS) – Airports Operator  
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o Civil Aviation Training Centre  
Their relationships are shown in Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38: The main National Stakeholders involved in ATM in Greece (LSSIP Greece, 
2015) 
If we had to compare Greece and the Netherlands, based on the competitiveness of the 
countries, the Netherlands is far more advanced than Greece. Figure 39 shows the 
differences of the two countries in the 12 pillars that demonstrate their competitiveness. 
Therefore, the two countries cannot progress at the same rate.  
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Figure 39: Comparison of Greece and The Netherlands(1: low score and 7: high score)  
(created by the author based on WEF, 2015) 
In terms of what is expected from the Countries/FABs for the Performance Scheme every 
FAB and every country has a different target. In the example below (Table 60), Blue Med 
for the period 01 January 2015 till 31 December 2015 the KEP was 5.17% whereas 
FABEC was 6.14%. Regarding the KEA, the target for 2015 was 3.3% for FABEC and 
2.78% for Blue Med. The EU Wide KEP target was 4.78% (Actual KEP=4.84%) and KEA 
target was 2.96% (actual KEA=2.83%).  
Table 60: Environment KPI #1: Horizontal en-route flight efficiency [%] (NM, 2016) 
Entity (based on FIR) KEP [2015] KEA [PP tgt. 2015] KEA [2015] Dif. 
Baltic FAB 3.17% 1.50% 1.62% 0.12% 
BLUE MED FAB 5.17% 2.78% 2.83% 0.05% 





























Entity (based on FIR) KEP [2015] KEA [PP tgt. 2015] KEA [2015] Dif. 
DK-SE FAB 2.55% 1.20% 1.22% 0.02% 
FAB CE  3.42% 1.99% 1.93% -0.06% 
FABEC 6.14% 3.30% 3.36% 0.06% 
NEFAB 2.07% 1.35% 1.44% 0.09% 
SW FAB 4.13% 3.85% 3.41% -0.44% 
UK-Ireland FAB 5.94% 3.36% 3.50% 0.14% 
SES Area (RP2) 4.84% 2.96% 2.83% -0.13% 
Hence, there are different targets for the countries based on their historic performance. It 
should also be highlighted that the Netherlands have both LVNL and Maastricht UAC 
offering ATC to the country. MUAC is a very sophisticated and efficient provider hence the 
Netherlands have a strong advantage. Greece on the other hand is lacking economic 
resources, faces serious staffing shortages and it should be noted that in terms of 
education there are no aeronautical or airspace engineering schools in the country. Some 
should also evaluate the supporting industry behind the aviation industry. Greece is 
located quite far from the strong economic centres of Europe and its relations with the 
supporting mechanism (e.g. CANSO, EC) are not as strong as those of the Netherlands. 
Hence, different targets might have been established based on the up that time 
performance, but the current and future situation of the countries has not been evaluated 
as well as their readiness for the reform. This statement has also been supported by the 
interviewees N.04 and N.01.  
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8.1.2 Incentive Scheme  
Air Navigation Service Providers are given incentives by the EC to enhance their 
compliance and efficiency to the Performance Regulation. The risk-sharing mechanism of 
the charging scheme, i.e. the sharing of the financial risk between Member States/ANSPs 
and airspace users, is seen as a meaningful economic incentive for ANSPs to be more 
cost–efficient taking advantage of good management, economies of scale and productivity 
gains. According to Crespo and Mendes De Leon (2011: 161) ‘this creates a regime close 
to a cost capping in a multi-annual framework’. According to article 12 of Reg. 390/2013 
with a link to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 391/2013, the incentives 
shall be part of the regulatory environment known ex ante by all stakeholders and be 
applicable during the entire reference period. Moreover, the incentives on environment and 
capacity shall be financial and the NSA should enforce corrective actions if necessary. 
Safety is a KPA that does not have any incentives mechanisms due to it uncompromising 
nature. The maximum number of aggregate bonuses and the maximum amount of 
aggregate penalties shall not exceed 1% of the revenue from air navigation services in 
year n.  
The Performance Plan of DANUBE in the Appendix 3 section 4.1 has a general description 
for the KPA environment and it is not an effective incentive. For the Capacity KPA the 
incentive is financial for both ANSPs, i.e. ROMATSA and BULATSA and it was decided to 
have bonuses or penalties equal to 0.1% of revenue from en route air navigation services 
(see Appendix 3 section 4.1).  
According to IATA, the Association of European Airlines, and the European Regions 
Airline Association (2013) ‘the targets and financial incentives set must cascade through 
the entire ATM supply chain with binding mechanisms between the states and their 
various air navigation services providers issued on a limited and regularly reviewed term 
312 
with binding performance obligations’. All the interviewees highlighted the importance of 
incentive mechanisms for the implementation and success of both SES and EU ETS.  
8.1.3 Trade-offs between the KPAs  
Flight efficiency always involves trade-offs between the different areas (interviewees N.01, 
N.02, N.03, N.04, N.05, N.06, N.07), for instance safety versus capacity, fuel cost versus 
time cost, ground versus airborne delay, noise versus emissions, etc. Excess fuel burn in 
the Air Traffic Management system is primarily characterized by flight delay costs and 
flight efficiency costs. Flight delays occur when an airport or airspace resource (runway, 
gate, taxiway, or airspace sector) has greater demand than the available capacity. Flight 
delays tend to grow exponentially with increased levels of traffic. Flight efficiency is 
measured as the increased flight time, distance, and fuel compared to an “ideal” flight 
trajectory. 
As per the DANUBE FAB Performance Plan section 3.3 - Description of KPAs 
interdependencies and trade-offs:  
"Safety 
Safety KPA establishes mandatory requirements in ATM operations and 
represents the key element of ANS. No safety compromises should be made in 
order to improve other KPAs especially the cost-efficiency.  The Performance 
Scheme Regulation and corresponding targets for RP2 are more oriented on cost-
effectiveness while focusing less on the safety key performance area. Thus, for 
the second reference period and the next to come the biggest challenge for States 
and FABs will be to keep focusing on safety while trying to achieve the targets in 
different KPAs. 
Capacity 
The very good performance of ATFM delays recorded by the DANUBE FAB in the 
last five years and for RP2 implies extra cost through investments, staff and 
corresponding procedures. DANUBE FAB RP2 capacity targets followed the PRB 
expectations and indicative figures while contributing to the very challenging cost-
efficiency objectives. We appreciate that having one of the most reduced FAB 
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determined unit cost and ATFM delays represent a very challenging objective and 
should be carefully assessed.  
Environment 
Similarly, to the capacity targets the flight efficiency requires extras cost through 
investments, staff and corresponding procedures that are requested for reaching 
the targets. " 
8.1.3.1 Example of Environment Vs Unit Rate Cost 
The flight Milano- Brindisi can follow different routes. In Figure 40 two different routes are 
given. The green flight path is sorely within Italy, whereas the red path is passing through 
Croatia. The Great Distance Cycle (GDC) are the dashed lines in the map. For the red 
flight path, i.e. the one passing from Croatia the GDC is calculated firstly from Milano to 
the border of the FIR and then within Croatia for the other intersections of the flight plan 
with the charging zone and then to Brindisi. Compared to the flight plan contained entirely 
within Italy, the route through Croatia implies a reduction of 430 km in Italy and an 
increase of 477 km in Croatia.  
For an aircraft weighing 80 metric tonnes, the price (for the unit rate) per kilometre (July 
2013) is €1.00 in Italy and €0.53 in Croatia. The longer route (through Croatia) is therefore 
€177.19 cheaper (430km x €1.00 – 477km x €0.53). The reason for this significant 
difference in cost is the different Unit Rate in the two charging zones. The airplane might 
burn additional fuel by a longer distance but the total savings are higher if the plane flies 
through Croatian airspace. In this specific example, the additional distance is 47km for the 
plan through Croatia. It is cheaper for the airspace user to file (and fly) the longer flight 
plan as long as its operating costs per kilometre are less than €3.77 (€177.19 / 47km).  
According to PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2012 (2013: 21) ‘such a situation exposes the 
risk of possible unintended consequences of the current rules. They might constitute an 
incentive for airspace users to file longer routes with a detrimental effect on the horizontal 
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flight efficiency indicator (KEP). They might create cost competition based on Unit Rates, 
in order to attract traffic’.  
 
Figure 40: Two alternative routes between Milan and Brindisi 
Avoiding expensive unit rates and asking for direct routing may have negative impacts on 
safety due to sector overloads and on capacity due to ACC under and overload. This is the 
argument that is used for the implementation of single unit rate per FAB, an action that is 
quite complex given the diverse local financial arrangements.  
8.2 Multi-Stakeholder Governance in Aviation  
In SES, there are three main levels of governance. There is the political level (EC), the 
management level (Deploy manager) and the Implementation level (Project managers). 
Hence, the multi-stakeholder governance theory will be applied to better understand the 
underlying issues in SES and EU ETS implementation as well as the possible solutions for 
the different stakeholders’ points of view. Schwab developed a stakeholder theory of 
management of industrial manufacturing firms in the 1960s. Schwab argued that in order 
to be effective in maximizing a firm’s potential, managers should consider the interests of 
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all the stakeholders in the firm, i.e. shareholders, customers and clients, employees, but 
also the broader interests of the communities within which the firm is situated, including 
neighbours in the immediate proximity of the firm, governments, and fellow users of the 
environment in which the firm operates. Governments can be counted as stakeholders 
since they certainly affect organisations and groups through their regulatory policies 
(Moloney, 2006). In the aviation industry and especially when considering the SES and EU 
ETS governments are one of the most ‘strong’ stakeholders. Moreover, within 
governments as a group there are specific governments with even stronger power of 
influence (Interviewee N.02).  
The stakeholders can be primary players, for instance the airlines, or secondary players, 
for instance education and training providers.  The different stakeholders are different 
types of groups or entities that do not represent themselves and communicate to other 
bodies in the same way hence the Multi-Stakeholder Governance (MSG) approach and 
problem solving become more complex as it was realised during the participant 
observation.  
 
Figure 41: Aeronautical data chain stakeholders (Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, 2013:7) 
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The graph above shows the overview of the aeronautical data chain elements and the 
relationships with the different stakeholders in The Netherlands. It is evident that for 
Aeronautical Information Services there are a lot of stakeholders to manage and their 
communication can be complex.  
 
Figure 42: Multi-stakeholder theory of governance in aviation (based on Schwab and WEF, 
2007) 
The stakeholders as stated in a previous chapter face four major attributes, 1) the 
stakeholders’ position on the reform issue, i.e. SES and EU ETS; 2) the level of influence 
(negotiation power) they hold; 3) the level of interest they have in SES and/or EU ETS; 
and 4) the group/coalition to which they belong or can reasonably be associated with. 
These attributes are identified through various data collection methods, including 
interviews with experts and with the actual stakeholders directly, as well as from literature 
review and public announcements.  
8.2.1 The Positions of the Stakeholders  
Based on a creative amalgamation of the participant observation and the unstructured 
interviews, the positions of the SES and EU ETS stakeholders are stated in the following 
317 
subsections. According to interviewees N.01, N.06 and N.07 it is of critical importance to 
understand who are the stakeholders and their positions in order to manage them. The 
main stakeholders in the EU ETS and SES reforms are the European Commission, 
European Parliament and National Governments, the airspace users, the organizations 
and institutions and the Air Navigation Service Providers. In this section their positions, as 
interpreted from the participant observation and the semi-structure interviews, will be 
presented.  
8.2.1.1 European Commission, European Parliament, and National Governments  
The European Parliament (EP) is the final decisions maker of the reforms. The European 
Parliament may approve or reject a legislative proposal, or propose amendments to it. The 
EP recognises that it has a duty to make a positive contribution to welfare and sustainable 
development as a long-term goal, both through its political and legislative role. The 
Parliament mentions in the website that it has always been keen on removing the 
obstacles of the SES implementation following a pragmatic approach. The EP is working 
closely with the European Commission in this matter. The European Commission’s 
position is the same with the European Parliament’s position (interviewee N.02). As per EP 
website (europarl.europa.eu, 2016):  
‘Given that the major objectives of the Single European Sky are still to be 
achieved, Parliament is now calling on the Commission to switch from a ‘bottom-
up’ to a ‘top-down’ approach, in order to overcome remaining reticence and to 
speed up the implementation of the initiative, notably with respect to the SESAR 
programme and the functional airspace blocks.’ 
Moreover, the Industry Consultation Body was established under Article 6 of Regulation 
549/2004 which was formed after the Parliament proposed it. It should be noted that the 
Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by voters in all Member States to 
represent people’s interests with regard to EU law-making and to make sure other EU 
institutions are working democratically. It is implied that the EP is affected many times from 
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the industry bodies in terms of policy making. As the British politician Shirley Williams 
(from Van der Brug and De Vreese, 2016:79) remarked: 
The “democratic deficit” is the gap between the powers transferred to the 
Community level and the control of the elected [European] Parliament over them, 
a gap filled by national civil servants operating as European experts…and to some 
extent by organized lobbies, mainly representing businesses. 
The PRB white paper on RP3 Performance Objectives (2016) states that the regulation 
and oversight is quite weak. It also argued that the Member States and their ANSPs have 
a ‘vested interest’ in maintaining monopolies and lack of competition as they benefit from 
this. PRB (2016: 8) also mentioned that ‘Unhelpful behaviours and gaming are observed. 
Not only in the regulated community but also in the operational elements of the legislation’.  
Since most of the ANSPs are government owned and the charging scheme is such that 
the ANSP cannot make a loss, the national governments have a strong incentive to 
preserve the situation as it is in terms of ownership and competition. Thus, Ministries retain 
control of the infrastructure and manage the interaction within its regulating bodies leaving 
clear conflicts of interests (PRB, 2016). Hence, the independence and credibility of the 
regulator is a function of the political economy that creates the regulator, sets its goals and 
instruments, and is always in a position to subsequently change the rules. 
8.2.1.2 Airspace Users  
The term airspace users refer to aircraft operators and especially airlines. Most of the 
airlines are private owned. Their main objective to increase their revenues and to decrease 
their costs. The costs of airlines are: fuel; cost of operations; pax services; airport and ANS 
charges; distribution; aircraft ownership; and maintenance. SES is affecting the cost of fuel 
and the navigation charges. Due to SES, the routes will be shorter, thus more fuel efficient 
and the navigation cost is decreasing through the performance scheme KPA Cost 
Efficiency. Hence airlines are in favour of the SES reform of ATM. Depending on the 
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business model (LCC or FSNC), the direct cost for ANS represents between 6 and 20% of 
the total operating costs (TOC), excluding fuel. In addition, there are additional costs for 
delays and flight inefficiencies (due to longer routes and more fuel consumption) (EC, 
2015). 
Regarding the EU ETS it needs to be highlighted that this a regulation for the airlines. 
Since most of the airlines are private, they try to be as cost efficient as possible. Fuel is 
considered the second or the third highest cost (depending on the fuel price). Airlines try to 
consume as much as possible. The fuel consumption is directly related to carbon 
emissions, thus by minimising its consumption airlines are minimising their carbon 
footprint. However, in order for the minimum consumption of fuel to be achieved, airlines 
need to invest in airplanes, new technologies, trainings of pilots and other measures. 
Thus, the EU ETS regulation causes stress to many airlines. The majority of airlines 
oppose the inclusion of aviation in EU ETS. On the other hand, there are some airlines 
that are already following a more environmentally friendly approach and are investing a lot 
of capital to the environmental improvement of their operations. Thus, those airlines 
embrace the EU ETS principles and concepts. Another condition that influences the 
position of the airline towards EU ETS is the size of the airline and the ownership. Airlines 
that have a small fleet and few operations, the time and effort that they invest in EU ETS 
exceeds the benefits they will get back. Moreover, airlines that are government owned 
need to have the approval of the ministry in order to do radical changes in the fleet or the 
management of the operations. Finally, it is also a matter of available expertise and 
mentality. Small airlines lack the necessary expertise in order to follow fuel-efficient 
strategies and operate sophisticated software for fuel planning operations.   
8.2.1.3 Organisations and Institutions  
The Institutions/Organisations related to SES are EUROCONTROL; the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA); the Association of European Airlines (AEA); and the 
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European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA); the Trade Unions, in particular the 
European Transport Workers' Federation (EFT) and 'Air Traffic Controllers European 
Union Coordination' (ATCEUC); and CANSO. In terms of EU ETS, the trade unions and 
CANSO are not an important stakeholder.   
EUROCONTROL is an independent organisation and does not have a position on the 
reforms. It supports and follows the regulations promoting the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the aviation systems for all its 41 Members States equally. IATA on the other hand has 
the mission to represent, lead, and serve the airline industry. As per IATA’s website 
(IATA.org, 2016c) ‘Advocating for the interests of airlines across the globe, we challenge 
unreasonable rules and charges, hold regulators and governments to account, and strive 
for sensible regulation’.  
The airlines are following the developments on SES and they want the aviation system 
both in terms of charges and in terms of operations to be more efficient. AEA promotes the 
reduction of emissions and environmental impact, but claims that due to the stop the clock 
the EU ETS has a negative impact on airlines operating on European routes and is looking 
forward to the reassessment of ETS following the outcome of the 2016 ICAO assembly. 
ELFAA’s mission statement is ‘to ensure that European policy and legislation promote free 
and equal competition to enable the continued growth and development of low fares into 
the future, allowing a greater number of people to travel by air. John Hanlon (2013), 
Secretary General of ELFAA said:  
‘ELFAA has consistently supported the inclusion of aviation in EU ETS. ELFAA 
renews its call for the reinstatement of full scope EU ETS, to restore environmental 
effectiveness and remove the unfair discriminatory burden of a limited scope’. 
The Trade Unions of ATCOs are opposing the way the SES is designed and is 
implemented due to the insecurity they feel for their jobs and salaries. One of the main 
targets of SES is to reduce the charges for airlines and the charges is related to the 
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ATCOs salaries. In addition, programs like the Remote and Virtual Tower (RVT), is a risk 
for the demand of ATCOs. Hence, they are opposing to some elements of SES. In terms 
of EU ETS, they have a neutral position.  
8.2.1.4 Air Navigation Service Providers 
ANSPs have two diverse positions for the SES and neutral position for EU ETS. Those 
ANSPs that are state enterprises/bodies, i.e. owned by the state follow the position of the 
state, i.e. preservation of the natural monopoly. Other ANSPs, that are more profit 
orientated like NATS, might be in favour of the reforms in order to be given the opportunity 
to overtake services provided by other ANSPs. Those services are mostly Terminal 
Control (TWR) or Approach Control (APP). With the current national regulations, there is 
the requirement/limitation that the ATCOs speak the country’s language especially in APP 
and TWR control. Moreover, to comply with the Performance Scheme rapid and drastic 
changes in the operations need to be done and many times the ANSPs personnel are not 
willing to adapt. Finally, the SES requires investments in the infrastructures that the 
ANSPs budget may not be sufficient.   
8.2.2 The level of influence and interest  
The effective power of the industry, i.e. the degree of power the stakeholder holds over 
other groups in relation to a reform of the aviation environment, is very strong. In Table 61, 
a general overview of the power and interest is depicted as it was identified by the 
participant observation and the unstructured interviews. The blue and red coloured 
bubbles represent the SES reform and the EU ETS respectively. Bubble number 1 
represents the airlines that have high power and high interest. Bubble number 2 
represents the academic community that has low power, but high interest. Bubble number 
three is the ANSPs that have high interest in the SES reform and quite high power too 
(due to strong Trade Unions and natural monopolistic power). The bubble number 4 in 
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Table 61, is the regulator either in the form of CAA/NSA or in the form of EC or EP. The 4th 
bubble has the highest power and the highest interest in the reform. Bubble number 5 is 
the airports. The airports, concerning the SES, benefit in terms of on ground ATC 
improvements, but their role is more as an observer than as an active participant. The 
sixth bubble represents the organisations/associations and institutions like IATA and 
EUROCONTROL. Bubble number 7 in Table 61is the fuel suppliers. The fuel suppliers 
have high power but low interest in SES. The 8th bubble represents the manufacturers. 
The manufacturers have higher power than fuel suppliers do, but lower interest compared 
to airports or airlines. The ninth bullet is the system providers. They have high power and 
high interest in SES.  
Table 61: Power-Interest Matrix of SES (blue bubbles) and EU ETS (red bubbles) (source: 
own elaboration) 
 
Regarding the EU ETS, the red bubbles depict the power and interest of the different 
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relatively high power over the reforms (see example about ‘stop the clock’). Bubble 2 
represents the academic society, which has high interest on EU ETS, but low power. The 
ANSPs (bubble 3) have no interest and little power over the EU ETS. The regulators, i.e. 
bubble number 4, have the same interest and power as in the SES. Bubble number 5, i.e. 
the airports, have low power and low interest in EU ETS reforms. The 6th bubble is in the 
exact position as the SES. Institutions and Associations as an entity have the same 
interest and power over the 2 reforms. The fuel suppliers, i.e. bubble number 7, have quite 
high power due to their oligopolistic power, and high interest regarding the environmental 
targets set to airlines. The manufacturers (bubble 8) have high power and high interest on 
EU ETS performance due to the possible change in the demands of the airlines. Finally, 
the system providers, i.e. red bubble 9 have low interest and low power over EU ETS.  
Based on Chinyio and Olomolaiye’s (2010:8) seven (7) principles of stakeholder 
management, the regulators should:  
1. ‘Acknowledge and actively monitor the concerns of all legitimate stakeholders, and 
take their interests appropriately into account in decision-making and operations. 
2. Listen and openly communicate with stakeholders about the latter’s respective 
concerns and contributions, and about the risks that the regulators assume because 
of their involvement with the corporation. 
3. Adopt processes and modes of behaviour that are sensitive to the concerns and 
capabilities of each stakeholder’s constituency. 
4. Recognise the interdependence of efforts and rewards among stakeholders, and 
attempt to achieve a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of corporate activity 
among them, taking into account the stakeholders’ respective risks and 
vulnerabilities. 
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5. Work cooperatively with other entities, both public and private, to ensure that risks 
and harms arising from corporate activities are minimised and, where they cannot 
be avoided, appropriately compensated. 
6. Avoid altogether activities that might jeopardise inalienable human rights (e.g. the 
right to life) or give rise to risks that, if clearly understood, would be patently 
unacceptable to relevant stakeholders. 
7. Acknowledge the potential conflicts between (a) their known roles as corporate 
stakeholders and (b) their legal and moral responsibilities for the interests of 
stakeholders, and address such conflicts through open communication, appropriate 
reporting, incentive systems and, where necessary, third-party review.’ 
The players that have high power and high interest need to be managed closely, because 
they are key players for the success of the schemes. The players that have high power 
and low interest need to kept satisfied. The stakeholders with low power and high interest 
need to be kept satisfied but also informed. Finally, for those stakeholders with low power 
and low interest, minimal effort can be provided; however, action must be taken by the 
policymakers when necessary. It needs to be highlighted that the Network Manager has 
strong power over the airspace users and minimum power over the ANSPs. The industry 
is also represented by the SESAR JU. There are numerous examples proving this power. 
The stakeholders can lead to amendments or changes in the reforms under consideration 
due to their interests and due to their power. The most important example with major 
effects on the aviation reform related to the reactions of many airlines against the scope of 
the EU ETS. 
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8.2.2.1 Reactions to the Implementation of European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in 
Aviation  
The United States of America (USA) disagreed with the implementation of EU ETS in 
international civil aviation. Representatives of the USA and other government bodies of 
other states claimed that the onside implementation of EU ETS to non-European carriers 
violates the Chicago Convection of 1947 for the international civil aviation and its bilateral 
agreements and that the issue should be resolved by ICAO (Havel and Sanchez, 2012). 
ICAO supports the cooperation of its Member States (MS) for the non-binding standards 
and recommended practices for safety, environmental protection and other issues 
affecting civil aviation. The United States is a signatory MS to the Chicago Convention and 
is one of the current 190 Member States of ICAO. While the European Union (EU) is not a 
signatory to the Chicago Convention, it is represented by its 28 Member States in the 
ICAO. But the EU has observer status in ICAO (Leggett et al, 2012:3). 
Since 1997 (Kyoto Protocol) ICAO has published technical information and a range of 
different volunteering options and recommendations relating to the limitation of 
greenhouse gas emissions from aviation. In 2004, ICAO ruled out the option of a global 
emissions trading system for aviation. Instead, it has established guidelines for the 
Member States which should include international aviation into their own emissions trading 
schemes. ICAO requested the introduction to be a "mutual agreement" and non-
discriminatory. Member states are requested to produce Action Plans presenting how they 
handle environment issues related to aviation (Leggett et al, 2012: 3). 
The US response is particularly strong. Some American airlines and Airlines of America 
(A4A) appealed to the European Court. But the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) concluded that the EU ETS did not contravene the Chicago Convention, the Kyoto 
Protocol or the US EU Open Skies Agreement. The Court ruled that application of the EU 
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ETS to aircraft operators infringes neither the principle of territoriality nor the sovereignty of 
third party State (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2011). 
The US government, China and some other countries have requested exemptions for the 
airlines from the emissions trading system (Malina et al, 2012). Europe's representatives 
responded by saying that the regulation is not contradictory to the Chicago Convention 
and that the consent of the other countries is not required (American Society of 
International Law, 2008). This policy of the European Union has raised many controversies 
among the stakeholders. On the one hand, there are countries such as the USA and China 
that actively react to this policy, because they believe it could have a negative impact on 
their carriers’ profitability. On the other hand, there are some countries, that are positive to 
EU ETS full scheme, because they have developed the biofuels industry. Brazil is one of 
them since Boeing and Embraer opened in 2015 a Joint Aviation Biofuel Research Centre 
in Brazil (Embraer, 2015).  
This example illustrates that within the category of the stakeholder, there are subgroups 
that are either supportive or against the regulation according to their interests. Hence 
countries that are biofuels producers supported the full scope of the EU ETS whereas fast 
developing countries like China were opposed. Nevertheless, some international airlines 
complied with the full, original, scope of the scheme including: Korean Air; Fed Ex; Nippon 
Air and Lufthansa Cargo (Sandbag, 2013). The reason for such a decision was that they 
considered it financially advantageous to receive the generous number of free allowances. 
According to Sandbag (2013) Ryanair publicly announced an ETS charge of €0.25 per 
passenger per flight, and had €8 million windfall profits since their actual ETS cost was 
€0.13 in 2012.  
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8.2.3 The group/coalition of stakeholders  
The stakeholders come closer and start forming groups with common goals and aims, i.e. 
coalitions. The ANSPs have developed coalitions due to SES, but the airlines haven’t 
developed coalitions due to EU ETS. The airlines are using the established groups, for 
instance IATA, ELFAA or AEA. The ANSPs formed COOPANS that included a system 
supplier. COOPeration between Air Navigation Services providers-COOPANS is an 
international partnership between the IAA and the air navigations service providers 
(ANSPs) of Austria, Croatia, Denmark and Sweden and system supplier, Thales. 
COOPANS has structured the development and deployment process around joint activities 
such as common specification, operational documentation, validation, training materials 
and generic safety cases.  
The overarching aim of COOPANS is to achieve financial savings and reduced investment 
risks by harmonising and standardising technical solutions and operational procedures. 
COOPANS also meets the EU requirements concerning future harmonisation of ATM 
systems in Europe. The business partners share the development costs. In total, the 
cooperation is expected to cut system development costs by approximately 30 per cent 
compared with the costs each partner would incur if it had to develop the technology 
independently. Using COOPANS capability, the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA) has enabled 
Free Route Airspace within the Rathlin West sector (RATHE), which allows airlines to 
reduce fuel uplift and gives them greater flexibility in how they route.  
Furthermore, the five biggest ANSPs plus PANSA (Poland) formed an alliance called A6 
alliance. Apart from A6 there is COOPANS Alliance consisting of the ANSPs of Austria, 
Croatia, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden that works with A6. Moreover, B4 Consortium 
consists of the ANSPs of the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia and is 
member of A6 on work associated with the Deployment Manager and SESAR 2020. 
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Noracon - representing the ANSPs of Austria (Austro Control), Denmark (Naviair), Estonia 
(EANS), Finland (Finavia), Ireland (IAA) Norway (AVINOR) and Sweden (LFV) at the end 
of 2016 - will no longer be a member of the A6 Alliance. The A6 aims to modernise of the 
European ATM network within the SESAR programme creating synergies between the 
ANSP members of the SESAR JU to maximise customer and network benefits as well as 
promoting leadership at a European level in critical technical and strategic areas. The 
practice of forming alliances that was followed by the airlines is now applied to the ANSPs 
as a result of SES regulatory framework.  
There are also some attempts from FABS. Functional and efficient cooperation 
arrangement with neighbouring states and FAB´s are of strategic importance for FABs. 
The FAIR STREAM (FABEC ANSPs and AIRlines in SESAR TRials for Enhanced Arrival 
Management) consortium involving major European airlines, ANPSPs and suppliers has 
started the concrete work on flight trials to improve predictability and flight efficiency 
towards major European airports. The project is launched by the SESAR. DK-SE FAB is 
cooperating with the ANSPs in NEFAB to increase the opportunities for establishing Free 
Route Airspace, so the airlines can determine their own routes throughout the entire 
Nordic airspace.  
In 2011, Irish IAA, Swedish LFV, UK NATS and Naviair established the so-called FAB 4 
project (IAA, 2013). The project is exploring the possibilities of closer cooperation on ATM 
in the airspace over Denmark, Sweden, the UK and Ireland. The aim is to enhance ATM 
efficiency in this area. The possibility of combining the only two European FABs to date – 
the Danish-Swedish and the UK-Irish FABs – forms part of the project analysis. A 
preliminary study already completed has shown that genuine cost reductions and 
enhanced efficiency would be possible in cooperation.  
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Significant improvements have been done in terms of the Inter- FAB Coordination, 
explicitly by creating `Borealis Alliance`, where ANSPs of Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia 
(NEFAB States), Sweden and Denmark (DK-SE FAB States), and UK and Ireland (UK-IR 
FAB States) cooperates to enable better performance for stakeholders through business 
collaboration. Borealis Alliance focuses on strategic business cooperation between the 
member ANSPs, seeking economies of scale and projects that can be achieved on a 
commercial basis, complementing the work of the northern European Functional Airspace 
Blocks (FABs) but without the need for regulatory or State involvement. 
8.3 Summary  
The four major attributes, 1) the stakeholders’ position on the reform issue, i.e. SES and 
EU ETS; 2) the level of influence (negotiation power) they hold; 3) the level of interest they 
have in SES and/or EU ETS; and 4) the group/coalition to which they belong or can 
reasonably be associated with, determine the capability the stakeholder has to block, 
amend or promote regulations either alone or in collaboration with other stakeholders. 
Hence, Stakeholder Analysis offers a detailed understanding of the aviation game taking 
into consideration political, economic, and social elements that affect the groups’ positions, 
the hierarchy of authority, but also the power among different groups.  
There are big differences among the stakeholders, but also within the stakeholders. For 
instance, the ANSPs in Europe operate in very diverse environments, both in terms of 
operational conditions (e.g. traffic complexity and traffic variability) and socio-economic 
conditions (e.g. cost of living, labour laws). There are also significant differences in terms 
of size across the ANSPs since the five largest bear 57% of the total Pan-European 

















This chapter is dedicated to the summarised conclusions of the research, but most 
importantly to the contribution of the thesis to the body of existing knowledge. Moreover, 
recommendations for the Single European Sky and the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme will be given. Finally, a holistic/systemic approach for handling 
environmental regulations in the aviation sector will be presented. 
9.1 Conclusion for EU ETS and SES  
The aviation sector has been included in the EU ETS since 2012. The provisional cap of 
aviation emissions has been set at a constant level of 210,349,264 aviation allowances per 
year which represents 95% of the historical aviation emissions. The allocation of 
allowances was done by free allocation (based on benchmarks and expressed at CO2 per 
tonne-kilometre) or via auctioning (15%).  
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme is the biggest ETS in scale and size in the world. The 
impact of Emissions Trading (ET) in aviation affects companies of all size and from various 
industrial sectors. For instance, the EU ETS in aviation affects the system suppliers in 
terms of implementing the element of the EU ETS in the Operation Control Centres 
software for choosing flight paths. The biomass producers are directly affected by the EU 
ETS. The carbon offsetting schemes in countries outside the EU are also linked to the 
ETS. Even consumers are affected by the way the trading scheme is set. If the biofuels do 
not comply with sustainability criteria and if they are produced in land used for food 
production, food prices are affected. Moreover, if the land is important for biodiversity, the 
ecosystem is affected. Therefore, the EU ETS not only affects the industries or the 
countries that it regulates, but it also affects every one of us directly or indirectly.  
Aircraft operators are requested to surrender a number of allowances to the Competent 
Authority. When it comes to compliance with the EU ETS, there are different options. 
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These options might be short-term (e.g. optimised use of the given technologies) or long-
term (e.g. investment in technical progress and new technologies).  
In order to achieve successful implementation of stakeholder management within an 
organisation, the following factors should be considered: a) the effort of the implementation 
must be aligned with the organisations’ readiness, i.e. the maturity of the organisations to 
comply with the reform, and b) the implementation must be treated as a change 
programme (Bourne, 2009).  
The concept of ‘organisational maturity’ for measuring the organisation’s performance in 
specific areas and benchmark their existing practices aiming at improvements is essential. 
The level of readiness of an organisation is closely related to the organisational willingness 
to engage proactively in developing and improving the processes. Therefore, the 
readiness of the stakeholders is of critical importance for the implementation and success 
of both the EU ETS and the SES. If and when the regulator understands the level of 
readiness an organisation is closer to, the management can define the starting point for 
improvements in stakeholder relationship management. We should note that the EU ETS 
and the SES are reform projects for many countries and they involve different stakeholders 
both in terms of nationality and in terms of nature. On that account, the regulatory 
authorities (EC, European Parliament, CAAs etc.) should first evaluate the readiness of the 
involved stakeholders and then proceed to stakeholders’ management in order to better 
support aviation reforms. The challenge is to keep Transaction Costs low enough to 
ensure that cost-effective reductions of GHGs can be achieved. In addition, the role of the 
institutions is very important as they are needed in order to make the results believable, 
enforce contracts, disseminate information and resolve disputes.  
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9.2 Contribution of the PhD thesis to the body of existing knowledge 
The current state of knowledge in the field of Air Transport Management is limited and the 
most abundant mass of studies concerns airspace engineering and environmental 
sciences. Most studies focus on the specific and limited topic of research, without linking 
areas or topics. Moreover, most of the comparative studies in policies refer to individual 
companies or entities in a single- or cross-country context rather than groups/stakeholders 
as part of two or more systems at the same time. However, an important contribution of 
this study is its synthetic nature. The study examined the interaction of the individuals in 
both reform programmes taking into consideration at the same time more than just the 
environmental sector.  
This PhD thesis contributes to the limited academic literature that is available on the topic 
of the Single European sky and the environmental regulation of climate change due to 
aviation operations. At the same time, it contributes by generating empirical evidence on 
the relationship of reforms to ANSPs and Airlines in terms of environmental performance 
and operations. To the knowledge of the researcher, no such research had been carried 
out previously. The contribution is in line with the literature review and the comments of the 
interviewees and therefore some citations and interviews statements are used to reinforce 
and support the recommendations.  
Different models have been built to measure the carbon footprint of aviation operations 
and its environmental consequences in general. Other studies have evaluated the welfare 
effect of environmental problems. There are plenty of studies regarding noise pollution and 
local air quality in the proximity of airports and their consequences to the health and well-
being of the communities living there. Other studies concern the models that evaluate the 
impacts of the implemented operational solution to civil aviation with regards to 
environmental performance. This research follows a different approach, focusing on the 
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management perspective and the governance issues related to the implementation of SES 
and EU ETS. Ultimately, it will be the task of aviation managers to implement policies for 
the environment. 
Furthermore, studies have been carried out about the implementation of the EU ETS in 
other industries, and research has been conducted concerning the inclusion of aviation in 
the area of environmental studies focusing on the emission reduction measurements due 
to EU ETS. As far as SES is concerned, research has been conducted in the engineering 
part, i.e. approached design, minimum separation criteria and avionics, as well as some 
studies by EUROCONTROL or the European Commission. However, all these studies 
were controlled or were conducted on behalf of the European Commission. 
Finally, transaction cost economic theory is applied widely in the environmental economics 
and especially in Emissions Trading Scheme, but it was never applied in the air transport 
management reforms and so to Single European Sky. It proved very topical to implement 
transaction costs to Single European Sky. Many participants in the Delphi method 
commented that they spend a lot of effort on ‘figuring out what is happening and how to 
handle the reform’. Moreover, all the interviewees reported that all the stakeholders apart 
from the direct economic cost of handling the reform, they spent and are spending a lot of 
time and consequently time to develop policies, evaluate the policies, think of strategies, 
monitor progress, i.e. a cost that is not taken under consideration and is not always 
obvious. When dealing with reforms implemented within one company or even within one 
country, the transaction costs are quite low, compared to the cost of the technical 
changes. However, when the reforms are for the entire aviation system, then the 
transaction costs and the complexity of implementation and monitoring can be extremely 
high.  
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9.2.1 Contribution to the policy makers and the aviation practitioners  
From an aviation policy point of view, the findings of the research could assist the relevant 
decision-and-policy makers with assessing the impact of regulatory reforms to the 
environmental performance of the sector as well as with evaluating possible corrective 
measures. The researcher focused on governance issues that obstruct the implementation 
and effectiveness of the policy reforms. The multi-stakeholders approach in implementing 
reforms can be a realistic solution to empower the reforms. 
9.2.1.1 Recommendations for EU ETS  
This section presents the recommendations for the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme. These recommendations focus on the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
processes, the revenue from auctions and penalties, the balance of allowances demand 
and supply, as well as the interaction with the Global Market Based Measure developed by 
ICAO.  
9.2.1.1.1 More simple MRV process and further environmental training  
A major difficulty in the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification of emissions is the 
verification of biofuels. This issue was brought up by the researcher during a workshop 
about the MRV and biofuels that was held in June 2016 in Brussels. Many airlines, 
verifiers and fuel suppliers expressed concerns about the process of MRV and discussed 
extensively the role of alternative fuels on the emissions reduction.  
The central EU regulation for alternative fuels is the RED Directive 2009/28/EC. The EU 
agreed on a Directive (2009/28/EC) on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources (RED). Some Member States have a large share of aviation in their gross final 
consumption of energy due to specific characteristics. For instance, Cyprus and Malta, due 
to their insular and peripheral character, have a gross final consumption of energy in 
national air transport that is more than three times the Community average in 2005. Since 
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these places rely largely on aviation, the exemption should cover the amount by which 
they exceed the Community average gross final consumption of energy in aviation in 2005, 
as assessed by Eurostat (Directive 2009/28/EC).  
The EU has set sustainability criteria (Directive 2009/28/EC, article 17) to ensure that the 
carbon savings from biofuels are real and that biodiversity is protected. Biofuels that are 
not produced according to these criteria do not count towards the environmental targets. 
According to DG Energy, biofuels cannot be produced either in areas converted from land 
with previously high carbon stock (such as wetlands or forests) or from raw materials 
obtained from land with high biodiversity (such as primary forests or highly biodiverse 
grasslands).  
In the renewable energy directive (2009/28/EC: “RED”) the European Union, in order to 
encourage the diversification of feedstocks used to produce biofuels, i.e. biofuels produced 
from wastes, residues and lignocellulosic, counts for double their real energy value in 
terms of their contribution to the national EU mandates. The double counting gives an 
economic value to some biofuel pathways (advanced biofuels) and it can increase their 
chances of being selected by airlines.  
One key issue that airspace users are facing is the complexity in monitoring, reporting and 
verifying allowances. For instance, reporting the use of biofuels is an especially 
complicated process. Biofuels are difficult to track when they are blended with the 
standard aviation fuel. In some airports some airlines have dedicated fuel tank farms. In 
case the airlines do not have one, the purchased blend of biofuel ends up in the common 
tank that supplies all the airlines. For instance, if Airline A buys 50% blend of bio-kerosene 
and this ends up in the common tank farm, it blends with the Fossil Jet A1 fuel that is paid 
by other airlines. As a result, everyone ends up with a blend of the blend and Airline A is 
not using what they paid for. In this case, the physical tracing of bio-kerosene is almost 
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impossible. A mathematical fuel balance is used to estimate the use of bio-kerosene. 
However, the verifier of biofuel has no knowledge about whether or not other airlines 
purchased bio-kerosene, which imposes the risk of double counting of biofuel and credits. 
Furthermore, we cannot verify whether the bio-kerosene is used for flights within the EU or 
for international flights.  
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Figure 43: The biofuel journey from production to consumption (Source: own elaboration) 
The above described practical problem could be resolved in different ways. For instance, 
we could claim that every airline should have its designated tank farm in every airport 
where it buys fuel. This might solve the problem with the use of the biofuel blend but, on 
the other hand, it would increase the cost of infrastructure and it would create land use 
problems. Building biofuel tank farms could be a solution, which could become a reality as 
soon as more airlines purchase biofuels.  
338 
A solution would be to virtually assign the credits of biofuels to airlines and to take for 
granted that the biofuel is used for EU flights. We could then count the total use of biofuels 
vs fossil fuel and this would make the process much easier and faster, which would 
encourage airlines to start reporting their use of biofuels. The airlines avoid reporting the 
use of biofuels blend because the process is too complex and the use of biofuels is limited 
to a small amount of flights. The interviewees N.05 and N.06 also mentioned this.  
Moreover, the physical tracing of biofuels is not possible. The airlines use an intermediate 
company that purchases the biofuels for them. This company, the verifier, is responsible 
for the logistics and documentation of the biofuels. The airline and the verifier use national 
databases to document the biofuel blend use. In these databases, such as the German 
Nabisy, there is the rule of ‘no information’ on the supply chain of the biofuel supplier. This 
ensures that the airline will not bypass the intermediate company and, instead, it will buy 
directly from the biofuel supplier. This process might protect the intermediate company but, 
on the other hand, it makes the physical tracing of the biofuel more difficult and it 
increases the risk of double counting.  
Aircraft operators, the MRV authorities as well as everyone involved in the documentation 
and administration of the EU ETS should first undergo training by the same organisation or 
training agency in order to have the same level of information as well as reference point for 
questions and answers. This training will, first of all, help to raise the environmental 
awareness of the involved members and, secondly, it can ensure a better administration 
and handling of the EU ETS. The implementation of simpler MRV processes and 
environmental training is an easy and inexpensive procedure.   
9.2.1.1.2 Revenue from auctions and penalties  
The Emissions Trading Scheme involves transactions from which Member States can 
create revenues. The Member States (MS) make revenues by selling allowances in the 
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stock market and from the penalties that are imposed to aircraft operators. The MS 
according to article 10 (3) of the EU ETS Directive are obliged to use at least 50% of 
auction revenues in order to combat climate change in the EU and third countries. 
However, since the MS do not have any obligation to publish relevant information, it is 
often unknown where exactly the revenues go. Of course, this raises ethical issues for the 
scheme and it became a main discussion topic in some workshops that the researcher 
attended.  
Regarding the penalties, the MS and the CA in particular are responsible for imposing 
them. According to Carbon Market Report 2015, the application of the 'excess emissions 
penalty' in 2014 was reported for a low number of cases (ca. 0.1% of installations) in 6 
Member States (DE, ES, PL, PT, RO, UK). As provided for by the Directive, Member 
States should increase the penalty in accordance with the European index of consumer 
prices. The range of different penalties varies substantially across MS; in certain cases the 
minimum can be a few hundred euros and the maximum €75,000, whereas in other cases 
the imposed penalties might range from €5,000 to €15 million. Seven Member States 
reported potential penalties in the form of imprisonment.  
Another important element is the transaction cost of the EU ETS. The issue here is the 
existing inconsistency in this respect, as some Member States charge the airlines 
administrative fees, whereas others do not. According to Carbon Market Report 2015 (EC, 
COM (2015) 576) there are 16 countries that do not charge any fees to operators. 
However, six EU countries collect an annual subsistence fee from operators or aircraft 
operators. These fees range from 671€ to 5250€ per year per operator. In two reported 
cases, they are expressed as an amount (0.02€ to 0.07€) per allowance. Seventeen 
Member States reported that they collect fees for various services, such as the approval or 
update of monitoring plans or permits. Those fees vary significantly, starting from below 
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100€ up to above 3,000€ for a new monitoring plan approval. That being said, it seems 
that some member states recover their transaction cost, whereas others do not. The 
inconsistency that is created, however, is unfair both to the member states administration 
offices and the aircraft operators.  
The situation calls for a standardisation of the processes; penalties should be given by a 
central agency following the same criteria and methods for all the operators in all 
countries. The CA should be responsible for MRV and not for imposing penalties in 
questionable ways. It is also proposed that the MS publish information about the revenue 
investments. Moreover, the MS should monitor the progress of the carbon offsetting 
schemes or the environmental improvements projects. Since climate change is a global 
phenomenon, all the money, i.e. 100% of the gathered revenues, should be assigned to 
environmental improvements. In order for this recommendation to be implemented, 
consensus needs to be reached among member states and this is not always an easy 
thing to achieve. .  
9.2.1.1.3 Balance of the allowances market  
The EU ETS is a virtual market based on shadow prices and requires that wisely set 
factors are applied to all aircraft operators in all EU countries. As a virtual market, it allows 
the ideal setting of the factors, which contributes to the achievement of the EU ETS target, 
i.e. the decrease of the negative environmental externalities. Since it is a market, all the 
rules of demand and supply apply to the scheme. As discussed in the literature review, it is 
evident that there is no balance between the supply and the demand of the allowances. 
The interviewees N.04 and N.05 expressed their concerns on this lack of balance. A 
mechanism is thus required in order to accommodate this need for balance in the market. 
There are numerous trials to project CO2 emissions. Different scenarios are applied in 
order to capture the interaction of the different policies, reforms, changes. However, the 
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problem arises when the different scenarios do not develop according to plan and, in that 
case, amendment or corrective measures should be taken by the regulator to adapt to the 
new standards and situations.  
According to the EC, there is a surplus of allowances leading to lower carbon prices and 
weaker incentives to reduce emissions. The surplus amounted to around 2 billion 
allowances at the start of phase 3 and it increased further to more than 2.1 billion in 2013. 
In 2015, it was reduced to around 1.78 billion as a consequence of back-loading. Without 
this, the surplus would have been almost 40% higher at the end of 2015 (EC, 2016). This 
massive oversupply of allowances has hugely devalued the carbon price.  
The surplus is a big issue for the position of aviation in the EU ETS and the existence of a 
surplus is proven by the allowances price in EEX. The surplus can be either due to a 
generous cap or an excess supply. According to the result of the Delphi analysis, the 
CAAs/NSAs (40%), some individual experts (29%) and other governmental bodies (60%) 
believe that the cap of the EU ETS is too generous. On the other hand, IATA (66%), the 
airlines (57%) and the ANSPs (100%) believe that the cap was not generous. The 
fundamental issue faced by the ETS is the absolutely fixed nature of the cap (SSE, n.d.).  
Companies that have been given enough free allowances to cover their emissions have an 
economic incentive to sell any offsets they do not actually need, since they are significantly 
cheaper than EU carbon allowances, giving them the option to make a profit. According to 
SSE (nd), the linear reduction factor does not align with expected targets. This 
phenomenon is mostly for energy industries, but it affects the supply of allowances for the 
aviation industry, too. This difference in the supply and demand of allowances makes the 
EU ETS vulnerable and increases the risks for stakeholders and especially investors.  
The supply of allowances needs to be controlled for the market to start working. A Supply 
Adjustment Mechanism (SAM) would allow the supply of allowances to respond to the 
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demand. To control the market, allowances that are considered surplus could be placed 
into a strategic reserve which can be used only when the demand is much higher than the 
supply. In the area of aviation, the EC, in an effort to control supply and demand, 
postponed the auctions and created some kind of scarcity in the market. This was an ad 
hoc measure with limited but not sufficient results for market stability. A more organised 
strategy like the SAM would be more beneficial for the virtual market of the EU ETS. The 
SAM can be used when additional schemes affect the availability of the allowances. For 
instance, the SES reform through the optimisation of the airspace provided aircraft users 
with shorter routes and, consequently, fewer emissions, saving in allowance usage. 
Technological improvements in the aircraft and the engines have the same effect. As a 
consequence, the supply of allowances becomes higher than the demand and the 
emissions market becomes vulnerable.  
The surplus of allowances can be identified in the auction markets or the banking reserves 
of the airlines. Airlines are allowed to bank the allowances that they have not used. 
SchleichI et al (2006:36) claimed that ‘banning the transfer of allowances increases the 
overall compliance costs because cost savings cannot be traded over time’. After their 
simulations, they also concluded that a generous allocation of allowances in the first phase 
results in the collapse of market prices towards the end of the first commitment period and 
a sharp increase afterwards when targets become stricter. However, reality proved that 
either the targets did not become strict enough after 10 years or what the simulation was 
suggesting was wrong. In both cases, the EU ETS needs to change. If the supply of 
allowances needs to be controlled, the banking of allowances rule should change or the 
free allowances given for next year need to be reduced. The simplest market rule says 
that, if the supply is much higher than the demand, the prices fall. Consequently, the 
aircraft operators will no longer have an incentive to cut emissions or even auction excess 
allowances.  
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The Market Stability Reserve (MSR) is a rule-based mechanism that allows the supply of 
allowances to respond to the changes in demand, maintaining the balance in the EU ETS 
carbon market. To put it simply, the MSR adjusts the auction volumes. By using the total 
number of allowances in the market as an indicator, market imbalances due to unexpected 
shocks that impact demand, such as the economic crisis, can be addressed. This allows 
the EU ETS to maintain its objective for emission reduction in a cost-effective and 
economically efficient manner, even under unexpected circumstances. 
Another way of offering stability and credibility to the market could be a price minimum 
cap, a price floor, for the auctioned allowances. This might improve the stability of the 
allowances markets but it will not serve the target as effectively as the control of the 
allowances supply. The minimum price for purchase of allowances will increase, ensuring 
minimum revenues from the auctions, but this does not mean that the oversupply is under 
control or that the market is functioning. Undoubtedly, it is a measure that can be 
implemented easier than the ban of banking or further reduction of free allocated 
allowances and its implementation is recommended, but only as a complement to SAM.  
9.2.1.1.4 EU ETS vs Global Measures  
The emissions trading scheme in the EU is the largest ETS in the world in scale as well as 
in scope. Aviation was recently included in it and so far only CO2 emissions are regulated. 
At the same time, there are discussions on how global measures will be adopted to 
address climate change as far as aviation emissions are concerned.  
The states were asked to voluntarily prepare the report ‘ICAO Action Plan on Emissions 
Reduction’ where they state the measures/actions they take to handle emissions from 
aviation operations. The states reported on their ATM reforms, i.e. the SES/FABs, the 
research and development actions like the Clean Sky Joint Undertaking (JU) which is a 
Joint Technology Initiative (JTI) involving the industry. Moreover, they reported on biofuels 
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with reference to the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) and SWAFEA (Sustainable Ways 
for Alternative Fuels and Energy for Aviation). This research actively contributed to the 
development of the “ICAO Action Plan on Emissions Reduction - Republic of Bulgaria” as 
part of a team from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation Administration - Republic of 
Bulgaria. These reports are the basis to understanding the similarities and differences 
among the different policies and actions. To clarify, the EU ETS regulates the airlines. The 
Clean Sky JU conducts research on the possible technological improvements in the 
engines and airframes of airplanes and helicopters contributing to environmental 
performance. The SES regulates ANSPs and the RED regulates the fuel provision.  
Carbon offsetting schemes, voluntary or not, do not provide an effective solution to climate 
change. The funded emission reduction projects enhance the clean technology and 
support developing countries. Carbon offsetting projects contribute to opening a path to a 
low carbon economy. However, these projects do not provide a solution to climate change 
as the problem is not actually resolved, but rather transferred to another industry or region 
causing carbon leakage. A multi-layered approach with different schemes working in 
conjunction is needed.  
The strong points of the EU ETS is the safeguarding systems to address environmental 
and social risks as well as the sustainable development criteria. Emitters can buy carbon 
offsetting only up to a certain extent, avoiding thus leakage phenomena. There are three 
main MBM: voluntary offsetting, mandatory offsetting with revenue and the emissions 
trading scheme. The administration of a carbon offsetting scheme is much easier since it 
can be handled by a centralised database/accounting system. According to ICAO Doc 
10018 (2013), the main difference between ETS and carbon offsetting schemes is the use 
of tradable emissions allowances in the ETS, which would create additional responsibilities 
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and opportunities for the participants as emissions allowances are similar to financial 
assets.  
Climate change is a global phenomenon and, for this reason, it should be addressed at a 
global level. The EC does not have the regulatory power to impose rules to non-EU 
countries and carriers. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN 
specialized agency to manage the administration and governance of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). ICAO has 191 Member States and it is 
the most appropriate organization to deal with a global issue. ICAO proposed the 
implementation of a Global Market Based Measures (GMBM) handling CO2 emissions 
worldwide. The decision regarding this was taken during the 39th Session of the Assembly 
(October 2016). The ICAO GMBMs is the Carbon Offsetting Scheme for International 
Aviation (COSIA) aiming at addressing any annual increase in total CO2 emissions above 
the 2020 levels, taking into account special circumstances and respective capabilities.  
Offsetting in COSIA is accomplished through the purchase of emissions units that certify 
emission reductions in other locations or sectors. The global MBM scheme uses emissions 
units that are available through carbon markets. This global scheme does not generate 
any emission reduction credits. According to ICAO, the aircraft operator will be required to 
offset n tonnes of CO2. The operator acquires a number of emissions units equivalent to 
this obligation in the carbon market; each emissions unit corresponds to one tonne of CO2 
that was reduced by another project/program. The aircraft operator surrenders these 
emissions units to the regulatory authority. The regulatory authority records that the 
operator surrendered these emissions units, thereby fulfilling its obligation (ICAO, 2016). 
The decision on the implementation of GMBM was taken during the 39th ICAO Assembly 
(27/09/2016-07/10/2016) and until the 40th ICAO Assembly in 2019 there will be actions for 
the implementation of GMBM, which is expected to be implemented by 2020. The first 
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Compliance cycle will be in 2021-2023, the second compliance cycle concerns the period 
2024-2026 and finally the third period will be in 2027-2029. The quantity to be offset by 
each operator is calculated using a formula that takes into account the average 
percentage increase in the sector’s emissions, the operator’s individual percentage 
increase in emissions, as well as adjustments for fast growers and early movers.  
One important element of CORSIA is that it takes into consideration the fast growers, new 
entrants, de minimis thresholds and the early movers. The new entrant is exempted from 
the application of the CORSIA for three years or until the year in which its annual 
emissions exceed 0.1 per cent of total emissions in 2020, whichever occurs earlier (ICAO, 
2016). Due to high transaction costs such as administrative costs, the smaller entities of 
both airlines and aircraft are exempted. Fast growers, i.e. individual airlines predominantly 
serving increasingly growing routes, will have fewer offset obligations than airlines serving 
more mature routes, in order to support those routes. There is a number of airlines that 
have invested in more fuel-efficient airplanes and/or have improved their operations 
resulting in fewer emissions. For those airlines the allocation of offset obligations will be 
made based on a historic performance benchmark (European Parliament, 2016).  
It is evident from both the ICAO Action Plans and the Delphi research undertaken in this 
thesis that one measure cannot on its own lead to carbon neutral growth. The COSIA 
initiative is a carbon-offsetting scheme that does not reduce emissions and climate 
change. It gives the opportunity to aircraft operators to transfer their emissions somewhere 
else without actually cutting them and without leading to carbon leakage. The initial name 
of the GMBM was COSIA, which stands for Carbon Offsetting Scheme in Aviation, and 
ICAO renamed it to CORSIA, i.e. Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme in Aviation. 
This is indicative of the change of the scheme’s aim making it maybe more vulnerable to 
carbon leakage. A fuller set of measures can achieve a better outcome. The ICAO Basket 
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of measures reducing aviation emissions is definitely a better solution to handle climate 
change. Individual efforts cannot lead to carbon neutral growth. The schemes should act 
complementarily to achieve the maximum outcome.   
9.2.1.2 Recommendations for SES  
This section presents the recommendation to improve the performance of the SES. The 
recommendations focus on raising the environmental awareness of ANSPs and CAAs, the 
use of navigation charges as incentives for better environmental performance, the 
consolidation of ANSPs and the ideal regulatory system for the better implementation of 
Performance Scheme. These are considered in turn. 
9.2.1.2.1 Environmental awareness of ANSPs and CAAs 
The KPA of Environment in the Performance Regulation is not exactly a separate target, 
but someone could argue that it benefits from improvements in the other areas. The 
creation of FAB and the implementation of FUA and FRA, the improvements in the 
communication and data sharing or the decrease of the en-route delays have positive 
consequences to the environmental performance. The targets set in the Performance 
regulation assist in measuring the benefits, but also in promoting the mentality of 
protecting the environment.  
Environmentally-friendly attitude and behaviour is not common across all the ANSPs and 
countries and this was noted during the participant’s observation. As discussed in the 
literature review, some of the ANSPs have implemented additional measures to protect the 
environment, hence they prove a more environmentally friendly behaviour. On the other 
hand, some ANSPs prioritise the other KPAs and the environment is not among their 
priorities (supported also by Interviewee N.01). In order to promote consistency among 
ANSPs and handle the global problem of climate change, a change of mentality is deemed 
necessary.  
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The most effective action to increase environmental awareness is to change the mentality 
of ATCOs, ANSPs employees and CAAs employees. Public Environmental Awareness 
and Education could be applied either by each state or centrally by the EC or NM. Should 
the training be developed and delivered from the CAAs/NSAs or Ministries of Transport, 
the implementation is expected to be self-defeating. The reason is that the educators most 
probably share the same mentality and do not have the mentality of environmental 
protection and sustainable development. They also need to be trained and educated. If the 
training was organised by a central authority like the EC or EUROCONTROL, there would 
be fewer transaction costs due to economies of scale. The researcher attended ‘the 
Aviation and the Environment’ training course offered by IANS/EUROCONTROL and 
believes that, if it was more adapted to SES and if some practical elements were 
introduced, it could become an effective solution. 
In addition, airspace users are not making the best from SES. There are conditional routes 
available that the airlines do not use either due to the short notice or due to the difficulty 
from the AOC to change the flight plans as a system. The airlines should also be informed 
about the implemented solutions regarding the CDRs and a better communication channel 
should be developed to make the change of routes a reality. The implementation of this 
recommendation is considered very important and necessary. The main advantage of its 
implementation is the low cost, the acceptance by the stakeholders and the radical effects 
it will bring to the environmental protection mentality.   
9.2.1.2.2 Charges Scheme as Incentive mechanism  
In terms of mitigating Climate change in the en-route level from an operational perspective, 
the main stakeholders are the Airlines and the ANSPs. The Airlines have an incentive to 
reduce their emissions based on the principle that excess fuel consumption costs them 
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money. The ANSPs have no incentive to be more environmentally friendly (Interviewee 
N.03).  
The airlines behaviour depends a lot on fuel prices. Fossil fuels are much cheaper than 
biofuels. Therefore, the price is the main parameter for its use. Secondly, the availability of 
biofuel is another important element as the airlines often have difficulties in finding 
biofuels. Finally, the certification and verification of biofuel use as explained above in the 
EU ETS process can be quite complicated. The question that arises is whether airlines 
need another incentive for using biofuel.  
One way to enhance the use of biofuels by airlines would be a discount in the en-route or 
terminal charges. All countries would benefit from the use of biofuel, regardless of whether 
the flight is taking place in their airspace. Should the discount be in the en-route phase, it 
would mean that all ANSPs should offer a discount to that airline proportionally to the 
airway use. If the discount was in terminal charges, that would bring extra benefits for the 
airports. Some airports, Heathrow for instance, face problems with the Local Air Quality 
(LAQ) and, if the airlines had a financial incentive to use biofuels, those airports would 
improve their LAQ and bring benefits to the local society. Biofuels though would be used 
during the whole phase of the flight contribution to climate change mitigation.  
The discount in the en-route charges for biofuel users might be a solution that needs to be 
accepted by all ANSPs, but some might bring objections to that. Discount to terminal 
charges in some selective airports that have a problem with LAQ because it might be a 
constraint for their expansion, is something that could be implemented more easily. 
Airports and local communities have adopted, or tried to adopt, measures to regulate 
airlines operations with regard to LAQ by implementing Pigouvian taxes, like the 
Catalonian NOx tax as discussed earlier. The taxes are not well received by airlines and 
the airlines often threaten airport authorities that they would move their operations to other 
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airports (Interviewee N.02). A discount could be a solution and it would be well received by 
the airlines, it would improve the LAQ and it would help an airport expand, as it would 
comply with the environmental regulations.  
The practical difficulty in this solution is the administration of biofuel use. When the airline 
does not possess a dedicated fuel tank, it is unknown whether the specific airline is using 
the biofuel. This solution can work for big airlines when they operate for flight connecting 
their base/hub with another big airport, but not in the connections among regional airports. 
Heathrow airport is capped to 480,000 ATMs per annum and hosts on average 670 flights 
per day. The fuel demand in 2008 was forecast to be 8 mil litres, but BAA and BA demand 
forecasts show fuel doubling by 2030 (IATA, 2008b). In 2008 there were two fuel tank 
farms and fuel was delivered to aircraft via hydrant systems. The analysis conducted by 
British Airways stated that LHR needs four additional tanks to accommodate fuel demand. 
Should the expansion of LHR be a reality and given the need for fuel storage, BA -as the 
dominant airline at Heathrow- should have a dedicated farm tank that could facilitate 
biofuel use and tracking.  
As far as route availability is concerned, the organisation of auctions regarding the routes 
that are closer to GDC could be a possible scenario. The ANSP could modify the charging 
scheme and charge by route. Routes identical or almost identical to GDC could be 
auctioned to airlines that are willing to contribute more for the use of these routes. The 
principles of slot trading could be implemented to this mechanism. For the time being this 
scenario looks unrealistic, but it could be an effective solution in case the nature of ANSPs 
changes and consolidation is achieved or in case ANSP alliances are reinforced and 
promoted.  
The ANSPs could be reshaped to have a centralised en-route level, or at least one 
handled by a single company or authority, as well as a terminal level handled by the 
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national authority/company. This would promote consistency among the different sectors, 
reduce the number of sectors and improve data sharing leading to improved, more direct 
routes. Other than that, the existing performance regulation includes economic incentives 
when the ANSP performance is above the expected targets. The implementation of this 
recommendation can be time-consuming and bears many bureaucratic procedures, but it 
is a very effective way to encourage an environmentally friendly behaviour.  
9.2.1.2.3 Consolidation and financing  
As discussed in previous chapters, the economic situation and the readiness of the 
countries are not at the same level. The performance targets are set at national/FAB level 
and at EU-wide level. Nevertheless, it is not very clear how these targets are set. They can 
be set at individual rate, at sectoral rate or a combination of both. The hybrid option could 
balance the pros and cons of the individual rate and sectoral rate options. It could be one 
level ahead of the existing regulation, offering flexibility and accommodating the needs of 
fast growers, new entrants and early movers so as to make the implementation of the 
regulation fairer for all the players. In case some ANSPs face problems that might make 
the achievement of the targets extremely difficult, the possibility to freeze the targets 
should be available.  
Some ANSPs have already taken action before the implementation of the Performance 
Scheme to improve and make their operations more efficient. From a fairness perspective, 
those early birds should be rewarded but they would be ignored if the targets were 
allocated based on the sectoral rate. Moreover, with regard to capacity and environment, 
the efficiency of ANSPs in ECAC is affected by the efficiency of other ANSPs that are not 
based in ECAC, but that handle traffic entering the ECAC airspace. Therefore, the scope 
of SES and the performance scheme could be extended to capture the actions of the 
neighbouring ANSPs.  
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The current aviation system in terms of ANS provision is based on the natural monopolies 
or, in the best case, on the oligopolies of ANSPs. The cost of infrastructure as well as the 
cost of service provision is very high which results in high charges for both the airlines and 
the passengers. Furthermore, some ANSPs cannot increase their CAPEX due to financial 
problems. The Greek ANSPs’ revenues from the charges are not necessarily reinvested to 
the ANSP thus contributing to infrastructure improvements, but they may be allocated to 
other sectors, such as healthcare or education. Consequently, there might be inefficiencies 
in the aviation systems affecting all the other ECAC members. If a special financing 
system from the EU is implemented to economically support those ANSPs for 
technological improvements, this might be unfair for other countries.  
Most of the ANSPs handle a small share of movements, but they still need all the 
infrastructure. Traffic movements are concentrated in 4-5 countries, i.e. 4-5 ANSPs. 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that only those 4-5 ANSPs are needed to 
provide ANS. Services could be provided from the most efficient and effective ones (one or 
two) with regard to safety, capacity, environment and cost efficiency factors. The system 
could be more efficient if the number of ANSPs was reduced or if some of the ANS were 
centrally provided by a separate entity. This recommendation is quite controversial and it 
can create a series of reactions from the trade unions. However, due to increased 
competition among the ANSPs, it will be a reality in the coming future and it is better to 
organise and control this transition.   
9.2.1.2.4 Independent regulator  
The Single European Sky (SES) reform is a necessity in order to respond to the 
contemporary needs of civil aviation. The European Parliament and the Council vote on 
the regulations, whereas the European Commission drafts the regulations with the help of 
some agencies. In order to monitor the performance plans of the Functional Airspace 
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Blocks (FABs), the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was separated from the Air Navigation 
Service Provider (ANSP). The National Supervisory Authority (NSA), which is usually part 
of the CAA, is responsible for monitoring the performance of the ANSP that is offering the 
services to the state. This separation was made in order to gain credibility and 
transparency in the monitoring process as well as in the proposal of corrective actions. 
The CAA/NSA is responsible for proposing penalties or financial awards to the ANSP. The 
question that arises is the independence of the CAA/NSA from the ANSP.  
A more independent regulator for the ANSP is proposed. The regulator can be the CAA of 
X country regulating and monitoring the ANSP of Y country. This might lead to mutual 
forbearance, as the CAAs of X country are less likely to act aggressively if needed when 
they perceive that the CAA of Y country can counterattack the ANSP of X country. This is 
related to the ownership of the ANSPs. Should the ANSPs be private entities, the mutual 
forbearance would be an unlikely hypothesis. In order to avoid this case, it should be 
ensured that the X country’s ANSP is not monitored by the Y country. This would enable 
the existence of a more binding mechanism for the FAB/State and the ANSP allowing the 
targets set to be cascaded. 
The Monitoring, Reporting and Verification practice of the EU ETS could be applied to the 
SES, too. This would either enhance the efficiency of the ANSP or create frictions between 
the ANSPs and the CAAs/NSAs. ANSPs could claim that, due to safety issues and the 
confidentiality of the operations of Military aviation, they do not wish to share specific 
information with foreign countries.  
Currently, there are many agencies and bodies involved with a rather unclear role, leading 
most probably to duplications of the tasks and efforts without contributing to the overall 
efficiency of the system. The role of EASA regarding the SES is not clarified enough 
(Interviewee N.07 and N.04) and, according to IATA, AEA and ERA (2013), the NM should 
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be empowered with new responsibilities and functions concerning airspace architecture. 
The position of the Performance Review Body and the Performance Review Commission 
should be further clarified since the PRB and PRC almost consist of the same members 
holding different positions.  
Another way of regulating the ANSPs more effectively could be the establishment of a 
body with the power to impose fines and actually enforce the regulation. PRC or PRB 
should be re-established and enrich the body with industry members, such as 
representatives of IATA, EUROCONTROL, CANSO and NCP. If the PRB/PRC consisted 
of all the main stakeholders, the regulation could be more effective as the consultation 
would be realistic and the views of the different stakeholders would actually be taken into 
consideration. The role of the new, reshaped PRB would not only be to monitor, but also to 
establish the performance scheme, to monitor and enforce the targets to the member 
states.  
9.2.1.3 Policies interaction and systemic approach  
Engine manufacturers are obliged to meet the noise certification standards adopted by the 
Council of ICAO that are included in Annex 16 — Environmental Protection, Volume I. The 
engine emissions principles and standards for the airplanes are also included in Annex 16. 
The EC implemented the Directive 2002/49/EC and the Regulation (EU) No 598/2014 on 
the procedures concerning the introduction of noise-related operating restrictions. The 
Framework Directive 96/62/EC and the Directive 2008/50/EC refers to the ambient air 
quality and cleaner air for Europe. Apart from global policies and EC regulations, there are 
also national regulations regarding noise levels and the LAQ. Pigouvian taxes can be 
imposed at national or local level. Those taxes are directly imposed to the airlines in 
combination with ICAO standards to manufacturers and EC regulations to airports.  
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With regards to climate change, engine manufacturers are regulated by Annex 16 of ICAO. 
Airports refer to local level only, and, thus, there is no regulation for climate change 
regarding aircraft operations. Airlines are regulated by the EU ETS and ANSPs are 
regulated by the performance regulation of SES. The passenger is the key point for air 
transportation, but since the passenger is the consumer and not the producer, there are no 
binding regulations for the passenger.  
Apart from the regulations, the players can take additional actions to mitigate or 
compensate their emissions. Once example is the Clean Sky Joint Undertaking focusing 
on technological improvements in the engines and airframes of the airplanes. The 
European Advanced Biofuels Flightpath aims at putting sustainably produced biofuels to 
the market faster through the construction of advanced biofuel production plants and at 
convincing the aviation industry to use 2 million tonnes of biofuels by 2020. Oslo airport is 
the first airport in Europe offering biofuels to all airlines. AirBP, the Norwegian airport 
operator Avinor and biofuel specialist SkyNRG work together to provide airlines at 
Gardermoen Airport with biofuel for jets. Finally, ICAO also introduced a balanced 
approach according to which airplanes should be quieter, the land around airports should 
be managed in a sustainable way, operational procedures to reduce the ground noise 
should be implemented and operating restrictions should be adopted.  
Figure 44 depicts the interaction of the EU ETS with operations and technology policies 
according to four scenarios. The first scenario is business as scheduled. In order to 
achieve carbon neutral growth, operational and technology policies (grey bars) are needed 
in combination with the EU ETS (blue bar). The EU ETS is represented by the blue bar, 
whereas the operational and technology policies are the grey bars. The blue line 
represents traffic growth. In the first three scenarios, the traffic growth is positive and as 
expected. The second scenario is capturing the case of failing operations and technology 
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policies. If those two policies underachieve their targets, more emphasis should be given 
to the EU ETS. By imposing stricter EU ETS requirements, the carbon prices will increase. 
According to the third scenario, if the supplementary policies achieve more than expected, 
the EU ETS requirements will become less strict leading to lower carbon prices. Finally, 
the last scenario suggests that traffic is reduced and, subsequently, the emissions as well. 
Should this be the case, the EU ETS will not be necessary for carbon neutral growth. It 
should be highlighted that the aim of the policies is environmental improvements and not 






















Figure 44: EU ETS and other policies for carbon neutral growth (source: own elaboration) 
The environmental issues should be addressed holistically according to the unstructured 
interviews and as identified by the Delphi method and the participant observation. 
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Regarding the operational aspect of aviation, the problems of the air transport industry 
(orange boxes in Figure 45) are the high cost of ATM service provision, the delays and 
related costs, safety issues and the climate change caused by excess fuel burn and 
emissions. Those problems are caused by the fragmentation of the ATM sector, labour 
and social issues, economic difficulties faced by the States, outdated technology and lack 
of airspace capacity (blue boxes in Figure 45). The reforms (red boxes in Figure 45) 
currently implemented are the EU ETS for the aircraft operators, the SES for the ANSPs 
and the Clean Sky JU for the manufacturers. The supply chain, mainly the manufacturers, 
are not forced to implement the technological solutions developed by Clean Sky JU, but 
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Figure 45: Problems and recent interventions in aviation (source: own elaboration) 
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In conclusion, there are two aviation stakeholders that are regulated (Airlines and ANSPs) 
and one that is self-regulated (manufacturers). The airlines operate under competition and 
in a global environment, the ANSPs are natural monopolies or oligopolies and operate in a 
national/local or ECAC environment, whereas the manufacturers are under oligopoly 
selling their products worldwide. The EC cannot impose a regulation to the manufacturers 
due to the fact that not all manufacturers are obliged to comply with EC rules and 
regulations. The only solution in ECAC level would be to intensify the existing 
environmental regulations and ensure their effective implementation.  
On the other hand, should ICAO implement the GMBM in all airlines, there will be no need 
for the EU ETS to continue in aviation; it can focus on other industries. The policy makers 
should approach this option taking into consideration all the industries and addressing 
climate change holistically. The lack of collaboration and coordination in R&D at regional 
and multi-national levels, within one industry and cross-industries should be eliminated.  
The environmental aspects of aviation should be looked into in parallel with the economic 
situation of the airlines, ANSPs and states, and societal needs. Moreover, Research and 
Development is a very costly sector and, when developing environmental policies in 
aviation (like the use of biofuels), the needs and policies for the other means of 
transportation should be interlinked. The links should be formed within Europe but also 
with the rest of the world.  
Finally, managing the stakeholders is one of the most critical points in order to achieve an 
effective reform. The interests of the different airlines, airports, ANSPs, States, CAAs, fuel 
suppliers, manufacturers and policy consultants should be taken into consideration when 
designing environmental policies. The next step is to develop more platforms, apart from 
the NSA Coordination Platform, and move beyond the consultation documents. The NSA 
have reported that they find the NSA Coordination Platform (NCP) very useful as it is the 
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only established official platform where they can gather and discuss related matters in 
person promoting the exchange of information and lesson learning. Similar platforms could 
be developed encouraging each group to meet separately or with other groups and 
contribute their ideas or express their concerns to the regulators.  
The processes should be adapted to the needs and capabilities of the stakeholders in all 
states or send experts as secondments to help the groups perform their obligations. Apart 
from that recognition of efforts, the communication of benefits and burdens as well as the 
fair distribution of benefits should be a priority for policy makers. When policy makers work 
together with the stakeholders, the can be more easily identified and solutions can be 
found with less difficulty. Improved communication, monitoring and reporting, incentive 
systems and third party review are key elements for the sustainable development of 
aviation through SES and EU ETS. In this way, potential conflicts between airlines, 
airports, ANSPs, CAAs, suppliers, policy advisers and makers will be identified and 
addressed. The connection and linking among the different schemes, rather than their 
individual function, can bring operational cost savings. However, the linking should be 
done only if there is consistency among the schemes in question.  
9.2.1.4 Concluding remarks  of recommendations  
Since Climate change is a reality with tremendous impacts to human well-being, it needs 
to be regulated. Both EU ETS and SES can contribute to the mitigation of emissions. Both 
reforms face many problems in terms of their effective implementation because, even 
though they have been implemented, they do not deliver to the expected extent.  
 A common solution would be to change the mind-set and mentality towards the 
environmental performance of civil aviation. The transparency and credibility of the 
SES and EU ETS can be enhanced by putting in place an independent regulator 
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that is able to balance the influences by the industry, airlines, ANSPs, governments 
and all the stakeholders.  
 In addition, the financial aspect can be a useful tool towards achieving the targets. 
The ETS bonus to the use of biofuels can enhance their use and economic 
incentives to ANSPs can enhance the offer of flight efficiency measures taken by 
the ANSPs. Climate change is a global issue which requires a global solution. ICAO 
is an organisation with power all over the world. The Market-Based Measure that 
will be implemented by ICAO should focus on the reduction of the actual emissions 
and it should not lead to carbon leakage. 
 Finally, the central point of the recommendations is the holistic approach of the 
environmental regulations. The regulator should consider all the policies and their 
interrelation in order not to have underachieving or overachieving schemes that are 
under-regulating or over-regulating the aviation system.  
9.2.2 Contribution to the methodology theory  
The originality of the proposed thesis is also based on its methodology. The Delphi method 
that was applied is usually conducted with one questionnaire (in which questions can be 
added) in 1, 2, 3, n rounds. In this research, two sets of questionnaires were used. One 
questionnaire (EU ETS Questionnaire) was addressed to airline orientated experts, and a 
second questionnaire (SES questionnaire) was addressed to air navigation experts. Both 
sets of questionnaires were focusing on the same issue, i.e. environmental performance 
and governance issues, but from different perspectives. The questionnaires had some 
common questions and few experts participated in both surveys since they had expertise 
in both areas. This can prove very helpful for future research that combines complex and 
multidisciplinary topics.  
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Finally, the study contributes to the body of knowledge of secondary research and the 
industry by creating a conceptual framework for the systemic environmental performance 
of the air transportation sector. The comprehensive overview of the Single European Sky 
with emphasis on the environment under the perspective of the management stream is 
one of the few such overviews. On the other hand, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in 
aviation and the connection of operational improvements, i.e. SES, is a very different 
undertaking.   
9.3 Conclusions for the Research Questions  
The main reason for endeavouring on this research path was the unanswered question 
why aviation is not as regulated as the other industries in terms of the negative 
environmental externalities. The reason was the airlines were traditionally owned by the 
state and regulating them via a tax or via MBMs would not make any sense in the context 
of vertical governance. There has been little academic discourse on the management 
aspect of aviation regulation and especially in the area of ANSPs. In the current PhD 
thesis, the research focused on the area of governance issues in civil aviation related to 
the implementation of the SES and EU ETS reforms. The SES reform focuses on 
restructuring the airspace system and reshaping the ANSP sector. The EU ETS aims at 
regulating civil aviation operations and at internalising external negative economies that 
are related to climate change. 
In order to understand the interactions of the policies, the general picture of the 
environmental problem and the reforms should first be explained. The environmental 
issues constitute a real problem. The environmental issues originate from natural causes 
and human causes. Natural causes, such as changes in volcanic activity, solar output or 
the Earth's orbit around the sun, cannot be controlled or mitigated. Human causes, such 
as the burning of fossil fuels and the conversion of land for forestry and agriculture, were 
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intensified after the industrial revolution. The human-induced enhancement of the 
greenhouse effect should be regulated to handle the negative externalities and achieve 
sustainable development.  
The main environmental issues in Europe are Local Air Quality, Noise Pollution and 
Climate change. Those issues are addressed at a local level, at EU level and at global 
level. Since climate change is a global problem, any solutions implemented locally are less 
effective than solutions implemented globally. Global warming is primarily attributed to the 
increase of the natural greenhouse gas effect. Without appropriate action, climate change 
endangers both the environment and the people. Temperatures are rising, upsetting the 
balance of the ecosystems, plants and animals. Landscapes are changing, rising seas 
threaten airports, and intensified storms affect aircraft operations. All the above put 
communities at risks and have a high economic impact.  
Carbon dioxide is the main cause of human-induced climate change and it is a very long-
lived gas contributing to the greenhouse effect. Increases in CO2 are due primarily to fossil 
fuel use, with additional contribution from the change in the use of land. Risks from climate 
change depend on cumulative CO2 emissions and, according to IPCC, there is fair 
scientific understanding regarding the behaviour of CO2 concerning climate change. 
Consequently, CO2 is the element that is regulated. The main sectors that contribute to 
climate change and CO2 emissions according to CAIT (2015) are: energy-electricity/heat 
(33%); Energy/transport (16%); Energy-manufacturing/construction (14%); agriculture 
(12%); energy-other fuel combustion (9%); industrial processes (6%); energy-fugitive 
emissions (6%); and waste (3%).  
According to IPCC (1999), airplanes emit gases and particles which alter the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases, trigger the formation of condensation trails and may 
increase cirrus cloudiness, all of which contribute to climate change; airplanes are 
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estimated to contribute about 3.5% of the total radiative forcing (a measure of change in 
climate) by all human activities and that this percentage, which excludes the effects of 
possible changes in cirrus clouds, was projected to grow. The main players involved in air 
transportation are manufacturers, airports, airlines, the ANSPs and passengers. Figure 46 
depicts the different policies that each player is obliged to comply with.  
 
Figure 46: Aviation Policies for Environment (source: own elaboration) 
The aim of the PhD thesis was to analyse the aviation governance concerning 
environmental regulation of aircraft emissions. The thesis used Single European Sky and 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme as its major schemes of study and looked into their 
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interaction and implementation having as main target to identify any areas in need of 
improvement and make suitable recommendations for policy makers.  
In order to achieve this aim, the PhD thesis addressed the following research questions 
(as identified in chapter 1):  
Research Question 1: Are airline operations environmentally sustainable and what 
are the factors leading to sustainable growth? 
The three pillars of sustainable development as discussed in chapter 2 are a) the 
economic pillar, b) the social pillar and c) the environmental pillar. Aviation offers 
connectivity to remoted or isolated regions, supports 63 million jobs and $2.4 trillion in 
economic activity. A third of all global trade by value is shipped by air. Despite the fact that 
aviation is a valuable driver for the economic development and the society in general, it 
damages the environment.  
Airport operations, aircraft manufacturing, construction of infrastructure, etc., produce 
harmful emissions and damage the natural environment and the social welfare. Emissions 
of nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), unburned hydrocarbons (UHC) and 
particulate matter (PM) contribute to local air quality deterioration, resulting in negative 
human health and welfare impacts. Air pollution has been linked to diseases like cancer, 
asthma, stroke and heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and dementia. Those negative 
externalities do not have a direct cost for the one that creates them.  
In the context of airlines, burned fuel produces the aircraft’s emissions. The airline 
industry’s fuel bill is estimated to $181 billion in 2015 and accounts for the 27% of 
operating expenses at $55/barrel (IATA, 2016b). In 2003 when the oil price was at $28.8 
per barrel (13.6% of operational cost), the airlines focused on reduction strategies of other 
costs (IATA, 2016b). When the price per barrel of crude oil is high, the airlines focus on 
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ways to reduce their fuel costs. Strategies for fuel reduction, apart from hedging, are the 
use of environmentally friendly aircraft/engines or operational improvements. By reducing 
the fuel consumption, airlines also reduce their emissions. Hence, airlines for example in 
comparison to airport operators or ANSPSs, have a direct economic incentive to emit less.  
Based on the literature review discussed in this thesis, in order to have sustainable 
development in aviation, all three dimensions, i.e. environmental, social and economic 
dimension, should be balanced. As discussed in chapter 2, this is not the case for 
contemporary aviation where the environmental pillar was not taken seriously under 
consideration until the introduction of EU ETS, SES and other environmental schemes. On 
these grounds, aviation growth is not regarded as sustainable for the time being.  Should 
the environmental aspect be incorporated better in the aviation operation, then aviation will 
have a more sustainable growth.  
Research Question 2: How does the market environment and structure, in which the 
Single European Sky (SES) and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) are implemented, affect the efficiency of the schemes? 
The market environment of airlines is very different from the ANSPs market environment. 
Therefore, the implementation process and associated issues of SES and EU ETS are 
very different too. The airline environment in Europe is quite competitive with many private 
companies with different business models. The EU ETS as discussed in chapter 3 is a 
reform scheme for different sectors and it included aviation in 2012. The airlines according 
to the regulatory framework may take actions to reduce their emissions, leading to excess 
allowances that they can bank or sell. Moreover, the carriers can purchase allowances 
from auctions (either from other airlines or other industries) or from carbon offsetting 
schemes. Therefore, the EU ETS market environment is primarily affected by the 
competitive environment of airlines (game theory can explain the airlines’ behaviour) and 
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the other industries to a lesser degree. European airlines could not obstruct the 
implementation of EU ETS, but the non-EU airlines managed to ‘stop the clock’ and 
amend the regulatory framework.  
On the other hand, the ANSPs environment as analysed in chapter 4, is characterised as 
natural monopoly, where almost every country has its own national ANSP. This practice is 
slowly changing where few ANSPs in spite of being state-owned developed a profit 
orientation. For instance, Belgocontrol offers training modules to individuals about safety, 
capacity, economic and environmental efficiency.  
Few ANSPs (e.g. NATs) offer services to other states and established cooperation or even 
alliances, leading to an oligopolistic market. For instance, DFS (a state-owned Limited 
Liability Company) offers ATC services at Gatwick airport. A6 alliance, Noracon and 
COOPANS are the first alliances of ANSPs. Those alliances are concentrated around the 
biggest ANSPs, i.e. NATS, DFS, ENAIRE, ENAV, DSNA, PANSA and the northern 
countries. ANSPs like Croatia Control and MATS find it difficult to follow the ‘giants’.  
The fact that ANSPs are still the leading players within their national borders (for both 
terminal and en-route control) means that there is still a monopolistic market that moves 
towards oligopoly. Due to this monopolistic/oligopolistic market, the full implementation of 
the SES is obstructed by the ANSPs unwillingness to liberalise the market.  
Research Question 3: Can the inclusion of aviation in the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme and/or Single European Sky lead to carbon-neutral 
growth? 
In chapter 3 and 4, it was made evident that both the EU ETS and the SES contribute to 
environmental improvements. The main aim of EU ETS is CO2 reduction. European 
Commission set the cap at 210,465,788 allowances per year. 82% is granted for free and 
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15% are auction (3% are held in a special reserve). There is only a 5% decrease to the 
allowances. It should be noted that the 15% of the 5% might be coming from the flexible 
mechanisms of Kyoto that does not necessary mean carbon emissions reduction. As 
analysed in chapter 7, the Delphi participants were asked to share 100 points to the 
factors that lead to carbon neutral growth and none of them gave 100 points to one factor. 
All of them split the points to two or even nine factors, the most important of which were 
flight efficiency and ETS. As a conclusion, the EU ETS alone (when 82% of the allowances 
based on the initial base year are for free) is not sufficient to achieve carbon neutral 
growth.   
On the other hand, the Single European Sky never aimed to carbon neutral growth. SES 
has the following high - level goals: a) to enable a 3-fold increase in capacity which will 
also reduce delays both on the ground and in the air, b) to improve safety by a factor of 10, 
c) to enable a 10% reduction in the effects flights have on the environment and d) to 
provide ATM services to the airspace users at a cost of at least 50% or less. As discussed 
in Chapter 7, the Delphi participants were asked if the route optimisation is sufficient 
enough to lead to carbon neutral growth; the majority of the participants stated that it is not 
enough (mean=1.77 where 1 is strongly disagree). The KPA of environment as understood 
in the participatory observation and the unstructured interviews is more like a ‘fortunate’, 
positive side-effect of the operational changes in the ATM system that aimed to improve 
capacity and safety and has positive externalities to the environment area. Therefore, and 
although the Delphi participants agreed that FABs lead to reduction of emissions, the SES 
alone cannot lead to carbon neutral growth.  
Research Question 4: Can the effective implementation of SES render the EU ETS 
redundant and are the environmental targets overlapping?  
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The SES general target is to reduce the effects flights have on the environment by 10%. 
According to the performance scheme (RP2) the EU - wide targets are to reduce the 
average horizontal en route flight inefficiency for the last filed flight plan trajectory to 4.1% 
and for the actual trajectory to 2.6 %. The targets of SES are related only to ATM structure 
and in some parts to the airline’s decision to use the possibilities offered by the ANSPs 
(e.g. CDRs) as identified by the participatory observation at EUROCONTROL. Therefore, 
there is no overlapping between the targets of SES in relation to EU ETS. SES was 
implemented after the baseline calculations for EU ETS had been set. Therefore, the 
environmental benefits of SES are not taken under consideration to the allocated 
allowances for EU ETS.  
The EU ETS is an environmental regulatory framework and it included aviation in 2012 in 
the third phase. In 2012 the cap was 97% and from 2013-2020 the cap is 95% of the 
baseline (average annual emissions of 2004-2006). The EU ETS target is easier to 
achieve because the business environment of aviation operations was very different in 
2004-2006. Therefore, the environmental target is made redundant and the scheme in 
spite of not underperforming according to the target, it is not delivering the emissions 
reduction that it could. This was concluded after the long discussions and interviews with 
the 7 experts that belong to different groups. Nowadays, the technological state-of-the-art 
as well as the ATM structure and procedures are of higher standards compared to 2004-
2006. It would be much better if the cap were applied based on the previous year 
operations.  
Research Question 5: What do the research findings reveal about any issues that 
the SES and the EU ETS reforms are facing and how can these findings be used to 
improve the aviation environmental performance and achieve a more sustainable 
growth?  
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The SES and EU ETS do not deliver to the extend they could. The main reasons, as 
identified in the primary research and discussed in chapter 8, are the following:  
 Different readiness/capabilities of the air carriers (for the EU ETS) and the 
states/ANSPs (for SES); 
 Insufficient incentive mechanism; 
 Different positions and the (political) willingness to take actions; and 
 Trade-offs and interactions among the different areas.  
The most significant contribution of this PhD thesis is the synthetic discussion of the SES 
and EU ETS issues and the recommendations made to address currently underperforming 
areas. The identification of the problem and its root is part of the solution. Therefore, the 
recommendations for EU ETS as discussed earlier in this final chapter of the Thesis are: 
 Simpler Monitoring, Reporting and Verification Process and further environmental 
training; 
 Standardised process in the revenue use form auctions and processes; 
 Balance of the allowances market; and 
 Development of an ambitious and realistic global environmental scheme for aviation 
operations.  
The recommendations for Single European Sky as explained above are: 
 Increase the Environmental awareness of ANSPs and CAAs 
 Use the charging scheme as incentive mechanism to improve the environmental 
performance 
 Restructure the ANSP market and make them more efficient in their operations and 
services  
 Use an independent regulator that has the political willingness to take actions  
The EU ETS, the SES and any other environmental reform/regulatory framework should 
not be treated separately, but it should be designed as part of a system of regulations. 
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Only then can the reform prove sufficiently effective to improve the environmental 
performance of aviation to the maximum possible extent.  
9.4 Limitations of the PhD Thesis 
The central point of this research is the policies about environmental performance in 
aviation. The SES and EU ETS reforms were used as case studies to evaluate the 
governance issues around the regulation of the European aviation system. The use of 
more cases would bring more added value to the findings. Moreover, comparisons 
between national and EU attempts to tackle environmental problems were not carried out.  
The Delphi study focused on the participants’ opinions on the SES and EU ETS reforms, 
but also on other options for the reduction of carbon emissions and the adoption of carbon 
neutral growth. A major limitation of this research was the fact that the focus is on carbon 
emissions, not on other harmful gases. The regulation focuses on carbon emissions due to 
the lack of scientific knowledge about other gases that contribute to Climate Change. The 
management approach would be more guiding and beneficial for the actual mitigation of 
negative externalities to the environment if further research is conducted in both physics 
and chemistry, in combination with the evaluation of the technological improvements in the 
aircraft. Due to the lack of consistent and reliable statistical data on aircraft emissions and 
their contribution to climate change, this topic is highlighted as an important one, requiring 
further research. The contribution of aviation reforms to carbon neutral growth can be 
accurately assessed provided that the emissions are researched and fully understood.  
Finally, the Delphi research gathered opinions from different stakeholders. The European 
Commission, EUROCONTROL, IATA, CAAs and NSAs, European airlines, ANSPs, 
individual aviation experts and experts from Ministries of Transports expressed their views 
about the SES and EU ETS reforms in relation to the main issues they face and their 
contribution to environmental performance. A major limitation is the omission of system 
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and fuel suppliers, the absence of manufacturers and non-European airlines. The reason 
for this absence is the difficulty to find experts that are familiar with the reforms and that 
are willing to participate in the research. If those groups were represented, the research 
would be more holistic and representative of the situation.  
9.5 Directions for further research 
The aim of this research was achieved. The PhD Thesis gives insight into the 
environmental problems caused by aviation operations and the key factors that can lead to 
carbon neutral growth. The areas of the Single European Sky and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme reforms and their associated issues were extensively 
researched; it has been found that they face implementation problems and 
recommendations have been given. Finally, the interaction of the aviation reforms, i.e. 
SES and EU ETS, were identified and a common approach was proposed.  
An area that is very interesting for further study is the route choice based on the trade-off 
between the environment and the economic cost of a flight. A conceptual model that arose 
from the PhD research takes into consideration the fact that the cost factor needs to be 
minimised and flight efficiency needs to be maximised. The model may prove extremely 
helpful for the Operational Control Centres of airlines and for the Capacity Flow 
Management. 
The airlines want to reduce fuel costs, spill costs, the time based cost and overflight costs. 
Those costs are subject to aircraft performance, weather conditions, the allowed route, 
altitude structure and any schedule and operational constraints. It should be noted that the 
route (the ground track), the profile (altitudes along route), the speed (possibly varying 
along the route) and the departure fuel vary. The Aircraft Price Index and Aircraft utilisation 
parameter are important elements for the model. 
372 
As far as environmental aspects are concerned, the en-route flight efficiency is affected by 
a number of factors. The most important are the following: the route network design 
(existing route network), route availability (utilisation of civil military structures), flight 
planning capabilities (use of software, repetitive flight planning), user preferences (time, 
cost, fuel), the tactical ATC routings and special events such as severe weather or ATC 
strikes. 
The reduction of emissions depends on the aircraft, the flight operations, technical 
optimisation and the network-ground relation. For the aircraft factor, the aircraft weight and 
size, the speed, the tanking and the balance-optimal centre for gravity in cargo should be 
considered. Flight operations are related to the SES scheme and especially to the 
Conditional routes and the airspace re-design. As for the technical optimisation factor, 
aerodynamics, the engines, alternative fuels, the 4D trajectory management algorithms (G, 
A), the advanced Communication: Datalink (G-A), the advanced Navigation: P-RNAV (A) 
and the advanced Surveillance: ADS-B (G ,A), these can actually affect carbon emissions. 
The Network/Ground factor concerns local air quality and, to a lesser extent, the climate 
change.  
The main parameters of the model are identified, but the weighing factors need to be set. 
The model will improve airline decision-making for routes selection and will incorporate the 
negative externalities towards the environment as well as the trade-offs with other areas of 
aviation. The model could be initially a theoretical model and it may afterwards be tested to 
historical data and different scenarios.  
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Appendices   
Appendix 1: Definitions of key terms and concepts  
Accountable 
entity  
The entity in a cap-and-trade emissions trading system that is 
responsible for measuring and reporting actual emissions and for 
submitting sufficient allowances to cover those emissions 
Additionality  To avoid giving credits for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
reductions that would have happened anyway, eligibility criteria have 
been developed to determine whether the reductions are “additional” 
— that is, are more than would have occurred in the absence of the 
project (environmental additionality) or in the absence of the incentive 
from the clean development mechanism (CDM) (project additionality). 
The concept of additionality is important as only carbon credits from 
projects that are “additional to” the business-as-usual scenario 
represent a net environmental benefit. Without the “additionality” 
requirement, there is no guarantee that the emissions reduction 





A service established within the defined area of coverage responsible 
for the provision of aeronautical information/data necessary for the 
safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation. Such information 
includes the availability of air navigation facilities and services and the 
procedures associated with them, and must be provided to flight 




This term includes air traffic management (ATM), communications, 
navigation and surveillance systems (CNS), meteorological services 
for air navigation (MET), search and rescue (SAR) and aeronautical 
information services/aeronautical information management (AIS/AIM). 
These services are provided to air traffic during all phases of 
operations (approach, aerodrome and en route). 




An Air Operator Certificate (AOC) is a certificate authorising an 
operator to carry out specified commercial air transport operations. 




is the dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace 
including air traffic services, airspace management and air traffic flow 
management - safely, economically and efficiently - through the 
provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration with all 
parties and involving airborne and ground-based functions. The 
general objective of ATM is to enable aircraft operators to meet their 
planned departure and arrival times and to adhere to their preferred 
flight profiles with the minimum constraints, without compromising 
agreed levels of safety. 
Aircraft 
operator  
Aircraft operator means a holder of an air carrier operating certificate 
Allocation  The initial distribution of allowances to accountable entities for a 
compliance period. This allocation could, for example, be based on 
historical emissions or a performance standard and level of 
production; it could be made for free or through an auctioning process 
or both. 
Allowance  An allowance is a tradable emission permit that can be used for 
compliance purposes in a cap-and-trade system. Each allowance 
allows the holder to emit a specific quantity of a pollutant (e.g. one 
tonne of CO2) one time. 
Annex B 
countries 
Annex B countries are the 39 emissions-capped industrialized 




Annex I countries are the 36 industrialized countries and economies 
in transition listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Annex I Parties A group of industrialized countries and economies in transition 
included in Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
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or Countries Climate Change (UNFCCC) that committed individually or jointly to 
returning to their 1990 levels of GHG emissions by the year 2000. 
Approach 
phase 
The operating phase defined by the time during which the engine is 
operated in the approach operating mode. 
Area Control 
Centre (ACC) 
is a unit established to provide air traffic control service to controlled 




Emissions targets for industrialized country Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol are expressed as levels of allowed emissions or “assigned 
amounts” for the 2008-2012 commitment period. Such assigned 





International aviation bunkers includes deliveries of aviation fuels to 
aircraft for international aviation. Fuels used by airlines for their road 
vehicles are excluded. The domestic/international split should be 
determined on the basis of departure and landing locations and not by 
the nationality of the airline. For many countries this incorrectly 




Air traffic complexity is a measure of the control activity required to 
accept an aircraft entering into the sector. In this paper we measure 
control activity by the total change in heading summed over all aircraft 
in the sector. 
Auctioning  The distribution of allowance - either the initial distribution or from a 
set-aside, this is achieved through an auction in which system 
participants bid for the right to purchase allowances. Different auction 
models could be used. Auctions often complement other forms of 
allowance allocation. ICAO Documents 9949/50/51 
Banking  A banking provision permits allowances issued for one compliance 
period to be saved for use during a subsequent compliance period. 
ICAO Documents 9949/50/51 
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Baseline  A reference level of emissions. For example, a baseline can be used 
to calculate the total quantity of allowances to be distributed under a 
cap-and-trade system or the quantity of credits generated under a 
baseline-and-credit (emissions intensity) system. A baseline also sets 
the level of emissions that would occur without policy intervention in 
an offset programme. 
Benchmarking  A reference level, such as emissions per unit of output that can be 
part of the formula for the free allocation of allowances under a cap-
and-trade system or that can define the target in an emissions 
intensity system. It is a method for distribution of obligations under an 
MBM scheme. It establishes a reference level based on efficiency 
such as emissions per unit of output, e.g. CO2/RTK 
Biofuels Products refer to non-fossil energy sources which are made from 
living organisms or from biogenic feedstocks (plant oils or animal 
fats). In order to be considered as biofuel, the fuel must contain over 
80 percent renewable materials. 
Borrowing  A borrowing provision permits an accountable entity to use 
allowances for a future period to achieve compliance in the current 
period. ICAO Documents 9949/50/51 
Cap and Trade The Cap and Trade system involves trading of emission allowances, 
where the total amount of allowances is strictly limited or ‘capped’ by 
a regulatory authority. Allowances are created to account for the total 
allowed emissions. At the end of each compliance period each entity 
must surrender sufficient allowances to cover its emissions during 
that period. Trading occurs when an entity can reduce units of 
emission at a lower cost than another entity and then sells the 
allowance. A Cap and Trade system is generally based on those 




CO2e is a measurement unit to indicate the global warming potential 
(GWP) of greenhouse gases. Carbon dioxide is the reference gas 
against which other greenhouse gases are measured. Other 
greenhouse gases that are reported as Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
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are: Carbon dioxide (CO2); Methane (CH4); Nitrous oxide (N2O); 
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6); Perfluorocarbons (PFCs); 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs).  For the EU ETS CO2 is the main 
greenhouse gas that is covered, with N2O and PFCs also covered for 
selected industry sectors. 
Carbon 
Leakage 
Emission reductions in one location could be offset by an increase in 
emissions in another location. Leakage occurs when laws or activities 
designed to cut greenhouse gas emissions implemented in one 
jurisdiction or project area lead to the movement rather than the 
reduction of the targeted emitting activities, such as a carbon-





A compliance unit under the Kyoto Protocol issued for emissions 
reductions achieved from project activities in non-Annex I Parties that 
meet the requirements of the clean development mechanism (CDM). 





A mechanism established by the Kyoto Protocol that enables 
emissions reduction projects in non-Annex I Parties to earn CERs that 
can be sold to entities in Annex I Parties for compliance with their 
emissions limitation or reduction commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
Climb phase The operating phase defined by the time during which the engine is 
operated in the climb operating mode. 
Code sharing The use of the flight designator code of one air carrier on a service 
performed by a second air carrier, which service is usually also 
identified (and may be required to be identified) as a service of, and 
being performed by, the second air carrier. 
Compliance System for checking adherence to reduction obligations, including 
measures and sanctions to be implemented if a country (in case of 
the Kyoto Protocol) or operator (in case of an ETS) does not fulfil its 
obligations to reduce emissions as laid down in legislation of the 
system 
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Distances Aerodrome-to-aerodrome great circle distances should be used in all 
items involving distance computations (Items 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 
19 and 20). Distances can be calculated using the Great Circle 
Distance which is defined as the shortest distance between any two 
points on the surface of the Earth which should be approximated 
using the Vincenty distance formula associated with the World 
Geodesic System – 1984 (WGS 84) adopted by ICAO and referred to 
in Annex 15 to the Chicago Convention. The latitude and longitude of 
aerodromes can be taken either form aerodrome data published in 
Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). 
Domestic A flight stage not classifiable as international. Domestic flight stages 
include all flight stages flown between points within the domestic 
boundaries of a State by an air carrier whose principal place of 
business is in that State. Flight stages between a State and territories 
belonging to it, as well as any flight stages between two such 
territories, should be classified as domestic. This applies even though 
a stage may cross international waters or over the territory of another 
State.  
NOTES: 
1. In the case of multinational air carriers owned by partner States, 
traffic within each partner State should be reported separately as 
domestic and all other traffic as international. 
2. “Foreign” cabotage traffic (i.e. traffic carried between city-pairs in a 
State other than the one where the reporting carrier has its principal 
place of business) should be reported as international traffic. 
3. A technical stop should not result in any flight stage being classified 




are defined in relation to the impact on unit costs when output 
increases holding network size constant. There are economies of 
density when unit costs fall as output increases on a fixed network 
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and there are diseconomies of density when unit costs rise as output 
increases on a fixed network 
Economies of 
scale 
are defined in relation to the impact on unit costs when both output 
and size of network increase in the same proportion and other 
characteristics of the operating environment are held constant. There 
are economies of scale when unit costs fall as output and network 
size increase, and there are diseconomies of scale when unit costs 
rise as output and network size increase. 
Filed Flight 
Plan (FPL) 
is the flight plan as filed with an ATS unit by the pilot or a designated 
representative, without any subsequent changes. 
Final Approach 
Fix (FAF) or 
Final Approach 
Point (FAP) 
The final approach starts at the Final Approach Fix (FAF), sometimes 
also called Final Approach Point (FAP). At the FAF the aircraft has 
reached its landing configuration with the landing gear and the flaps in 
the correct landing position. 
Flexible 
mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol makes provision for three instruments that provide 
flexibility to its signatories in implementing their reduction goals: 
emissions trading, Joint Implementation (projects carried out jointly by 
industrial countries) and the Clean Development Mechanism (projects 
which reduce emissions in developing countries). The underlying 
philosophy of all three flexible mechanisms is that the Annex B 
countries can make some of the reductions to which they have 
committed themselves outside their own country. 
Flexible Use of 
Airspace (FUA) 
Concept 
is based on the fundamental principle that airspace should not be 
designated as either pure civil or military airspace, but rather be 
considered as one continuum in which all user requirements have to 




is an airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information 
service and alerting service are provided 
Flight stage A flight stage is the operation of an aircraft from take-off to its next 
landing. A flight stage is classified as either international or domestic 
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A specified airspace within which users may freely plan a route 
between a defined entry point and a defined exit point, with the 
possibility to route via intermediate (published or unpublished) way 
points, without reference to the ATS route network, subject to 
airspace availability. Within this airspace, flights remain subject to air 
traffic control. 
Grandfathering  Allocation methodology under an ETS under which the distribution of 
allowances to entities is based on historical emissions. 
International A flight stage with one or both terminals in the territory of a State, 





Joint implementation is a flexible mechanism established by Article 6 
of the Kyoto Protocol for project-based emissions reduction activities 





Key areas of performance corresponding to the expectations of 





Current/past performance, expected future performance (estimated 
as part of forecasting and performance modelling), as well as actual 
progress in achieving performance objectives are quantitatively 
expressed by means of indicators. Since indicators support 
objectives, they should be defined having a specific performance 
objective in mind. 
Kyoto Protocol 
(KP) 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol commits 39 industrial nations as a whole to 
a five-percent reduction from 1990 levels in their emissions of gases 
damaging to the climate between 2008 and 2012 in the first 
commitment period. It came into force on February 16, 2005. The 
European Union is committed to reduce emissions between the years 
2008 and 2012 by eight percent compared to the level in 1990. 
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138/138 The second commitment period is between 2013 and 2020 
and the EU has committed to reduce its GHG emissions by 20% by 
2020 compared to 1990 levels. 
LTO cycle  The reference emissions LTO cycle defines the thrust settings to be 
used when making emissions and smoke measurements and the time 
to be used for each mode in the subsequent calculations of Dp. 
These thrust settings and times are listed in Annex 16, Volume II, Part 
III, Chapter 2 (engines for subsonic propulsion). 
Market-based 
measures 
Sometimes referred to as market instruments, MBMs provide financial 
incentives and disincentives to regulated entities towards desired 
behaviour, e.g. lowering emissions. These measures can be 
implemented to reduce damage to the environment 
Network 
Manager 
means the entity established under Article 6 of regulation (EC) No 
551/2004 (the Airspace regulation) to perform the duties provided for 
in that article and in regulation (EU) 677/2011 (the ATM Network 
Functions regulation). 
Offset Credit or 
Offset 
In this report the term “credit”, “offset credit” or “offset” is used to 
denote the compensating emissions reductions (product) that have 
been achieved and can be applied in the activity of offsetting. An 
offset credit could equate to a one-tonne reduction of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions or a one kilogram reduction of nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
emissions, for example. These credits can be tradable units. 
Offsetting  Offsetting is the activity of “cancelling out” or “neutralizing” emissions 
from a sector like aviation using offset credits — compensating 
emissions reductions created in a different activity or location that 
have been rigorously quantified and verified. It is only when credits 
are acquired from outside the emissions trading scheme or linked 
schemes and used to meet commitments/obligations under the 
scheme that the activity is referred to as offsetting. On the other hand, 
if a regulated emitter acquires compliance units (allowances or 
credits) from another regulated emitter within the same emissions 
trading scheme, or from a linked scheme, this is referred to simply as 
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An emissions trading system where allowances can be traded in and 
outside the given scheme or sector. For example, within an emissions 
trading scheme for aviation, participants would be allowed to buy 
allowances from sectors outside the aviation emissions trading 
scheme. 
Performance Performance can be expressed as a set of parameters or indicators 
that are complementary, and sometimes contradictory. Performance 
measures are categorised in the four following measures 
Pooling 
arrangements 
An air carrier commercial agreement which may involve some degree 
of  capacity control and may cover matters such as routes operated, 
conditions of operation, and the sharing between the parties of traffic, 




An ownership and management structure in which the private and the 
public sectors both participate. PPPs refer to arrangements where the 
private sector supplies infrastructure assets and services that 
traditionally have been provided by the government. This technique 
provides private financing for infrastructure investment without 
immediately adding to government borrowing and debt, and can be a 
source of government revenue. PPPs also present business 
opportunities for the private sector in areas from which it was in many 
cases previously excluded. 
Registry  Registries usually use electronic databases to record the unit holdings 
and transactions for each account, as well as verified emissions. 




A passenger for whose transportation an air carrier receives 
commercial remuneration. 
NOTES: 
1. This definition includes, for example, a) passengers travelling 
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under publicly available promotional offers (for example, “two-for-
one”) or loyalty programmes (for example, redemption of frequent-
flyer points); b) passengers travelling as compensation for denied 
boarding; c) passengers travelling on corporate discounts; d) 
passengers travelling on preferential fares (government, seamen, 
military, youth, student, etc.). 
2. This definition excludes, for example, a) persons travelling free; b) 
persons travelling at a fare or discount available only to employees of 
air carriers or their agents or only for travel on business for the 
carriers; c) infants who do not occupy a seat. 
Surrendering Submitting allowances for emissions by the accountable entity in 
order to fulfil the obligations under the emissions trading scheme. 
Surrender’ typically refers to the process by which public/private 
entities submit units for compliance under their applicable regulatory 
system, whereas ‘retire’ typically refers to the process by which 
countries submit units under an international agreement. 
Unit (Includes 
permit) 
The compliance instruments, otherwise referred to as “credit”, “offset 
credit”, “offset” or “allowance” are called emissions units. One 







The UN Convention on Climate Change has been ratified by 192 
countries, and it sets an overall framework for intergovernmental 
efforts to tackle the challenge of climate change. Under the 
Convention, governments share information on GHG emissions, 
national policies and best practices, commit to GHG 
limitation/reduction activities/targets, and provide financial and 
technical support for the adaptation and mitigation activities of other 
countries. 
Verification  Verification provides independent assurance that the emissions 
quantification and reporting have been accurately completed. The 
“level of assurance” provided depends on the system requirements. In 
most systems the verifiers must be accredited by a standard-setting 




Voluntary markets for emissions reductions cover those buyers and 
sellers of Verified Emission Reductions, which seek to manage their 
emission exposure for non-regulatory purposes. Such credits are not 
eligible in the EU ETS due to a potential lack of transparency and 
control exercised compared to government controlled compliance 
systems. 
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Appendix 2: Key features of the EU ETS for aviation (EC, 2013:16)  
EU ETS feature  Description  
Geographical 
coverage  
European Economic Area (EEA) which includes the 28 EU Member 
States, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein).  
Territories of Member States are treated as follows:  
- The 13 territories that are part of the EU are included in the EU 
ETS for aviation: Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, 
Reunion, the Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands, Aland Islands, 
Akrotiri, Dhekelia, Ceuta, Melilla and Gibraltar  
- All other territories of Member States that are not part of the EU 
are outside of the scope of EU ETS for aviation (e.g. Greenland or 
Channel Islands)  
Flights covered  All flights landing at or departing from EEA airports.  
Emissions 
coverage  
All CO2 emissions released during the whole flight.  
Open or closed 
system  
Aviation is regulated under the same rules as the general EU ETS 
i.e. as an open system, but allowances are specific to the aviation 
sector (i.e. they cannot be used by other EU ETS operators).  
Quantity of 
allowances  
Total number of allowances (cap): 210,349,264 per annum from 
2013  
Free allowances: 172,486,396 per annum from 2013  
Allowances to be auctioned: 31,552,390 per annum from 2013  
Special reserve: 50,483,824 
Allocation of 
allowances  
82% of allowances are allocated for free to operator based on a 
benchmark in line with their activity levels in 2010. In addition, 15% 
of allowances can be purchased through auctions. The special 
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reserve shall ensure access to the market for new aircraft operators 
and to assist aircraft operators which increase sharply the number 
of tonne-kilometres that they perform.  
International 
credits  
Aircraft operators may use Certified Emission Reductions and 
Emission Reduction Units for up to 1.5 % of the number of 
allowances they are required to surrender.  
Exclusions  
Commercial airlines that operate fewer than 243 flights per period 
for three consecutive four-month periods or flights with total annual 
emissions lower than 10,000 tonnes per year. Other types of 
special purpose airplanes are also excluded (e.g. military flights, 
medical / rescue / scientific research flights or flights performed in 
the framework of public service obligations on routes within 
outermost regions or on routes where the capacity offered does not 
exceed 30,000 seats per year). A full list is in Annex I to the 
Directive.  
MRV approach  
CO2 emissions are based on applying an agreed emission factor 
(tCO2/km) to fuel consumption measured by considering tank 
levels at specific points in time as well as fuel uplift at the airport. A 
simplified approach is available for small emitters with emissions 
estimated using a standardised distance flown based on Great 
Circle Distance.  
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Appendix 3: DANUBE FAB Performance Plan (Draft version)  
 
A3 - 2 
A3 - 3 
A3 - 4 
A3 - 5 
A3 - 6 
A3 - 7 
A3 - 8 
A3 - 9 
A3 - 10 
A3 - 11 
A3 - 12 
A3 - 13 
A3 - 14 
A3 - 15 
A3 - 16 
A3 - 17 
A3 - 18 
A3 - 19 
A3 - 20 
A3 - 21 
A3 - 22 
A3 - 23 
A3 - 24 
A3 - 25 
A3 - 26 
A3 - 27 
A3 - 28 
A3 - 29 
A3 - 30 
A3 - 31 
A3 - 32 
A3 - 33 
A3 - 34 
A3 - 35 
A3 - 36 
A3 - 37 
A3 - 38 
A3 - 39 
A3 - 40 
A3 - 41 
A3 - 42 
A3 - 43 
A3 - 44 
A3 - 45 
A3 - 46 
A3 - 47 
A3 - 48 
A3 - 49 
A3 - 50 
A3 - 51 
A3 - 52 
A3 - 53 
A3 - 54 
A3 - 55 
A3 - 56 
A3 - 57 
A3 - 58 
A3 - 59 
A3 - 60 
A3 - 61 
A3 - 62 
A3 - 63 
A3 - 64 









This page is intentionally left blank 
 
 
A4 - 1 




Marina Efthymiou  
Andreas Papatheodorou  
  
FABs and EU ETS: Delphi survey 
A4 - 2 
Delphi survey  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this Delphi survey on the interrelations and dynamics 
between Functional Airspace Blocks and European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in aviation. 
Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group communication process so that the 
process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem. 
This questionnaire round is the first of up to three rounds of the survey. Please try to answer all 
questions, even though we do not expect you to have in depth knowledge of all of them. You will 
have the opportunity to revise your answers with subsequent rounds of the survey. 
In these surveys, you will be asked to contribute by developing ideas and statements for the two 
notions, FABs and EU ETS. Some of the questions can be answered with only a single selection. 
Where appropriate, a space is also provided for you to comment on the underlying reasons for your 
responses. 
Specifically, the research study investigates the four following domains: 
 RD1. The contribution of FABs and EU ETS on emissions’ reduction 
 RD2. The interrelation and dynamics of the two parallel regulating and deregulating 
schemes, ETS and FABs  
 RD3. Recommendations and suggestions for issues relating to FABs and EU ETS 
 RD4. The states and views of the involved stakeholders and the dynamics that are developed 
among them 
Once we have received responses from all panellists, we will collate and summarise the findings 
and formulate the second questionnaire.  
We assure you that your participation in the survey and your individual responses will be strictly 
confidential to the research team and will not be divulged to any outside party, including other 
panellists. 
 
Kind regards,  
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Project Description  
Introduction to the two notions, Functional Airspace Blocks and European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme  
A. Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) 
The Single European Sky is a European Commission initiative. Its aim is to de-fragmentize 
the European airspace, reduce delays, increase safety standards and flight efficiency to reduce 
the aviation environmental footprint and reduce costs related to service provision. In the 
context of the Single European Sky (SES), Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) will 
reorganize the European airspace in a more sufficient and operational way.  
A FAB means an airspace block based on operational requirements and established regardless 
of State boundaries, where the provision of air navigation services and related functions are 
performance-driven and optimized with a view to introducing, in each functional airspace 
block, enhanced cooperation among air navigation service providers or, where appropriate, an 
integrated provider.  
Nine FAB initiatives are established: 
1) NEFAB (North European FAB): Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway. 
2) Denmark-Sweden: Denmark, Sweden 
3) BALTIC FAB Poland, Lithuania 
4) FABEC (FAB Europe Central): France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland 
5) FABCE (FAB Central Europe): Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Austria, Hungary, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
6) DANUBE Bulgaria, Romania 
7) BLUE MED Italy, Malta, Greece, Cyprus, (and Egypt, Tunisia, Albania, Jordan as 
observers) 
8) UK- IRELAND FAB United Kingdom, Ireland 
9) SW FAB (South West FAB) Portugal, Spain 
 
B. European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), also known as the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme, was the first large emissions trading scheme in the world, 
and remains the biggest. In 2008 the EU passed legislation to include aviation in the EU-ETS. 
This means that from 2012, overall CO 2 emissions of the aviation industry are capped: 
initially at 97% of 2005 emissions levels, and from 2013 onwards at 95%. All operators 
flying to and from the EU will have to surrender one allowance for every tonne of CO 2 
emitted on a flight to and from (and within) European Economic Area. 
Under the 'cap and trade' principle, a cap is set on the total amount of greenhouse gases that 
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can be emitted by all participating installations. 'Allowances' for emissions are then auctioned 
off or allocated for free, and can subsequently be traded. Installations must monitor and 
report their CO2 emissions, ensuring they hand in enough allowances to the authorities to 
cover their emissions. Non-complying aircraft operators face a penalty of € 100 per missing 
allowance on top of the obligation to procure and surrender missing allowances. If emission 
exceeds what is permitted by its allowances, an installation must purchase allowances from 
others. Conversely, if an installation has performed well at reducing its emissions, it can sell 
its leftover credits. This allows the system to find the most cost-effective ways of reducing 
emissions without significant government intervention. 
 
Focus 
A particular emphasis is to investigate the states and views of the involved stakeholders and 
the dynamics that are developed among them. The In-depth and confidential interviews with 
the participants will provide the data for the qualitative part of the study and contribute to the 
development of a model about the convergence of the emissions diminution resulted from 
FABs and EU ETS. 
 
The Questions 
In the questionnaire below, you will find the question categorised in the 4 domains mentioned 
above. There are xx questions and it will take you xx minutes approximately to answer them.  
Please respond to those questions you feel comfortable with, for each addressing their 
probability and consequences. You may leave any of the questions unanswered, if you wish. 
When you return to the study at a later time, you will be able to change or edit your prior 
answers, as well as add others. 
You can also submit additional text on a separate page. Explain further issues with the online 
tool. 
 
Time requirements  
It is expected to take you xx minutes approximately to answer all the questions. You are 
kindly asked to send fill the questionnaire until xxxx.  
 
The next phase  
Once we have received responses from all experts, we will collate and summarise the 
findings and formulate the second questionnaire. In the second round, each Delphi participant 
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receives a second questionnaire and is asked to review the items summarized by the 
investigators based on the information provided in the first round. As a result of round two, 
areas of disagreement and agreement will be identified 
 
 
The research team  
Ms Marina Efthymiou works as trainee at EUROCONTROL at the Directorate Pan-European 
Sky/Support to States and Regional Initiatives (DPS/SSR). She is a PhD candidate at the 
Department of Business Administration, University of the Aegean, Greece. She holds a 
Master in Planning, Management and Policy of Tourism with specialization in Strategic 
Development and a bachelor in Business Administration, University of Patras, Greece. 
 
Dr. Andreas Papatheodorou is Associate Professor in Industrial and Spatial Economics with 
Emphasis on Tourism at the Department of Business Administration, University of the 
Aegean, Greece. He is also a Fellow of the UK Tourism Society and a member of the 
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Questionnaire 
RD1. The contribution of FABs and EU ETS on carbon offsetting 








RQ1.3 Evaluate, please, the following factors according to their contribution to emissions’ reduction  
Factors Evaluation*  Comment  
Flexible Use of Airspace  Choose an item.  
Free Route Airspace Choose an item.  
Shortest feasible routes  Choose an item.  
Implementing continuous descent approaches Choose an item.  
Use of Bio fuels Choose an item.  
Use of Eco-friendly engines  Choose an item.  
Improving load factors Choose an item.  
Reduced traffic because of economic crisis Choose an item.  
Trading Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) Choose an item.  
Trading Verified or Voluntary Emissions Reductions (VERs) Choose an item.  
Airlines develop offsetting programs  Choose an item.  
EU Emissions Trading Scheme  Choose an item.  
Single European Sky Choose an item.  
Other … Choose an item.  
*Higher numbers indicate higher contribution to emissions reduction  
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RQ1.4 Can you please give your opinion about the effectiveness of the current charging scheme? Do 
you think that the present charging scheme is enough to avoid fragmentation because of intra and 




RQ1.5 Please write the problems the FABs face, their importance and their possible solutions  
FABS Problems and solutions  Importance*  
Uk-IR 
























P: Choose an 
item. 
S:  
Danube  P: Choose an 





P: Choose an 
item. 
S:  
*Higher numbers indicate higher importance  
RQ1.6 Do you believe that the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS will influence the development of 




RQ1.7 Do you think that the EU ETS will lead to airline mergers in order to obtain more emissions 




RQ1.8 Do you think that in the future it would be possible to link the different Emissions Trading 




RQ1.9 Do you think that the monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions in EU ETS is 





RD2. The interrelation and dynamics of the two parallel regulating and deregulating schemes, ETS 
and FABs  
RQ2.1 Can you please describe the landscape of stakeholders’ dynamics in FABs and EU ETS?  




RQ2.2 In your opinion can the optimization of air routes through FABs substitute the effects of the EU 









RD3. Recommendations and suggestions for issues relating to FABs and EU ETS 
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Marina Efthymiou   
Dr. Andreas Papatheodorou    
  
EU ETS and Aviation: Delphi survey 
A5 - 2 
Delphi survey  
Thank you for participating in this Delphi survey that is part of my PhD entitled “Functional 
Airspace Blocks and European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in aviation”. 
Delphi is a method for structuring a group communication process effective in allowing a group of 
individuals, to deal with a complex problem, as a whole. 
This questionnaire round is the first of up to three rounds of the survey. Thanks for answering to all 
the questions, even when you do not have in depth knowledge of some of them. You will have the 
opportunity to revise your answers during the next rounds of the survey. 
In these surveys, you will be asked to contribute by developing ideas and statements. Some of the 
questions need to be answered with a single selection. Where appropriate, a space is provided to 
argument on the reasons for your responses. 
Once the responses from all panellists are received, the main findings will be collated and 
summarised to feed the formulation of the second questionnaire.  
Your participation in the survey and your individual responses will be strictly confidential to the 
research team and will not be divulged to any outside party, including other panellists.  
This research is for academic purposes only, the outcome of which is the attainment of a doctoral 
degree and the publishing of articles in accredited scientific journals.  
 
Please send your feedback to the following address emtm10014@emt.aegean.gr  
 
Many thanks for your kind co-operation. 
 
Marina Efthymiou 
Dr. Andreas Papatheodorou 
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Project Description  
Introduction to the notion of  
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), also known as the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme, was the first large emissions trading scheme in the world, and remains the 
biggest. In 2008 the EU passed legislation to include aviation in the EU-ETS. This means that from 
2012, overall CO2 emissions of the aviation industry are capped: initially at 97% of 2005 emissions 
levels, and from 2013 onwards at 95%. All operators flying to and from the EU will have to surrender 
one allowance for every tonne of CO2 emitted on a flight to and from (and within) European 
Economic Area. 
Under the 'cap and trade' principle, a cap is set on the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be 
emitted by all participating installations. 'Allowances' for emissions are then auctioned off or allocated 
for free, and can subsequently be traded. Installations must monitor and report their CO2 emissions, 
ensuring they hand in enough allowances to the authorities to cover their emissions. Non-complying 
aircraft operators face a penalty of € 100 per missing allowance on top of the obligation to procure 
and surrender missing allowances. If emission exceeds what is permitted by its allowances, an 
installation must purchase allowances from others. Conversely, if an installation has performed well at 
reducing its emissions, it can sell its leftover credits. This allows the system to find the most cost-
effective ways of reducing emissions without significant government intervention. 
 
Focus 
A particular emphasis is to investigate the opinions of the involved individual stakeholders, ANSPs, 
NSAs, Organisations, Academia and Airlines and the dynamics that are developed among them.  
The focus of the questionnaire is to collect the opinions of the individuals involved stakeholders, 




The in-depth and confidential interviews with the participants aim to provide the data for the 
qualitative part of the study and contribute to the development of a model explaining the convergence 
of the diminution of emissions resulted from FABs and EU ETS initiatives. 
 
Time requirements  
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To address the 6 questions of the present questionnaire will take approximately 15 minutes You may 
leave any of the questions unanswered, if you wish. When you return to the study at a later time, you 
will be able to change or edit your prior answers, as well as add others. 
You can also submit additional text on a separate page. 
You are kindly asked to send fill the questionnaire until 27/07/2014.  
 
The next phase  
As said earlier as soon as the responses from all experts are received the main findings will be used to 
in formulating the second questionnaire. As a result of round two, areas of disagreement and 
agreement will be identified.  
 
The research team  
Ms Marina Efthymiou works as trainee at EUROCONTROL at the Directorate Pan-European 
Sky/Support to States and Regional Initiatives (DPS/SSR). She is a PhD candidate at the Department 
of Business Administration, University of the Aegean, Greece. She holds a Master in Planning, 
Management and Policy of Tourism with specialization in Strategic Development and a bachelor in 
Business Administration, University of Patras, Greece. 
 
Dr. Andreas Papatheodorou is Associate Professor in Industrial and Spatial Economics with Emphasis 
on Tourism at the Department of Business Administration, University of the Aegean, Greece. He is 
also a Fellow of the UK Tourism Society and a member of the German Aviation Research Society 
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Q1. Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following statements 
1 stands for strong disagreement, 2 for disagreement, 3 for neutral position, 4 for agreement and 5 for 
strong agreement. 
Statements Scale Comments  
The inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS will 
influence negatively the development of non-
European airlines if they are included in EU ETS.  
  
The EU ETS will lead the airlines to merge in order 
to obtain more emissions allowances. 
  
The EU ETS is causing competition issues to airlines    
It is possible to link the EU ETS and the other 
Emissions Trading schemes and have a global ETS. 
  
The monitoring, reporting and verification of 
emissions in the EU ETS is effective. 
  
The EU ETS is vulnerable to frauds, for instance VAT 
fraud and ‘phishing’ scams. 
  
The cap of EU ETS is too generous.   
The carbon market’s stability is vulnerable because 
of the continuous changes in legislation.  
  
The carbon market stability is vulnerable because 
of the low prices of the allowances.  
  
Postponing the auctions can force the prices of 
allowances to increase.    
The free allocation of allowances to the airlines 
must be stricter.  
  
Using biofuels is a promising solution for carbon 
offsetting.   
The creation of carbon as a “financial instrument” 
can lead to sufficient carbon offsetting.    
Additional fuel savings will also be achieved owing 
to better fuel predictability. 
  
Route optimisation is sufficient enough for carbon 
neutral growth. 
  
The EU ETS can cause carbon leakage.   
The economic scale of the EU ETS drives heavy 
lobbying around allocation. 
  
The EU ETS is source of profit-making incentives 
unprecedented in the history of environmental 
policy 
  
There are small cutbacks relative to ‘business-as-
usual’ and this leads to instabilities in the EU ETS. 
  
The corresponding large proportion of free 
allocation underlies legal stresses and the scope for 
distortions.  
  
The multi-period nature of allocations drives 
dependence both upon post-2012 decisions and 
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creates risk of perverse incentives 
 
Q2. Please assess the impact of different allowances allocation methods to the aviation sector  
1 stands for strong disagreement, 2 for disagreement, 3 for neutral position, 4 for agreement and 5 for 
strong agreement. 





The cost of EU ETS is 
passed to ticket or 
freight prices  
    
Airlines have windfall 
profits  
    
Airlines demands more 
allowances  
    
Technical improvements 
and industry measures 
are implemented 
    
Q3. Please divide 100 points over the different allowance allocation methods that you deem as 
appropriate for the allocation of allowances to the airlines, where the most important factor gets the 
highest number of points. You are allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you wish.  
Allocation methods Points  Comments  
Grandfathering   
Benchmarking   
Auctioning   
Total points  100  
Q4. In order to link the difference ETSs (like New Zealand or Shanghai ETS), the following factors should 
be applied to the same degree. Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following 
statements.  
1 stands for strong disagreement, 2 for disagreement, 3 for neutral position, 4 for agreement and 5 for 
strong agreement. 
Parameters  Scale Comments  
There are the same Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification (MRV) rules for allowances 
  
There are the same banking provisions   
There are the same registries’ rules   
There are the same rules governing new entrants and 
closures 
  
There are the same compliance periods   
The same allocation methods are applied   
There is the same stringency of targets   
There is the same stringency of enforcement   
There is the same eligibility of offset credits    
There are the same intensity targets   
There are the same cost-containment measures   
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Q5. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that lead to carbon neutral growth, where the 
most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are allowed to allocate points to as many 
factors as you wish.  
Factors  Points  Comments  
The EU ETS leads to carbon neutral growth.   
Individual carbon offsetting programs from airlines 
lead to carbon neutral growth. 
  
Individual carbon offsetting programmes from states 






Direct routes lead to carbon neutral 
growth  
  
Wind optimal routes lead to carbon 
neutral growth 
  
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) leads to 
carbon neutral growth 
  
Free Route Airspace (FRA) leads to carbon 
neutral growth 
  
Other,    
Total points  100  
Q6. Do you think that there is a connection between EU ETS and Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs)11? If 




Thank you very much for your contribution  
 
 
                                            
11
 A FAB means an airspace block based on operational requirements and established regardless of State boundaries, 
where the provision of air navigation services and related functions are performance-driven and optimized with a view 
to introducing, in each functional airspace block, enhanced cooperation among air navigation service providers or, 
where appropriate, an integrated provider. In the context of the Single European Sky (SES), the nine Functional 
Airspace Blocks (FABs) that were established will reorganize the European airspace in a more sufficient and 
operational way. The goal is to de-fragment the European airspace, reduce delays, increase safety standards and flight 
efficiency to reduce the aviation environmental footprint and reduce costs related to service provision. For more info 
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Marina Efthymiou  
Dr. Andreas Papatheodorou  
FABs and Environment: Delphi survey 
A6 - 2 
Delphi survey  
Thank you for participating in this Delphi survey that is part of my PhD entitled “Functional 
Airspace Blocks and European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in aviation”. 
Delphi is a method for structuring a group communication process effective in allowing a group of 
individuals, to deal with a complex problem, as a whole. 
This questionnaire round is the first of up to three rounds of the survey. Thanks for answering to all 
the questions, even when you do not have in depth knowledge of some of them. You will have the 
opportunity to revise your answers during the next rounds of the survey. 
In these surveys, you will be asked to contribute by developing ideas and statements. Some of the 
questions need to be answered with a single selection. Where appropriate, a space is provided to 
argument on the reasons for your responses. 
Once the responses from all panellists are received, the main findings will be collated and 
summarised to feed the formulation of the second questionnaire.  
Your participation in the survey and your individual responses will be strictly confidential to the 
research team and will not be divulged to any outside party, including other panellists.  
This research is for academic purposes only, the outcome of which is the attainment of a doctoral 
degree and the publishing of articles in accredited scientific journals.  
 
Please send your feedback to the following address emtm10014@emt.aegean.gr  
 
Many thanks for your kind co-operation. 
, 
Marina Efthymiou 
Dr. Andreas Papatheodorou 
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Project Description  
Introduction to the notions of 
Functional Airspace Blocks and European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
 
Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) 
The Single European Sky is a European Commission initiative. Its aim is to de-fragment the 
European airspace, reduce delays, increase safety standards and flight efficiency to reduce the 
aviation environmental footprint and reduce costs related to service provision. In the context 
of the Single European Sky (SES), Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) will reorganize the 
European airspace in a more sufficient and operational way.  
A FAB is an airspace block based on operational requirements and established regardless of 
State boundaries, where the provision of air navigation services and related functions are 
performance-driven and optimized with a view to introducing, in each functional airspace 
block, enhanced cooperation among air navigation service providers or, where appropriate, an 
integrated provider.  
Nine FAB initiatives are established: 
1) NEFAB (North European FAB): Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway. 
2) Denmark-Sweden: Denmark, Sweden 
3) BALTIC FAB Poland, Lithuania 
4) FABEC (FAB Europe Central): France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland 
5) FABCE (FAB Central Europe): Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Austria, Hungary, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
6) DANUBE Bulgaria, Romania 
7) BLUE MED Italy, Malta, Greece, Cyprus, (and Egypt, Tunisia, Albania, Jordan as 
observers) 
8) UK- IRELAND FAB United Kingdom, Ireland 
9) SW FAB (South West FAB) Portugal, Spain 
 
European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), also known as the European 
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Union Emissions Trading Scheme, was the first large emissions trading scheme in the world, 
and remains the biggest. In 2008 the EU passed legislation to include aviation in the EU-ETS. 
This means that from 2012, overall CO2 emissions of the aviation industry are capped: 
initially at 97% of 2005 emissions levels, and from 2013 onwards at 95%. All operators 
flying to and from the EU will have to surrender one allowance for every tonne of CO2 
emitted on a flight to and from (and within) European Economic Area. 
Under the 'cap and trade' principle, a cap is set on the total amount of greenhouse gases that 
can be emitted by all participating installations. 'Allowances' for emissions are then auctioned 
off or allocated for free, and can subsequently be traded. Installations must monitor and 
report their CO2 emissions, ensuring they hand in enough allowances to the authorities to 
cover their emissions. Non-complying aircraft operators face a penalty of € 100 per missing 
allowance on top of the obligation to procure and surrender missing allowances. If emission 
exceeds what is permitted by its allowances, an installation must purchase allowances from 
others. Conversely, if an installation has performed well at reducing its emissions, it can sell 
its leftover credits. This allows the system to find the most cost-effective ways of reducing 
emissions without significant government intervention. 
 
Focus 
A particular emphasis is to investigate the opinions of the involved individual stakeholders, 
ANSPs, NSAs, Organisations, Academia and Airlines and the dynamics that are developed 
among them.  
The focus of the questionnaire is to collect the opinions of the individuals involved 
stakeholders, ANSPs, NSAs, Organisations, Academia and Airlines on the inclusion of 




The in-depth and confidential interviews with the participants aim to provide the data for the 
qualitative part of the study and contribute to the development of a model explaining the 
convergence of the diminution of emissions resulted from FABs and EU ETS initiatives. 
 
Time requirements  
To address the xx questions of the present questionnaire will take approximately xx minutes 
You may leave any of the questions unanswered, if you wish. When you return to the study at 
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a later time, you will be able to change or edit your prior answers, as well as add others. 
You can also submit additional text on a separate page. 
You are kindly asked to send fill the questionnaire until 10/07/2014.  
 
The next phase  
As said earlier as soon as the responses from all experts are received the main findings will 
be used to in formulating the second questionnaire. As a result of round two, areas of 
disagreement and agreement will be identified 
 
The research team  
Ms Marina Efthymiou works as trainee at EUROCONTROL at the Directorate Pan-European 
Sky/Support to States and Regional Initiatives (DPS/SSR). She is a PhD candidate at the 
Department of Business Administration, University of the Aegean, Greece. She holds a 
Master in Planning, Management and Policy of Tourism with specialization in Strategic 
Development and a bachelor in Business Administration, University of Patras, Greece. 
 
Dr. Andreas Papatheodorou is Associate Professor in Industrial and Spatial Economics with 
Emphasis on Tourism at the Department of Business Administration, University of the 
Aegean, Greece. He is also a Fellow of the UK Tourism Society and a member of the 
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Q1.Please evaluate the major FAB Improvement Areas (FIAs) that have been 
identified as the most promising areas according το the degree of the potential 
benefit coming from the establishment of FABs12.  
1 stands for strong disagreement, 2 for disagreement, 3 for neutral position, 4 for 
agreement and 5 for strong agreement. 
FIAs  Scale Comments  
Common Routes Network design   
Common Sector Design   
Common Operational Procedures   
Airspace consolidation   
Synergies in ATFCM   
Common R&D   
Harmonised ATM system   
Common Procurement   
Common AIS & MET   
Surveillance Data sharing   
Communication Data Sharing   
Sharing of navigation aids   
Improved cooperation with 
Militaries 
  
Common Flight Inspection   
Common Safety Management 
System 
  
Common ATCO Training   
Reduction of emissions    
Other,    
 
Q2. Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following statements  
1 stands for strong disagreement, 2 for disagreement, 3 for neutral position, 4 for 
agreement and 5 for strong agreement. 
Statements  Scale Comments  
                                            
12
 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/studies/doc/traffic_management/evaluation_of_fabs_final_report.pdf  
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The airspace before SES didn’t 
need to be changed. 
  
FABs bring routes closer to the 
optimum “Great Circle” route and 
reduce extended flight paths. 
  
The European airspace network 
today can benefit from a 
significant level of dynamism 
through the application of the 
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 
concept. 
  
The reorganisation of the 
European Sky was necessary.  
  
The horizontal component is of 
higher economic and 
environmental importance than the 
vertical component of the Flight 
efficiency. 
  
Due to inherent safety (minimum 
separation requirements between 
aircraft) requirements, the level of 
“inefficiencies” cannot be reduced 
to zero at system level.  
  
Due to capacity (organisation of 
traffic flows) requirements, the 
level of “inefficiencies” cannot be 
reduced to zero at system level.  
  
The main environmental KPI 
should be the estimated economic 
value of CO2 emissions due to 
route extension. 
  
All FABs are fully operational.   
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Q3. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that affect horizontal en route 
flight efficiency13, where the most important factor gets the highest number of 
points. You are allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you wish.  
Factors  Points  Comments  
Route structure and availability affect 
horizontal en route flight efficiency. 
  
Availability of airspace (utilisation of civil 
military structures) affects horizontal en 
route flight efficiency. 
  
Flight planning capabilities (use of 
software, repetitive flight planning) affect 
horizontal en route flight efficiency. 
  
User preferences regarding time affect 
horizontal en route flight efficiency. 
  
User preferences regarding fuel affect 
horizontal en route flight efficiency. 
  
Tactical ATC routings affect horizontal 
en route flight efficiency. 
  
Special events such as ATC strikes 
affect horizontal en route flight 
efficiency. 
  
Other,    
Total points  100  
Q4. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that affect the use of the 
civil/military airspace structures (Free Route Airspace, Flexible use of Airspace), 
where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are allowed 
to allocate points to as many factors as you wish.  
Factors  Points  Comments  
Political issues    
Flight planning capabilities (use of 
software, repetitive flight planning) 
  
Special events    
Existing ICAO ATM procedures   
Aspects related to position information   
                                            
13
 Horizontal en route flight efficiency compares the length of flight trajectories (L) to the “achieved” reference 
distance (H). The achieved distance apportions the Great Circle Distance between two airports within European 
airspace. If the origin/ destination airport is located outside of European airspace, the entry/exit point into the 
airspace is used for the calculation. 
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and radar vectoring 
Other,    
Total points  100  
 
Q5. Please evaluate the following factors according to their contribution to 
emissions’ reduction. 
1 stands for strong disagreement, 2 for disagreement, 3 for neutral position, 4 for 
agreement and 5 for strong agreement. 
Factors Scale Comment  
Flexible Use of Airspace    
Free Route Airspace   
Shortest feasible routes    
Implementing continuous descent 
approaches 
  
Use of Bio fuels   
Use of Eco-friendly engines    
Improving load factors   
Reduced traffic because of economic crisis   
Trading Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs) 
  
Trading Verified or Voluntary Emissions 
Reductions (VERs) 
  
Airlines develop offsetting programs    
EU Emissions Trading Scheme    
Single European Sky   
Other,    
Q6. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that lead to carbon neutral 
growth, where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are 





The EU ETS leads to carbon neutral growth.   
Individual carbon offsetting programs from 
airlines lead to carbon neutral growth. 
  
Individual carbon offsetting programmes 








Direct routes lead to carbon 
neutral growth  
  
Wind optimal routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth 
  
Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) 
leads to carbon neutral growth 
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Free Route Airspace (FRA) leads 
to carbon neutral growth 
  
Other,    
Total points  100  
 
Q.7 Do you think that the present charging scheme is enough to avoid 





Q8. Do you think that there is a connection between FABs and Emissions Trading 







                                            
14
 The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), also known as the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme, was the first large emissions trading scheme in the world, and remains the biggest. In 2008 the EU passed 
legislation to include aviation in the EU-ETS. This means that from 2012, overall CO2 emissions of the aviation industry 
are capped: initially at 97% of 2005 emissions levels, and from 2013 onwards at 95%. All operators flying to and from 
the EU will have to surrender one allowance for every tonne of CO2 emitted on a flight to and from (and within) 
European Economic Area. Under the 'cap and trade' principle, a cap is set on the total amount of greenhouse gases 
that can be emitted by all participating installations. 'Allowances' for emissions are then auctioned off or allocated for 
free, and can subsequently be traded. Installations must monitor and report their CO2 emissions, ensuring they hand 
in enough allowances to the authorities to cover their emissions. For more info please visit 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm  
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Appendix 7: 2nd round Questionnaire: EU ETS and Aviation 
 
Thank you for participating in the 1st round of the Delphi survey that is part of my PhD entitled 
“Functional Airspace Blocks and European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in aviation”. Delphi is 
a method for structuring a group communication process effective in allowing a group of 
individuals, to deal with a complex problem, as a whole. 
 
Thank for continuing to the 2nd round! 
This questionnaire round is the second and last round of the survey. Thanks for answering as many 
questions as possible. In this round you will have the opportunity to revise your answers and take 
under consideration what the rest of the participants have answered (You will find their answer in 
a separate column next to yours) 
Your participation in the survey and your individual responses will be strictly confidential to the 
research team and will not be divulged to any outside party, including other panellists. 
This research is for academic purposes only, the outcome of which is the attainment of a doctoral 
degree and the publishing of articles in accredited scientific journals. 
Please send your feedback to the following address emtm10014@emt.aegean.gr or 
marina.efthymiou@aegean.gr 
Many thanks for your kind co-operation. 
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Introduction to the notion of the 2nd and last round of Delphi   
Focus 
A particular emphasis is to investigate the opinions of the involved individual stakeholders, ANSPs, 
NSAs, Organisations, Academia and Airlines and the dynamics that are developed among them. 
The focus of the questionnaire is to collect the opinions of the individuals involved stakeholders, 
ANSPs, NSAs, Organisations, Academia and Airlines on the EU ETS Scheme. 
 
Questions and Time requirements  
To revise the questions of the present questionnaire will take less than 10 minutes You may leave 
any of the questions as you scored them in the first round, if you wish. One of the questions that 
you answered in the first round is replaced with another question and an additional one is added. 
You are kindly requested to answer them.  
You can submit additional text on a separate page if you wish. 
 
You are kindly asked to send your answers until 01/09/2015.  
 
The research team  
Ms Marina Efthymiou works as at EUROCONTROL at the Directorate Pan-European Sky/Support to 
States and Regional Initiatives (DPS/SSR) and she is looking for her next career step in aviation 
industry. She is a PhD candidate at the Department of Business Administration, University of the 
Aegean, Greece. She holds a Master in Planning, Management and Policy of Tourism with 
specialization in Strategic Development and a bachelor in Business Administration, University of 
Patras, Greece. 
 
Dr Andreas Papatheodorou is Associate Professor in Industrial and Spatial Economics with 
Emphasis on Tourism at the Department of Business Administration, University of the Aegean, 
Greece. He is also a Fellow of the UK Tourism Society and a member of the German Aviation 
Research Society (GARS) and the international Air Transport Research Society (ATRS). 
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Q1/Q6. Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 1 stands for 











the 2nd  
round 
Comments 
The inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS will 
influence negatively the development of 
non-European airlines if they are included in 
EU ETS.  
    
The EU ETS will lead the airlines to merge in 
order to obtain more emissions allowances. 
    
The EU ETS is causing competition issues to 
airlines  
    
It is possible to link the EU ETS and the other 
Emissions Trading schemes and have a global 
ETS. 
    
The monitoring, reporting and verification of 
emissions in the EU ETS is effective. 
    
The EU ETS is vulnerable to frauds, for 
instance VAT fraud and ‘phishing’ scams. 
    
The cap of EU ETS is too generous.     
The carbon market’s stability is vulnerable 
because of the continuous changes in 
legislation.  
    
The carbon market stability is vulnerable 
because of the low prices of the allowances.  
    
Postponing the auctions can force the prices 
of allowances to increase.  
    
The free allocation of allowances to the     










the 2nd  
round 
Comments 
airlines must be stricter.  
Using biofuels is a promising solution for 
carbon offsetting. 
    
The creation of a carbon market as a 
“financial instrument” can lead to sufficient 
carbon reduction.  
    
Additional fuel savings will also be achieved 
owing to better fuel use predictability. 
    
Route optimisation is sufficient enough for 
carbon neutral growth. 
    
The EU ETS can result in carbon leakage.     
The economic dimension of the EU ETS 
drives heavy lobbying around allocation of 
EU ETS allowances. 
    
The EU ETS is source of profit-making 
incentives unprecedented in the history of 
environmental policy 
    
There are small emissions reductions relative 
to ‘business-as-usual’ and this leads to 
instabilities (related to economics, policies 
and time frames) in the EU ETS. 
    
The corresponding large proportion of free 
allocation underlies legal stresses and gives a 
scope for distortions.  
    
The multi-period nature of allocations( i.e. 
banking and borrowing flexibility) drives 
dependence both upon post-2012 decisions 
and creates risk of perverse incentives 
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Q2/Q6: Please divide 100 points over the different allowance allocation methods that you deem 
as appropriate for the allocation of allowances to the airlines, where the most important factor 
gets the highest number of points. You are allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you 
wish.  
Allocation methods 




Your opinion in the 




    
Benchmarking     
Auctioning     
Total points  100 100 100  
Q3/Q6: In order to link the different ETSs (like New Zealand or Shanghai ETS) with entire scheme 
and not only in aviation, the following factors should be applied to the same degree. Please 
assess the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 1 stands for strong 









in the 2nd  
round 
Comments 
There are the same Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification (MRV) 
rules for allowances 
    
There are the same banking 
provisions 
    
There are the same registries’ rules     
There are the same rules governing 
new entrants and closures 
    
There are the same compliance 
periods 
    
The same allocation methods are     
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Parameters  
Your opinion 









There is the same stringency of 
targets 
    
There is the same stringency of 
enforcement 
    
There is the same eligibility of offset 
credits 
    
Q4/Q6 Please divide 100 points over the different factors that lead to carbon neutral growth in 
aviation, where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are allowed to 
allocate points to as many factors as you wish.  
Factors  
Your opinion 





in the 2nd  
round 
Comments 
The EU ETS leads to carbon neutral 
growth. 
    
Individual carbon offsetting programs 
from airlines lead to carbon neutral 
growth. 
    
Individual carbon offsetting programmes 
from states lead to carbon neutral 
growth. 




Direct routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth  
    
Wind optimal routes 
lead to carbon neutral 
growth 
    
Flexible Use of 
Airspace (FUA) leads 
    
A7 - 7 
to carbon neutral 
growth 
Free Route Airspace 
(FRA) leads to carbon 
neutral growth 
    
Other      
Other      
Total points  100 100 100  
Into for the last section of the questionnaire: Search and information, bargaining and 
decision, monitoring and enforcement of the EU ETS scheme create transaction costs (TC) for the 
stakeholders. This is because there are legislative and regulatory enactment costs related to the 
ETS such as implementation costs to meet the targets; monitoring costs to check the progress of 
the states/Aircraft operators; and enforcement costs to make the scheme work. 
Q5/Q6: In the following table, please allocate 100 points over the various factors associated 
with transaction costs for policymakers/regulators emerging from the aviation EU ETS scheme.  
The most important factor gets the highest number of points and the least important factor gets 
the lowest number of points. You are allowed to allocate points to as many factors as you wish. 
TC Factors Areas within Factors Points Comments 
Application 
 Quantification of historic emissions 
 Development of emission outlooks 
 Decision for an application rule 
 Compilation of an application 
 Where necessary, compilation of a 
benchmark 
 Verification of the application 
 Fees for annual allocation 





 Information, training 
 Assessment of obligation to participate in 
the EU ETS 
 Set up of organizational structures and 
assignment of responsibilities 
 Adaptation or purchase of software 
 Material costs 
  
Monitoring   Design of a monitoring concept   
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TC Factors Areas within Factors Points Comments 
 Implementation of an internal monitoring 
system 
 Ongoing monitoring 
Reporting  and 
verification  
 Quantification of annual emissions 
 Compilation of an emissions report 
 Verification of an emissions report 




 Identification of abatement measures 
 Decision about abatement measures 
  
Trade  
 Transactions fees (exchange fees, broker 
fees, clearing) 
 Trade and negotiation  
 Market observation 
  
Strategy  
 Design of a risk strategy 
 Design of a trade strategy 




 Please explain   
Total Points:   100  
Q6/Q6: Overall, how important do you consider transactions costs to be for the effective 
functioning of the aviation inclusion in the EU ETS scheme? Please mark the box. 
Very 
unimportant 
Unimportant Neither Important or 
Unimportant 
Important Very Important 
     
Email for contacting for the final results dissemination:  
Thank you very much for your contribution! 
Marina Efthymiou (marina.efthymiou@aegean.gr) 
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Appendix 8: 2nd round Questionnaire: SES/FABs and the Environment   
 
Thank you for participating in the 1st round of the Delphi survey that is part of my PhD entitled 
“Functional Airspace Blocks and European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in aviation”. Delphi is 
a method for structuring a group communication process effective in allowing a group of 
individuals, to deal with a complex problem, as a whole. 
 
Thank for continuing to the 2nd round! 
This questionnaire round is the second and last round of the survey. Thanks for answering as many 
questions as possible. In this round you will have the opportunity to revise your answers and take 
under consideration what the rest of the participants have answered (You will find their answer in 
a separate column next to yours) 
Your participation in the survey and your individual responses will be strictly confidential to the 
research team and will not be divulged to any outside party, including other panellists. 
This research is for academic purposes only, the outcome of which is the attainment of a doctoral 
degree and the publishing of articles in accredited scientific journals. 
 
Please send your feedback to the following address emtm10014@emt.aegean.gr or 
marina.efthymiou@aegean.gr 
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Introduction to the notion of the 2nd and last round of Delphi   
 
Focus 
A particular emphasis is to investigate the opinions of the involved individual stakeholders, ANSPs, 
NSAs, Organisations, Academia and Airlines and the dynamics that are developed among them. 
The focus of the questionnaire is to collect the opinions of the individuals involved stakeholders, 
ANSPs, NSAs, Organisations, Academia and Airlines on the SES Scheme. 
 
Questions and Time requirements  
To revise the questions of the present questionnaire will take less than 10 minutes You may leave 
any of the questions as you scored them in the first round, if you wish. Two of the questions that 
you answered in the first round are replaced with another 2 short questions, that you are kindly 
invited to answer.  
You can submit additional text on a separate page if you wish. 
 
You are kindly asked to send your answers until 01/09/2015.  
 
The research team  
Ms Marina Efthymiou works as at EUROCONTROL at the Directorate Pan-European Sky/Support to 
States and Regional Initiatives (DPS/SSR) and she is looking for her next career step in aviation 
industry. She is a PhD candidate at the Department of Business Administration, University of the 
Aegean, Greece. She holds a Master in Planning, Management and Policy of Tourism with 
specialization in Strategic Development and a bachelor in Business Administration, University of 
Patras, Greece. 
 
Dr Andreas Papatheodorou is Associate Professor in Industrial and Spatial Economics with 
Emphasis on Tourism at the Department of Business Administration, University of the Aegean, 
Greece. He is also a Fellow of the UK Tourism Society and a member of the German Aviation 
Research Society (GARS) and the international Air Transport Research Society (ATRS). 
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Q1/Q8.Please evaluate the major FAB Improvement Areas (FIAs) that have been identified as 
the most promising areas according to the degree of the potential benefit coming from the 
establishment of FABs. 1 stands for totally unimportant, 2 for unimportant, 3 for neutral position, 
4 for important and 5 for very important. 
FIAs 
Your opinion in 
the 1st round 
Others 
(n=28) 
Your opinion in the 
2nd  round 
Comments 
Common Routes Network 
design 
    
Common Sector Design     
Common Operational 
Procedures 
    
Airspace consolidation     
Synergies in ATFCM     
Common R&D     
Harmonised ATM system     
Common Procurement     
Common AIS & MET     
Surveillance Data sharing     
Communication Data 
Sharing 
    
Sharing of navigation aids     
Improved cooperation with 
Militaries 
    
Common Flight Inspection     
Common Safety 
Management System 
    
Common ATCO Training     
Reduction of emissions      
Other,      
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Q2/Q8. Please assess the extent to which you agree with the following statements.  1 stands for 











the 2nd  
round 
Comments 
The airspace before SES didn’t need to be 
changed. 
    
FABs bring routes closer to the optimum 
“Great Circle” route and reduce extended 
flight paths. 
    
The European airspace network today can 
benefit from a significant level of dynamism 
through the application of the Flexible Use 
of Airspace (FUA) concept. 
    
The reorganisation of the European Sky was 
necessary.  
    
The horizontal component is of higher 
economic and environmental importance 
than the vertical component of the Flight 
efficiency. 
    
Due to inherent safety (minimum separation 
requirements between aircraft) 
requirements, the level of “inefficiencies” 
cannot be reduced to zero at system level.  
    
Due to capacity (organisation of traffic 
flows) requirements, the level of 
“inefficiencies” cannot be reduced to zero at 
system level.  
    
The main environmental KPI should be the 
estimated economic value of CO2 emissions 
    










the 2nd  
round 
Comments 
due to route extension. 
All FABs are fully operational.     
 
Q3/Q8. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that affect horizontal en route flight 
efficiency, where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are allowed 
to allocate points to as many factors as you wish.  
Factors 
Your opinion 





in the 2nd  
round 
Comments 
Route structure and availability affect 




Availability of airspace (utilisation of 
civil military structures) affects 




Flight planning capabilities (use of 
software, repetitive flight planning) 





User preferences regarding time affect 




User preferences regarding fuel affect 




Tactical ATC routings affect horizontal 




Special events such as ATC strikes affect 




Other,      
Total points  100 100   
Q4/Q8. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that affect the use of the civil/military 
airspace structures (Free Route Airspace, Flexible use of Airspace), where the most important 
factor gets the highest number of points. You are allowed to allocate points to as many factors 
as you wish.  
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Factors 
Your opinion in 
the 1st round 
Others 
(n=27) 
Your opinion in 
the 2nd  round 
Comments 
Political issues      
Flight planning capabilities (use of 
software, repetitive flight 
planning) 
    
Special events      
Existing ICAO ATM procedures     
Aspects related to position 
information and radar vectoring 
    
Other     
Total points  100 100 100  
Q5/Q8. Please evaluate the following factors according to their contribution to emissions’ 
reduction. 1 stands for totally unimportant, 2 for unimportant, 3 for neutral position, 4 for 















Flexible Use of Airspace      
Free Route Airspace     
Shortest feasible routes      
Implementing continuous descent approaches     
Use of Bio fuels     
Use of Eco-friendly engines      
Improving load factors     
Reduced traffic because of economic crisis     
Trading Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs)     
Trading Verified or Voluntary Emissions 
Reductions (VERs) 
    
Airlines develop offsetting programs      
EU Emissions Trading Scheme      















Single European Sky     
Other,      
Other,      
Q6/Q8. Please divide 100 points over the different factors that lead to carbon neutral growth, 
where the most important factor gets the highest number of points. You are allowed to allocate 





in the 2nd  
round 
Comments 
The EU ETS leads to carbon neutral growth.     
Individual carbon offsetting programs from 
airlines lead to carbon neutral growth. 
    
Individual carbon offsetting programmes from 
states lead to carbon neutral growth. 




Direct routes lead to 
carbon neutral growth  
    
Wind optimal routes lead 
to carbon neutral growth 
    
Flexible Use of Airspace 
(FUA) leads to carbon 
neutral growth 
    
Free Route Airspace (FRA) 
leads to carbon neutral 
growth 
    
Other     
Other      
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Total points  100 100 100  
Into for the last section of the questionnaire: Search and information, bargaining and 
decision, monitoring and enforcement of the Performance scheme create transaction costs (TC) 
for the SES stakeholders. This is because there are legislative and regulatory enactment costs 
related to the KPAs, such as implementation costs to meet the targets; monitoring costs to check 
the progress of the states/FABs; and enforcement costs to make the scheme work. 
Q7/Q8: In the following table, please allocate 100 points over the various factors associated 
with transaction costs for stakeholders emerging from the environment KPA in the SES 
Performance scheme.  The most important factor gets the highest number of points and the 
least important factor gets the lowest number of points. You are allowed to allocate points to as 
many factors as you wish. 
TC Factors Areas within Factors Points Comments 
Alternative policies 
 Develop alternative solutions 
 Evaluate the alternative solutions 
 Decision for the implementing policy 
  
Development and 
Implementation of the 
regulatory scheme 
 Quantification of historic emissions 
 Development of emission outlooks 
 Decision for an application rule 
 Measures to overcome “frictions” and 
negotiation with stakeholders 
 Assessment of participants 
 Adaptation or purchase of software 
 Material costs Set up of organizational 
structures and assignment of 
responsibilities 
 Fees for Information, training 
  
Monitoring 
 Design of a monitoring concept 
 Implementation of an internal 
monitoring system 
 Ongoing monitoring 
  
Reporting  and verification 
 Quantification of annual emissions 
 Compilation of an emissions report 
 Verification of an emissions report 
 Delivery of data for ex-post-control 
  
Compliance measures 
 Identification of compliance measures 
 Offering recommendations and support 




 Design of a strategy for NSAs, ANSPs 
 Design of a regulation enforcement 
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TC Factors Areas within Factors Points Comments 
procedure 
 Design of an abatement strategy 
Other (please explain)  Please explain   
Total Points:   100  
Q8/Q8: Overall, how important do you consider transactions costs to be for the effective 
functioning of the environment KPA in the SES Performance scheme? Please mark the box. 
Very 
unimportant 
Unimportant Neither Important or 
Unimportant 
Important Very Important 
     
Email for contacting for the final results dissemination:  
Thank you very much! 
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Appendix 9: Permission to use copyright material 
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